γον oe eee FT ss βάν Wipe ἀν Lee eek peo) ort et a ata en ee paptemaccacet chess eee ΟΣ ΤῊ ane ~ .-«“,9 τ ares Φ- τἦφδον . boned eat aa : pean Rees et ee arene me > ὯΝ - 20. 4. ow Mw ν Ά ὶ γγφγύνε “ἡαὐεύνιν κε φέφηφινς ζει . oe SO is σ΄ πὸ Tea 4 ΧΩ A Ἀλλ δὰ αδαὶ san sm hk νο ΑΣ, Sehemesen teoree pr , . eng eases rh cha mt ben en te a na : : pans rhs net Bere pes anh~ ai a a a μῶν ee hth Dk ak Pt γυνὴ ae! : ΟἹ και > as Peer eh kd aes Saat ae eS “4. . ore ao ‘os ef Sens “9 Φ 5 ἈΝ we ἐλ“ ὴ ἢ qa eee sree we SRT 248 Qe Te en al ‘ oy Ἀ ν τῷ: φήτ νυν ee gar eee peer ere : J meh a ὡς μὰς hen ee eters ἤν Ὁ : . 4 we TS Te alka alee pike ἔψγγ εῦνν νυν ν᾽ νοῦ ee pote eee yy ree ee pe ae eh ἈΝ ἃ γν σὐν ee ya eerie Se ad γσιψ το TT SNS ere twee ee hay te see BD δ see μὰ VIET Sy en ae p νιν ὙΠ Ail Jeti 4 ik ait , "ew - “ « γὰν . re “ - ᾿ Β an Se saa ha - τ + > ἊΝ Ν “~~ us Ves ™ » φ rear γυνή erty PEER TOE fe , A γον έν AS Ns na 2a dest SLES «+ et ne Riri aaa Whe τ, τ ar ere ον" τὸ τς, ἐν. nae στ μεν eS gt πὸ ee ah ed oe wan J Ψ Tew erty ee ᾿ νυ ὙὙ cw yt Γ ae ad veer VET eT γὲν ν" Η oe Ὁ mee a ὦ ὧς ἀκ δ; ρα». εἶμι ~ eC st δὰ ἢ ὋΘθΡ ἢ ρον γ © ae τοῖν ΓΟ ἘΔ. γ᾽ Ὗ 4 pes Wigte ts 6 eer i ae 5 ἐν τς «Ὁ we ert ee TSP ° ν Ὁ -τ τὶ "δ τιν er Se as eed pert eo ere rere FS, ye QT eT vere ee ees αν, 4" UNIVERSITY OF, ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN CLASSICS The person charging this material is re- sponsible for its return to the library from which it was withdrawn on or before the Latest Date stamped below. | Theft, mutilation, and underlining of books are reasons for disciplinary action and may result in dismissal from the University. To renew call Telephone Center, 333-8400 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LIBRARY AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN L161—O-1096 ce = ᾿ ἤν, ye " 2 ἡ 1” ΤΠ τ ΜΙ ΐ παν ἢ ι ΣΝ ὑπ δι TEN, ie ie ΠΝ wy! ΤῸ Bd fy ii ΔΤ δ ὯΝ ͵ δὴ, δι we ve ἐπ ἢ Hite a Re Aye ᾿ THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO CAMPBELL London HENRY FROWDE OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE -7 PATERNOSTER ROW THE THEAETETUS OF PLATO WITH A REVISED TEXT AND ENGLISH NOTES BY LEWIS CAMPBELL, M.A., LL.D. PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF ST. ANDREWS SECOND EDITION @rfory AT THE CLARENDON PRESS 1883 [ All rights reserved 1 4 ὦ ΡΥ ΝΣ ‘ ase, eee TO EDMUND LAW LUSHINGTON, EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW, THIS EDITION OF PLATO'S THEATETUS IS ONCE MORE GRATEFULLY INSCRIBED. Le & January, 1883. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION. Since the first edition of this work was published in 1861, there have been several important additions | to Platonic literature in England. Mr. Grote’s book on Plato and the other companions of Socrates ap- peared in 1865; Professor Jowett’s translation, with the analyses and introductions, in 1871 (the second edition in 1875). These great and monumental works had been preceded by the less important effort of Dr. Whewell, who, in 1861, attempted, not without success, to popularize the dialogues in part, and to assert their educational value. Of critical editions, Riddell’s Apology, with the valuable Digest of Idioms, was published in 1867 (after the author's death), Dr. Thompson’s Pheedrus in 1868, his Gorgias in 1871, and the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus, which forms the continuation of this Thezetetus, came out in 1867. An edition of the Parmenides, by Professor Maguire, published at Dublin in 1882, is remarkable for clearness of arrangement, and also for a point of view which I venture to think more idealistic than Plato's b 2 viii PREFACE TO THE. own. Mr. F. A. Paley published a translation of the Thesetetus, with some notes, in 1875. The — recent edition of this dialogue by Professor Ken- nedy of Cambridge is also accompanied with a translation. Mr. Grote’s intensely real conception of Hellenic, and especially of Athenian life, his personal interest in the Sophists and in Socrates, have enabled him to throw a powerful cross-light on Plato, bringing out some features which would otherwise have re- mained in shadow. His intellectual sympathy with Protagoras in particular gives great piquancy to his analysis of the Theztetus. But his steadfast utili- tarian point of view has made it hard for him to do real justice to Plato's meaning here. No part of Mr. Grote’s singular exposition is more paradoxical, or has called forth more criticism, than his account of this dialogue. Mr. Cope’s just and clear rejoinder may be alluded to in passing; and an article in the Edinburgh Review for October, 1865, which con- tains a powerful refutation of Mr. Grote’s ‘theory of Knowledge, is the more noteworthy, as it is known to have been written by his friend and fellow-disciple Mr. John Stuart Mill, who, although not a Platonist in philosophy, was a warm admirer of Plato. An excerpt from the Quarterly Review for January, 1866, on the same subject, is reprinted, with Mr. Murray’s permission, as an Appendix to the present volume, - SECOND EDITION. ix Several interesting papers on Plato have ap- peared in the Journal of Philology, of which those by Mr. Henry Jackson, ‘On Plato's later theory of Ideas, are the most recent and in some ways the most important. It is needless to refer at length to the many works on Plato which have appeared in other countries since 1861. Of books dealing generally in a critical spirit with the whole body of the dialogues, that of Schaarschmidt (1866), of which more will be said presently, is probably the most re- -markable. The voluminous work of Peipers (1874) deals so far principally with the Theetetus. His exposition is learned and thoughtful, but is only occasionally referred to in this volume. On the other hand, I have made constant use, in revising my notes, of three important helps to the study of the Theeetetus which have appeared in recent years :—the critical and exegetical commentaries of Hermann Schmidt (1877), the revision of Stall- baum’s edition (in the case of the Thesetetus amount- ing to a new edition) by Wohlrab (1869), and the critical edition of Martinus Schanz (1880), who has in many ways done good service to the text of Plato. It has been no small satisfaction to me to find that many of the views advanced in my former edition have been since endorsed by writers of so x PREFACE TO THE much authority. To H. Schmidt, especially, my acknowledgments are due for the close attention which he has given to my observations, and for the subtlety and acuteness which he has often expended in examining them. A full apparatus criticus has never formed part of the plan of this edition. But in the year 1856, being still at Oxford, and having undertaken to edit the Theeetetus, I collated the dialogue in the Bodleian MS. with the Zurich edition of 18 20; and with Gaisford’s collation in his Lectiones Platonicee (1820). Bekker in his Commentaria Critica (1823) had written with reference to this work of the Oxford Professor of Greek -— Cogat agmen, quem solum non ipse exploravi, (20) codex Clarkianus. Eius enim causa Oxonium profectus cum Thome Gaisfordi lettiones Platonicas prelo paratas invenissem, nolui actum agere, totumque viri diligentissimi libellum in mea commentaria ita recepi, ut quee ad sententiam, ad syntaxin, ad flexionem quoquo modo pertinerent, transcriberem — omnia, qué orthographica essent, ea fere speciminis loco semel atque iterum posita deinde omitterem.’ Bekker’s confidence in Gaisford’s accuracy was suf- ficiently well-grounded, but finality in dealing with MSS. is not soon reached, and I was able in several places to correct or supplement Gaisford’s report. To place on record every ν ἐφελκυστικόν, every accent \ SECOND EDITION. xl or breathing supplied by a later hand, was no part of my intention, nor has it yet been done. Any one who turns from the Thezetetus in the MS. to the Sophist, Politicus, or Parmenides, which have been much less read, and are therefore more nearly as the scribe left them, will see at once how many accents in particular must have been added by later hands. I left Oxford in 1858, and was therefore unable, at the time of bringing out my edition in 1861, personally to verify my notes. I might else have avoided one somewhat serious error, viz. that of printing ἐπὶ πολύ instead of ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, as the Bodleian reading in 153 B. How easily such an error might arise under the circumstances may be illustrated by a simple instance. Dindorf’s critical note on (Ed. Tyr. 11, at least in the editions of 1861 and 1868, is as follows :--- στέρξαντες pro στέξαντες am. rec.’ This is the reverse of the fact, and M. Schanz may perhaps conjecture that Dubner, who collated for Dindorf, ‘merely inspected’ the Medicean MS. But it must be evident to a candid mind,—to borrow for a moment the language of constructive criticism,—that Dibner wrote στέρξαντες pr.: στέξαντες a m. rec., and that Dindorf misread Diibner’s note. Schanz collated the MS. in 1870, and having tested his work on this dialogue I can bear witness to its great accuracy. He tells us that he went on ΧΙ PREFACE TO THE the principle of registering everything, however slight. Yet even a Schanz is compelled to place limits to minutize. Not only are there still many changes of accent unregistered, not only is the resolution of a, ar, etc., by correctors unobserved in places where it affects the reading, but the distinction between early and late corrections (b and recens b) is by no means completely noted. Also, if Schanz were supposed to have transcribed everything however slight, it might be inferred that the MS. was not punctuated. Now the Bodleian MS. as it stands has three distinct sorts of punc- tuation :—1. the double colon, by which in this, as in other MSS. of Plato, the speeches of the different interlocutors are kept apart. These divisions are right in some places where the earlier editors went wrong. 2. The colon, often marking even Insignificant pauses. This, as well as the mark of a new speaker, has been generally inserted by the first hand. 3. The comma, frequently added by an early diorthotes so as to indicate a slight break in the sentence. This sometimes amounts to an interpretation. The same hand has often added a comma beneath the double colon, thus: where the preceding sentence is interrogative. These three marks—in different degrees certainly, and none of them in a significant degree, but still appreciably,— form part of the traditional deposit which the MS. contains, None of them, least of all the first, SECOND EDITION. ΧΙ should be ignored by those who undertake to register every difference however apparently un- important. Having reperused the MS. side by side with Schanz’s edition, I may be permitted to register a few points (certainly of the very slightest moment) where his observation seems to have been at fault. N.B.—Zne references are to Schanz’s edition of the Theatetus, published at Leipzig in 1880. Schanz, page 1, line 5. ποῦ μήν; Here as below p. 2, 1. 9, b has added τ for τερψίων, which was however unnecessary, as the double colon (:) marks the new persons—hence τ 1s not continued. 2.9. “καὶ .. εἶπεν Terpsioni tribuit b.’ This is not true in the sense that B had omitted to distinguish the persons with the colon (:); τ is added, as before, ἐκ περιουσίας. 2.15. ἐπηνορθούμην BT, corr. bt. ὥστέ BT (so also in 15, 1, 22 μήτέ). 3.6. τὰ ἐκεῖ ἄν σε, καὶ περὶ ἐκείνων ἄν' ἠρώτων interp. B vel b. A, 11. εὐδοκίμου Th. (rec.): εὐδόκιμον Β. 10. 35. “ἀτόκοις BT, sed « ex emend. B.’ The correction is by a recent hand. The note should run therefore ‘ ἀτόκοις Ὁ ree. T: ἀτόποις B et apogr. δ. 12. 22. Post γεγονὸς commate distinxit b vetus. 12. 26. Post ἐναργὲς distinguit B. 18. 29. ἀφαιρῶμαι bt: ἀφαίρωμαι BT. 16. 23. “ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ revera B.’ This is so, but ἐπιτοπολὺ b should be added. 17. 8. τὸν κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω' προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν" ὡς sic distinxit b. xiv PREFACE TO THE 19.7. ἔγωγε is written in space of fewer letters by first hand. The former word was oxytone: qy. ἐγώ ὃ 20. 9. “θαύμαντος BT, sed v in ras. B.’ Imo ν erasit b. 22. I. ὅτουν οὖν (in the note) is an obvious misprint. ᾿ 23. τό. ἧιπερ (accent uncertain) B: ἧπερ b. 24, 15. Post ὄναρ distinguit B. 27.4. ‘re add. T. om. B.’ It should be observed that ἐμέ is at the end of a line (ἐμέ | τινος). 27.16, 17. τό. “οὔτ᾽ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον om. BD, add. bd. 17. ἀποδεκτέον T: ἀπολεκτέον B.’ This is not quite accurate. The note should run οὐ [τἀυτῶι λεκτέον B: Litteras τ᾽ αυτῶι erasit, τ᾽ αὐτῶι λεκτέον, οὔτ᾽ ἄλλου λέγον in margine sinistra supplevit, ros ἀπὸ in rasura scripsit, A in ὃ mutavit, b. (The vox nihili ἀπολεκτέον was never written.) 28. 14. tlrov B: the corrector erased the stroke which > made the τ, changed o to o and v to x. 29. 9. “λέγομεν᾽ recens ‘b.’ 31. 1. “πιθανολογίᾳ TV et ut videtur B: πιθανολογίαις ex emend. B.’ πιθανολογίαις is the reading of B p. m.: only, as in number- less other places, a has been corrected by a recent hand to sr. 31.9. “ἢ ἕτερον T’ et recens ‘b,’ 32. 29. ὁρῴη (sic) (not pa) Ὁ. 35. 24. οἵων τε ‘in marg.’ recens ‘b.’ 36. 26. παρ᾽ ἃ dy etiam b. 37. 22. ἄλλ᾽ ἢ (not ἀλλ᾽ 7) Β. 38. 19. “ἐβοήθησαν B, corr.’ recens *b.’ 39. 1. αὖ τοῦτὸν τὸν (sic) B pr. 39. 16. τὸν σκίρρωνα (Ὁ) B. 40. 3. The confusion in B is increased by ro having no accent :--οὑπήρειτο. 43.7. ταυτὰ B. 43.13. 9} b. 44, 20. 69* BY’—Fuit fi. 45. 15. ἢ B pr. (?). 46. 5. ἤ τι τῶι B pr. 46. 18. Opar τά B pr. SECOND EDITION. XV 47. 27. μυρία BT: μύρια b. 48. 23. τ᾽ ad B: τ᾽ ἀῦ Ὁ. 49. 15. “ ἐπιδέξια B.’ The accent is not by the first hand. 50. 15. καὶ σοφαὶ B (Schanz has here corrected his own error). 51. 34-52. 1. B omits the division of the persons after πάνυ ye, and the second μὴ γάρ. 52. 27. B has αὐτῶι. 53. τό. I read ἀκυροτέρα in Β. ὉΠ Ὁ. ἢ Ὁ. * Fut 7. 55, 4. Post ὑπερβάλλει commate distinxit b. 55. 18. αὐτοῖς B: αὑτοῖς b. 55. 24. ὅπεριηι ἀέρων B: ὅπεριηιἀξρῶν vetus Ὁ. 57. 15. ἀναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν statim post δοκεῖ sine puncto infert et Theodoro tribuit B. 59. 7. αὐτῶι B:—the breathing is by a second hand. 59. 16. “ταὐτὰ ut videtur in margine voluit b’—recentior. GL33, δ΄ τι B (sic). 61. 34. “ὀργάνων B, sed ν postea additum.’ 8B wrote ὀργάνωι, and the . has since been changed to v—probably not by the first hand. 62. 34. “ ἀμφοτέρως T, apogr. V et ut videtur B’” The last statement is erroneous. What may have looked like a sigma over the line is a mark of reference to the marginal note φωνὴν καὶ χρόαν, which has a corresponding mark. 63. 4. τό, Te (sic) Ὁ. 64. 3. ἡ ψυχὴ (recens b) is not a v.r., but an interlinear gloss. 64, το. Here is a similar error, τούτων δηλονότι (not δὴ) 1s an interlinear gloss. 64. 24. “οὐδὲ B’ (cum rasura supra v), “εἰ in marg.’ (recens) ‘b.’ 64. 29, 30. The Bodleian while reading οὔ for οὖν, also loses the distinction of persons, appearing to drop a speech of Thestetus, thus :—éxe? δὲ ἀδύνατον φαίνεται ἢ ob: ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς. There is this mark of uncertainty τ. in the margin. ΧΥΪ PREFACE TO THE 65, 1. δὴ (7 in rasura) B. 66. 11. ὅπηγοῦν (not ὅπηιγοῦν) B. 69. 18. (Here in Schanz’s text the second Sw. should be deleted and Κάλλιστα. τὸ δέ, κιτιλ. should be continued. There has been an oversight in proof-correcting). “ἤτοι... μέρει Thezeteto, κάλλιστα Socrati tribuit Hirzel. B reads as Schanz intends to do, only with a superfluous colon (:) after ἀνάγκη μὲν οὗν. But the lower dot is probably by a second hand. 71. 6. “ἀναγκάζοιτο. . . δοξάζει primus Thesteto tribuit Heindorf.’ Here B is not clear about the persons, placing the colon (:) after doth λέγεις and δοξάζει. But the Cesena MS. divides with Heindorf. 71, 23. ἧ revera B: ἢ vetus b, sed 7 iterum in marge. Ὁ. 72. 4. νῶι B with :- in marg. 73. το. αἰσθανεται sine accentu B. 73. 21. Dele “ αὑτοῖς B.’ 78. 24. 67 B. Fuit δή:. 74, 11. In the marginal reading of Ὁ, which is prefaced with ἐν ἄλλοις οὕτως, τούτων is read for τοῦτο. 75. 15. To sine accentu B. 75. 21. αὐτοῦ sine spiritu B. 76. 4. B probably wrote ἐπείθετο ἐπηίσθετο. The corrector has erased all but the last five letters, and clumsily corrected to ἐπήσθετο. 76. 26. διαβαινουσιν Ὁ (not B). The β and ν are written over erasures of ν and μ, and the αἱ is cramped into the space of ε. 77. 8. ἐὰν τοῦ B pr. 78. 5. αὑτὸν B (? or b?). 80. 19. ‘ φορῶν᾽ recens “ Ὀ.᾽ 81. 24. ἄλλω (not ἄλλωι) b. 85. 11. B began to write a colon (:) after ἀπεροῦμεν, then added yérw instead, without the colon (:), and without ac- centuating μεν of ἀπεροῦμεν. δῦ, 12. “ ἀπαγορεύης B, sed ἡ ex emend.’ Fuit ει. 85. 28. αὕτη : τῶν (not αὕτη τῶν) Β. SECOND EDITION. xvi 86. 14. δικαστήρια sine accentu B pr. 87, 11. αὐτῶν sine spiritu B. 88. 31. “ ἐνεργέστατα B.’ Sed alterum ε correctum ex a, 92. 9. Ὁ (marg.) would add ἔχης (sic) after μέρη. What Schanz reads ἐστιν is the mark of reference ‘/. corresponding to the mark over μέρη “ : in the text. 93. 6. αυτὴ B. 93. 9. The & of ἄγνωστον seems to have been blotted off by the first hand. 99. 7. There is no division of the persons, and the accents in B are even fewer than is noticed by Schanz. ἐσκοτωμένωι εἰ ye δη τι νυν dyn ὡσερῶν B pr. 99. 22. ἡ Β : ἢ b. More really important than Schanz’s re-collation of the Bodleian is the work which he has done at Venice. By singling out the Venetian MS. App. 4, τ, (T), as the archetype of all MSS. of the lesser dialogues not copied from the Bodleian, he has ereatly simplified the task of settling the text of this part of Plato. And his use of Ven. Il (Schanz’s D) as a witness to the earlier reading, where the Bodleian has been made illegible by correction or otherwise, is also very judicious. While consulting Schanz throughout, however, I have by no means always followed him. He has introduced into the text, without marking them, several conjectural readings, which appear to me unnecessary. And he has adopted some rules of orthography, which, even if proved correct, would hardly be convenient in a work like the present. XVlil | PREFACE TO THE Dr. W. H. Thompson, the Master of Trinity College, Cambridge, is so high an authority on the inter- pretation of Plato, that an opinion which he has kindly communicated to me must not be neglected, although his expression of it came too late to be inserted in the proper place. In the difficult passage 153 C: Kai ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, «.7.A., he agrees with the late Mr. James Riddell and myself in taking τὸν κολοφῶνα as an ‘accusative of the effect:’— (he would print καὶ---ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα----ἀναγ- κάζω προσβιβάζων)ὴ :—but he prefers to understand ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, Sc. σε, “1 get or force you to admit.’ He observes that προσβιβαζειν in the sense of πείθειν is not unfrequent, and that the accumu- lation of ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων, when either seems sufficient, is characteristic of Plato. Dr. Thompson concurs in rejecting the old interpretation, which made τὸν κολοφῶνα accusative in regimen, and προσ- βιβάζων = ἐπιτιθείς. I have also to acknowledge the kindness of Professor Jebb, of the University of Glasgow, in calling my attention to the oration of Lysias pro Mantitheo (xvi. §§ 13-17),—referred to also by Grote,—as an illustration of the keen interest which the Athenians of all classes felt in the battle of Corinth (B.c. 394), in which Dexilaus fell and Thezetetus probably received his wounds. The inscription on the monument of Dexilaus, by naming the archonship of Eubulides, leaves no doubt as to SECOND EDITION. ΧΙ the year in which he died; although we may never know in what way he and his four comrades were distinguished from the rest of the Athenian six hundred. Mr. Ε΄. A. Paley, in a note on 202 A, says that αὐτό is ‘necessarily emphatic, being in the nomina- tive’ This is hard to understand. Why may not the construction be the same as in Rep. 5. 472 D: ‘Qs καὶ δυνατὸν γενέσθαι τοιοῦτον dvdpa?—Mr. Paley adopts the readings of 204, 209C, suggested by me in 1861. _ Lastly, I may be allowed to make here a cor- rection in the text of the Sophist, which had not occurred to me at the time of publishing my edition of that dialogue. In Soph. 226 ©, the word διακρίνειν has rightly been condemned as introducing the general notion inopportunely, and where a specific term is obviously required. Read δίνειν, ‘to thresh out corn,’ and compare Hesiod, Op. et D. 595, 6, δμωσὶ δ᾽ ἐποτρύνειν Δημήτερος ἱερὸν ἀκτὴν δινέμεν. This emendation, although conjectural, has had the rare felicity of being adopted by Professor Jowett. St. ANDREWS, January, 1883. 4 INTRODUCTION. Aurnoucn the three chief lines of thought in Plato, whether to be described as practical, speculative, mystical, or as ethical, theoretical, erotic’, are rarely quite separate, and are blended in different proportions, yet the distinction between them affords a convenient enough ground for a rough classification of his dialogues. ven the simplest, which are also presumably the earliest, of Plato’s writings, such as the Laches, Charmides, and Lysis, may, without violence, be thus distinguished. In trying to ascertain the point of view from which a particular dialogue was composed, we should therefore study it, im the first instance, less in relation to those of the same period but different subject matter, than to those before and after it which dwell upon a cognate theme :—(just as a student of Shakespeare may learn more in comparing Mids. N. Dream with the Tempest than with Romeo and Juliet, or Romeo and Juliet with Ant. and Cleo. than with Rich. 11). Now as the Gorgias is a clear sample of the ethical and the Symposium of the mystical aspect of Plato’s thought, so in the Thezxtetus the purely scientific tendency is in the ascendent. Socrates’ confession of ignorance was felt by Plato to General imply a certain ideal of knowledge. His eager persistent a search for an irrefragable definition of each term of human interest, implied that this ideal was not merely transcendent, but must be applicable to the’ world and to human life. His acceptance of knowledge as the sole test of authority pointed the same way. And his resolution of blameworthy 1 More generally one might speak enthusiasm. But the words used in of the good, the true, the beautiful, or the text are more directly descriptive of conduct, knowledge, and esthetic of Plato. C XXll INTRODUCTION, conduct into intellectual error added a religious sanction to the pursuit of Truth. _ In the simpler dialogues Plato is contented with repre- senting Socrates as engaged in his life-work of detecting contradiction in others, and so bringing into strong relief at once their ignorance and his own,—pointing only from afar off to the conception of a Science which shall be an infallible guide. The questions, Can Virtue be taught? Are the Virtues many or one? are dimly felt to run up into the higher question, Is Virtue one with Knowledge? Once in the Charmides, where Temperance has been defined as Self-Knowledge, some difficulties concerning Knowledge itself are started by the way, as whether there can be a Knowledge of Knowledge—must not this be a Knowledge of ignorance as well?—and so on. But the problem is merely incidental and the treatment of it paradoxical and verbal. Plato knew, however, that underneath these inquiries, and behind the ~ contrast between the Socratic and Sophistic methods, there lay deeper problems, which Socrates had not distinctly for- mulated, and still less fully discussed: viz. What is teaching? What is the nature of Knowledge? What is the standard of Truth? What is meant by the distinction of One and Many ὃ In approaching the concentrated investigation of these higher problems, Plato is not content with idealizing Socrates, but enters anew into relations with the older philosophies which had possibly impressed his youth and certainly went far to constitute the intellectual atmosphere in which he lived. In dwelling afresh upon the work of Socrates he (in common probably with Euclides) saw in it a striving towards certain general forms, which, in their perfect abstraction, could only be thought of as eternal. To Plato that was a vision which enlightened all his subsequent thoughts: but on any theory except that which denies all growth and change in him, it must be acknowledged that there was progress also in his conception of the Ideas. How far he was ever satisfied with the half-mythological presentation of them which appears in the Cratylus, Meno, and Phedo, may be left for those to de- termine who seem to know him better than he knew himself, However this may have been, we need not wonder, it, in passages avowedly mythical, like those in the Phadrus, INTRODUCTION. XXIll Timeus, and Politicus, such crude unscientific notions tend to reappear, But the new vision of Truth, however inspiring, was sometimes felt to ‘raise more questions than it solved.’ And it was in consequence of these questionings that Plato was led to reconsider his own and his master’s relation to Hellenic thought. In order to interpret Socrates and to advance beyond the position gained by him, it was necessary to draw back in order to spring forwards, reculer pour mieux sauter, and to examine into the first principles not only of the inquiries of Socrates, but of all inquiry. In undertaking this new ‘ Kritik of Pure Reason,’ Plato did not desert the Socratic spirit. He only carried into a region which Socrates had declined to enter, the same process of self-examination and of unwearied converse with others which Socrates practised and enjoined. In destroying dogmatism Socrates had seemed to get rid of metaphysics; but he had only made more fruitful the metaphysics of the future. In exposing the conceit without the reality of Knowledge he had only provoked the question, ‘What, then, is the reality?’ In controverting particular fallacies, he had set one at least of his disciples thinking, ‘What then is the πρῶτον edSos—the main source of error ?’ While passing his hand, so to speak, over the tangle which he had to solve, Plato found two main threads, which were often twisted into one:—the tendency to postulate in all inquiry either the non-existence or the absoluteness of dif- ference,—the identity of opposites, or the incommunicability of attributes: either to say, Black is white, or That which 1s white can have no tinge of yellow. In this more condensed treatment of first principles, Plato still retains much of the spirit as well as the form of dramatic dialogue. In the Thestetus, indeed, they are retained to the fall. Only the conversation is now not merely between Socrates and his respondent for the hour, but also between Plato and other philosophers old and new. They are brought upon the stage and made to explain themselves. They are confronted with each other. They are treated with the ut- most urbanity, and with a searching criticism, ironical and unsparing, until they are compelled, as it were, to give in their contributions to the sum of Truth. Philosophic Cc 2 Dialectical dialogues. The Par- menides. XXIV INTRODUCTION. Dialogue thus becomes the vehicle of a sort of historic fiction, containing, with the criticism of the present, at once a re- production and an interpretation of the past. This ‘ History of Philosophy’ is, however, penetrated with original thought, and each actual phase is represented as typical of a universal tendency and necessary moment in the realization of true ideas. The dialogues in which Plato adopts this comprehensive standpoint are thought by some to indicate a later phase of Greek speculation generally, which is supposed to have passed out of a rhetorical into a more logical mode. But Plato’s — conception of what is opposed to philosophy may naturally have moved together with the aspect of philosophy which was uppermost in his own mind. And until it ean be shown by some independent proof that the Euthydemus is later than the Phedrus?, it is best to steer clear of such assumptions. It is antecedently by no means improbable that the Phedrus and the Parmenides represent, not different periods, but different moods. The less known cannot throw light on the more known: and Plato’s thoughts are better known to us than the particular incidents of Athenian life which gave occasion to them. The Euthydemus and Parmenides may be regarded as, in different ways, preparatory to the dialectical effort which is commenced in the Thestetus, and continued in the Sophist, Statesman, and Philebus. The Euthydemus is a broad caricature of reigning logical fallacies, : The Parmenides is a serious statement of the difficulties which beset Idealism, whether (1) in the post-Socratic, or (2) in the Eleatic form. At the same time it contains the most uncompromising assertion of Idealism. This is not the place for a full exposition of the Parmenides, which Professor Jowett’s Introduction has rendered superfluous. But it may not be amiss to point out the significance of the dramatic situation in that dialogue. Socrates is there represented as in early youth anticipating the theory of εἴδη, which has since been generally associated * From the allusion to Isocrates in early date. But this presumption is the Phedrus L. Spengel infers a very —_ balanced by other considerations, cee oT INTRODUCTION. XXV with the name of Plato, and would be naturally attributed to him by the reader of the Cratylus, or the Phedo, or of the fifth and tenth books of the Republic. By means of this theory the young Socrates successfully refutes the thesis of Zeno, which that philosopher blush- ingly acknowledges to have been a polemical effort of his own early youth. But the aged Parmenides subjects Socrates in turn to criticism, and the wonderful boy, whose speculative impulse is praised by the old philosopher as Divine, answers each objection with a new hypothesis, which always cor- responds to some actual form of idealism. He fails, however, to establish any of them: whereupon Parmenides puts him through an exercise not unknown to Zeno, in which, by the application of ordinary logic to his own transcendental theory of the One Being, he develops a series of antinomies, which Socrates is compelled at once to admit, and to declare im- possible. Is it reading too much between the lines to understand Plato here to mean: (1) that the current mode of applying the principle of contradiction, however much it might rest on the authority of Zeno, was, as he says in the Sophist (259 D), unworthy of any one who is come to man's estate ; (2) that although the Platonic theory based on the practice of Socrates gave promise of a mighty grasp on truth, yet, as hitherto held and stated, it was still immature ; and (3) that, in order to complete and strengthen it, it was necessary to go back once more to the great fountain of speculative thought, and appeal from the disciple to the master, from the method of Zeno to the spirit of Parmenides, who must be approached in the truth-seeking temper of Socrates ? In the Theztetus, Socrates declines to examine Parmenides. That task is reserved for the Neo-Eleatic friend who appears with Theodorus and Thestetus on the following day. The present dialogue is chiefly occupied with the consideration of what may be loosely spoken of as Heraclitean doctrines, but which, as Plato says, are really ‘older than Homer.’ In developing these doctrines Socrates makes use of more than one saying which is still to be found amongst the fragments of Heraclitus. It is remarkable that Plato nowhere speaks of Heraclitus Genuine- ness of disputed dialogues. INTRODUCTION. ΧΧΥῚ with unqualified respect, although much in his own teaching Was consciously or unconsciously a repetition or expansion of truths stated or anticipated by that great mind!. If we may trust Aristotle, Plato had first known Heracliteanism in the exaggerated form in which it was taught by Cratylus, and certainly he has more to tell us of the followers, whether in Ephesus or Athens, than of their master. Yet it is not fanciful to say that in idealizing Socrates, and connecting the remembrance of him with the great thoughts of the first philosophic age, he saw in the Elenchus an illustration in the sphere of mind, on the one hand of actual mutability and fluctuation, and on the other of an absolute standard,—in so far justifying both Heraclitus and Parmen- ides. Socrates can make any opinions move; no position remains fixed when he comes near. But he cannot and will not argue unless allowed to assume the reality of knowledge. In the foregoing general exposition it has been assumed that the main body of the Platonic writings, and the dialectical dialogues in particular, are from the hand of the master, The position so held is intermediate between that of Mr. Grote, who maintains the Alexandrian tradition in its in- tegrity and defends even the Axiochus and the Epistles, and that of Schaarschmidt, who acknowledges only nine dialogues. The work of Schaarschmidt appeared in 1866, when my edition of the Sophistes and Politicus was in the press. He had previously given some indication of his views in the pages of Rheinische Museum and elsewhere. He, and Socher before him, have succeeded in showing the remarkable disparity which exists between the purely dialectical dia- logues and those which these writers leave unquestioned ὅ---- a disparity both in the mode of handling and in the sub- stance of the thought. The difference is not here denied, 1 The following statement of Pla- tonic doctrine, by one of the most zealous of modern Platonists, con- tains the sum and substance of Hera- clitus’ teaching: ‘Ohne Stillstand in fortwihrenden Kriege wie in Schach- spiele Alles in geregelte Weise seine Plaitze Wechselt, so dasz das Lebende zum Todten, das Todte zum Leben- dens wird und nichts verlsengeht, indem nichts sich gleich bleibt, In diesen ewigen Processe des Werdens is das einzige Constante das Gesetz.’ Teichmiiller, Die Platonische Frage, p. 54. Only, in the inchoate thought of Heraclitus, the Law is not distin- guishable from the Process. ? Schaarschmidt carries his scep- ticism much further than Ast or Socher did. Td. © es he INTRODUCTION. XXVil but, as in the edition of the Sophist, ete. (1867) and in Professor Jowett’s introductions (1st ed. 1871), the dialogues in ques- tion are assigned to a different period of Plato’s literary activity, in which, as Professor Jowett observes, ‘the style begins to alter, and the dramatic and poetical element has become subordinate to the speculative and philosophical. In the development of abstract thought great advances have been made on the Protagoras and the Phedrus, and even on the Republic. But there is a corresponding diminution of artistic skill, a want of character in the persons, a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and 1n- completeness in the general design.’ .. ‘The play of humour and the charm of poetry have departed never to return a Schaarschmidt’s three great tests, viz. literary excellence, the presence of a moral purpose, and quotation by Aristotle, are more plausible than some which previous critics have ap- plied. And in his application of his method there is much acute criticism, although a suspicion now and then arises that insufficient grounds are being eked out by vigorous writing. But (1) (to take first the external test) the argument from silence is especially fallacious in the criticism of ancient writings, and the question of Aristotle’s testimony to Platonic dialogues is complicated with doubts as to the genuineness of the Aristotelian treatises °. (2) For masterly skill in composition, is there any com- parison, for example, between the Symposium or Republic and the Timeus or the Laws? Is there not also in both of these last named ‘a laboured march in the dialogue, and a degree of confusion and incompleteness in the general design ?’ The cumbrousness and prolixity, which are so evident in the Laws, are accounted for on the ground that Plato is reported to have left his last work in an unfinished state. Without cavilling about the possible origin of the story, may it not be observed, in the spirit of Goethe’s pregnant saying‘, ‘It is a sketch which never could have been finished ?’ On the other hand, if the subject is taken into account, the literary skill shown in the Parmenides is very great. 1 Tntrod. to Philebus, sub init. and the eleventh of the Metaphysics 2 Introd. to the Statesman. are rejected by Schaarschmidt. 3 The third book of the Rhetoric 4 Conversations with Eckerm.inn. Protagoras, XXVill INTRODUCTION. (3) That Plato at the meridian of his powers wrote with the consciousness of a great practical aim, may be at once conceded, But is it inconceivable that a time may have arrived when experience had shown him the distance of the goal, and, with- out relinquishing the end, he may have applied himself for a while to the speculative treatment of intermediate problems ? There are not wanting traces, even in the Republic, of a belief that if “ Geist’ was ever to be the ruling power, a severer train- ing than Glaucon could bear must be prepared for the Kings of the future. And if the legend embodied in the Epistles is not absolutely baseless, we are led by it to conceive of a time when Plato’s hopes for the Hellenic world had been rudely checked,—when he was ‘weary of the hateful con- fusion’! of Greek politics. And what is more natural than that, at such a time, he should reconsider his whole position ; and that even in bitterness and isolation, still remembering his practical aim, he should bethink him of a δεύτερος πλοῦς, a second best polity, which mankind might possibly receive to their advantage, though they rejected the highest and best? For the writer of the Politicus at least, although estranged from his contemporaries, is fully bent on bettering the world through a science of Politics. And the lines sketched out by him are precisely those which Plato in his old age, with renewed calmness and mellowness of insight, carried out at length in his last great writing—the Laws 2, The most brilliant representative of ‘ordinary thinking,’ or rather of popular philosophizing, in the age of Socrates was Protagoras, whose assertion of relativity was the counterpart of Gorgias’ denial of the absolute. As, in the dialogue which bears his name, he powerfully defends Hellenic education and morality against the criticism of Socrates, so here his doctrine® is made to serve as the type of all doctrines of sensationalism and subjective relativity. In the absence of external evidence it is difficult to determine (1) how much of what is here assigned to Protagoras is really 1 Μεμισηκὼς τὴν... πλάνην καὶ ἀτυ- χίαν. Ep. γ. 350 Ὁ. “ For a more detailed attempt to sup- port these views see the edition of the Sophistes and Politicus alreadyreferred to. (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1867.) * On the real value of Protagoras’ saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον gee Appendix B: also Jowett’s Introduction, 2nd edition, iv. 256-9. INTRODUCTION. XX1X his, or again (2) whether those unnamed philosophers who are called his ‘disciples’ were really so or not. (1) In three places at least we may point with some confidence to traces of the real Protagoras :—(a) in the interpretation of his saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον,---ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται τοιαῦτα μέν ἐστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί, which recurs almost verbatim in the Cratylus, and which Plato would hardly have repeated so nearly in the same language if he were not quoting :—(4) in the defence of Protagoras (167, 8), where he contends that the bettering of mankind is possible without assuming an absolute standard of knowledge and truth ;—the agreement even of the language here with the representation in the Protagoras is an ‘ undesigned coincidence,’ which may fairly strengthen our belief in the fidelity of both :— and (c) _ in the confession of ‘agnosticism’ which is introduced casually at 162 D. So much being clear, it is natural to infer that some other points, such as the illustration of ‘the wind blowing hot and cold,’ may be Protagoras’ own. But here it becomes impossible to speak with any approach to certainty. Of one thing, however, we may be quite certain, viz. that what Protagoras is said to have ‘told as a secret,’ was not to be found in his writings. When he is represented as saying that Being is an unscientific term, and should be replaced by Becoming, that is only a dialectical inference from his words!. He had asserted the Reality of Appearance, but would have been surprised to find his assertion construed into the denial of Reality. , (2) That some actual persons are alluded to as the ‘dis- ciples of Protagoras,’ and that they held a sensationalist theory, is rendered probable by the further reference, which can only be construed as a sober statement of fact, to those who maintain a modified Protagoreanism. But it would be rash to assume that the μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου held the doctrine which Plato assigns to them with anything like the clearness and consistency with which it is developed by him. It is far more probable that from scattered and inarticulate hints he has evolved the subtly woven theory which he criticises. This probability is greatly enhanced by the passage of the Sophist (246 A B) in which the contest between idealism 1 Kennedy’s Theetetus, p. 231: Aristippus. ΧΥΣ INTRODUCTION, and materialism is described. ‘The idealist in defending his serene invisible height, breaks down the earthworks of his opponents bit by bit, until what they maintain for true reality (ἀλήθεια) is shown by his destructive arguments as a moving process of becoming, and not as being.’ This is really the mancuvre, only veiled with irony, which Plato here employs against the disciples of Protagoras, In attributing to them the refinement of acknowledging unseen processes, he ‘ takes them for better men than they are,’ and assumes that they would make a similar admission to that which is wrung from them in Soph. 2471. Those whose case is hopeless (the αὐτόχθονες) are left out in the cold as ἀμνητοί. Plato says, in short, to the sensationalist, ‘You are a kind of idealist, if you only knew it. Let me take you with me as far as you can go: and then (like the dog in Jules Verne’s Voyage to the Moon) | you shall be left hanging between Earth and Heaven.’ In favour of supposing that Aristippus was at least in- cluded amongst the men thus designated may be urged (1) the general resemblance of the doctrine of sense to later statements of Cyrenaic theory ;—it is not necessary, as Peipers imagines, that the men alluded to by Plato were so thorough- going as he represents them to be :—(2) the person of Theo- dorus, who is connected both with Protagoras and Cyrene (not that he is himself inclined to hedonism). But this point, like many others in the historical environment of the The- eetetus, must be left uncertain. Aristippus is mentioned by name only once in Plato. In the Pheedo it is emphatically remarked that he and Cleombrotus were not present at the death of Socrates. If we connect this with the strong language in which the position that pleasure is the chief good (which Aristippus held), is met in the Republic (6. 509 B: Ov yap δήπου σύ ye ἡδονὴν αὐτὸ λέγεις. Εὐφήμει, ἦν & ἐγών, it is natural to infer that he was regarded by Plato with little sympathy, and that he was probably one of those who left Socrates too early, and gave themselves the credit of their discoveries?, The tone of Xenophon’s representation conveys a similar impression. Attend- 1 J. S. Mill may in like manner be that Aristides in Theet. 150 E is a said to have made admissions against sort of paronomasia for Aristippus which his father and Bentham (the may seem an extravagant suspicion, true γηγενεῖς) would have protested. and yet it is difficult to banish it * To say (with Schleiermacher) altogether, INTRODUCTION, XXXI1 ing, like Socrates, to the theory of human life, of knowledge and of the chief good, he seems to have been enabled, by the impulse of Socratic inquiry, to give a philosophical form to the popular doc- trine, to which his easy temper and indolent life inclined him, that the Good is nothing else but pleasure. With this he consistently enough combined the sceptical assertion, The impression of the moment is the only Knowledge. He probably supported both these principles with certain physical and logical theories : adding that nothing was by nature just, but by custom and usage, and that the same word used by different men represents a different idea. Whether his doctrine had fully developed itself into the distinct form which is given in the Theetetus to the hypothesis, Sense 15 Knowledge, it is impossible to say. That he is pointedly alluded to amongst the ‘disciples of Protagoras, if not as their chief, there seems little doubt, from what is recorded of his opinions. A com- parison of the following extracts tends to establish this: although it must be remembered that the discussion of these questions by Plato and Aristotle may be supposed in some degree to modify the statements of later writers :— Diog. L. 2. 86: Avo πάθη ὑφί- , N oe ὃ DE \ A σταντο, πόνον Kal nOovnv’ τὴν μεν Plat. Theet. 152 D: Ἔκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς καὶ κινήσεως καὶ κράσεως πρὸς λείαν κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, τὸν δὲ πό- νον τραχεῖαν κίνησιν. Aristocles ap. Euseb. Pr. Ev. 11:18: 5 , σεις εἶναι κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν σύγκρα- Τρεῖς γὰρ ἔφη καταστά- , \ > A > A > ow’ μίαν μὲν καθ᾽ ἣν ἀλγοῦμεν, €ot~ κυῖαν τῷ κατὰ θάλασσαν χειμῶνι, ἑτέραν δέ, καθ᾽ ἣν ἡδόμεθα, τῷ λείῳ , > , " ἊΝ \ , κύματι ἀφομοιούμενοι᾽ εἰναι γὰρ λείαν , \ ¢ U rea κίνησιν τὴν ἡδονήν, οὐρίῳ παραβαλ- λομένην ἀνέμῳ" τὴν δὲ τρίτην μέσην en) ar ae ery μεσ > , a » 3 a εἶναι κατάστασιν καθ᾽ ἣν οὔτε adyov- μεν οὔτε ἡδόμεθα, γαλήνῃ παραπλη- σίαν οὖσαν. Sext. Emp. ady. Math. 7. 101 : Pac οὖν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κρι- ’ 3 A / Ν , τήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα κατα- λαμβάνεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχά- νειν, τῶν δὲ πεποιηκότων τὰ πάθη μη- δὲν εἶναι καταληπτὸν μηδὲ ἀδιάψευ- στον. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ λευκαινόμεθα, φασί Ύ μέσα, ) ἄλληλα γίγνεται πάντα. 153 Οὐ : Ἔτι 5 ΄ , \ , οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε Kat yadnvas καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι ,’ Α ΕῚ ’ὔ A Ta A σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ δ᾽ ἕτερα , σώζει: See also Phileb. 42 Εἰ : Μὴ κι- th A , 3 > ε , νουμένου TOU σώματος ἐφ ἑκάτερα... ᾿΄, ,[,, ἃ ς \ , > A v7» +S οὔτ᾽ ἂν ἡδονὴ γίγνοιτ᾽ ἂν οὔτ᾽ ἂν τις λύπη. Plat. Thest. 152 Ο : αἴσθησις 2 aA Wy Des 3. XY ΔῈ , ¢ dpa τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι καὶ ἀψευδές, ws , > a ἐπιστήμη οὖσα. 157 A B: To ποιοῦν a , “ εἶναί τι καὶ τὸ πάσχον αὐτῶν ἐπὶ ἑνὸς A 3 , νοῆσαι, ὥς φασιν, οὐκ εἰναι παγίως. , “ 9 .. ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ, εὐέλεγ- 153 D: Ὃ δὴ KTOS ἃ τοῦτο ποιῶν. XXXil καὶ γλυκαζόμεθα, δυνατὸν λέγειν ἀδια- , \ 2 , . τ δ, ἐμ ἢ ψεύστως καὶ ἀνεξελέγκτως" ὅτι δὲ τὸ > ‘ a , i > ἐμποιητικὸν τοῦ πάθους λευκόν ἐστιν “Δ Κ΄ 5 > er ,, .5 ΄ ἢ γλυκὺ ἐστιν, οὐχ οἷόν τ᾽ ἀποφαί- νεσθαι. 102 : Καθὰ γὰρ ὁ μὲν σκοτωθεὶς καὶ ἱκτεριῶν ὠχραντικῶς ὑπὸ πάντων κινεῖται, ὁ δὲ ὀφθαλμιῶν ἐρυθαίνεται, ὁ δὲ παραπιέσας τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν ὡς ὑπὸ δυοῖν κινεῖταιϊ ς δὲ Ἁ , ὁ δὲ μεμηνὼς δισσὰς ὁρᾷ τὰς Θήβας καὶ δισσὸν φαντάζεται τὸν ἥλιον, ἐπὶ πάντων δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν ὅτι τόδε τι πάσχουσιν, ὭΣ > f 5 ed , x 4 οἷον ὠχραίνονται ἢ ἐρυθαίνονται ἢ Oud- ζονται, ἀληθές, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ὠχρόν ἐστι τὸ κινοῦν αὐτοὺς ἢ ἐνερευθὲς ἢ διπλοῦν Ψεῦδος εἶναι νενόμισται, οὕτω καὶ ἡμᾶς 3 , , 2 v4 “ 9 if εὐλογώτατόν ἐστι πλέον τῶν οἰκείων παθῶν μηδὲν λαμβάνειν δύνασθαι. [05 : Ἔνθεν οὐδὲ κριτήριόν φασιν εἷ- A > Λ) > 2 \ A vat κοινὸν ἀνθρώπων, ὀνόματα δὲ κοινὰ 106 : Λευ- A \ / Ἂν \ A κὸν μὲν yap τι καὶ γλυκὺ καλοῦσι , “ Π τίθεσθαι τοῖς κρίμασιν. κοινῶς πάντες, κοινὸν δέ τι λευκὸν ἢ γλυκὺ οὐκ ἔχουσιν" ἕκαστος γὰρ τοῦ ἐδίου πάθους ἀντιλαμβάνεται. Diog. L. 2. 87: ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν οὐδὲ κατὰ μνήμην τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἢ προσδο- κίαν ἡδονήν φασιν ἀποτελεῖσθαι, ὅπερ ἤρεσκεν ᾿Επικούρῳ, ἐκλύεσθαι γὰρ τῷ χρόνῳ τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνημα. Diog. L. 2. 88: Μηδέν τε εἶναι φύσει δίκαιον ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν, ἀλλὰ νόμῳ καὶ ἔθει. INTRODUCTION. καλεῖς χρῶμα λευκόν, K.T.A, 156 EB: 159 C: 7 > Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, «7.2. Λευκότητος περιεπλήσθη. 167 A: Οὔτε γὰρ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα παρ᾽ ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ. a aA wy ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ. 178 Β : Ἔχων yap αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὑτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἴεται αὑτῷ Vw Kal ὄντα, 4 157 Εἰ : Λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων τε , \ , al ‘ πέρι Kal νόσων, τῶν τε ἄλλων καὶ μανίας, ὅσα τε παρακούειν ἢ παρορᾶν i} τι ἄλλο παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. 1584: Δοκεῖ... πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινό-- Cb A \ > > \ μενα ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι, ἀλλὰ σ᾿ > , 33. 4 , 9 παν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἷ- ναι. 156: Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν ἅθροι- , Θ Vale ‘ SLA , σθέντων, @ δὴ ἁθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἴδος. 154: Τί δέ; ἄλλῳ ἰνθρώπῳ ἄρ᾽ ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ φαίνεται ἀνθρώπῳ ἄρ᾽ ὅμοιον καὶ i ὁτιοῦν ; Theeet. τ66 : Αὐτίκα γὰρ δοκεῖς τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην παρ- εἶναί τῳ ὧν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος, οἷον ὅτε ἔπασχε, μηκέτι πά- σχοντι ; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. Thezet. 172: Καλὰ μὲν καὶ αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια, K.T.A. The apparent force of the above parallel must be slightly quali- fied by two observations. 1 This argument is met by Aristotle, when he is discussing the theories of Heraclitus and Protagoras, Met. το. 6. 1063 a: Οὐθὲν γὰρ διαφέρει τοῦτ᾽ ἀξιοῦν ἢ τὰ φαινόμενα τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν ὄψιν ὑπο- (1) Very similar language about the βάλλουσι τὸν δάκτυλον καὶ ποιοῦσιν ex τοῦ ἑνὸς φαίνεσθαι δύο, δύο δ᾽ εἶναι did τὸ φαίνεσθαι τοσαῦτα καὶ πάλιν ἕν. τοῖς γὰρ μὴ κινοῦσι τὴν ὄψιν ev φαίνεται τὸ ἕν. INTRODUCTION. ΧΧΧΙΠ senses is ascribed to Democritus. Some of the expressions and illustrations, as well as the argument itself in different aspects, are thus proved to have had a wider currency. (2) In the early part of the Theetetus, motion is said to be good, and rest evil. In the Cyrenaic theory, and in the Philebus, three states are spoken of, smooth motion, which is pleasure, rough motion, which is pain, and the absence of both, which is a state of indifference, ‘like the sea in a calm.’ But while these considerations should be allowed their full weight, it must be remembered that Aristippus and those who thought with him did resolve knowledge into shifting impressions of a changing world. And here the parallel of the Philebus affords a strong confirmation of the hypothesis we are considering. Nothing was more natural than that the boy Thestetus should attribute certainty to momentary impressions, and that the boy Philebus should petulantly assert that pleasure is the only good. Each in doing so presents a different aspect of a necessary phase of mind. But when they both (or rather Socrates for them) attempt to strengthen their theory by a peculiar doctrine of motion, which, however popular, must have had limits to its reception, it becomes highly probable that the two speakers drew some of their inspira- tion from a third, who is found to have upheld both pleasure and, sensation, and to have supported them with this same doctrine of motion. There remains therefore some ground for the hypothesis that, in the earlier part of this dialogue, Plato has these Pseudo-Soeratics in his eye, together possibly with others. Whether Aristippus was really, or only by implication, a ‘ disciple of Protagoras, and whether or not he consciously based his doctrine on the Heraclitean theory of the Universe, are questions which it is wisest to leave undecided. It is more distinctly obvious that throughout the dialogue Megarians Plato is holding close converse with his friends of Megara. The elenchus of Socrates is whetted for the occasion by contact with Megarian logic. Both in the attack upon Protagoras and in his defence, weapons are plied which pear the distinct brand of that neighbouring workshop, and it is often hard to say whether Plato is laughing most at the doctrine refuted or at the method of the refutation. For reasons which will appear presently it suited his pur- pose to make the ‘negative arm’ preponderate in this dialogue. And the Megarian dialectic was adapted to this aim. Euclides. XXXIV INTRODUCTION, It may be noticed generally, that there is a peculiarity in Plato’s manner of alluding to the thinkers of his own time. He speaks not of definite schools, but of ‘a certain theory,’ or of ‘certain men.’ We do not read of the friends of Antisthenes, or the disciples of Aristippus, or of Euclides and his band (of ἀμφὶ Εὐκλείδην), but ‘I have met many such men,’ ‘there are numbers who keep saying this,’ or more familiarly, ‘there are certain refined persons, to whom we must show courtesy.’ Allowance must no doubt be made for the natural reticence of Plato, and for the irony of the philoso- pher, who ‘knows nothing of his neighbour,’ But it is also rea- sonable to infer that the schools which claimed affinity with Socrates were only in process of formation, and that their boundaries were not yet well defined. It is from later writers, and not from Plato, that we learn which of the other philosophers then living exercised an influence that could survive their age. Euclides of Megara, Plato’s contemporary and fellow-disciple,. seems in his method to have combined the negative dialectic of the Eleatics with the cross-questioning and with the ethical defini- tions of Socrates. The dialogue, written and spoken, seems to have assumed with him something of a controversial form. His ἐρι- στική must have been more earnest and philosophical than the vulgar ἀντιλογική so often ridiculed by Plato; but it was subject to the same defects, though in a less degree. We are told further, that he used to attack the conclusion and not the premisses of an opponent.—One other fragment of his logic remains. He is said to have objected to definition by comparison, because if things are . unlike, they should not be compared; and if like, it is better to deal with the thing itself than its resemblances ἴ, The centre of his positive teaching was the Good, which he said was one, called by many names, as Wisdom, God, Intelligence; and to what was opposed to this he denied existence. Here also the teaching of Socrates is engrafted on that of Parmenides and Zeno. The One Being, which is above growth and decay, is to be sought for, not in the universe, but in wisdom, the mind, and virtue. The non-existent is that which is opposite to, or other than the Good. His theory of knowledge was probably less absolute than that of Parmenides, denying reality to the impressions of sense, but relying upon a sort of dialectic and upon certain ideas or forms, amongst which some diversity was allowed, so far at least as they entered into human language. * Cp. Plat. Rep. 476: Td ὀνειρώτ- ὅμοιον, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ ἡγῆται εἶναι ᾧ ἔοικεν. τειν ἄρα οὐ τόδε ἐστίν, ἐάν 7 ἐν ὕπμῳωη Ar, Eth, N. 6. 3: ᾿Ακριβολογεῖσθαι, τις ἐάν τε ἔγρηγορὼς τὸ ὅμοιόν τῳ μὴ καὶ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖν ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν. ὩΣ Saree INTRODUCTION. XXXV It is not easy to determine to what extent the teaching of Euclides contained the germs of the sophisms of Eubulides, or of the paradoxes of Diodorus and Stilpo. If it had such a ten- dency, he must have approached Antisthenes more nearly than would otherwise appear. It seems not unreasonable, however, to suppose that Eubulides may have introduced a new element into the Megarian school. At all events he gave a new and not alto- gether wholesome impulse to its paradoxical side. The following are the chief points in which the Theztetus affords indications of its connection with the school of Megara. (1) Its controversial tone. Socrates more than once expresses the consciousness of such a tendency. We start indeed with the virtuous determination to conduct the argument, not as professors of word-fencing, but as lovers of knowledge, and yet presently we find ourselves in danger of being on a par with ‘those skilful men.’ Protagoras is 1ma- gined as reiterating this reproach, and confirming it by the reflec- tion, which is dwelt upon also in the Phedo, that controversy leads to the hatred of inquiry. We are moreover oppressed throughout the discussion with the fear of an imaginary adversary, skilled at the same sophistical weapons*. And on reflecting, at each stage of the argument, what it is that has ruled throughout, and that remains triumphant, we are compelled to answer ‘a negative dialectic.’ The first impression of the youth, the maxims of the old philosophers, even our second thoughts and the strained effort of the imagination to substantiate them, are raised, only to be parted from the sphere of knowledge by this sharp weapon ; which in another aspect is the liberating though still dividing instrument of the man-widwife Socrates. In this sense the Theetetus may fairly be regarded as an ‘eristic’ or Megarian dialogue; since, although it is no mere sophistical sham-fight, it is characterized by the predominance of that dialectical exercise which consists in refuting theories. This is noticed by Plato himself in the passages just referred to, and is implied in the image of μαιευτική. And the form of refutation used corresponds to that ‘reductio ad absurdum’ which is described as characteristic of Euclides. In each case the proof is not impugned, but the thing proved is laid hold of and annihilated. Man is not the measure, for, if so, then why not every other creature endowed with sense? Motion cannot be the sole principle, for, if so, language would be impossible, Pro- tagoras is made to object to this mode of treatment. Socrates imagines him as challenging them to disprove his premiss, and complaining that they use only negative proof. 1 Theet. 164 D. -2 200 A-C, KXXV1 INTRODUCTION, (2) Besides this correspondence of method, there are also some coincidences of idea. | (a) The turning-point of the whole dialogue, the fulerum, by means of which the mind is finally lifted out of the region of sense, is the mention of the good, or expedient, which Theztetus had at first unwarily included amongst the things which are not, but become. The knowledge of what is good cannot be resolved into sensation, nor into those motions on which the doctrine of sense was founded, because it regards the future. This thought arises simultaneously with the eloquent digression, in which a just and holy life accompanied with wisdom (μετὰ φρονή- σεως) is set forth as the way from Earth to Heaven. And the form in which this idea of good occurs, is not transcendent, as in the Republic’, nor, as in the Philebus, arrived at by a process of reasoning upon the combination of finite and infinite in-the world. It is more simple and Socratic than in either of these. And while it is conceived of as one, Socrates is not afraid of varying the name: (ἀγαθόν, καλόν, ὠφέλιμον, δίκαιον, ὅσιον, φρόνησις). ᾿ (8) In its general aspect the Thesetetus affords only a partial escape from the relative world of sense and opinion towards abso- lute being, terminating with the conception of λόγος as definition by the distinctive difference. Where it may be noticed, by the way, that the stress laid upon the perception of individual peculiarities (πρὶν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων... διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον... κατάθηται) is parallel to the saying of Euclides, that comparison does not convey knowledge. This intermediate character of the Thesetetus is indicated by Plato’s own remark, that we are wavering between two factions, not siding wholly with either. Such a position is still in harmony with the philosophy of Euclides, who made some attempt to hold unity and diversity in solution together, and who rested ultimately on some form of reasoning (Adyos). It may be added, that the two | conceptions with which the dialogue closes, of the separation of a whole into its elementary parts, and of the power of distinguish- ing the thing in question from all others, belong to the tendency combated in the Sophist, but more or less embodied in the Thee- tetus, to acquiesce in difference, falling short of the highest unity. (3) In one or two points we are reminded of the later Megarian subtleties, and are led to suspect that they may have had their counterpart in the school of Euclides. The humorous account of the man, from whom there is no escape, who shuts your eye, and asks if you see his cloak with it ", may be 509: Οὖκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος, 2 τόρ Β. INTRODUCTION. XXXVll compared with the ἐγκεκαλυμμένος of Eubulides. And when we are asked whether any one ever said to himself τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι ', we may find a later parallel in the paradox of Stilpo, ἕτερον ἑτέρου μὴ κατηγορεῖσθαι. Such casual hints confirm the suspicion that the tendency already existed at Megara, though in a milder form than afterwards, ‘to part everything from everything,’ τὸ διαλύειν ἕκαστον ἀπὸ πάντων (Soph. 259 E). A more pleasing instance of the same analytical bias appears in the three φάσματα 2 or axioms of the mind, by which it suffers itself to be bound ; or in the repeated difficulty, "Ap οἷόν τε τὸν εἰδότα μὴ εἰδέναι, Which in fact underlies many of the later paradoxes. There is often no more satisfactory account to be given of varia- tions and inconsistencies in Plato, than that in different dialogues he is consciously approaching and examining different contemporary theories, adopting their tone, putting on their dress, as it were proving their armour, not without a latent confidence in the unaided strength of Mind. This philosophical side of the dramatic genius of Plato is as real as and more important than the poetical. The dialogue is not only a convenient artistic form for bringing out the different aspects of a question; Plato is himself continually holding con- verse with some one: and dramatic propriety is preserved not only in minute points, but in the tone pervading a whole dia- logue. Those in which an Eleatic stranger is the chief spokes- man may still be Plato’s, although they seem pervaded by a pedantic consciousness of method not found in others: a similar remark applies to the Parmenides: and even amongst those in which Socrates holds the first place a marked difference is per- ceptible ; which may be accounted for by saying, (1) that Socrates is not Socrates, but Plato becoming all things to all philosophies : (2) that Socrates is not altogether Plato, but a part-representation, part-creation of Plato’s, which he contemplates and converses with, and even criticises: (3) that Socrates himself has different faces, reflected partially in his different followers, the most characteristic of which, the negative ‘elenchus, was reflected in Euclides of Megara. Recent critics, both in England and Germany, have denied all connection between the part played by Euclides in the Preface and the Megarian element of the dialogue which is generally admitted. And yet the significance of such indications in other dialogues can hardly be questioned. ΤΟ: 2 TES bus d XXXVIll INTRODUCTION. The prominence of Simmias and other Pythagorizing So- cratics in the Phedo affords an obvious parallel. And supposing that the Preface were merely equivalent to a dedication, even a dedication often implies the acknowledg- ment of special affinities. That one motive is to awaken interest in the person of Thestetus is perfectly true; but this could have been done equally by other means, for The- ztetus had many friends in Athens. In representing this dialogue as having been preserved and read at Megara by the head of the Megarian school, Plato makes a departure from his usual practice analogous to the more striking inno- _ vation of making a friend from Elea the chief speaker in the Heracli- teans, Antisthe- nes, dialogues which follow. Plato’s criticism of Protagoras, both here and in the Pro- tagoras, is friendly and respectful,—rather indicating certain necessary stages in the pursuit of truth, than destroying fatal error. But for other professed thinkers he has less tolerance. And if it were possible to ascertain who those were with whom he found it impossible to argue,—who were beyond the pale of dialectic, in short,—the fact would be of no less interest than the evidence of his close inter- course with the school of Megara. (1) Of the enthusiasts of Ephesus, who profess to be deeply read in the wisdom of Heraclitus, it is unnecessary to say more than is contained in the description of Theodorus, whose exact soul is naturally vexed by their inconsecutiveness. ‘They support their master’s theory of a flux, only by the absence of fixity in their own thoughts. They are fond of explaining “ignotum per ignotius;” each follows his own inward light, regardless of the rest, and every one of them despises his fellow.’ This picture, the oriental features of which are noticeable, may be illustrated from the Cratylus,— which is partly written in imitation of the same school,— where Socrates professes himself puzzled to determine what is intended by their symbol, Fire. By one it is interpreted to mean the Sun, by another the principle of Heat, by another Mind 1. (2) The Cynics are probably the ὀψιμαθεῖς of Soph. 251, 1 Crat. 43. 1 J 4 3 > 4 = Ὺ INTRODUCTION. ΧΧΧΙΧ who are admitted to discussion e# gratia for form’s sake, who deny predication, and ‘will not have it that a man is to be called good. Man, they insist, is man, and good is good. And it has been usual to identify these persons with the men from whom Socrates has heard ‘in a dream’ that prime elements cannot be defined!. But the latter doctrine is surely very dif- ferent from such crude nominalism, and belongs to some one who believed too much rather than too little in the ‘formal cause,’ since he asserts that the essence which cor- responds to definition is a definite ratio between units which are undefinable. The opinion quoted, if properly examined, is not a denial of predication, but rather the denial that any- thing can be predicated of the prime elements, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τἄλλα, which is by no means the same thing, and merely amounts to saying that matter 1s formless, or that substance in the abstract is without attributes. The conjecture which identifies notions so different would hardly have been entertained but for some misunderstanding of a passage of Aristotle, Metaph. 2. 3. 1043 b, where ‘the Antistheneans and such rude persons’ are mentioned in con- nection with a theory of essence as a complex (συλλαβή) of elements (ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων). Aristotle says that his own view, in which οὐσία is the concrete, of which matter and. form are the component elements, may he thought to give a certain colour to the error of those coarse thinkers who denied the possibility of definition. But οὐσία (the object of definition) is really neither matter nor form, although these elements in their separate abstractedness are undefinable. Aristotle in writing thus may have had this part of the Theetetus in his mind. But the allusion to the Cynics 1s a mere excrescence on his argument, and, if closely examined, is seen to have but a remote bearing on the distinction of στοιχεῖον and συλλαβή. A suggestion put forth by the pre- sent editor in 1861 is more defensible, viz. that Socrates here as in other places, where he ‘speaks from hearsay ’ (Phd. 62, Phil. 20), is quoting some Pythagorean. The whole tenor of the passage, and the illustrations from number, measure, and music in the pages which follow, are in favour of this, He and Theetetus, however, have not heard from 4-208, 2. d 2 xl INTRODUCTION. the same source, and the man who, using the term ἐπιστητά, said that what was definable was knowable, but that the un- definable was also unknowable, must have been a Socratic philosopher, and probably (as Schleiermacher also thought) was a Megarian. Another thesis of Antisthenes, the denial of contradiction, μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, has a certain bearing on several parts of the Theztetus, and in particular on the question, ‘Is false opinion possible?’ But a fallacy which entered so deeply into all the controversies of the time, and which Socrates acknowledges to have had a disturbing influence on his own (i.e. on Plato’s) mind, is not to be exclusively attributed to men of whom Plato speaks as he does of the ὀψιμαθεῖς in the Sophist. It is safer and more profitable to pass by Antisthenes and his master Gorgias, and to refer the fallacy at once to its. origin in the Eleatic logic. The same may be said of the ‘eristic’ difficulty which occurs both here and in the Meno, ‘How will you inquire about that which you do not know ?? If the deniers of predication, who are introduced under protest, in Soph. 251, are the followers of Antisthenes, it is beforehand highly improbable that the same persons had been spoken of under another aspect in Soph. 246. And if it is true that the Cynics preferred logical and ethical dis- cussion to physical inquiries, their nominalism can hardly be made to represent downright materialism. Thus, on two independent grounds, it is unlikely that the αὐτόχθονες of the Sophist, and the σκληροὶ καὶ ἀντίτυποι ἄνθρωποι of Thext, 155 E, who are, to say the least, closely related to each other, have any connection with Antisthenes. More features of the personal character of Antisthenes are preserved than of Euclides and Aristippus, but fewer of his philosophy. From the way in which the grave Xenophon treats him, and from the calm epithets of Aristotle, he seems to have been the butt of the Socratic school, a sort of mixture of Ajax and Thersites. He regarded Socrates with a rude half-appreciating fondness, which was reciprocated with good- humoured pleasantry. But he boasted, justly enough, of a certain strength of character, which was in fact the piece of Socrates that was continued in him. He is praised for his pure and nervous Attic style, of which we have a specimen, iii —- f : in | Sil oe ue Tt γι INTRODUCTION. xli possibly genuine, in a rhetorical contest between Ajax and Ulysses. His genius, however, seems to have been opposed to abstract speculation. Hence he followed rather the form than the spirit of the Socratic teaching, both on human life and on the significance of terms. His views on the latter subject were probably influenced also by his previous inter- course with Gorgias. There are, as might have been expected, several points of outward coincidence between his teaching and that of Euclides on the ethical side. They agree that virtue is one, that wisdom (φρόνησις) is the chief good, and so on. But the dialectic of Antisthenes seems to have been at once more rhetorical and more sceptical: approaching much more nearly to the later Megarian paradoxes, with which it finally coalesced in the teaching of the Stoics. He has been called a materialist, and no doubt the term applies to him so far as he denied ideas, but his scepticism had nothing to do with physical inquiries, which he abjured. It was a part-practical, part-logical nominalism. ‘I see a horse, equine properties I cannot see.’—‘There is only one term applicable to one thing.’ Hence controversy 1s impossible, and every assertion equally true. Definition 15 only a complex term, and ac- cordingly no single thing can be defined, except in the 1m- perfect way of comparison. You cannot say what a thing is, except by naming it, but only what it is like. Connected in some way with this theory was the saying, in which he agrees with Prodicus, that the first principle of education is the study of names. He was thus related to Aristippus in philosophy much as Gorgias had been to Protagoras : denying the absolute, while the other asserted the relative, —or rather contending that nothing existed absolutely but facts and individual things. The one great philosophy of which Plato takes no account Democri- is Atomism. Democritus, though a contemporary of Socrates as ἐστίν, Socrates seems to be alluded to in the latter part of this. In the 1 See Isocrates, Ἑλένης ἔγκώμιον ad init. καταγεγηράκασιν οἱ μὲν ov φάσ- κοντες οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι ψευδῆ λέγειν, οὐδὲ ἀντιλέγειν, οὐδὲ δύο λόγω περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξι- ὄντες ὡς ἀνδρία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταὐτόν ἐστι, καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ᾽ ἐπιστήμη καθ᾽ ἁπάντων former part Protagoras and Anti- sthenes seem to be opposed. 2 Maxpds λόγος. In which there is probably the same derisive force as in Σιμωνίδου μακρὸς λόγος, ὅταν μηδὲν ὑγιὲς λέγωσιν, Ar. Met. N. 3. xl INTRODUCTION. and Protagoras, is nowhere named by him, although he is continually quoted by Aristotle, who speaks of him as ‘com- prising in his definitions the material only.’ The question is at least worth raising, whether the believers in gross matter, whose views Plato felt to be so alien to his own, were fol- lowers of Democritus and Leucippus in whole or in part. If the passage of the Thestetus only were in question, the ‘uninitiated’ might be supposed to be mere ordinary thinkers, the unregenerate mass of mankind. But the men in the Sophist are clearly philosophers who are ready to maintain their principles against the world, although the description may be generalized from more than one school. The supposition that the Atomists are referred to in these passages has been rejected on the ground that according to Ar. Met. 1. 4, in upholding their ‘Void, they asserted the existence of ‘ Not-Being,’ and not-being is of course bodiless and unseen. The collection of the very numerous allusions to Democritus in Aristotle would be a valuable contribution to the History of the earlier Greek Philosophy. They would be found to present the student with this difficulty, that while occasionally, as in the passage above quoted, the Atomistic doctrine is spoken of as a kind of purely speculative dualism, it is much more frequently referred to in terms which indicate a dis- tinctly physical theory. It is happily unnecessary to argue here at length a point which has been clearly established by Dr. Zeller in his History of Greek Philosophy (2nd edition), that the chief characteristic of the Atomistic philosophy from the first was the firm grasp with which it held the ideas (which to most contemporary schools were so unreal) of space, extension, solidity, and weight. It is not hard to believe that the abstract foundation of mechanical science should thus have been laid in an age when geometry was rapidly growing to maturity: the real difficulty for us is to conceive in what manner a mechanical theory was united with, if not occasioned by, the dialectical recoil from the Eleatic Undivided Whole. Yet in the earlier stages even of modern science such a confusion of physic and metaphysic was not impossible. The ‘Plenum’ of Descartes has probably not been without its influence on the Interpretation of Nature. Δ eS ee Ὁ «. δὰ μὰ INTRODUCTION. xi The Absolute Being of the Eleatics, although the object of Pure Mind and identical with it, was not yet free from the associations of extension. ‘Being is full of being, it is con- tinuous, for being touches being.’ Against this aspect of their doctrine the polemic of the Atomists was directed, when they asserted the existence of the non-existent. It was the non-existent, as the space in which the existent moves: and their Existence, while uncreated and unchange- able, was also that which has extension, solidity, and weight. - Parmenides and Democritus both sought for something ab- solute behind phenomena: the Eleatic found it in the Unity of Being: the Atomist resolved this into Space and body. The relations between these made it possible to conceive of motion and of primordial differences of bulk and form.—The weight of atoms of equal bulk was supposed uniform.—All else was relative and subjective (νόμῳ) : depending on the impression produced on us by the Atoms in various com- binations. How far is this view of their theory consistent with the conjecture that some friends of Democritus may be alluded to in the passages of the Theetetus and Sophist already mentioned ? (1) It does not seem impossible that Plato should accuse such persons of denying the existence of anything ‘ bodiless’ or ‘unseen.’ For the ‘bodiless existence’ which they are represented as denying is the ‘immaterial essence’ of the εἰδῶν φίλοι; and the ‘unseen process,’ which they will not believe in, is the movement of the Heraclitean fire which annihilates all that is stable or tangible. Both these are very different from the ‘void space’ of the Atomist, which is only asserted as the necessary condition of matter and motion. And (except polemically) he would rather say that ἄτομον and κενόν together constitute the reality of sensible existence, than that Being exists and Not-being also exists. Aristotle speaks of the Atomistic principle as τὸ ὑποκείμενον σῶμα. And this, to use Plato’s language, is at least κατὰ φύσιν ὁρατόν (Tim. 30 B). (2) A presumption in favour of such an allusion is afforded by the manner in which the sense of touch and of resistance is dwelt upon. It is true that the atoms could not literally xliv INTRODUCTION. be either seen or handled: but they had all the mechanical properties of things visible and tangible, and Plato was at least as likely as Aristotle to represent them as the objects of sense. See Ar. de Sensu, 4: Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ of πλεῖ- στοι τῶν φυσιολόγων ἀτοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσι: πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἁπτὰ ποιοῦσι. The sense of touch or resistance (which the Ancients hardly distinguished) is naturally referred to those ‘ primary’ qualities of body which the Atomists upheld. Now these are dwelt upon in the two passages in question more than in the whole discussion of the doctrine of sense in the Theex- tetus, and in language which is much more suggestive of something hard. Note especially the words, Thest. 1 55H: ᾿Απρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι. Soph. 246: Eis γῆν... ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμβάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφαπτόμενοι πάντων διϊσχυρίζονται τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσβολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα. 247: Πότερον ὁρατὸν καὶ ἅπτόν τι αὐτῶν; Ib.: Πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ συμ- πιέζειν εἰσί. (3) It may be observed further that in the Sophist the men are driven into a corner by being pressed to define (a) whether the Soul is material, which they are not afraid to admit, and (6) whether justice and wisdom are so. Might not this mode of attack be suggested to a Socratic philo- sopher by the apparent contradiction between the moral sayings of Democritus and his material system ? The materialists are then imagined as retiring upon a more abstract conception of Being :—‘ Everything in which there is either an active or a passive power ;’—i.e, they are supposed to rise from the idea of matter to that of force. The tendency thus recognized surely indicates a different materialism from that of Antisthenes, and the close sequence of the reasoning by which it is developed is not unworthy of the tenacity and penetration which seem to be justly ascribed to Democritus. See Ar, de An. 1. 2: Δημόκριτος περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων γλαφυρωτέ- pws elpykey:—an expression which anticipates Bacon’s praise of him. (4) It may be urged against the above conjecture (a) that, although Democritus might fairly (from Plato’s standpoint) be called ἄμουσος, as the spirit of his inquiry was alien to a ἐ..νὼ........ INTRODUCTION. xlv rhetoric and poetry, and ἀμύητος, for he is known to have written against the Protagorean maxim, yet the imputation of coarseness which Plato’s picture conveys could not attach to him.—This objection may be partly met, however, by supposing his theory to have degenerated in the hands of his followers.—(b) That the elenchus of the εἰδῶν φίλοι is described as levelled at the ἀλήθεια of these materialists, who would thus seem to be identified with the disciples of Pro- tagoras in the Theetetus. To which it may be replied, that the account in the Sophist appears to be generalized from more schools than one, not all of whom would deserve the title of ‘sprung from the ground’ (σπαρτοὶ καὶ αὐτόχθονες). This last therefore alone strictly answers to the title ‘hard and repellent’ in the Thextetus. The difficulty must, how- ever, be acknowledged, and it remains, whatever hypothesis with regard to the allusion is adopted *. If these passages really contain any allusion even to de- generate followers of Democritus (who might be related to him as the Ephesian enthusiasts to Heraclitus), the fact is interesting as confirming the anticipation that no Greek thought of any permanent value failed to obtain some recog- nition from Plato, though it might be recognized only to be rejected. We are also reminded of Aristotle’s saying, that Plato’s dialectical bias unfitted him for physical studies ; and of Lord Bacon’s, that Time brings down the lighter goods of anti- quity but drowns what is of solid worth, which may be thought no unfitting comment from the physical point of view. (5) Democritus would also rank with those who argued from dreams and madness that nothing which appears is real (οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι) *. Plato’s relation to other Greek thinkers, although of great importance, especially in connection with the dialectical dia- 1 Another ἀλήθεια is spoken of in the Cratylus, which may perhaps be that of Antisthenes, but the reference there is evidently to a logical and not a physical theory. 2 It is possible that the δυσχερεῖς of the Philebus, 44, 46, who are said to be very clever in physical science, and have an account to give of plea- sure while they deny its reality, may also have been in some way related to the Atomistic school. Compare, for in- stance, the fragment Ξυόμενοι ἄνθρω- ποι ἥδονται, K.7.A. and the minute way in which the causes of sensation are analyzed by Democritus while its reality is denied: also the words τῷ τὰ συγκεκριμένα Bia διαχεῖν ἢ τὰ διακεκριμένα συγχεῖν, Phil. 46 ad fin, xlvi INTRODUCTION. logues, ought not to be conceived of in a narrow or literal way. Contemporary theories must not be suffered to crowd in upon him, so as to cramp the freedom and originality of his thoughts, of which they are not the substance but the occa- sion. It may be impossible always to trace the threads which he has taken up and woven into the fabric of his philosophy, but this defect in our knowledge need seldom leave us in doubt of his meaning. He views existing opinions in different lights and in different combinations as he moves amongst them, just as natural objects group themselves dif- ferently according to the point at which we stand. The materialist and sensationalist, who in the Thestetus are ironically contrasted, in the Sophist appear to be combined as the enemies of ideas, differing only in the degree of their unregenerate hardness. In the Cratylus, again, Heraclitus and Protagoras are opposed. Plato had certain men in his eye, but what interested him far more were the different aspects of philosophy. And these could not be limited to this or that individual, or extended so as to embrace his inconsistencies. A great name in the past might be wholly identified with one of the great streams of thought; but from the speculative height whence Plato surveyed the present, rival doctrines might at one time be generalized in a single view, and at another time by a change of position might be seen as wholly distinct. The general significance of the Thesetetus has been fully treated by Professor Jowett in his Introduction. In what follows I propose to touch separately on the following points: (1) Philosophy and Education, (2) The Doctrine of Sense, (3) Plato’s appeal to Experience, (4) the Ideas as Categories, (5) Connection of Thestetus, Sophistes, Politicus, (6) Plato’s psychology, (7) The digression or episode in pp. 172-7, (8) The date assigned by Plato to the reading of the dialogue at the house of Euclides. The discussion of these topics will give an opportunity of illustrating the Thetetus from other dialogues besides those already quoted. | a. INTRODUCTION. xl vil 1. Philosophy in Plato is inseparable from the higher education, i.e. from the evolution of true thought by the action of mind on mind. This general notion is expressed under various imagery, in each case symbolizing: the develop- ment of an inherent power. (a) ἀνάμνησις (Meno, Pheedo, Phedrus). The soul is led by questions, or by the sense of imperfection, or by the vision of beauty, or by intercourse with a sympathetic mind, to the reminiscence of ideas or of an ideal, perceived by her in her prenatal state. (4) τόκος ἐν καλῷ (Symp.). The soul of man when he approaches maturity aspires to break the limits of the individual being. This is a kind of puberty or potential pregnancy of the soul, which, through contact with what is beautiful either in per- sons, actions, or thoughts, attains to the object of her longing, the birth of lasting truth. (ὦ) κάθαρσις, λύσις (Phado, Re- public). The soul is bound by the force of desire in a prison of sense, until philosophy or dialectic gradually breaks her bonds, and purifies her from the earthly elements amidst which she has been compelled to live, and also lifts the eye of the soul from looking downwards on dark shadows to contemplate the ideas, as they are illumined by the good. Then thought attains its highest energy, the light within is married to its kindred light, and Reason and Truth are born. (ὦ) Har- monic motion (Timzus). The soul is plunged in a turbid stream of growth and decay, and the circle of the Diverse in her is wheeling all ways, until she is steadied by the perception of number in the movements of the planets as organs of Time, and this perception gives predominance to the motion of the Same in her. The humorous image of μαιευτική, ‘the art of delivering,’ which is peculiar to the Theetetus, brings several of these different figures into a single form. It combines more com- pletely than any of them the positive and negative aspect of the elenchus, the stimulating and the benumbing effect of Socrates. These no longer appear separately, as in the Charmides and Meno, but exist together in harmonious unity. The Charmides ends with the contradiction that temperance or modesty is inconceivable, and yet Charmides, the modest youth, is ready to commit violence upon Socrates, that he may gain modesty from him, xlviil INTRODUCTION. (a) Thestetus, like the slave in the Meno, is led by questions to express what is not merely his own private thought, but, as appears from the history of Philosophy, a necessary step in the progress from unconsciousness to the possession of truth. As each hypothesis is evolved and put away, he is prepared and induced to rise naturally to the stage next following, And as he becomes more aware of the difficulty of the subject, he is more eager to proceed with the inquiry. Socrates, who has the discernment of spirits which the Phzedrus requires in the educator, perceives in Theztetus the true philosophic nature. Although ‘there is no reason to doubt that Thezxtetus was a real person',’ yet we may suppose that, like Socrates, he is more or less idealized. The qualities - which are postulated in the sixth book of the Republic as necessary for the pupils of philosophy are one and all ex- pressly attributed to him. And when he acknowledges the unity of the mind as the organ for perceiving general truths, Socrates—although the features of the youth are far from regular—declares him to be beautiful as well as good. On the other hand, the figure of Socrates himself, as the man- midwife, combines with the familiar characteristics of the real man much that is Platonic and ideal. Whilst he holds In reserve the sharp dividing instrument of the Elenchus, which separates between the mind and her offspring and dis- cerns the false birth from the true, he also presides, as the Spirit of Dialectic, over the mental intercourse which alone can satisfy the legitimate longings of the soul. (4) The condition which Socrates by his art perceives in Theztetus, is that on which Diotima expatiates in the Sym- posium:—xvoiou γάρ, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι... καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιχειρεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. The signs of this travail (which Socrates alternately aggravates and allays) are the discontented consciousness of ignorance and the irrepressible desire of knowing the Truth, In Thetetus it already takes the highest form, not love or ambition, but a passion for ideas, and Socrates, with a skill which is comparable to that of Diotima, sets before him successive courses of wisdom, which excite or slake his 1 Jowett’s Plato, iv, 226. INTRODUCTION. xix ‘fancies,’ but do not appease them. The humour of this conception is kept up to the end’. (c) At the same time Socrates is liberating Theetetus from the prison of sense and clearing his vision that he may look steadily at the Ideas. At first he is only permitted to distinguish each individual sensation from every other, though binding them together in bundles for the convenience of naming them. Presently, perception and memory are shown to be separable from sensation; but they are still occasioned by it. The bonds are further loosened by the observation that in judging what is expedient for the future, the present impression of sense is worthless in comparison with reflection: but still the future is relative to the present and the past, and the test of past wisdom is the impression of the moment when it arrives.—Thestetus now seizes the great truth that the mind does perceive some things (unity, number, sameness, differ- ence, etc.), without the instrumentality of the senses; but still it perceives them as attributes of the object of sense. Further inquiry is made into this process of thought. ‘The mind can think truly and also falsely. What difference 15 implied in this? An attempt is made to conceive of it by reasoning from an abstract alternative,—(knowledge or ig- norance, being or not-being), but we are compelled to fall back upon the conception of a process between sensation and the recollection of former sensations, or between different abstractions of the world of sense laid up in the memory. Lastly, there is allowed to float before the mind the thought of an abstract whole; first as consisting of the combination of indefinite elements, then as an indivisible elementary unit arising out of them. But if the combination is known, the elements must also be known. And even the power of analysis is an inadequate test of Knowledge. Nor 18 the desired criterion fully attained, even when the complete whole I. 9 ἐξόφθαλμος is opposed to κοιλόφ- θαλμος. But in Ar. H.A.1.8. 5 the words ἐκτός and ἐντός seem to refer 1 In the notes on p. 143 a doubt has been raised concerning the de- scription of the appearance of Socrates, which adds piquancy to the humorous image of his ‘art,’—viz. whether τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων means ‘ prominence of the eyes,’ or ‘width between the eyes. It is true that in Xen. Kqu.1. more naturally to the position of the eyes in the face. And the new mean- ing suggested is rather more in ac- cordance with the allusions in Aristo- phanes and in Plato’s Symposium. INTRODUCTION. which is the object of thought, has been distinguished, by its characteristic difference, from every other. Socrates (in the language of Rep. B. 7) has gone down into the cave, and is leading Thextetus upwards, step by step, till towards the end he gives him just a far-off glimpse of the summit to be attained hereafter,—) τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἐκείνων ἔν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον. But he is not himself groping his way. Each footstep is firmly planted, as by one who has tried every inch of the path and knows the country well. In other words, Plato is no longer satisfied with anticipations of truth, but is striving to bridge the chasm between ideas and facts, between crude experience and complete theory. But of this more presently. Here only remains to say (4) that in this upward progress | that which most steadies the thought of Theeetetus, who is a trained geometer, is the perception of number and an adum- bration of the idea of good. 2. Much of what is rejected in the Thestetus as a theory of Knowledge reappears in the Timeus as a ‘probable’ account of the physiology of sense. The same interflow of active and passive motions, especially in vision, of which the same phenomena are mentioned, the carrying about of qualities from place to place, and several points even of minute ter- minology, are repeated there. This helps to show that the theory here developed as that of the disciples of Protagoras who rest their doctrine on Heraclitean principles, is not a mere occasional Essay written for the special purpose of this dialogue, but a serious piece of work having a real place in the history of thought. There is one point of this doctrine as stated in the The- etetus, on which some obscurity still rests, viz. the distinction between quicker and slower motions in 156 C D, The text is not quite free from uncertainty, although the reading of Cornarius is probably a consequence and not merely a cause of confused interpretation. The Scholiast not unnaturally understood the slower motions to be the sensations of touch and taste as distinguished from those of sight and hearing. Sight might naturally be supposed to have more of fire, and touch more of the nature of earth. But this distinction has no relevancy to what precedes, and is nowhere applied in | jing é Νὰ _— ΎαΨΨ ἊΝ INTRODUCTION. li what follows. And in the MS. text the words φέρεται yap. . πέφυκεν appear to refer, not to all the motions, but to the _ swifter only. Now in the example of wine being distasteful to the sick palate (159 Ὁ), the term φέρεσθαι, which is here intro- duced in formulating the theory, is deliberately applied. So that if the MSS. are right, the sensation of taste is not one of the slower motions. And the same illustration makes it manifest that in any case the subject and object, πάσχον and ποιοῦν, on the one hand, and on the other hand the sensation and quality together, are opposed, if not as slow and swift, yet certainly as producer and produced (γεννῶντα καὶ γεννώ- μενα). And the word πλησιάζω, which belongs to the slower elements, is applied not to the tongue, but to the eye. Recent editors are agreed (even Dr. Kennedy yielding a Elimina- doubtful assent) in adopting another interpretation, according oe to which the slower elements are the ποιοῦντα and πάσχοντα, stance.’ the quicker elements being the qualities and sensations. Pro- fessor Kennedy’s doubt is thus expressed: ‘I am unable to discern the use of discriminating between agent-patient and their products as to slowness and swiftness. This remark hits the point of the obscurity, and ought to be met. The answer turns upon the motive which Socrates here attributes to the Protagoreans, viz. to develop a sensational doctrine that shall not too obviously violate common experience. With this motive, for example, they are supposed to invent the term ἄθροισμα, and to speak of each kind of concrete objects as ‘an ageregate of motions.’ Thus, to speak with Aristotle for the sake of clearness, they get rid of the categories of quantity and quality. But there is another category, not less surely given in experience, which they find it still more difficult to dispose of, the category of substance. There is an ineradi- cable prejudice in favour of thinking that Jam more lasting than my impressions, the chameleon than his colours, the moon than her phases, ete. Thus, when sensations and attri- butes have been shown to be ever so momentary, the doubt lingers, whether there is not still something permanent, viz. the subject and object in which these severally inhere (in the language of Scoto-German Metaphysics, the Ego and the External World). To which doubt the theorists reply by saying, ‘Oh, substance is only a slower motion,’ It would Philosophy and Expe- rience. li INTRODUCTION. have been clearer certainly to have introduced the distinction between ἀλλοίωσις and φορά, and to have said expressly that substance is altered, while sensation and quality are in locomo- tion. But this distinction is wanted afterwards for a serious use, and would have taken from the humour of the present passage, where the Protagorean is represented as simply bent on reducing all as far as possible to motion as such. Where he is obliged to admit a difference, it suits his purpose to call it a difference of degree. For it is not his cue in any case to recognize differences of kind. But the implied admission is turned against him by the Elenchus in the passage re- ferred to (181 D). Mr. J. S. Mill’s ‘ Permanent Possibilities’ may be cited as a metaphysical expedient having a similar motive. 3. Plato is well aware that philosophy, to be fruitful, must _ begin and end with experience. This is the note, which chiefly distinguishes his method, not only from the dogmatic anticipa- tions of the fifth century, but still more from the comparatively barren idealism of his Megarian friends. The whole spirit of Socrates, with his common instances and his resolute preference for human questions, in spite of his love of paradox, pointed in this direction. And the reader of the Platonic dialogues is often surprised, when he seems to have been carried into a region of mere abstractions, to be suddenly met by an argument drawn directly from the facts of ordinary life. The truth is that Plato is perpetually striving to reconcile thought with reality both in the individual and in the world. And although in spite of all his efforts his thought remains abstract still, and never entirely penetrates the subtlety of Nature, he continually acknowledges in practice that while all things are to be tested by logic, the conclusions of logic must be tested again by fact. ‘That sensations differ is a matter of fact’ (154 A), ‘the illusions of dreams and madness are facts of experience’ (157 E), ‘Protagoras must be wiser than others, else he would have no fees’ (161 D), ‘the world is full of ex- amples of the truth that knowledge is power’ (170 A, B), ‘any one must acknowledge this’ (171 D), ‘States make laws with a view to future expediency’ (177 E), ‘ Protagoras himself knows better than his pupil the effect which will be produced INTRODUCTION. 11] by a particular speech’ (178 E). All these are direct appeals to experience. And therefore the student need not be sur- prised when, after the subtle inconclusive argument about false opinion, the claims of true opinion are cut short with the example of the law-courts (201 A), or the question whether the knowledge of the simple or the compound comes first is settled by the experience of Thextetus in learning to read (206 A). A similar collocation of fact and logic occurs in Soph. 264 A, where, after it has been proved with incredible difficulty by a long chain of metaphysical proof that communion is possible between not-being and some kinds of being, the further question, whether not-being in the shape of falsehood enters into speech, is decided in a moment by the mere repetition of the statement ‘ Theetetus is flying. So in the Republic, when the definition of jus- tice has been reached, it is tested by vulgar instances,—ra φορτικὰ αὐτῷ προσφέροντες (4. 442 E). It is said in the Parmenides, and the thought recurs in the Sophist and Politicus, that the mature mind despises no phe- nomenon in which there are the traces of a law. In the Philebus the dialectician is said to carry subdivision as far as there are forms tq guide him. In the Phedrus—where Plato’s transcendentalism 15 most apparent—individual experience is not forgotten: Δεῖ γὰρ ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ᾽ εἶδος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθήσεων εἰς ἕν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον----δεῖ δὴ ταῦτα ἱκανῶς νοήσαντα, μετὰ ταῦτα θεώμενον αὐτὰ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν ὄντα καὶ πραττόμενα, ὀξέως τῇ αἰσθήσει δύνασθαι ἐπακολουθεῖν (271 E), Indeed the Phedrus sounds every note in Plato’s compass. And his struggle to reach the individual while holding fast the universal is nowhere more evident than in the passage just quoted. The same purpose is evinced in the remark at the end of the Thezetetus: ᾿Αλλ’ οὐ πρότερόν ye, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν 7 σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτή- τῶν ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, K.T.A. 4, In accordance with this clinging to experience, Plato’s ideal theory, so far as it is allowed to appear in the Theextetus, deals not with hypostatized entities, but rather with neces- sary forms of thought, which are as inseparable from percep- e : liv INTRODUCTION. tion as from reasoning. In the digression indeed, which, however luminous, has still something of a mythical tone, the philosopher is described in language which recalls the Re- public, as contemplating everything as a whole and as taking men up out of the sphere of personal questions into the higher region, where justice and injustice, kingship as kingship, hu- man nature as human nature, are discussed apart from par- ticulars. But in the dialectical argument, the relative aspect’ which has been suggested by Protagoras is nowhere lost sight of. The mind perceives by herself the being of objects, their identity, difference, likeness and unlikeness, also unity and number concerning them. She also reaches after the good and beautiful, reviewing and comparing her perceptions with this aim. Knowledge is not to be sought for in particular im- pressions, but in generalizations drawn from them. The num- bers eleven and twelve are forms upon the waxen block, i.e. they are remembered, or rather abstracted from perceptions of sense. In the aviary there fly innumerable birds, some gathered in groups (κατ᾽ εἴδη), some flying everywhere about (1.6. modes of thought universally applicable). Whether the whole is separable from the parts or not (χωριστόν or ἀχώρι- στον) it bears some relation to them, and for the present we are disposed to think that the parts must be included in per- fect knowledge. This manner of conceiving knowledge and being is not a mere concession to Protagoras or Heraclitus, nor is it only due to the intentionally subjective aspect of the whole dia- logue. It rather marks Plato’s advance to a more definite conception of his own meaning. He is not now engaged, as in the Republic, with sketching a vague outline of philosophic method, but has entered upon the ‘longer way’ of dialectical inquiry, in which the highest generalizations, when he really grapples with them, are found to be conceivable, if at all, only in relation to an actual world to which they give light and order,and where affirmation and nega- tion, to have any meaning, must have reference to one another, and to the content as well as to the form of propositions}, * The obvious fact, that οὐσία in question the genuineness of the So- the Theetetus is equivalent to Daseyn phist because there Being=the sum rather than to Wesen has not been οἵ positive realities, sufficiently observed by those who Δ Ἷ ᾿ v4 a ee eee 4 ie ν᾽ ὁ, 4 4 : INTRODUCTION. lv 5. This aspect of the Thextetus is closely connected with ease: bs the Sophistes and Politicus which follow it. ἘΩΚῸΙ In the Sophistes the criticism of sense and motion is fol- lowed up with a no less thorough criticism of the Immutable Being, and the question ‘ How is falsehood possible ?’ is an- swered through an examination of the idea of falsehood and of negation. In the Politicus an attempt is made to sketch an ideal outline of the application of Science to human societies, and of the false or imperfect forms of society, from which the immediate guidance of Science is withdrawn. These dialogues were to have led up to the Philosopher, in which, probably apart from controversy, Plato’s ideal of Theory and Practice would have been bodied forth. It does not appear that at the time of writing the Thetetus Plato had distinctly planned the other three. The terms in which Socrates declines to examine Parmenides might cer- tainly lead the reader to expect a separate treatment of the Eleatic principle. And the conversation ends with an ap- pointment to meet at the same palestra on the following day. But the Preface only contemplates Socrates, Thezetetus, and Theodorus as the interlocutors. These alone are mentioned by Euclides as having taken part. Still less is there any hint of another than Socrates having taken the lead. And although the opening of the Sophist links on that dialogue to the conversation of the previous day, yet there is no direct reference to the unfinished talk about Parmenides, nor is the figure of μαιευτική in any way kept up, while the concrete form in which the question is bluntly put by Socrates, ‘What are the Sophist, Statesman, Philosopher?’ is strikingly dif- ferent from the ‘ What is Knowledge?’ of the previous day. Had Plato written the Thestetus and Sophist. continuously, it is hardly to be supposed that he would not have woven them together with more art. There are other grounds for believing that the Sophistes and Politicus were written somewhat later than the Thestetus. In my edition of those two dialogues (Oxford, 1867) I have proved by ‘quantitative criticism’ that in point of diction, as well as in other important respects, they are intermediate between the Republic and the Laws, while the Theetetus stands between the Phedrus and Republic. And in a more e€ 2 lvi INTRODUCTION. general way Professor Jowett, whose judgment on such a question is of the highest value, remarks emphatically on the difference of style which separates the Philebus, Sophist, Politicus, Laws, and in some degree the Timeus, from the earlier dialogues. (See his Introduction to thé Sophist, sub init.) Pure Eleaticism has no doubt a great effect in drying up the springs of imaginative expression. The second part of the Parmenides, and the passage in the Thetetus about the whole and its parts, may be contrasted in this way with other portions of the same dialogues. But this remark does not dispose of the criticisms here referred to, which relate to the whole tenour of the dialogues now in question, nor does it account for the change of manner both in Thesxtetus and Socrates. These and other reasons have led some to doubt the genuineness of the Sophistes and Politicus. I have attempted | to meet such doubts by showing, as above stated, that in the same degree in which these writings diverge from the Gorgias or Republic, they approximate to the Laws. The discussion may now be summed up in the words of the English trans- lator of Plato: ‘There would have been little disposition to doubt the genuineness of the Sophist and Politicus, if they had been compared with the Laws rather than with the Republic, and the Laws had been received, as they ought to be, on the authority of Aristotle, as an undoubted work of Plato.’ Schaarschimidt, the latest enemy of the two dia- logues, is as inconsistent in accepting the Laws, as he is con- sistent (however paradoxical) in rejecting the Philebus !. But to return. However different from the Thestetus in style and external treatment, the Sophist and Statesman are connected with it in subject, and also in their point of view. The theory of Knowledge, which at the end of the - Thextetus remains indeterminate, is completed by the dis- cussion of first principles in the Sophist. And although the subject of the Statesman is not the nature, but the * An important contribution to the Jackson, in his elaborate papers on more exact definition both of the place the Philebus and the Parmenides in of the dialectical dialogues and of the the Journal of Philology, Nos. 21 and growth of Plato’s central doctrine has 22: “ Plato’s later Theory of Ideas,’ been made quite recently by Mr. H. . INTRODUCTION. lvii application of Knowledge, yet, there is a distinct advance in the conception of Knowledge or Science, on which the dis- cussion is based. The relation of Knowledge to Experience, and the nature of the ideas as categories (supr. 4, 5), have come out in the Thestetus. But the chief conceptions of Knowledge there put forth are those (a) of rising from particulars to universals and so contemplating each thing as a whole, (2) of analyzing ἃ whole into its parts, and (c) of being able to describe an object by its difference. In the Sophist it is shown that to generalize, distinguish, and analyze is not enough. Ideas must not be seen only in their separate abstraction, but also in their combinations and correlations. And in the course of the Politicus it appears further that Knowledge, in order to be fruitful, must take a grasp of the actual world, where the ideas are not found in elementary simplicity, but are transferred into the long and difficult syllables of action. Logical analysis must follow the lines of nature. Dichotomy must not be forced where it 15 inapplicable. And rash generalization (misplaced συναγωγή) 15 to be equally avoided. Every nature is to be separately in- terrogated, until each has yielded all that its peculiar expe- rience enables it to contribute to the sum of wisdom. It is not enough to define an art by some distinguishing mark. To know its boundaries aright, we must also know the kindred arts from which it is distinguished. There are categories not only of things in general, but of social facts: seven de- partments, for example, of human industry. Plato nowhere shows a deeper conviction of the extent and comprehen- siveness of Science. 6. Another growth which may be traced in these three Psycho- dialogues, and also in the Philebus and Timeus, is the in- 8 creasing clearness and minuteness of Plato’s psychology. Such hints towards a study of the phenomena of mind as occur in the Phzedo, Meno, Gorgias, Republic, or even in the Pheedrus, are comparatively vague. In the Thewxtetus Plato is for the first time continuously employed in the close ana- lysis of mental operations. The nearest parallel in the Re- public is the description, in Book 7, of the effect of number lvili INTRODUCTION. in awakening reason by giving distinctness to contradictory perceptions. But in the Theztetus we have a whole series of similar observations :—the connection of αἴσθησις and φαντασία in the case of the wind (p. 1 52), the analysis of vision (153 E foll.), the logical postulates, which we are asked to contem- plate steadily as ‘facts of consciousness’ (155), the further analysis of vision (156, 7), the account given of illusory perceptions (158, 159), the case of letters and sounds seen and heard but not understood (163), the relation of μνήμη to αἴσθησις (ibid.), the illustration of degrees of perception (165), the distinction between the organ and the percipient mind (184), the whole attempt to give a subjective account of false opinion (187-200), and, in particular, the description of thought as self-dialogue (189, 190), the image of the waxen-block, accounting for confusions of sense and memory (191 foll.), that of the aviary, for confusions of pure thought, | (198 foll.), the three definitions of Adyos (206 foll.) ;—all these are instances of the working of a new spirit, which is not found in equal strength in the Republic or Pheedrus. Now to the same reflective tendency may be referred several passages of the Sophist and Philebus, and the effect of it may be traced also in the Politicus and Timeus. The following points may be especially noted :—the acknowledgment ob- tained from the idealists that Knowledge is a process (Soph. 248), the description of the process of dialectic (254), the meaning of denial (ἀπόφασις) (2 57), the distinction of λόγος, διάνοια, φαντασία, αἴσθησις (263, 4):—the origin of γραμματική (Phil. 8), the description of ἡδονὴ, δόξα, μνήμη, ἀνάμνησις, pav- τασία (37--39) :—the passage about μετρητική (Polit. 285), the reason for the argument from example (277) :—the account of sensation, and the distinction of νοῦς from δόξα ἀληθής in the Timeeus. The question raised towards the end of the Theztetus, whether knowledge is not of simple parts as well as of the complex whole, corresponds to various ἀπορίαι in the Par- menides, and also to the place in the Sophist (245) where it is shown that Becoming as well as Being partakes of completeness and unity. A cognate point is also touched upon, viz. whether the εἴδη are χωριστὰ or ἀχώριστα. The theory that the Element (or simple idea) is unknowable, forms > he oe 4 ; Ὶ INTRODUCTION. lix the opposite extreme to the ‘Protagorean’” assertion that single impressions only are known. The truth is indicated that an apprehension of unity and universality is present even in the simplest distinct perception, The passage which pre- pares the way for this conclusion may be compared with the similar ‘ propedeutik’ in Rep. 4. 436. 7. The Episode or Digression, 172-177. The Di- | Throughout the earlier part of the dialogue Plato’s moral Pee * enthusiasm has been held under a severe restraint. It here bursts forth in a passage of still chastened and subdued elo- quence. Socrates is represented as having hitherto found it difficult to be quite serious, while delivering the boyish mind of Thezetetus of its first crude notions, and refuting with in- direct arguments, which he himself occasionally suspects of sophistry, a popular philosophy which dressed up men’s ordi- nary thoughts with subtle notions borrowed from past thinkers. He has accordingly been using various arts to draw the grave Theodorus into the discussion. In this he at last succeeds. But even so, his attempt at seriousness at first breaks down. He is still haunted by the humour of the previous argument, and Theodorus rebukes him for ‘ running Protagoras too hard.’ On this Socrates lays hold of the admission, implied in Prota- goras’ teaching, that there is a difference, if not between truth and falsehood, right and wrong, yet between better and worse conditions of individuals and communities. On this he is about to base the argument that since legislation aims at bet- tering the condition of states, it is proved true or false, right or wrong, as it succeeds or fails. But at this point he seems to catch the tone of his respondent, and indulges the inclina- tion of Theodorus by interposing a pause in the game of ques- tion and answer. In the presence of the deeper subject which now awaits discussion he suspends the argument for a while, and allows his eye to range over the whole position, — re- connoitring as it were before engaging at close quarters,— contrasting the life of the philosopher with that of the lawyer and the man of the world. After this (177 D) he resumes the argument at the point where it was broken off, and, still in conversation with Theodorus, disposes finally of Protagoras and the Heracliteans. And in all that follows, although Ix : INTRODUCTION. Socrates does not relinquish his playfulness, a deeper note is clearly perceptible. The productive power of Knowledge, the universal striving toward the good, the independence of mind in perceiving the true relations of things, the difficulty about false opinion, and other weighty topies, are handled with essential gravity and sobriety. Thus the poetical and dialectical aspects are fused together more completely than in the Phedrus. And the correspond- ence is unmistakable between the contrasted lives on the one hand and the contrasted theories on the other :—as the phi- losopher is to the lawyer, so is the ἐπιστήμη τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ to the φαντασία τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. But Peipers (Untersuchungen, i. pp. 472 ff.) is too matter-of-fact, when he treats the digression as an integral part of the discussion, and as directly suggested by the mention of δίκαια καὶ καλά. Teichmiiller, on the other hand, would treat such semi- mythical passages in Plato as wholly secondary and subor- dinate to the dialectical, concessions to popular sentiment, or to ‘the child-in us.’ I cannot think that Plato would endorse this view of the imaginative portions of his own writings, They express a different but not a lower aspect of the truth ; and at least equally vindicate his claim to have surveyed “all time and all existence.’ «Reason touched with emotion’ need not have less hold of reality than reason pure and simple. And abstract thought without such aid is not merely less effectual (διάνοια yap αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ᾽ ἣ ἕνεκά του καὶ πρακτική), but is also less complete. The digression approaches very closely in style and gub- stance to many passages in the Republie, as will appear in the notes. But it contains no allusion to the philosopher’s relation to an ideal state, whether (as in the Gorgias) because Plato had not yet enounced his conception of the philosopher- king, or because he had withdrawn again into isolation,—or more probably because of the difference of the subject. The philosopher here is not merely useless to hig city, but looks down upon it as from a distant height. He knows nothing of his neighbour, but ig engaged in contemplating human nature in general. The conception is more ironical than in the Sophist (in this approaching the Republic), and less embittered than in the Politicus; although the con- ~~ pl > fi ἣν Me εἰ ee i INTRODUCTION. ]x1 tempt with which the legal spirit is described is sufficiently biting. 8. The solemnity of this passage, and the shadow which Imaginary it casts over the remainder of the dialogue, is in keeping with = the time when the whole conversation is imagined to have taken place. Socrates, as he tells Theodorus casually at the end, is going presently to answer the indictment of Meletus ; —to show, therefore, in his own person what a poor figure the philosopher makes in a law-court. This life-and-death occasion, however (ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου αὐτοῦ), sits very lightly on him, and he is as ready as at any moment of his life to engage in philosophical discussion. Not only so, but his inexhaustible humour, if less irrepressibly exuberant than in his intercourse with Phedrus by the Ilissus, is no less ready to spring forth in the presence of a youth who is gifted with the philosophic nature. Yet there is an undercurrent of more than usual earnestness, which takes advantage from the grave presence of Theodorus, but 15 profoundly in keeping with the actual crisis. Another shadow mingles with that cast by the death of Socrates, and helps to give a further personal interest to the discourse. For the reader is to imagine that at the moment when this record of his brilliant promise is being read at Megara, Thezxtetus himself, who has been wounded in battle at Corinth, has just been carried back to Athens, that he may die at home. The memory of one thus distinguished in action as well as in thought is intended to consecrate the whole dialogue. The date of the battle mentioned in the Preface can only be fixed within certain limits. The suggestion of EK. Munk (whose arrangement of the dialogues in the order of the life- time of Socrates of course gives a late place to the Thezetetus) that the occasion meant was in the year 369, when the allied forces under Chabrias disputed the Isthmus with Epami- nondas, is sufficiently disposed of by the remark 1 that Terpsion cannot be supposed to have waited thirty years before ful- 1 Wohlrab, 1869. Ixai INTRODUCTION, filling his intention of asking to see the writing of Euclides. So late a date also, as Professor Jowett observes, ‘a little im- pairs the beauty of Socrates’ remark, “that he would be a great man if he lived.”’ These are strong reasons for pre- ferring the battle of B.c. 394, which seems to have stirred the hearts of the Athenians in a peculiar way, as the first great national effort after the restoration of the democracy 1. In that year Thetetus would be at most twenty-one. And this date does not seem impossible, for the praise of his con- duct in the fight would be all the louder if he then saw service for the first time. The supposition which alone re- mains, that of an uncertain date between B.c. 390 and 387 (the limits of the Corinthian war), has the doubtful ad- vantage of giving time for the distinctions mentioned by later writers as attaching to Thextetus,—at all events for the discovery of the five regular solids, which he might have hit upon even sooner than this (μαθητὸς yap Kav παῖς γένοιτ᾽ ἄν 3). Time of 9. In any case, therefore, the Preface cannot have been ag written earlier than B.c. 394, when Plato was about thirty- five, and in all probability was written much later, for in fiction (unlike politics) the mention of an event is none the worse for being ‘ancient history.’ But even so much cannot be decisively maintained respecting the dialogue as a whole, —tfor the preface, and the concluding words, and other pas- sages, may possibly have been written long after the main portion had been composed, Internal evidence, however, as has been already indicated, would seem to assign to the Theetetus a place, though earlier than the Sophist, yet not much, if at all, earlier than the Republic. Teichmiller has recently, with great confidence, set up a new criterion, by which he thinks to separate once for all between the earlier and later writings of Plato. This is afforded by the simple statement of Euclides, that in finishing his transcript of the conversation he has omitted the inter- locutory words. By which Teichmiiller understands Plato * The beautiful monument to the λίδου ἐν Κορίνθῳ, τῶν πέντε ἱππέων) is young knight Dexilaus in the Cera~ commonly attributed to this year. micus at Athens (ἀπέθανεν én’ EvBov- 4 Ar, Eth, Ni i INTRODUCTION. Ixiil to signify that the admixture of narrative in the Parmenides, Symposium, and Republic had been a mistake, and that this method should be abandoned by him henceforth. Our critic also assumes that Plato kept this resolution, and that con- sequently no narrated dialogue is later than the Thestetus, and no dialogue in which the several persons are directly introduced is to be considered as earlier. The form of the Euthydemus, Protagoras, and Phedo, where a narrated dia- logue is enclosed in a dramatic setting, is regarded as inter- mediate, and these dialogues are therefore assumed to come shortly before the Theetetus. That the words of Euclides are not without significance may at once be admitted. The Thestetus is the only dia- logue which is supposed to have been written down!. This takes from the improbability of so close and subtle an argu- ment being repeated from memory. And the omission of ‘said I’ and ‘said he’ certainly adds to the continuity of the effect, without destroying the illusion that we have the au- thority of Socrates for the minute accuracy of the report. It may further be conceded that of the dialogues which are similarly dramatic in form, several of the most important are on other grounds probably the last of all,—the Sophist, Politicus, Philebus, Timzeus, Laws. But, not for the pre- sent to state objections to an hypothesis which makes the Gorgias a later dialogue than the Republic,—not only is the Phedrus thus placed inordinately late, but the Laches, Io, Euthyphro, Crito, Meno, and Cratylus must either be rejected, or assumed to belong to the later half of Plato’s career, A theory which undertakes so much is somewhat heavily weighted, and this one happens to be not very securely based. For the Preface shows, not that the Theztetus is like some dialogues in its dramatic form, but that (in having a formal introduction) it is unlike all. And the inference to be drawn from this is rather that Plato was willing to vary his style in such external respects, than that he now adopted. a hitherto unthought of plan to be henceforward uniformly followed by him. Indeed, if he had laid so much stress upon this point as Teichmiiller supposes, there was nothing 1 Jowett’s Plato, iv. 225. Genuine- ness, and place in the series of the Platonic Dialogues. Ixiv INTRODUCTION. to prevent him from revising the whole series of his writings in the same sense. 10. In the Thestetus, the various notes of the most un- doubted of Plato’s writings are present in felicitous harmony. While rivalling the Symposium in perfection of form, and containing touches of humour and of enthusiastic insight which recall the Pheedrus, it is, of all the dialectical dialogues, the most exact in philosophical expression. And in the sub- dued eloquence of moral earnestness it is comparable only to the Phiedo, Gorgias, and Republic, To return once more to the vexed question of its position in the series. The Symposium cannot have been written before the division of Arcadia in B.c, 384. But in the Sym- posium, Plato has not yet broken with the poets (p. 209), and the Republic is therefore later than the Symposium. Now it has been seen that the indications of style in the Thextetus bring it very near indeed to the Republic, while it has close relations with dialogues which are later still. The combined maturity and freshness, complexity, subtlety, and lightness of the Theetetus are consistent with the result thus indicated, that when he wrote it Plato ‘had on his back? years (at least) forty-eight. He has himself indicated (at 180 E) the point of view from which the dialogue was composed. The battle of the philosophies was not yet over. Socrates had set up a standard of knowledge, which, supported by his dialectic as preserved at Megara, was sufficient to overthrow the popular doctrine of mere relativity, and to cast a shadow of ‘philosophic doubt’ over the scepticism of the day. But the ground gained hitherto had been mainly in the region of negative proof. In order to win an entrance for Science upon the ‘terra firma’ of positive reality, it was still neces- sary to criticise afresh the first principles of dialectic itself, and to come to a final reckoning with Parmenides. What came of this final reckoning need not be considered here. But it may be observed that the difficulties raised in _ the Theztetus, no less than those in the Parmenides, tend to show the inadequacy of merely formal reasoning’, and to pre- pare the way for a provisional solution, in which an indeter- minate element, whether to be known as θἄτερον, ἄπειρον, i INTRODUCTION, Ixv πολλά, Or ἄπειρος δυάς, is to be admitted into the region of speculative truth ;—in which the composite nature of οὐσία is also to be admitted, and the correlation of or communion of different categories postulated’. In working out this pro- blem, ‘new weapons’ have to be introduced into the Platonic armoury, while some of those here exhibited are retained in use. 1 See H. Jackson, On Plato’s later Theory of Ideas, Journal of Philology, Nos. 21 and 22. This discussion throws additional light on Theet. 201, 2. CONSPECTUS. THE dialogue has been written down by Euclides and is pro- duced by him on the occasion of Theztetus’ expected death. The persons are, Socrates, THEOpDORUS of Cyrene, and the boy THERTETUS. Time, just before the trial of Socrates. Theodorus introduces Thextetus to Socrates as a youth who has all the essential qualities of the philosophic nature. Socrates acknowledges the authority on such a point of Theodorus as an accomplished teacher. He begins to question Thextetus. ‘You go to Theodorus for wisdom, i.e. Knowledge. But what is Knowledge?’ ‘Geometry, arithmetic, astronomy ;, shoemaking and other handicrafts.’ ‘That is an enumeration of Knowledges, not a definition of Knowledge.’ ‘I see, you want a general expression, such as I and young Socrates here lately invented for irrational quantities.’ ‘Excellent, only try.’ ‘I want to do so all the while, but cannot.’ ‘Then come to me, who am the man-midwife of young minds.’ Socrates proceeds to expound the nature of his art in such a way as effectually to encourage Theetetus, whom he once more exhorts to try his best. The youth now answers, I. Know1epce 1s SENSATION. This (1) is shown to be the same with the dictum of Pro- tagoras, ‘Man the Measure,’ i.e. Things are to each man as they appear to him :—which again is proved to rest (2) on the mys- terious doctrine of Heraclitus and other great men that All is Motion and that things are not but become. (3) Sensible perception is then explained as the .momentary outcome of the meeting of action and passive motions. Sensa- tion is an instantaneous process; all attributes are absolutely relative. Ixvill CONSPECTUS. (4) Sensation and quality are twin vibrations, perpetually shifting from place to place, whilst agent and patient (object and subject) change their attributes indeed, but are comparatively (though never entirely) stationary. They are slow motions, where- as the others are swift. (5) What are known as the illusions of dreams and madness and the disordered taste of the sick palate are accounted for by this hypothesis. The unpleasantness of wine is as real to Soerates ill, as its pleasantness is to Socrates when well. (6) Thus the doctrines of Heraclitus and Protagoras unite to substantiate the answer of Thestetus, of which they are the objective and subjective counterparts. I. (a) 1. But the theory, if consistent, is somewhat strange. Does it not make all percipients equally wise, and make dis- cussion purposeless? Protagoras is no wiser than an ape: Theeetetus is as wise as any god. (2) This is perhaps a superficial objection. Let us examine the statement ‘ Knowledge is Sensation.’ Then to see without understanding is to know: to remember without seeing is not to know. Further, one may know and not know the same thing, know it near but not far off, know it faintly and strongly, dimly and vividly, and the like. (3) To this Protagoras would reply by deprecating mere verbal quibbles, and boldly accepting the facts, that memory is indistinct, that each man differs infinitely from himself, and may at the same moment both know and not know the same thing. In supporting his thesis, he would maintain that men’s per- eeptions differ not as trwe and false, since all alike are real; but as better and worse. And the wise man is he who can change them from worse to better, whether in men or vegetables, in individuals or states. I. (8) Theodorus being now the respondent, Protagoras’ own maxim is examined, as explained by himself:—What seems to each man is reat to him to whom it seems. Does it not seem to each man that other men are wiser than he ? If all think always truly, some think falsely. Theodorus has trouble in maintaining his opinions. Are they false to his opponents, but true to him 1 Most men dissent from the opinion of Protagoras. But his opinion justifies them in their dissent. Is the one ‘measure’ CONSPECTUS. Ixix here to be preferred to the many? Or does not the one confirm the many, by asserting that they are right in thinking him wrong ἵ I. (y) Protagoras is not in life, and would not be convinced if he were. But his followers will hardly maintain that all men are equally wise in knowing what is wholesome for the individual or expedient for the state. So much indeed has been already hinted in Socrates’ defence of Protagoras (I. (a) 3).— (At this point the argument is interrupted with an eloquent digression, in which the life of the philosopher, who has leisure for many arguments, which he can drop and take up again at will, is contrasted with the life of the politician). —Well, the state makes laws with a view to expediency, of which experience is the only test. And the same is true of every judgment which regards the future. Protagoras professed himself a better judge than his disciple could be of the persuasiveness of a rhetorical speech. So far, then, the doctrine of absolute subjectivity is disproved. I. (8) Butwhatof theimmediate perceptions of warmth, white, and sweetness? Are they always true for the percipient at the moment? Even this cannot be maintained by those (I. (3)), who base the doctrine of Sensation upon the doctrine of Motion. All motion is either change of place (φορά) or change of nature (ἀλλοίωσις). And if motion is absolute, all things are always moved in both these ways. Therefore the perception and the quality which flit between subject and object, as before described, must also change their nature in the instant of sensation, so that they cannot be so much as named. Each thing no sooner is, but it ἐδ not; it is no more thus than not thus ; or rather it is anyhow and nohow. In the course of this argument Theodorus has expressed his abhorrence of the Heracliteans of Ephesus, whose doctrine is as unstable as the Universe in their conception of it. Theztetus now asks that the opposite doctrine,—that of Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus, may be discussed. — II. Socrates avoids this task for the present, but takes Thezetetus again in hand and resumes the previous question about the nature of Perception. The sensible qualities of objects are perceived not with but through the organs of sense. And there are some attri- butes which the mind herself perceives without a separate organ,— number, difference, sameness, being. The mind’s own judgment of these things is called Opinion. f στ CONSPECTUS. Now Opinion is either true or false, and KnownEepez 1s TRUE OPINION. But how is false opinion possible? We have already felt this difficulty within the sphere of sense. It now returns upon us in a more abstract form. Three answers are proposed, and each is followed into various ramifications. False opinion is (1) to think without Knowledge, or (2) to think what is not, or (3) to mistake one thing for another. For thought is the mind’s dialogue, and opinion is a silent pro- position. But each of these answers leads to insuperable difficulties, and, finding ourselves in a strait, we are driven to seek aid from the imagination. (a) Shall we say that the mind takes impressions like a waxen block, and that mistake occurs in the process of identifying new impressions with the old, i.e. at the meeting-point of sensation and memory ἢ This image does not extend to mistakes in abstract reasoning. (8) Then shall we compare the mind to an aviary containing birds, some of which are gregarious, some grouped in families, some solitary and ranging over all? We have caught them all, and have them all within the mind, but as they fly about we may get the wrong bird by the wing, and so may take a rock-pigeon for a turtle- dove, and this is false opinion. Even here the image comes short of the reality. For so far as we take hold of the wild pigeon we have it actually in hand as known, and cannot err about it. However, leaving this subsidiary question unsolved, we find a short cut to answering the main question, whether True Opinion is or is not Knowledge. The judges in a law-court have often been brought by rhetoric to form a true opinion of matters of fact, which no arguments can demonstrate. They have True Opinion but not Knowledge, which in such cases cannot exist without ocular demonstration. III. Wherein then does Knowledge differ from True Opinion ? If we can find this, perhaps we shall at last find the definition of Knowledge. (2) Knowteper is TRuE OPINION WITH AN AccouNT of the object. That of which no account can be given is unknowable. (8) The prime elements are unknowable, while their complex or combination is known. The element can only be named. The CONSPECTUS. Ixxi nature of language implies that an accownt comprises more elements than one. Here are two statements, which may be considered together. True Opinion with an account or reason is a plausible definition of Knowledge. But how can the complex be known if the element is unknown? In learning to read, we learned the letters first, then syllables. In learning music, we first learn the notes. Yet, on the other hand, the syllable may be regarded as an in- dependent unity springing from this combination of the letters. And this leads up to the general question of the relation of parts to a whole. Is the whole identical with all the parts, or separable from them? Is ‘All’ in the singular identical with ‘ All’ in the plural? So far from simple unity being unknowable, we find that the object of Knowledge is always one and indissoluble. But, to return to the former of our two statements, If Knowledge is true Opinion with an account, what is meant by the latter term ? Three answers are again proposed :— 1. Statement in words. But this is universally attainable. 2. Enumeration of parts or elements. (Definition by analysis.) But I may enumerate the parts, having only true opinion of them and not Knowledge. 3. Definition by the characteristic difference. But here again the question rises, Does such definition rest on Knowledge or on True Opinion? And if the former, then we have once more to ask ourselves, What is Knowledge ? The art of Socrates condemns all the answers hitherto given. But Thezetetus, who has been delivered of more than he knew was in him, will be more fruitfully inventive, or at least more intellec- tually modest, in the time to come. Ὁ 7 i ed. Steph. p. 142. OEAITHTOS. TA TOY AIAAOFOY ΠΡΟΣΩΠΑ. EYKAEIAHS, TEPVION, ΣΩΚΡΑΤΗΣ, ΘΕΟΔΩΡΟΣ, SCEAITHTOS. | APTI, ὦ Tep ier, ἢ πάλαι ἐξ ἀγροῦ: TEP. ᾿Ἐπιεικῶς πάλαι. καὶ σέ γε ἐζήτουν Kar > \ Ἂ 19 ’ “ » er > 3 τὸν ones AyYOpav Και ἐθαύμαζον, OTL Οὐχ OlOS T ἢ €UPELV. EY. Ov yap ἢ κατὰ πόλιν. TEP. Ποῦ μήν; EY. Εἰς λιμένα καταβαίνων Θεαιτήτῳ ἐνέγυχον το φερομένῳ ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου ᾿Αθή- pale: 3. EYKAEIAHS, TEPVION] Euclides and Terpsion appear also in the Phedo as the Mega- rians who were present at the death of Socrates, p. 59 C: Kai Μεγαρόθεν Ἐὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων. Compare with the preservation of this dialogue by Euclides, and the introduc- tion of Theodorus of Cyrene, the preservation of the Pytha- gorean dialogue by Phedo, and the introduction in it of Simmias and Cebes (Φιλολάῳ συγγεγονότων). See also Tim. 27 A, 5. For the ellipse (of ἥκεις or some such word) cp. the omis- sion of ef with ἄξιος, infr. 143 B E. This idiom suits the con- versational style. 6. ᾿Επιεικῶς πάλαι] ‘A good while ago.’ Cp. Phed. 80 C: ἐπιεικῶς συχνὸν ἐπιμένει χρόνον. 7. καὶ ἐθαύμαζον]! It is per- haps intimated that Euclides, like his master Socrates, was to be found daily in the market-: place. 9. ‘Where, then?’ μήν ex- presses surprise. 11. ἐκ Κορίνθου ἀπὸ τοῦ orpa- τοπέδου]͵ For the expression compare Charm. 153 A: Ἔκ Ποτιδαίας ἀπὸ τοῦ στρατοπέδου. For the probable date of this battle see Introduction. a The Preface. Terpsion and Eucli- des meet before Euclides’ house in Megara. They con- verse about the danger- ous state of Thestetus, of whom Socrates had truly prophesied great things. Eu- clides has preserved the con- versation, which Socrates ἃ little while before his death held with The- zetetus, -who was then a boy. 2 MAATONO2 TEP. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι ; p- 142. EY. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις" χαλεπῶς μὲν yap B 3) δ ΤΩΝ , an a ΝΥ "ἌΝ EXEL καὶ ὑπὸ τραυμαάατῶν τινῶν, μᾶλλον μὴν avTOV a ἊΝ Ἂν , 3 A , αἱρεῖ ΤΟ γέγονος YOON Ua eV Τῷ OT PAaTEVLATL. TEP. Μῶν ἡ δυσεντερία 5 EY. Nai. TEP. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι. EY. Καλόν τε καὶ ἀγαθόν, ὦ 'Τερψίων, ἐπεί τοι ἧς A By 4 id 3 lA Se A καὶ νῦν ἠκουὸν τινων μᾶλα ἐγκωμιαζόντων QUTOV TrEpt το τὴν μάχην. TEP. Καὶ οὐδέν γ᾽ ἄτοπον, ἀλλὰ πολὺ θαυμα- ’ \ a 3 Ἁ A ϑ 3 ΄“. στότερον εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος Ἦν. ἀτὰρ πῶς οὐκ αὐτοῦ “-“ 4 Meyapot κατέλυεν ; EY. ᾿Ηπείγετο oikade: ἐπεὶ ἔγωγ᾽ ἐδεόμην καὶ I. Ζῶντι ἢ τετελευτηκότι] Terpsion’s fears are excited by the word φερομένῳ. 2. Ζῶντι καὶ μάλα μόλις] ‘Indeed, only just alive.’ χαλεπῶς .. τινῶν] Observe the anticipatory καί, contrasting the wounds with the disease. 3. μήν] ‘However.’ 4. αἱρεῖ] ‘ Affects him.’ Com- pare Soph. Ant. 606: Τὰν ot ὕπνος αἱρεῖ ποθ᾽ ὁ παντογήρως. ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι completes the sense of γεγονός : 1.6. τὸ νόσημα TO ἐν τῷ στρατεύματι γεγονός : but the expression is less formal. ἡ. Οἷον ἄνδρα λέγεις ἐν κινδύνῳ εἶναι] ‘What a noble life is then in peril!’ The worth of Theeetetus is acknowledged by his Megarian friends, and is further confirmed (though con- firmation was needless, ll. 11, 12) by the praise of him which Euclides has just heard (καὶ 13 συνεβούλευον, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἤθελε. καὶ δῆτα προπέμψας νῦν, 1. 0). 9. ἤκουον] The imperfects here and below, ll. 14, 15, re- fer to the time spent by Eu- clides in company with Thes- tetus and those who carried him. 11. θαυμαστότερον] Se. ἦν av. The conversational ellipse, con- tinuing the idiom from οὐδέν ye ἄτοπον, avoids the awkward- ness of repeating ἦν. (@avpa- στότερον ἣν Schol., Thom. Mag.) 14. ἐπεὶ .. ἐδεόμην] Wohlrab compares infr. 150 A B, 158 A, 167A, ete. eémel.. ye in such places marks the necessity of the foregoing explanation. It was not for want of friendly insistence that Theetetus did not stay, but because he longed to be at home. 15. δῆτα implies that there is something important to be said. ‘And, I may tell you.’ nn οὐ. SEAITHTOS. 3 ᾿ 9 , 3 A a 9 , \ 3 ’ Ῥ. 142. αὐτὸν, ἀπιὼν πάλιν ἀνεμνήσθην καὶ ἐθαύμασα Σω- , e a 5, \ S Ἁ A / κράτους, ὡς μαντικῶς ἄλλα τε On εἶπε Kal περί του- od 7 » ‘A x A 7 3 “ του. δοκεῖ γὰρ μοι ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου ἐντυχεῖν x δ , 5, \ , , \ αὐτῷ μειρακίῳ OVTL, καὶ συγγενόμενος TE καὶ δια- \ , 3 AS > a \ , V4 λεχθεὶς πανυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. καί μοι ς ἐλθόντι ᾿Αθήναζε τούς τε λόγους ods διελέχθη αὐτῷ / Ν t ED aA > a See, “ὕ a Ὁ διηγήσατο, Kal μάλα ἀξίους ἀκοῆς, εἶπε TE OTL TATA Ρ. 143. Sa ἢ 3) a ae ee A ᾿ "5 5 ἀναγκὴ εἰ τοῦτον ἐλλογιμον γενέσθαι, εἴπερ εἰς » ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι. TEP. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε, ὡς ἔοικεν, εἶπεν. ἀτὰρ τίνες ἦσαν οἱ λόγοι ; ἔχοις ἂν διηγήσασθαι; EY. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, οὔκουν οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στό- ματος" ἀλλ᾽ ἐγραψάμην μὲν τότ᾽ εὐθὺς οἴκαδ᾽ ἐλθὼν I. ἀπιὼν πάλιν] ‘As I re- turned.’ ἀνεμνήσθην͵] Se. ἃ εἶπε Σ. περὶ τούτου͵ The sentence is modified by the introduction of the verb ἐθαύμασα. ‘I recalled the words of Socrates about him, and marvelled at the pro- phetic insight, which, like many sayings of Socrates, they show- ed.’ 3. δοκεῖ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ gives a slight uncertainty to the ex- pression. It here qualifies ra- ther the mark of time ὀλίγον πρὸ τοῦ θανάτου than the infinitive ἐντυχεῖν. So below, 144 OC, δο- κοῦσι belongs more in sense to ἀλειψάμενοι than to ἰέναι, ‘T think it was a little while be- fore his death that he met with him, 8. εἴπερ εἰς ἡλικίαν ἔλθοι] ‘If he lived long enough.’ These words also, as inter- preted by the event, have a prophetic sound. εἰς ἡλικίαν] Sc, rod ἐλλόγιμος γενέσθαι. 10. Καὶ ἀληθῆ γε... εἶπεν] In the editions before Heindorf these words were given to EY. But in the Bodleian MS. they are properly assigned to Terp- sion. 12. The particles οὔκουν... ye imply, ‘Not, at least, in the way you mean.’ .ovr| Compare the use of νῦν οὕτως, Heindorf quotes Xen. Mem. 3. 6. 9: Οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμί σοι οὕτω γε ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν. 13. ἐγραψάμην... ἔγραφον] “1 wrote for my own use—I went on writing.’ So the change of voice may be rendered. But ἐγραψάμην... τὸν λόγον below, 143 B, has a different force, ‘I made my transcript.’ And in 143 C, where the notion of writing recurs without any personal reference, the middle voice is dropped. Such varia- tions belong to the freedom of Greek idiom, and must be noticed, although of slight sig- nificance. The Bodleian MS, omits μέν, and Schanz formerly B-2 4 | ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ ὑπομνήματα, ὕστερον δὲ κατὰ σχολὴν ἀναμιμνησκό- P. τ43. μενος ἔγραφον, καὶ ὁσάκις ᾿Αθήναζε ἀφικοίμην, ἐπα- νηρώτων τὸν Σωκράτη ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην, καὶ δεῦρο ἐλθὼν ἐπηνωρθούμην: ὥστε μοι σχεδὸν τι πᾶς ὃ 5 λόγος γέγραπται. a 3 4 / ’ TEP. ᾿Αληθῆ" ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, καὶ μὲν- A ~ 7 ΄ τοι ἀεὶ μέλλων κελεύσειν ἐπιδεῖξαι διατέτριφα δεῦρο. \ ’ a a an 7 + ἀλλὰ τί κωλύει νῦν ἡμᾶς διελθεῖν; TavTMs ἔγωγε να ΤΑΝ [4 7 e 3 >’ na Ὁ καὶ ἀναπαύσασθαι δέομαι, ὡς ἐξ ἀγροῦ ἥκων. (1871) proposed ἔγραψα μέν. But both the middle voice and the particle are idiomatic and expressive. And although μέν at first opposes the written notes to an extempore repe- tition, it is quite Greek, though not quite logical, to utilize it for the minor opposition (with ὕστερον δέ) of the fair copy to the notes or rough draft. 1. ὑπομνήματα] ‘Notes. See Phedr. 275 A, where letters are called ὑπομνήσεως φάρμακον : 10. 276 19. 3. ὃ μὴ ἐμεμνήμην Ξε εἴ τι μὴ ἐμεμνήμην. μή gives indefinite- ness to 6. 6. Αληθῆ" ἤκουσα] The clauses are parallel and not consequent ; hence the ἀσύνδετον. Heindorf’s conjecture, adopted by Schanz, GAN ἤδη ἤκουσά σου καὶ πρότερον, although most ingenious, is less idiomatic than the MS. text. καὶ μέντοι, κ. τ. A.| μέντοι Op- poses Terpsion’s present con- fession to his question in 142 D, which implied ignorance of the story. ‘And, now I think of it, I have always meant to ask you to show it me, but have let opportunities slip till now. That which is really most emphatic is expressed by the participle. It has been objected to this rendering, (a) that δεῦρο is not used as an adverb of time except with μέχρις or ἀεί, (8) that διατρίβειν, meaning ‘to delay,’ could not have been used here without an adverb of place. But, (a) such transference of adverbs from place to time is not un- usual, and it occurs in the case of δεῦρο in Plat. Tim. 21 D: “Hy ἥδε ἡ πόλις ἔπραξε μέν, διὰ δὲ χρόνον καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ἐργα- σαμένων οὐ διήρκεσε δεῦρο ὁ λόγος. In the present passage, the deviation from common use is softened by the neighbourhood of ἀεί. Comp. Aisch. Kum. 596 : Kal δεῦρό γ᾽ det τὴν τύχην οὐ μέμ- φομαι. Such ἃ refinement upon a common phrase is in the manner of Plato. And (8) διατρίβειν is elsewhere used ab- solutely, with a touch of blame in it, as meaning not simply ‘to delay,’ but ‘to waste time.’ See Rep. 5. 472 B: λέγε, καὶ μὴ διάτριβε : Thuc. 7. 42, 43, 47: also Aristoph. Eq. 515: Φησὶ yap ἁνὴρ οὐχ ὑπ᾽ ἀνοίας τοῦτο πεπονθὼς διατρίβειν, Where it occurs together with a par- ticiple, as here. 8. πάντως ἔγωγε .. δέομαι] ‘Besides, as I have walked in from the country, I should in Ρ. 143. OEAITHTO2. 5 EY. ᾿Αλλὰ μὲν δὴ καὶ αὐτὸς μέχρι Epwod Θεαί- Β yf o > ἫΝ 3 a ’ , TNTOV προὔπεμψα, WOTE οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς ἀναπαυοιμην. 3 >» ΚὙἡ i ag “ 3 , ε 4 2 ἀλλ ἰωμεν, καὶ μιν AULA ἀναπαυομένοις ὁ παῖς ανα- / γνώσεται. TEP. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις. EY. Τὸ μὲν δὴ βιβλίον, ὦ Tepiiov, τουτί: ἐγρα- ψάμην δὲ δὴ οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον ὡς διηγεῖτο, ἀλλὰ διαλεγόμενον οἷς ἔφη διαλεχθῆναι. ἔφη δὲ τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ καὶ οτῷ Θεαιτήτῳ. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ μὴ παρέχοιεν πράγματα αἱ μεταξὺ τῶν λόγων διηγήσεις περὶ αὐ- ᾿ τοῦ τε, ὁπότε λέγοι ὃ Σωκράτης οἷον Κἀγὼ ἔφην ἢ any case be glad of a rest.’ This asyndeton is frequent, πάντως having the force of a particle. Infr. 162 A: Πάντως καὶ νῦν δὴ μάλ᾽ ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαί- vero ὑπακούειν. Polit. 268 E: Πάντως ov πολλὰ ἐκφεύγεις παιδιᾶς ἔτη. I. "Epwod] ’Epivedy was a spot onthe Cephisus, close to Eleusis, where it was fabled that Pluto had descended with Proserpine. Paus. 1. 92. There were other places of the name. 3. 6 παῖς] Euclides’ servant. 7. οὐκ ἐμοὶ Σωκράτη διηγούμενον κιτιλ.] These words are parallel tO οὑτωσὶ τὸν λόγον, depending on ἐγραψάμην. Compare Apol. 19 C: Ταῦτα... ἑωρᾶτε... Σωκράτη . . περιφερόμενον. 9. τῷ τε γεωμέτρῃ Θεοδώρῳ] Theodorus the mathematician of Cyrene, with whom, accord- ing to a doubtful tradition, Plato once studied. He is a geometrician, and _ stands thus on the threshold of phi- losophy ; and he is of Cyrene, the city of Aristippus, with whom he may be also connected as being one of the friends of Protagoras. See infr. 164 E: Oi ἐπίτροποι ods Πρωταγόρας κατ- έλιπεν . . ὧν Θεόδωρος εἷς ὅδε. 10. ἵνα οὖν ἐν τῇ γραφῇ, k.7.A. | Imitated by Cicero, de Ατηΐο. c. 1: ‘Quasi enim ipsos induxi loquentes, ne inquam et inquit seepius interponerentur. Teich- miiller finds in these words the transition from the earlier to the later manner of Plato. But this seems to prove too much. See Introduction. 11. αἱ peragd . . διηγήσεις] ‘The bits of narration inter- rupting the dialogue.’ περὶ αὐτοῦ τε] περὶ αὐτοῦ de- pends immediately on διηγήσεις, and ὁπότε λέγοι 1s epexegetic. Editors have preferred αὑτοῦ, placing the comma at διηγήσεις, which makes the syntax more regular, though with an awk- ward inversion. The MSS. often err in reading αὐτοῦ for αὑτοῦ, but it is safer to follow them where there is no mani- fest error. They enter the house, and Eu- clides pro- duces the roll, which his servant ‘reads to 10 them. The Dialogue. Socrates meeting 5 6 MAATONOZ A EN > x 5 4 ee 7 Φὥ Kai ἐγὼ εἶπον, ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου, OTL P. 143. 4 x 3 ε ἰ , oa ε SAN » Συνέφη ἢ Οὐχ ὡμολόγει, τούτων ἐνεκα ὡς αὑτὸν αὖ- ra / 3 Ν \ a τοῖς διαλεγόμενον ἔγραψα, ἐξελὼν τὰ τοιαῦτα. TEP. Καὶ οὐδέν γε ἄπο τρόπου, ὦ ἘΕϊὐκλείδη. EY. ᾿Αλλαά, παῖ, λαβὲ τὸ βιβλίον καὶ λέγε. so. Hi μὲν τῶν ἐν Κυρήνῃ μᾶλλον ἐκηδόμην, νυ 53 / M4 Sn. CS: QR Nae ,ὔ 3 , @ Θεόδωρε, τὰ ἐκει αν σε και πέρι ἐκεινῶν ἀνηρωτῶων, I. ἢ αὖ περὶ τοῦ ἀποκρινομένου] Sc. λέγοι. i, κιτιλ, referring to ὁπότε λέγοι is introduced instead of the regular καί, k.r.A. answer- ing to περὶ αὐτοῦ te. This helps to confirm the reading and punctuation, for the change from καί to # is more natural, if the epexegesis begins. with ὁπότε. ‘The interruptions both concerning Socrates himself,— when he said, for instance, “I remarked,” or “ I replied ;”—or again, when he told of the re- spondent, that “he assented,” or “he did not agree.”’ Op. infr. 203 B. The forms here quoted are commonly reserved for the more emphatic places. in nar- rated dialogue: cp. esp. Rep. 42% B, Prot. 314% D. 4. οὐδέν ye ἄπο τρόπου] Comp. Rep. 5. 470 B: Καὶ οὐδέν γε, ἔφη, ἄπο τρόπου λέγεις. . Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τόδε εἰ πρὸς τρόπου λέγω. Also the emphatic use of the prep. ‘from’ in Elizabethan poetry : e.g. Jul. Ces. 2, 3, ‘Why bird and beast from’ (i.e. contrary to) ‘quality and kind.’ (ἄπο is the Bodleian reading.) 5. λέγε] ‘ Let us.hear.’ Not said facetiously, as Wohlrab supposes, but more vivid and conversational than ἀναγίγνωσκε. In this Preface we have been introduced to Theeetetus as a man already distinguished among his fellow-citizens. In what follows we are to see the promise of his youth. We are told of Thetetus by late writers (besides the fact that he heard Socrates and followed Plato) that he taught mathe- matics at Heracleia, and that he was the author of the first treatise on the five regular solids. The interval which this seems to require between the trial of Socrates and the death | of Thezetetus (to which it is dif- ficult not to suppose an allusion here) increases the uncertainty of the date. But see Intro- duction. 6. Ei pev..] ‘If my heart were in Cyrene. ‘There is an imperfect sequence of clauses, arising out of the interpo- sition of the clause ἧττον yap . ἐπιεικεῖς, The last words form a transition to the main thought, to which the speaker gradually returns. The open- ing is characteristic of Socrates. He begins by putting an ana- logous case, in which the person addressed. is interested. ἡ. τὰ ἐκεῖ dv. , ἀνηρώτων] οὐ ᾿ ΘΕΔΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 7 p. 143. εἴ τινες αὐτόθι περὶ γεωμετρίαν ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλο- i; 5... Νὰ A 4 5 / / . la) δέ σοφίαν εἰσι TMV VEWV ἐπιμέλειαν ποιουμένοι νυν OE © \ xX Ta ἴω ΄- --ἧττον γὰρ ἐκείνους ἢ τούσδε φιλῶ, καὶ μᾶλλον 3 lal 5. / δ te a 4 SAS, » ἐπιθυμῶ εἰδέναι τίνες ἡμῖν τῶν νέων ἐπίδοξοι γενέ- Ψ lad ; a \ 9 ’, nn > of σθαι ἐπιεικεῖς" ταῦτα On αὐτὸς TE σκοπῶ καθ ὁσον , \ \ y 3 an - x e nq \ Ouvvapat, καὶ τοὺς aAAous ἐρωτῶ ols ἂν ὁρῶ τοὺς / id > νέους ἐθέλοντας ξυγγίγνεσθαι. σοὶ δὴ οὐκ ὀλίγιστοι 4 / 57 ἣν ᾿ 57 Ὁ πλησιάζουσι, καὶ δικαίως" ἄξιος γὰρ Ta τε ἄλλα καὶ 7 “ὔ > Χ 5 ats 2 > xs / VEMMET PLAS EVEKA. εἰ δὴ οὖν τινι EVETUXES ἀξίῳ λογου, ἡδέως ἂν πυθοίμην. GEO. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐμοί τε εἰπεῖν καὶ ‘IT should have examined you about things there and persons there.’ ἐκείνων is masc. The Bodleian MS. reads ἄν" ἠρώ- των (sic), in which the repetition of ἄν may be defended by com- paring Rep. 7. 526 C: οὐκ ἂν ῥᾳδίως οὐδὲ πολλὰ ἂν εὕροις. But the other reading, which is supported -by T, is on the whole more probable, and the compound is expressive of the thorough-going,persistent ques- tioning of Socrates. I. ἢ τινα ἄλλην φιλοσοφίαν] ‘Or other liberal pursuit.’ Comp. Tim. 88 C: Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ προσχρώμενοι. This word, like ἐπιστήμη, σοφι- ons and others, is used by Plato sometimes in the more general and familiar, and sometimes in a more restricted and technical sense, 2. νῦν δέ, κι τ. λ.] It makes little difference whethor νῦν δέ is joined immediately with ταῦτα δή, κιτιλ., or With a sup- pressed apodosis of which these words are a resumption. In the latter case we should omit the break with Wohlrab, Schanz and H. Schmidt. 4. tives ἡμῖν τῶν νέων] ἡμῖν (sc. τοῖς ᾿Αθηναίοις) is not em- phatic. The emphasis is anti- cipated in τούσδε. ἡμῖν τῶν νέων... (8.) τ. ὑμῖν τῶν πολιτῶν] Comp. Thue. 1.6: Οἱ πρεσβύτεροι αὐτοῖς τῶν εὐδαι- μόνων. γενέσθαι ἐπιεικεῖς “ΤῸ make a good figure.’ ἐπιεικῆς in Plato seems frequently to mean sim- ply ‘ excellent’ (laudabilis, Ast. Lex.), cp. Legg.12.957A: Ἔστ᾽ ἐν πόλεσιν οὐκ ἀσχήμονα ἐπιεικῶν ἀνδρῶν οὐκ ὀλίγα νομοθετήματα. Symp. 210 Β: Ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπι- εικὴς ὧν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐὰν σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ. Rep. 3. 398 HE: Αχρηστοι γὰρ καὶ γυναιξὶν ἃς δεῖ ἐπιεικεῖς εἶναι, μὴ ὅτι ἀνδράσιν. (Cp. 387 E: Τυναιξὶ δὲ ἀποδιδοῖμεν, καὶ οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις.). ᾿ 8. ἄξιος γάρ] The adjective receives greater emphasis by the omission of the substantive verb. Comp. Soph. Cid. Col. 758: Tyvde τὴν πόλιν φίλως Εἰ- Tov, ἐπαξία yap. Also Rep.6. 499 D : Περὶ τούτου ἕτοιμοι (86. ἐσμὲν) τῷ λόγῳ διαμάχεσθαι. 11. ereivrefers to λόγου 1]. 9. lO Theodorus in an Athe- nian pale- stra, asks what youth of promise he has met with, not in Cyrene, but in Athens. Theodo- rus speaks warmly in praise of Theete- tus, who, though not beautiful, ἡ is at once bold and gentle and intelligent, a rare com- bination ! Like a stream of oil, flowing smoothly and swiftly without a murmur, σι δ ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ 2 A 4 57 Φ εκ a A ‘ σοὶ ἀκοῦσαι πάνυ ἄξιον, οἰῳ υὑμιν τῶν πολιτῶν μεῖι- p. 143: , 3 , Ny 9 \ 3 Χ J 3 / ρακιῷ ἐντετυχηκα. καὶ εἰ μεν ἣν καλὸς, εφοβουμην Ἂ ΄ 4 \ / 7 3 / 3 σι ἂν σφόδρα λέγειν, μὴ καί τῷ δόξω ἐν ἐπιθυμίᾳ αὐτοῦ 3 : an 7 Q , yf 3 y / εἶναι" νῦν δέ, καὶ μὴ μοι ἄχθου, οὐκ ἐστι καλος, ’ Ἂν Q / [2 4 N yA an TT POO EOLKE δὲ σοὶ THY TE σιμοτητα Καὶ TO ἔξω των 3 4 ομματων" @ XV oN AY ana > Φ ϑ a Ἀ ’ὕ ἧττον δὲ ἢ σὺ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει. ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. 3 Ν of “ χὰ Nt 7 See \ i“ εὖ yap ἰσθι ort ὧν δὴ πώποτε ενετυχον, καὶ πανυ τ / , 9 ’ πολλοῖς πεπλησίακα, οὐδένα πω ἡἠσθόμην οὕτω A 95) ’ θαυμαστῶς εὖ πεφυκότα. 3. μὴ καί τῳ δόξω] The ex- pression is softened by the im- personal τῳ. ‘Lest it should be thought.’ This indirect re- ference to persons is common in Plato, as in other Greek. Cp. infr. 175 B: Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα εν ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, Viz. τὸν δικανικὸν ἐκεῖνον, Pheed. 63 A: ᾿Αεὶ ὁ Κέ- βης λόγους τινὰς ἀνερευνᾷ, sc. ἐμοὺς. 4. καὶ μή μοι ἄχθου] καί in- troduces what is suddenly in- terposed. Comp. 1. 7, and Gorg. 486 A: Καίτοι, ὦ φίλε Σώκρατες---καί μοι μηδὲν ἀχθεσθῆ ς" εὐνοίᾳ γὰρ ἐρῶ τῇ σῇ----οὐκ αἰσχ- ρὸν δοκεῖ σοι, κιτιλ. The out- line of the sentence is εἰ μὲν ἦν..., ἐφοβούμην ἂν... viv δὲ... οὔκ ἐστι..." ἀδεῶς δὴ λέγω. δή has an illative force=‘ where- fore.’ In οὔκ ἐστι the sentence breaks from the subordinate form. Cp. Euthyphr. τα C: καὶ εἰ μὲν... σκώμματος. 5. τήν τε σιμότητα καὶ τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων] This passage and the speech of Alcibiades in the Symposium, p. 215 : Ὅτι μὲν τὸ εἶδος ὅμοιος εἶ τούτοις (τοῖς Σειλη- vois.. καὶ τῷ Μαρσύᾳ) οὐδ᾽ αὐτὸς δή που ἀμφισβητήσεις----ἃγΘ the chief allusions to Socrates’ per- sonal appearance in Plato. Cp. infr, 209 C: Τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ Ν. A » ὌΝ WE ε τὸ yap εὑμαθὴ ὄντα, ὡς ἐξόφθαλμον. An imitation of this passage occurs in the Sym- posium attributed to Xenophon, 6. δ΄. τὸ ἔξω τῶν ὀμμάτων] (1) ‘In having prominent eyes.’ So this point in the description of Socrates has been commonly understood. But may it not rather mean (2) ‘in the width between the eyes,—a confor- mation sometimes accompany- ing a powerful brain? This suits with the τὠφθαλμὼ παραβάλλων of Aristophanes quoted by Plato in Symp. 221 B (ep. Phed. 86 D), As ἔξω γα} the article takes the place of an adjective, so it is used here, like a neuter ad- jective, for the abstract notion of ‘outwardness.’ Cp. τὸ σφόδρα, Symp. 210 B, Phil. 45 C. 9. τὸ yap εὐμαθῆ ὄντα... γιγνο- μένου] The anacoluthon adds to the expression of surprise. Comp. Protag. 317 A: Τὸ οὖν ἀποδιδράσκοντα μὴ δύνασθαι ἀπο- δρᾶναι, ἀλλὰ καταφανῇ εἶναι, πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Parm. 128 B: Τὸ οὖν, , οὕτως ἑκάτε- ρον λέγειν ὥστε μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν εἰρηκέναι δοκεῖν σχεδόν τι λέ- yovras ταὐτά, ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἄλλους φαίνεται ὑμῖν τὰ εἰρημένα εἰρῆσθαι. ὡς ἄλλῳ χαλεπόν] The simple Ρ. 144. OEAITHTOS. | 9 / 35 a 3 5 , a. 3 § : ἧς 144. ἄλλῳ χάλεπον, 7 PQOv av ELVQAL διαφερόντως, Και επι 7 ΕῚ lal a 9 « ΄“- 3 Ν (νὰ YS 9 nN TOUTOLS ἀνδρεῖον παρ οντινουν, ἐγὼ MEV OUT αν 97 J 6 +f ε lal , ᾿ Don “ φΟμὴν γένεσ αι OUTE ορῶ γίγνομενους α Ol TE 3 a σ Ὁ XN 3 7 Ν / ε \ ὀξεῖς ὥσπερ οὗτος Kal ἀγχίνοι καὶ μνήμονες ὡς τὰ \ x ἊΝ ἂν > \ > / Ἂν 5 \ wy TOAAG καὶ πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποί εἰσι, καὶ ATTOV- and obvious meaning of these words, ‘as it is hard for an- other to be,’ i.e. ‘in a degree hardly to be equalled,’ has been questioned by critics because it was thought that χαλεπόν could not be applied to qualities that are not acquired. But the _ word is not tied down to this preciseness of meaning. It has passed out of it even in Homer. Cp.Od. 11.156: Χαλεπὸν δὲ τάδε ζωοῖσιν ὁρᾶσθαι (which may be similarly explained as=xane- πόν ἐστι τοὺς ζωοὺς τάδε ὁρᾶσθαι). So elsewhere in Plato χαλεπός occurs where human agency is not in question to signify ‘next to impossible.’ See Rep. 6. 502 C:; Χαλεπὰ γενέσθαι, οὐ μέντοι ἀδύ- vara ye—viz, that philosophers should be kings, a consumma- tion requiring, as a precedent condition, the combination of qualities which is indicated here. What Plato would think of this grammatical refinement may be inferred from his eari- cature of it in the Protagoras, 344 E: Σὺ δὲ dys, ὦ Πίττακε, χαλεπὸν ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι" τὸ δὲ... ἀδύνατον. 3. γενέσθαι (τοιοῦτόν τινα), “1 should not have thought there could have been an instance of this combination, nor do I find it usual.’ γιγνομένους Se. τοιούτους. Cf. Rep. 6.492 E: Οὔτε γὰρ γίγνεται οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτ᾽ οὖν μὴ γένηται ἀλλοῖον ἦθος, κ. T,X. GXN’ of τέ, KT. Δ. The thought is exactly paralleled in the Republic, where the same combination of qualities is described as essential to the philosophic nature, and its rarity is dwelt upon in similar words. Rep. 6. 503 C: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι Ν > “ a 3 ey > 47 kal ὀξεῖς οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν [τὰ ’, Ν , A ἅμα φύεσθαι καὶ νεανικοί τε καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τὰς διανοίας, οἷοι κοσμίως μετὰ ἡσυχίας καὶ βεβαιό- τητος ἐθέλειν ζῆν, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ τοιοῦτοι C2 eS , te τ “Δ , um ὀξύτητος φέρονται ὅπῃ ἂν τύ- χωσι, καὶ τὸ βέβαιον ἅπαν αὐτῶν > a »»ἤὔ Ἀληθῆ, ἔφη, Οὐκοῦν τὰ βέβαια αὖ ταῦτα ἤθη καὶ ἐξοίχεται. λέγεις. οὐκ εὐμετάβολα, οἷς τις μᾶλλον ὡς πιστοῖς χρήσαιτο, καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ πρὸς τοὺς φόβους δυσκίνητα ὄντα, πρὸς τὰς μαθήσεις αὖ ποιεῖ ταὐτόν, δυσκινήτως ἔχει καὶ δυσμαθῶς, καὶ ὕπνου τε καὶ χάσμης ἐμπίπλανται, ὅταν τι δέῃ τοιοῦτον διαπονεῖν ; So the difficulty of combining bravery with gentleness is dwelt upon, ib. 375, 6. See also Polit. 309, 310, Lege. 6.773. The essentials of the philosophic nature enumerated in the 6th Book of the Republic are, love of truth, quickness in learning, good memory, liberality, justice and gentleness, temperance, courage. Thestetus is the embodiment of this nature. 4. ὀξεῖς] ‘Quick.’ Cp. Rep. 6.5030: Εὐμαθεῖς καὶ μνήμονες καὶ ἀγχίνοι καὶ d&eis—quoted above. 5. πρὸς τὰς ὀργὰς ὀξύρροποι] ‘Impetuous.’ ‘ Quick in temper as In mind.’ 10 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ ’ 4 \ , A τες φέρονται ὥσπερ τὰ ἀνερματιστα πλοῖα, καὶ μανι- p. τ44. jy 9 ’ / Ψ 3 9 Β K@TEPOL ἢ ἀνδρειότεροι φύονται, οἱ τε αὖ ἐμβριθεστε- a Ν ti f pot νωθροί πως ἀπαντῶσι πρὸς Tas μαθήσεις καὶ λή- / ε δι “ 4 / Ν Ons γέμοντες. ὁ δὲ οὕτω λείως τε καὶ ἀπταίστως καὶ σι 3 , y SEEN \ / Ν / ἀνυσίμως ἔρχεται ἐπὶ Tas μαθήσεις τε Kal ζητήσεις \ “ / - 5 , το κα 3 Ν μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος, οἷον ἐλαίου ῥεῦμα ἀψοφητὶ Cf ἘΚ / \ las BA “ βέοντος, wate θαυμάσαι τὸ τηλικοῦτον ὄντα οὕτω an , ταῦτα διαπράττεσθαι. 2Q. Ed ἀγγέλλεις. τίνος δὲ καὶ ἔστι τῶν πολι- 10 τῶν 3 > / \ , ’ \ 3 πος ΘΕΟ. ᾿Ακήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημονεύω δὲ οὔ. phronius of ἀλλὰ νάρ ἐστι τῶνδε TO ) 5 ἐν τῷ μέσῳ. cee λλα yap ἐστι τῶνδε τῶν προσιόντων ὃ EV τῷ METG now enters BY 4 \ > nan ; 7 > 7 ε a 7 ’ὔ αρτι yap ἐν Τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ ηλείφοντο ETALPOL TE τινες 2. φύονται] Rep. 6. 503 C: Οὐκ ἐθέλουσι. . φύεσθαι. * Have more the nature of madmen than of courageous men.’ 3. λήθης γέμοντες] Βρρ.6.486 C: Εἰ μηδὲν ὧν μάθοι σώζειν δύ- ναιτο, λήθης ὧν πλέως, ap’ ἂν οἷός τ᾽ εἴη ἐπιστήμης μὴ κενὸς εἶναι. 5. ἀνυσίμως | ‘ Successfully’ — ‘Making rapid progress.’ ἡ. ὥστε θαυμάσαι] Soph. El. 394: Καλὸς γὰρ οὑμὸς βίοτος, ὥστε θαυμάσαι. Aristoph. Plut. 810: Τὰ σκευάρια πλήρη ᾿στίν, By an expan- sion, the particular cause of wonder is here expressed and made to depend on θαυμάσαι. 9. καί asks for further in- formation. 11. ᾿Ακήκοα μὲν τοὔνομα, μνημο- νεύω δὲ οὔ] Theodorus takes the interest of a teacher in the youth himself, Socrates that of a fellow-citizen in his father. 12. ἀλλὰ γάρ ἐστι... ἀλλὰ σκό- wet] This double ἀλλά is fre- quent in Plato. Comp. also Soph. Phil. 520: ᾿Αλλ᾽ αἰσχρὰ el ff WOTE θαυμάσαι. μέντοι σοῦ γ᾽ ἔμ᾽ ἐνδεέστερον | ξένῳ φανῆναι πρὸς τὸ καίριον πονεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δοκεῖ, πλέωμεν. Thesecond ἀλλά puts definitely forward the proposition for which the first ἀλλά has cleared the way. 13. ἐν τῷ ἔξω δρόμῳ] The scene then is a gymnasium, perhaps the Lyceum. Compare Euthyphr. 2 A: 30 ras ἐν Λυκείῳ καταλιπὼν διατριβὰς ἐνθάδε νῦν διατρίβεις περὶ τὴν τοῦ βασι- λέως στοάν ; taken in connection with infr. 210 DD: Nips ἀπαντητέον μοι εἰς τὴν τοῦ βασι- λέως στοάν. Theodorus had seen the young men in the portico as he entered. The word δρόμος seems to have been applied to several parts of the gymnasium. Euthyd. 273 A: Ἔν τῷ καταστέγῳ δρόμῳ. (See the whole passage.) Aristias ap. Polluc. 9. 43: "Hy po παλαίστρα καὶ δρόμος ξυστὸς πέλας. Archeologists are not agreed as to the exact part of the pa- lestra which is here indicated. ἑταῖροί τέ τινες] One of these, OEAITHTOS. 11 ® 3 A \ 2S κι / κ᾿ 3 4 Ρ. 144. οὗτοι αὐτοῦ καὶ αὑτὸς, νῦν δέ μοι δοκοῦσιν ἀλειψα- A 37 3 Ἀ , 9 / > Sf μενοι δεῦρο ἰέναι. ἀλλὰ σκόπει εἰ γιγνώσκεις AUTOV. LQ. Γιγνώσκω" ὃ τοῦ Σουνιέως Evdpoviov ἐστί, ιν , 5 7, 3 Ν - ἂν \ γι Καὶ 7TQVU γξ, [2] φίλε, ἀνδρὸς OLOV Καὶ συ Τοῦτο» διη- la) \ »7 Σ / \ Ke Ν 3 / , yel, καὶ ἄλλως εὐδοκίμου, καὶ μέντοι καὶ οὐσίαν μᾶλα Χ / \. yw 7 3 2 a , πολλὴν κατέλιπε. τὸ δ᾽ ὄνομα οὐκ οἶδα τοῦ μειρακίου. 3 My / of \ D ΘΕΟ. Θεαίτητος, ὦ Σώκρατες, TO γε ὄνομα τὴν , 3. ἡ) ΗΝ ἈΠῈ / ΄ μέντοι οὐσίαν δοκοῦσί μοι ἐπίτροποί τινες διεφθαρκέ- » LN Ὁ ἣν Ν δ a ΄ » ναι" ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως καὶ πρὸς τὴν τῶν χρημάτων ἐλευθε- / a V4 ριότητα θαυμαστὸς, ὦ Σώκρατες. \ Ν ΨΚ / OQ. Γεννικὸν λέγεις τὸν ἄνδρα. Kai μοί κέλευε αὐτὸν ἐνθάδε παρακαθίζεσθαι. ΘΕΌ. Ἔσται ταῦτα. Kparn. Θεαίτητε, δεῦρο παρὰ Σω- , κ᾿ 5 5 , Ψ τας Ss κ LQ. avy μὲν οὖν, ὠ Θεαίτητε, wa kayo ἐμαυτὸν > /, al yf \ Ψ' Ν \ ἀνασκέψωμαι, ποῖον TL ἔχω TO πρόσωπον. φησὶ yap Θ ὃ ΕΒ \ ὦ ἌΝ 3 “ ΝΕ Z εο ῶρος εχέιν με σοι ομοιον. aTap ει νῷν εχόντοιν ε l4 / y SN e / € / / εκατέρου λύραν epn αὐτὰς ἡρμόσθαι ὁμοίως, πότερον 3 \ A 3 / x 3 , 9 ἃ 9 Ἂς εὐθυς ἂν ἐπιστεύομεν ἢ ἐπεσκεψαμεθ ἂν εἰ μουσικὸς x 4 ὧν λέγει ; Νέος Σωκράτης, is named in this dialogue, and is an interlocutor in the Politicus. The others remain mute. Such κῶφα πρό- σώπα occur in many dialogues ; e.g. Lysias, Charmantides, etc., in the Republic. Observe the idiomatic use of δοκεῖν here and infr, D, Cp. supr. 142°C. 4. καὶ πάνυ] καί is intensive. 5. kat μέντοι] ‘And surely, now I think of 10... This is a reason why the youth should have been better known. The construction returns to the in- dicative. 9. ἐλευθεριότητα] Rep. 6.485 . , ei : Kat μήν που καὶ τόδε δεῖ σκοπεῖν, ὅταν κρίνειν μέλλῃς ψυχὴν φιλόσοφόν τε καὶ μή. Τὸ ποῖον : Μή σε λάθῃ μετέχουσα ἀνελευ- θερίας. 11. τὸν ἄνδρα] Not μειράκιον. ‘He must be a capital fellow.’ καί, as elsewhere, adds a touch of earnestness to the im- perative. 13. Θεαίτητε] The abrupt vo- cative, without ὦ, 15 the address of the master to the pupil. E5. κἀγώ] καί is to be taken closely with ἵνα and the verb. Cf. Soph. Antig. 280): Παῦσαι, πρὶν ὀργῆς κἀμὲ μεστῶσαι λέγων (where join πρὶν καὶ μεστῶσαι). LQ. εἰ μουσικὸς dv λέγει] The σι Io 20 the gym- nasium with some compan- ions. Theo- dorus adds that, al- though im- poverished, the youth is most liberal. He is made to sit by So- crates. They con- verse. ‘If Theo- dorus were a draughts- man, he would be an autho- rity on the subject of our per- sonal ap- pearance, ‘As heisa cultivated man, we must re- spect his judgment of our mental en- dowments. 5 10 15 20 12 MAATONOZ OEAI. ᾿Επεσκεψαμεθ᾽ av. LQ. Οὐκοῦν τοιοῦτον μὲν εὑρόντες ἐπειθόμεθ᾽ av, a» 7 > a ἄμουσον δέ, ἡπιστοῦμεν 5 ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. ΣΩ, Νῦν δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι, εἴ τι μέλει ἡμῖν τῆς τῶν , ε , (2 x Ἃ 4 προσώπων ὁμοιότητος, σκεπτέον εἰ γραφικὸς ὧν λέγει P. 145. x » ἢ οὐ. OEAI. Δοκεῖ μοι. ΣΩ. Ἦ οὖν ζωγραφικὸς Θεόδωρος ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ody, ὅσον γ᾽ ἐμὲ εἰδέναι. DQ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός ; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάντως δή που, ὦ Σώκρατες. 5) Ν / >Q. Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικὸς καὶ λογιστικὸς TE καὶ Χ 7 / 4 μουσικὸς καὶ ὅσα παιδείας ἔχεται 5 ΘΕΑΙ. "“Eporye δοκεῖ. SQ. Ei μὲν ἄρα ἡμᾶς τοῦ σώματός τι ὁμοίους Ν ἊΣ 3 a Ἃ 7 3 Z ‘9, ues φησὶν εἶναι ἐπαινῶν πῃ ἢ Ψέγων, ov πάνυ αὐτῷ 327) Ἂν ΄σ΄' Ψ ἄξιον TOV νουν προσέχειν. ΘΈΑΙ. Ἴσως οὔ. A Ν ΣΩ. Τί δ᾽, εἰ ποτέρου τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπαινοῖ πρὸς 5 man then is not the measure of the likeness of musical sounds ! Yet afterwards Theetetus 15 wholly unconscious of contra- dicting this his first admission. I. ᾿Επεσκεψάμεθ' ἀν] Cp. esp. Crit. 47 B: Γυμναζόμενος ἀνὴρ καὶ τοῦτο πράττων πότερον παντὸς ἀν- δρὸς ἐπαίνῳ καὶ ψόγῳ καὶ δόξῃ τὸν νοῦν προσέχει, ἢ ἑνὸς μόνου ἐκείνου, ὃς ἂν τυγχάνῃ ἰατρὸς ἢ παιδοτρίβης av; Lach. 184 DE. το. Οὔχ, ὅσον γ᾽ ἐμὲ εἰδέναι] The Cesena MS., with a few others, has γ᾽ ἐμέ, but the greatest number (including the Bodl.) read γέ pe. ἐμέ seems more pointed, ‘not that 7 know of, but pe is possibly right. II. "Ap οὐδὲ γεωμετρικός ; | ‘Nor a geometrician, neither, eh?’ There is an archness in the question, which affects to make doubtful what is matter of notoriety. 13. Ἦ καὶ ἀστρονομικός] ‘tT wonder if he is also an astro- nomer.’ 20. εἰ ποτέρου] ‘The mind of one of us two.’ The indefinite πότερος occurs several times in Plato. Cp. Soph. 252 A: Ἔσται" πότερον αὐτῶν, οὐσίας μὴ προσκοινώνουν; Though not common in other writers, it is precisely analogous to the SEAITHTOS. 13 I 3 ;ἬἭ . ‘ pi ΤΣ. 3 LE a ὲ ᾽ “th Ῥ. 145. QApPeTHV TE Καὶ σοφιαν AP οὐκ αςίον T@ μεν ακοὺυ σαντι προθυμεῖσθαι ἀνασκέψασθαι τὸν ἐπαινεθέντα, o \ i ε δὰ > 4 τῷ δὲ προθύμως ἑαυτὸν ἐπιδεικνύναι ; \ a ΓῚ ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. LQ. Ὥρα τοίνυν, & φίλε Θεαίτητε, σοὶ μὲν ἐπι- “ 3 / δεικνύναι, ἐμοὶ δὲ σκοπεῖσθαι: ὡς εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι Θεό- ἡ N Ψ 2 / Swpos πολλοὺς δὴ πρός με ἐπαινέσας E€vous τε καὶ 3 ἐν 8. Α 9. ὦ e \ a / ἀστοὺς οὐδένα πω ἐπήνεσεν WS GE νῦν On. ΘΕΑΙ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι, ὦ Σώκρατες" ἀλλ᾽ ὅρα μὴ / y+ c παίζων ἔλεγεν. ΣΩ, Οὐχ οὗτος ὁ τρόπος Θεοδώρου: ἀλλὰ μὴ Cee! / δὴ ς 4 , 7 ’ὔ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα σκηπτόμενος παίζοντα λέ- Ui ¢ δ a a , ae τόνδε, ἵνα μὴ Kal en aero πάντως γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ. ἀλλὰ ers ἔμμενε TH ὁμολογίᾳ. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ χρὴ ταῦτα ποιεῖν, εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ. ΣΩ, Λέγε δή μοι' μανθάνεις που παρὰ Θεοδώρου , y γεωμετρίας ATTA 5 indefinite use of τὶς, πού, ποθέν, etc. 9. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι] ‘That is good !’—‘T am glad to hear it. Or rather, perhaps, more hypothetically, ‘It is well, if it is so. For (1) cp. Menex. 249 EH: Χάριν ἔχω τῷ εἰπόντι. Σ. Εὖ ἂν ἔχοι. ἀλλ᾽ ὅπως μου μὴ karepets. And for (2) Polit. 277 A: Κινδυνεύει τέλεως ἂν ἡμῖν ἔχειν. Σ. Καλῶς ἄν, ὦ &., ἡμῖν ἔχοι. δεῖ δὲ μὴ σοὶ μόνῳ ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ κἀμοὶ----ξυνδοκεῖν. 11. μὴ ἀναδύου τὰ ὡμολογημένα] ‘Do not shrink from what you have agreed to.’ Cp. Hom. 1]. 13. 225: Οὔτε tis ὄκνῳ Εἴκων ἀνδύεται πολέμου κακοῦ. Huthyd. 302 EH: Οὐκ ἔστι γάρ μοι ἀνά- δυσις, 14. ἐπισκήψει αὐτῷ] ‘ Will be found to impugn him.’ The verb ἐπισκήπτειν, to accuse of murder or false witness (φόνου, ψευδομαρτυρίων), is commonly found in the middle voice, be- cause the accuser in such cases is generally an interested party. The passage of Aeschines contr. Timarch., formerly quoted in support of the active, is found to have the middle in the best MSS., and Wohlrab tries to substantiate a different mean- ing here, while Schanz writes ἐπισκήψετ᾽ αὐτῷ from conjecture. Neither is really necessary. 17. μανθάνεις] There is a stress upon the word, preparing for what follows. Io 15 ‘ Therefore, Theetetus, you must be cate- chized by me; for he has praised you to me very highly. ‘You learn from Theo- dorus seve- ral things. ‘ To learn is to become wiser. To be wise is to know. ‘What, then, is Know- ledge 2” 5 Xa , το σθαι περὶ ὃ μανθάνει τις 5 15 20 14 ΘΈΑΙ. Ἤγωγε: NAATQNOZ Ρ. 145. ΣΩ K te ea) Ν 3 , Q e ’ . αι τῶν TE pl ATT POVOLLLAV TE Και αρμονιᾶφ D Ν ’ καὶ λογισμους : ΘΕΑΙ. Προθυμοῦμαί γε δή. SS Ν » UZ 3 a ’ ’ὔ - Q 3 ΣΏ. Καὶ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ παῖ, παρὰ γε τούτου καὶ πὰρ 5, ἃ Δ 57 ? , 3 fe 9 5 ὦ ἄλλων, OVS ἂν οἰωμαὶ τι τουτῶν ἐπαιειν. ἀλλ ὁμῶς, \ \ yf » “ Ν S59N / Ν V4 τὰ μὲν ἄλλα ἐχω᾽ περὶ αὑτὰ METPLOS, μικρον δέ τι > a ἃ Ἧ A Ν “ 4 ’ ATTOP@, O μέτα σου TE Και τῶνδε σκέπτεον. Καὶ μοὲ 7 53. 9 ’ Ν iY 3 ἈΝ BS) V4 4 λέγε: ap οὐ TO pavOavery ἐστὶ TO σοφώτερον γιίγνε- ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὔ: ,ὔ Pr aee 5 SS e [4 TQ. Σοφίᾳ δέ γ᾽ οἶμαι σοφοὶ οἱ σοφοι. OEAI. Ναί. SOQ. Τοῦτο δὲ μῶν διαφέρει τι ἐπιστήμης ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; x a TQ. Ἡ σοφία. ἢ οὐχ ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα Ν 7 καὶ ToDo ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ti μήν; SQ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἐπιστήμη καὶ co ia: ρ UT ad | 9 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. Aad A Es Pe ἃ ww , SOQ. Τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ τοΐνυν ἐστὶν ὃ ἀπορῶ καὶ ov δὺ- 2. τῶν περὶ ἀστρονομίαν] “ Α- stronomy, and what relates to it,’ 4. Προθυμοῦμαί ye δή] “1 cer- tainly do my endeavour.’ He is more modest about these higher subjects. 5. παρά ye τούτου] ye (the MS. reading) may be defended : ‘certainly when I have such a master,’ referring to προθυμοῦ- pa: althongh τε, the correction of Heindorf, which is supported by the version of Ficinus, per- haps reads more harmonious- ly; and the change is slight. Cp. Crat. 384 E. 6. GAN’ ὅμως, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα... μικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ For the parataxis cp. Rep. 2. 367 Εἰ: Kal ἐγὼ ἀκούσας, det μὲν δὴ--- ἠγάμην, ἄταρ οὖν καὶ τότε πάνυ γε ἥσθην. 7. For the ironical μικρόν τι cp. Charm. 154 Ὁ. τό. ἅπερ ἐπιστήμονες, ταῦτα καὶ σοφοί] For the indefinite plural cp. Georg. 457 C: Οὐ ῥᾳδίως δύνανται---διορισάμενοι πρὸς ἀλλή- λους οὕτω διαλύεσθαι τὰς συνου- σίας. And for the sense ep. Xen. Mem. 4. 6. 7: Ὃ ἄρα ἐπίσταται ἕκαστος, ταῦτα kat σοφός ἐστιν, E OEAITHTOS. 15 4 BY x Ne A x 5 “ Ee 4 (4 7 Ρ. 145. ναμαι λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ ἐμαυτῷ, Ἐψπτιστημη O τί ποτε , δ, ἥν ee 5 \ 5 Ne ΟΡ, , Ρ. 146. τυγχάνει ον. ap οὖν δὴ εχομεν λέγειν αὐτὸ: τί ͵ , x e ἴω ΄σ ΕΣ ε \ ε 7 φατε: τις αν ἡμῶν πρῶτος εἰποι: 0 δὲ αμαρτῶν, ὰ Ἃ TOM e ’ὔ a a \ e και OS QV GEL ἀμαρτανῇῃ; καθεδεῖται, ὠσπερ φασὶν οἱ a e ,ὔ 4 ὰ 5, aN / παῖδες οἱ σφαιρίζοντες, ὄνος. ὃς δ᾽ ἂν περιγένηται σι 5) , “4 e las AG 7 od A ἀναμάρτητος, βασιλεύσει ἡμῶν καὶ ἐπιτάξει OTL ἂν 7 3 ’ / “a 4 , > βούληται ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Ti σιγᾶτε; ov Ti που, ὦ A pause. , Ἀ Ν M4 / Θεόδωρε, ἐγὼ ὑπὸ φιλολογίας ἀγροικίζομαι, mpobv- ᾽ὔ Gacy o \ / μούμενος ἡμᾶς ποιῆσαι διαλεγεσθαι καὶ φίλους τε Q Up 3 4 ’ καὶ προσηγόρους ἀλλήλοις γίγνεσθαι ; 10 Υ , 5 7’, Ν a x B ΘΕΟ. “Hora μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸ τοιοῦτον ἂν ΠΟ » ϑ \ a 7) / , 3 εἰ ἄγροικον, ἀλλὰ τῶν μειρακίων TL κέλευε σοι ἀπο- , Sy ON \ \ 3. a , κρίνεσθαι. ἐγὼ μὲν yap ἀήθης τῆς τοιαύτης δια- ’ 3 53 ,ὕ »ὔ a λεκτου, καὶ οὐδ᾽ ad συνεθίζεσθαι ἡλικίαν ἔχω. τοῖσδε I. λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς] adequately.’ conception of,’ λαβεῖν ἱκανῶς παρ᾽ ἐμαυτῷ] Phileb. 50 D: Λαβόντα δὲ τοῦτο παρὰ σαυτῷ ἀφεῖναί με, κιτ.λ. 3. ὁ d€.. ἁμαρτάνῃ] ‘ But he who makes a blunder, or who- ever is in error from time to time.’ 4. καθεδεῖται... ὄνος] Schol. Τῶν οὖν παιζόντων ταῦτα τοὺς μὲν νικῶντας βασιλεῖς ἐκάλουν, καὶ 6 τι ἂν προσετάττον τοῖς ἄλλοις ὑπή- κουον, τοὺς δὲ ἡττωμένους ὄνους. ΠΡ: Το Ep, τ. 1. 59: ‘At pueri ludentes, Rex eris, aiunt, Si recte facies.’ ‘ Mant. Prov. 1. 34: βασιλεὺς ἢ ὄνος" ἤγουν νικῶν ἢ ἡττώμενος. Wohlrab. 9. ἡμᾶς] So the Bodleian MS. Others (including Ces.) have ὑμᾶς by a common error. The first person is obviously more in keeping with the ur- banity of Socrates. b..50, mpoonydpovs | The active ‘To grasp ‘To get a clear and passive meanings are com- bined. ‘ Mutually conversable.’ Cp. Republic 8. 546 C: Πάντα mpoonyopa καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν. ‘There is possibly an allusion to the mathematical meaning here: ‘to make you friends, and bring you into relations with one another.’ Cp. Republic 7.534 Ὁ: ᾿Αλόγους ὄντας ὥσπερ γραμμάς, and the phrases Σύμφωνα καὶ ποτάγορα,---- Ὅμοια καὶ ποτάγορα, in later Py- thagorean writings. II. pev is omitted in T. 12. τῶν μειρακίων τι] Steph. conj. τινά, which is also found as a correction in one MS., but ep. Euthyd. 277 D: Τνοὺς βαπ- τιζόμενον τὸ μειράκιον, βουλόμενος ἀναπαῦσαι αὐτό. 13. διαλέκτου] ‘Conversation,’ with something of the more technical meaning of ‘ abstract discussion.’ Cp. Republic 5. 454 A: ἜΡριδι, οὗ διαλέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. Thesetetus is at length encouraged to attempt an answer. ‘Geometry and other branches of education, shoe-mak- ing and the other use- ful arts, all and each of these is know- ledge.’ But these are many and vari- ous; know- 16 MAATONOZ \ , x a \ an a δὲ πρέποι τε ἂν τοῦτο Kal πολὺ πλεῖον ἐπιδιδοῖεν" P. 146. “- Ν A ε / 9 ζω 5 (ὃ yy Be: Τῷ yap οντί ἢ VEOTNHS εἰς παν ETTLOOOLY EXEL, ἃ 9 a 3, a ὥσπερ ἤρξω, μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα. SOQ. ᾿Ακούεις δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἃ λέγει Θεόδωρος, Ὁ >’ ἴω e ΩΝ 3 ΕΥ \ ’ ’ δ 5@ ἀπιστεῖν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὔτε συ ἐθελήσεις, οὔτε © θέ \ x a >’ \ ΠῚ ’ 7 εμις τέρι τὰ TOLAVTA ἀνδρὶ σοφῷ EMLTATTOVTL VED τερον ἀπειθεῖν. ἀλλ᾽ εὖ καὶ γενναίως εἰπέ: τί σοι δο-- a 3 3 , κεῖ εἶναι ETLOTHEN § ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ χρή, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐπειδήπερ ὑμεῖς θώσετε. 7 7 V4 δ᾽ ν e ’ : 3 10 κελεύετε. πάαντῶς γάρ, AV TL Καὶ ἁμάρτω, επτανορ- ΣΩ, Πάνυ μὲν οὖν, ἄν πέρ γε οἷοί τε ὦμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ τοίνυν μοι καὶ ἃ παρὰ Θεοδώρου ἄν iA 3 A 53 , x aA a Ν τις μάθοι ἐπιστῆμαι εἶναι, γεωμετρία τε καὶ ἃς νῦν δὴ \ a 5 / \ a / τ σὺ διῆλθες, καὶ αὖ σκυτοτομικὴ TE καὶ al τῶν ἄλλων Ῥ ἴω - ΄ / KS 7 ’ > δημιουργῶν τέχναι, πᾶσαι TE καὶ EKATTN τούτων, οὐκ y x 93 / 5 ἄλλο τι ἢ ἐπιστημὴ εἰναι. ΣΏ. Γενναίως γε καὶ φιλοδώρως, ὦ φίλε, ἕν αἰτη- θεὶς πολλὰ δίδως καὶ ποικίλα ἀντὶ ἁπλοῦ. 2. ἐπίδοσιν ἔχει] Rep. 7. 536 Ὁ : Σόλωνι γὰρ οὐ πειστέον, ὡς γηράσκων τις πολλὰ δυνατὸς μαν- θάνειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἧττον ἢ τρέχειν, νέων δὲ πάντες οἱ μεγάλοι καὶ οἱ πολλοὶ πόνοι. 3. μὴ ἀφίεσο τοῦ Θεαιτήτου, ἀλλ᾽ ἐρώτα] Cp. Lach. 184 C: Χρὴ δ᾽ ὅπερ σοι ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔλεγον, καὶ Σωκράτη τόνδε μὴ ἀφιέναι, ἀλλὰ δεῖσθαι συμβουλεύειν. Rep. 5. 449 C. 5-7. ἀπιστεῖν, ‘to disobey ;’ ἀπειθεῖν, ‘to be disobedient.’ 5. οὔτε Ocuis.. νεώτερον ἀπει- θεῖν] Instead of making ἀπιστεῖν depend on θέμις, a new clause is introduced expressing the par- ticular points in this disobedi- ence which make it unlawful. The like change occurs often in Plato, and is part of the fulness of his style. See above, 144 B: Ὥστε θαυμάσαι, x.7.r., and note. 10. πάντως γάρ, κιτ.λ.] Thes- tetus is not yet alive to the dif- ficulty of the subject. He is sure that Theodorus and So- crates have entire command of it. 14--:ῆ. ἐπιστῆμαι .. ἐπιστήμη] Thesetetus does not distinguish between ‘sciences’ and ‘sci- ence. Grammatically, the va- riation is caused by the intro- duction of the singular ἑκάστη, 18, Γενναίως γε] Referring to Ῥ. 146. E OEAITHTOS. ἘΣ ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς τί τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες : ΣΏ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν. ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι, φράσω. ὅταν λέγῃς σκυτικήν, μή τι ἄλλο φραζεις ἢ ἐπιστή- μην ὑποδημάτων ἐργασίας ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. σ , ϑ Ἃὃ 2Q. Τί δ᾽, ὅταν τεκτονικήν ; μή τι ἄλλο ἢ ἐπι- , “A lal 7 “ > / στήμην τῆς τῶν ξυλίνων σκευῶν Epyacias ; GEAI. Οὐδὲ τοῦτο. ~~ 3 ΄- Ὄ / / 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ἐν ἀμφοῖν, οὗ ἑκατέρα ἐπιστήμη, n GS. τοῦτο ὁρίζεις ; OEAI. Ναί. 2Q. Τὸ δ᾽ ἐπερωτηθέν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὐ τοῦτο ἦν, εὖ καὶ γενναίως above, and to Theodorus’s praise, supr.144 D. 1g. ποικίλα] Hither ‘a rich variety of things, or ‘many complex notions for one simple one. The analysis of terms which follows points rather to the latter meaning; but the former is more natural, and is supported by comparing Phile- bus 12 C (at the opening of the dialogue) : Τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οἶδα ποικίλον... ἔστι γὰρ ἀκούειν μὲν οὕτως ἁπλῶς ἕν τι, μορ- φὰς δὲ δήπου παντοίας εἴληφε καί τινα τρόπον ἀνομοίας ἀλλήλων. The two objections (πολλά, ποι- kita) are discussed in the re- verse order. See below: Τίνων .. ὁπόσαι, Πρῶτόν yé mov . ."Ἔπειτά ee > WS EOTL γέ που, K.T.A, I. Πῶς ri] What (τί), and with what meaning (πῶς). Cp. Soph. 261 ἘΞ: Πῶς τί τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες ; ὅπερ φήθην, κιτιλ. Some editors interpunctuate in all such cases (πῶς; ri, «.7.d.). But the Greek idiom often combines two interrogations in a single clause. 2. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν] Se. λέγω, ‘perhaps I am talking non- sense.’ ὃ μέντοι οἶμαι] Sc. λέγειν. 3. σκυτικήν] This is said to have differed from σκυτοτομική (above); and the change of word is an instance of Plato’s love of variety (cp. supr. C: ἀπιστεῖν... ἀπειθεῖν). Perhaps the one was a generic, the other a specific term. At least they do not exclude each other in Plato. See Rep. 2. 374 B: Ἦ οὖν σκυτικῆς δεῖ μᾶλλον κήδε- σθαι ἢ πολεμικῆς ; Οὐδαμῶς. ᾿Αλλ᾽ dpa τὸν σκυτοτόμον, κιτιλ. Ib. 10. 601 Ο: ποιήσει δέ γε σκυ- τοτόμος καὶ xadkevs;... οὐδ᾽ 6 ποιήσας ὅ τε χαλκεὺς καὶ ὁ σκυ- Τευς 3 ὅταν... φράζεις] ‘ You express by the term “shoemaking.”’ 1 Ta δὶ ἐπερωτηθέν] ‘But what I went on to ask you.’ Cp. supr. p. 16. 1. 3, μὴ ἀφίεσο, κι-τ.λ. To δέ γ᾽ ἐρωτηθέν is a MS. con- jecture ( τὸ b€ ye, t mg. τὸ δέ ye ἐρωτηθέν, Vind. suppl.7.’Schanz). σι ledge is one and simple. To enume- rate is not to define. This is il- lustrated. ὃ 10 18 MAATOQNO2 ἐπα La ham , e 9 , TAN eC ’ ’ 3 \ ’ ~ ε τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη; οὐδὲ ὁπόσαι τινες. οὐ γὰρ ἀριθμῆ- p- 146. 3 Ἂς Ms > , 3 Ν “ 3 ’, σαι αὐτὰς βουλόμενοι ἠρόμεθα, ἀλλὰ γνῶναι ἐπιστη- Aes, Δ ΓΤ, a » , Ἂ rah s μην αὐτὸ ὃ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν. ἢ οὐδὲν λέγω: ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς. TQ. Σκέψαι δὴ καὶ τόδε. εἴ τις ἡμᾶς τῶν φαύλων Ν Mh 3, - Ν a (4 , 9 TL Και προχέίρῶν εροίτο, OLOV TE pt πηλοῦ, O-Ft ΠΟΣῚ 3 , εἰ 3 : ! θ αὐ oO rn e lal é ν ἐστίν, εἰ ἀποκριναιμεθα αὐτῷ TAOS ὁ τῶν XUTPE@ ἊΝ nan ἴω N lal καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν ἰπνοπλαθῶν καὶ πηλὸς ὁ τῶν πλιν- aA x ΄- 5 θουργῶν, οὐκ ἂν γελοῖοι εἰμεν 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. a de 7 if ’ a TQ. Πρῶτον μέν γέ που olopevor συνιέναι ἐκ τῆς ᾿ 7 ϑ 7 ἈΝ 3 a Υ 5 ημετερᾶς ATTOKPLOEWS TOV EPWTOVTA, ὁταν εἰπῶμεν τ. τίνων ἡ ἐπιστήμη, οὐδὲ ὅὁπό- σαι twés| The first answer of Meno to the question, ‘ What is virtue?’ is exactly analogous to this of Theztetus about know- ledge. Instead of attempting to generalize, he enumerates the several kinds of virtue. Men. 71 Εἰ : ᾿Ανδρὸς ἀρετήν... γυ.αἰκὸς ἀρετήν . .. παιδὸς ἀρετή, Socrates replies (Men. 42 A): Πολλῇ γέ τινι εὐτυχίᾳ ἔοικα κεχρῆσθαι, ὦ Μένων, εἰ μίαν K.T.A, ζητῶν ἀρετὴν σμῆνός Te ἀνεύρηκα ἀρετῶν παρὰ σοὶ κειμένων, κιτιλ, The whole passage should be compared with this. See also Lach. 191, 192, where Socrates finds a similar difficulty in lead- ing the respondent to the con- ception of a general notion,— and Soph. 240, where Theeete- tus is again entrapped into a similar mistake in defining the word εἴδωλον. 2. ἐπιστήμην αὐτό] Rep. 472 Ο; ᾿Εζητοῦμεν αὐτό τε δικαιοσύνην οἷόν ἐστι. 5..ἕ εἴ τις ἡμᾶς---εἰ ἀποκριναί- μεθα] Por the double εἰ comp. Rep. 331 C: Et τις λάβοι παρὰ φίλου ἀνδρὸς σωφρονοῦντος ὅπλα, εἰ μανεὶς ἀπαιτοῖ, K.T.A, τῶν φαύλων τι καὶ mpoxetpar | ‘Some trivial and obvious mat- ter. 8. ἰπνοπλαθῶν] For this, the reading of all the MSS., κοροπλα- θῶν has been substituted in the margin of some MSS., for the sake of the uniformity which Plato avoided. See below, note on κοροπλαθῶν, p. 19. 1.1. 11. οἰόμενοι συνιέναι] Cp. Rep. 505 C: Ei ὀνειδίζοντές γε ὅτι οὐκ ἴσμεν τὸ ἀγαθόν, λέγουσι πάλιν ὡς εἰδόσι’ φρόνησιν γὰρ αὐτό φασιν εἶναι ἀγαθοῦ, ὡς αὖ συνιέντων ἡμῶν ὅ τι λέγουσιν, ἐπειδὰν τὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ φθέγξωνται ὄνομα. Soph. 244 A: Ti ποτε βούλεσθε σημαί- νειν ὁπόταν ὃν φθέγγησθε; We find ourselves involved in a further stage of the same ab- surdity at the end of the dialogue, p. 210 A: Καὶ παν- τάπασί γε εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης εἴτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. p. 147. OEAITHTOS. 19 - fs / e A A ΞΖ 7 yy p- 147. πήλος, Eire ὁ τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσθέντες εἴτε ἄλλων A a nN 7 , / Β ὡντινωνοῦν δημιουργῶν. ἢ ole τίς τι συνίησί τινος » ἃ Ν 3 foo ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστιν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμώς. 2Q. Οὐδ᾽ ἄρα ἐπιστήμην ὑποδημάτων συνίησιν 6 ἐπιστήμην μὴ εἰδώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ. N oS > iA ἃ xX 3 / 2Q. Σκυτικὴν apa ov συνίησιν ὃς ἂν ἐπιστήμην 2 a 5.2 y Ἢ ayvon, οὐδέ τινα ἄλλην τέχνην. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστιν οὕτως. 7 e / ~ 20. Γελοία apa ἡ ἀπόκρισις τῷ ἐρωτηθέυντι ἐπι- Ly if 83 7 3 / / Ν Μ COTHMY τι ἐστιν, ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινος OVOMA. N A 3 7 3 7, ᾽ nA > 3 τινος γὰρ ἐπιστημὴν ἀποκρίνεται, OV TOUT ἐρωτήηθεις. ΘΕΑΙ. ”Eouxev. ΣΩ, “Erara γέ που ἐξὸν φαύλως καὶ βραχέως 5 / 7 3 f ς ͵ - A ἀποκρίνασθαι περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν. οἷον καὶ > “ aA lal ’ - a a \ e la εν TH τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει φαῦλον που καὶ ἁπλοῦν I. εἴτε 6 τῶν κοροπλαθῶν προσ- θέντες] It is in Plato’s manner to surprise us with a fresh ex- ample at each step of the argu- ment, instead of dwelling upon one already adduced. Rep. 3. 333 B: Ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστικός, τ. Prot. 312 D: Ὥσπερ ὁ κιθαριστής, κιτιλ., and ἴῃ this dialogue, p. 161 D: Βατράχου yupivov. τόρ B: Σὺ δὲ κατ᾽ ᾿Ανταῖον, κιτιλ. 178 D: Οὐχ ἡ τοῦ κιθαριστοῦ. 190 C: ‘Yyai- νοντα ἢ μαινόμενον. 2. ἢ οἴει τίς τι] τὶς is made oxytone here because of τι fol- lowing. οἴει is parenthetical, and therefore does not affect the position of the enclitics. For the sense cp. Men. 80 D: Καὶ τίνα τρόπον ζητήσεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἶσθα τὸ παράπαν 6 τι ἔστι, 12. ὅταν. ὄνομα] ‘ When he gives as an answer the name of a particular art.’ The ac- cusative is cognate. 15. Ἔπειτά γέ που] This ought strictly to refer to the illustration : to which the sen- tence presently returns. But Socrates had reverted to the main subject in the preceding instances, 16. περιέρχεται ἀπέραντον ὁδόν] Ar. Met. 3. 1007 a: ᾿Αδύνατον ἄπειρά γ᾽ ὄντα τὰ συμβεβηκότα δι- ελθεῖν: ἢ οὖν ἅπαντα διελθέτω ἢ μηθέν. 17. ἐν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει] For the form of reference with ev cp. Thucyd. 1. 9: Ἔν rod σκήπτρου τῇ παραδόσει. Phileb, 33 B: Ἐν τῇ παραβολῇ τῶν βίων. The frequency of this idiom perhaps assists the genitive C 2 on Io Theetetus perceives that the answer re- quired is analogous to a geo- metrical expression ; σι 40 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ’ a Ψ ol tks “ a XN Sy 53, ‘ 3 εἰπεῖν ὅτι γῆ ὑγρῷ φυραθεῖσα πηλος ἂν εἰ, TO δ a χω , οτου €QAV χαιρειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, νῦν ye οὕτω φαίνε- ἈΠ Ἃ [4 > a - \ >’ ἴω εις Ὡς ται" ατὰρ κινδυνεύεις ερῶταν οἰἱον και QUTOLS μιν +S 9 an , 3 7 Q na as ἔναγχος εἰσῆλθε διαλεγομένοις, ἐμοὶ τε και τῷ σῷ ξ / ’ / ὁμωνύμῳ τούτῳ Σωκράτει. ΣΩ. Τὸ ποῖον δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε; πηλοῦ, Which is descriptive rather than objective. ‘In the question of the clay.’ 1. πηλὸς ἂν εἴη] Either, (1) ‘earth, if tempered with mois- ture, will be (ἂν εἴη) mud,’ or (2), ‘moistened earth would seem to be (ἂν ety) the definition of mud.’ 2. ὅτου is masculine (supr. AB), although τινός above (p. 19, 1. 13) was neuter. 3. νῦν ye οὕτω] ‘ Now as you put it.’ So far Theetetus has appeared wholly unfamiliar with the conception of a universal notion. But Socrates’ illustra- tion reminds him of the com- prehensive simplicity of geo- metrical expressions, And thus he finds a clue in what he knows to the new labyrinth of inquiry into which Socrates invites him. Mathematical ideas, being the first pure abstractions obtained by the mind, are peculiarly fitted to guide it to the contemplation of abstractions generally. So at least thought Plato: Rep. g. 522-533. On the mi nuteness of such illustrations see Hegel, Gesch. d. Phil. (1840) Ρ. 197: ‘A number of Plato's dialogues are intended merely to produce the consciousness of a general notion, which we possess without the trouble of acquiring it. Hence his dis- cursiveness has often the effect of tediousness to us.’ In reading what follows, it must be borne in mind that, by the ancients, arithmetic was studied through geometry. If a number was regarded as sim- ple, it was a line. If as com- posite, it was a rectangular figure, whether plane or solid. To multiply was to construct a rectangle, to divide was to find one of its sides. Traces of this usage still remain in terms like square, cube, common measure, but the method itself is obso- lete. Hence it requires an effort to conceive of the square root, not as that which multiplied into itself produces a given number, but as the side of a square, which either is the number, or is equal to the rectangle which is the number. The use of the Arabic notation and of algebra has greatly as- sisted in expressing and con- ceiving the properties of num- bers without reference to form. 6. Σωκράτει] Young Socrates becomes the respondent in the Politicus. To introduce him here by name is quite in the manner of Plato. Naber’s pro- posal to cancel this word, and Meyapot supr. 142 B, is surely erroneous. ΤῸ do so would be to blur the outlines which Plato has made distinct, p- 147- Ρ. 147. OEAITHTO?. 21 OEAI. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι ἡμῖν Θεόδωρος ὅδε x “ id / Ss ΄ > ἔγραφε, τῆς TE τρίποδος πέρι καὶ πεντέποδος ἀπο- νων OTL μή ) ξύμμετροι τῇ ποδιαίᾳ, καὶ οὕτω φαίνων ort μήκει οὐ ξύμμετροι TH ποδιαιᾳ, καὶ OUT I. Περὶ δυνάμεών τι, κ. τ. λ.] See Eucl. Β. το. Deff. 3-11: > = / , , 3 a Εὐθεῖαι δυνάμει. σύμμετροί εἰσιν, ὅ- ταν τὰ GT αὐτῶν τετράγωνα τῷ αὐτῷ χωρίῳ μετρῆται. ᾿Ασύμμετροι δέ, “ 7 a ὅταν τοῖς ἀπ᾿ αὐτῶν τετραγώνοις μη- δὲν ἐνδέχεται χωρίον κοινὸν μέτρον ’ ’ ς ’ , γενέσθαι. Τούτων ὑποκειμένων δεί- κνυται ὅτι τῇ προτεθείσῃ εὐθείᾳ 6c ase 3 ε , » ὑπάρχουσιν εὐθεῖαι πλήθει ἄπειροι , ἀσύμμετροι ai μὲν μήκει μόνον, ai δὲ καὶ δυνάμει, (v. 1. σύμμετροι καὶ 4 ἀσύμμετροι, ai μὲν μήκει καὶ δυνάμει, αἱ δὲ δυνάμει μόνον.) Καλείσθω οὖν ᾿ ἣ μὲν προτεθεῖσα εὐθεῖα ῥητή. Καὶ é , , ” , κ᾿ αἱ ταύτῃ σύμμετροι, εἴτε μήκει καὶ δυ- ΄ ᾽ ὃ ΄ὔ , ε cd Ai νήμει, etre δυνάμει μόνον, ῥηταί. Ai 4 ce δὲ ταύτῃ ἀσύμμετροι, ἄλογοι καλεί- σθωσαν. Καὶ τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς προτε- , θείσης εὐθείας τετράγωνον, ῥητόν. Καὶ τὰ τού ’ ἡητά. Τὰ τὰ τούτῳ σύμμετρα, ῥητά. Τὰ ‘ ων ? ’ ay [2 δὲ τούτῳ ἀσύμμετρα, ἄλογα καλεί- σθω. ἐς βι. ὙΨΟΥΝ ,ὔ 7 Sale NY cle you εἰ μὲν τετράγωνα εἴη, αὐταὶ ai , > δ, 4 » , πλευραί, εἰ δὲ ἕτερά τινα εὐθύγραμ- Καὶ αἱ δυνάμεναι αὐτά. ἄλο- μ ᾽ μα, αἱ ἴσα αὐτοῖς τετράγωνα ἀνα- γράφουσαι. B. 7. 17. 19: Τε- τράγωνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν ὁ ἰσάκις ἴσος, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυὸ ἴσων ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. Ὅταν δὲ δυὸ ἀριθμοὶ πολλαπλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ποι- ὥσί τινα, ὁ γενόμενος ἐπίπεδος κα- λεῖται" πλευραὶ δὲ αὐτοῦ οἱ πολλα- πλασιάσαντες ἀλλήλους ἀριθμοί. Prop, 21: Τὸ ὑπὸ ῥητῶν δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρων εὐθειῶν περιεχομέ- νον ὀρθογώνιον ἄλογόν ἐστι. καὶ ἡ δυναμένη αὐτὸ ἄλογός ἐστι. Κα- λείσθω δὲ μέση. δυνάμεων] In mathematical language δυνάμεις, or ‘ powers,’ are commonly understood to be the squares, cubes, etc., of sim- ple quantities. And the word has been so interpreted here. But it is not clear that in Plato’s time this point of terminology was fixed. And on comparing 148 A it would rather seem that δύναμις is here an abbreviation for ἡ δυναμένη γραμμὴ εὐθεῖα,1.6. to speak arithmetically, not (1) the ‘power’ but (2) the ‘root,’and the same term is presently limited by Theetetus and young So- crates to irrational roots. Cp. Bucl. B. 7. Deff.: Ἔκ δύο ὀνο- ατο- τομὴ πρώτη, δευτέρα, ete. This explanation suits the context best. But the question is not one of much consequence. For just as the sides of the squares which are equal to 3, 5, 6, 7, PONG, 21, 12, £3, 14,15, Γ are δυνάμει σύμμετροι, the squares themselves may be described as μήκει ἀσύμμετροι TH ποδιαίᾳ, 1. 6. having irrational sides. 2. H. Schmidt, who is fol- lowed in this by Schanz, has deleted the comma which was placed after πεντέποδος in pre- vious editions. 3. τῇ ποδιαίᾳ] Se. (1) δυνάμει, or (2) εὐθείᾳ :—the unit οὗ mea- surement for integer quantities. The meaning is that the line = /1 or 1 is incommensurable with the line= 3. H. Schmidt takes τῇ ποδιαίᾳ (δυνάμει) for an instrumental dative, ‘commensurable by the “unit.”’ This is less natural than ‘commensurable with uni- ty, and particularly awkward if δύναμις is the square. For how can a square be the measure of a line? Ifthe words τῇ ποδιαίᾳ were cancelled as a gloss, they μάτων πρώτη, δευτέρα, ete. i.e. simple and com- prehensive. He relates the disco: very of the integral and poten- tial root. 22 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ. \ ’ 4 ’ “ e κατὰ μίαν ἑκαστὴν προαιρούμενος MEX PL τῆς ETTAKAL- ’ὔ 3 Ν᾿ 7 > J Cc ie 5 9 δεκάποδος" ἐν δὲ ταύτῃ πως ἐνέσχετο. ημῖν οὖν εἰσ- nr an Ν yf ἈΝ “ ’ὔ HAGE τι τοιοῦτον, ἐπειδὴ ἄπειροι τὸ πλῆθος αἱ δυνα- a a oS μή μεις ἐφαίνοντο, πειραθῆναι ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, ὅτῳ / 5πάσας ταύτας προσαγορεύσομεν Tas δυνάμεις. ΣΩ, Ἦ καὶ εὕρετέ τι τοιοῦτον ; ΘΕΑΙ. "Eporye δοκοῦμεν. σκόπει δὲ καὶ σύ. XQ. Δέγε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν. τὸν Ἁ » 3 fd i? a i? 10 μὲν δυνάμενον ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι τῷ τετραγωνῷ could be more easily spared than many phrases which have been excised by recent editors. The square root of 2 was also incommensurable with the unit-line. But this had been already proved. in the familiar theorem about the side and the diameter of a square, and was therefore passed over as already known. The sides of the square could easily be found through the familiar relation between the hypotenuse and the other sides of ἃ right-angled triangle. Thus, the diameter of r= WV 2. The hypotenuse of | 2 and V1= 7/3. And so on. o 4. ξυλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν, ὅτῳ] ἐν is not the antecedent of ὅτῳ ; the construction 15 κατὰ σύνεσιν, as if it were εὑρεῖν, ὅτῳ, k.T.A. ‘To generalize and find an ex- pression whereby we should embrace them all.’ Cp. Soph. Philoct. 341: Τοιγαροῦν τὸ σὸν φράσον | αὖθις πάλιν μοι πρᾶγμ᾽, ὅτῳ σ᾽ ἐνύβρισαν. Charm. 166 Β: Ἔπ᾽ αὐτὸ ἥκεις ἐρευνῶν, ὅτῳ διαφέρει a= σῶν τῶν ἐπιστημῶν ἡ σωφροσύνη. 9. Τὸν. ἀριθμὸν πάντα] For this collective use of ἀριθμός cp. Phed. 104 A: Ἢ τριὰς καὶ πεμπτὰς καὶ ὁ ἥμισυς τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ Soph. 238 Α : ᾿Αριθμὸν δὴ τὸν ξύμπαντα. 10. δυνάμενον] Used here in its ordinary sense, without any reference to δυνάμεων above. ἴσον ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι] 1. 6. to be made as ἃ square number, which, as Euclid says, is ὁ ἰσάκις ἴσος, ἢ ὁ ὑπὸ δυοῖν ἴσων. ἀριθμῶν περιεχόμενος. “ΤῸ arise by the multiplication of equal num- bers. Such technical abbre- viations hardly admit of strict grammatical analysis. But this formula may be accounted for by the apposition of parts to the whole. Cp. infr, 148 A: ᾿Αδύνατος ἴσος ἰσάκις γίγνεσθαι, κιτλ. 193 Ὁ: Δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερά, and, note. iv a7ras, Ρ. 147. E . ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 23 \ a 5 , j , / , Ῥ. 147. TO σχῆμα ἀπεικάσαντες τετράγωνον TE καὶ ἰσόπλευρον p. 148. ἢ Τροσέείτομεν. ΣΟ, Καὶ εὖ γε. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸν τοίνυν μεταξὺ τούτου, / \ Ν ’ὔ \ A a » / T Pla Καὶ Τὰ TWEVTE Καὶ TAS OS ἀδυνατος ἣν Q 4 ων Και Ta 7 3 , ἰσος ισακις ἡ x ,ὔ ’ ΄ Ἂ / γενέσθαι, ἀλλ᾽ ἢ πλείων ἐλαττονάκις ἢ ἐλάττων , , , \ Nee , A \ πλεονάκις γίγνεται, μείζων δὲ καὶ ἐλάττων ἀεὶ πλευρὰ es / la) , 5 / ἧς αὐτὸν περιλαμβάνει, τῷ προμῆήκει αὖ σχήματι ἀπεικα- » 3 Ν ’ / σαντες προμήκη ἀριθμὸν ἐκαλέσαμεν. "ἃ \ μὰ \ nN >Q. Καλλιστα. adda τί τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο: σ \ N ’ / ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅσαι μὲν γραμμαὶ τὸν ἰσόπλευρον Kat δ 3 3. / “ ε ’ὔ’ ἐπίπεδον ἀριθμὸν τετραγωνίζουσι, μῆκος ὡρισάμεθα, \ Ἂ / 4 «ε Vd \ > ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη, δυνάμεις, ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ I. τετράγωνόν τε καὶ ἰσόπλευρον] The expression is amplified and varied for the sake of non-ma- thematical readers. 9-13. προμήκη . . ἑτερομήκη] These terms were distinguished by the later Pythagoreans. Nicomachus says that ἑτερομήκης ἀριθμός has one factor greater than the other by 1, προμήκης by more than 1. 12. τετραγωνίζουσι] ‘ Form as their squares. This use of τετραγωνίζειν is enough to show that geometrical terminology was not yet fixed. See the notes on δυνάμεων . . προμήκη .. ἑτερομήκη. 13. ὅσαι δὲ τὸν ἑτερομήκη] Se. τετραγωνίζουσι. See Eucl. 2.14. ὡς μήκει μὲν οὐ ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύναν- ται] Translate either, (1) ‘not commensurable with the former in linear measurement, but in the superficial content of their squares, or(2)‘not commensur- able with them in linear mea- surement, while they are mu- tually commensurable in the surfaces of which they are severally roots.’ I.e. the lines which are (or stand for) the irrational roots are not com- mensurable with the integral roots or with unity (τῇ ποδιαίᾳ), but their squares, being inte- gers, have a common measure. They are commensurable not iu themselves, but in their squares, that is, they are potentially commensurable (δυνάμει μόνον σύμμετροι). For the construction ἃ δύνανται comp. ai δυνάμεναι αὐτά in the Deff. of Euclid quoted above; also, Eucl. το. 22: ‘H δυναμένη αὐτό. It remains doubt- ful whether the one set of roots (δυνάμεις) or both are the no- minative to δύνανται, and conse- quently, whether τοῖς ἐπιπέδοις refers (1) only to oblong number, or (2) to both oblong and square number. The former alternative may be adopted as the simpler ; although the latter would be the more accurate expression, Instead of enumerating all the 24 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ , 3 , a 93 7] ἃ 7 A : ξυμμέτρους ἐκείναις, τοῖς δ᾽ ἐπιπέδοις ἃ δύνανται" καὶ p. 148. Β σι ΑΝ Ν x »y na περὶ Ta στερεὰ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. TQ. "Αριστά γ᾽ ἀνθρώπων, ὦ παῖδες" ὥστε μοι δοκεῖ 6 Θεύδωρος οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρτυρίοις ἔσεσθαι. irrational roots, which seemed infinite, they conceived the idea of finding an expression which should embrace them all. They first went for assistance from arithmetic to the less abstract forms of geometry (Ar. Met. I. 2: Αἱ yap ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκρι- βέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγο- μένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμετρίας). Here they at once found a generalization. All numbers which can be produced by equal integers they called square num- bers. The rest, formed of un- In other words, ν΄ τό = 4 or τό = equal factors, they called. ob- long. The roots of the former can be measured by unity, the roots of thelatter cannot, though the numbers themselves can. Hence a general distinction, and a simple nomenclature. The roots of square numbers they called μήκη, 1, 6. μήκει σύμ- μετροι, commensurable in whole numbers, the roots of oblong numbers, δυνάμεις, 1. 6. δυνάμει μόνον συμμέτρους. And similar- ly, in regard to solid quantity, i.e. the cube roots of numbers, 4 4 ἢ and 4 = .:3:3:4: ΞΞ the line forming one of its sides. On the other hand 6 6 A 2 == 3 δὰ σε 18 and 2 | = 8.464 Or ingen and 3.464 = , which is not commensurable with the side of the former square, al- though the squares are com- mensurable. The boys ended with the term with which they started; and yet they had gained much: they saw now as one, what they had seen as many; as a whole, what they had seen as infinite; and this by limiting the application of the term and distinguishing the thing from that with which they had confused it. In like 3.464 3 manner an advance is made towards a true conception of knowledge, when we have distin- guished it from sense and from true opinion, although we fail to define it as it is in itself. 4. οὐκ ἔνοχος τοῖς ψευδομαρ- τυρίοις ἔσεσθαι] ‘Will not be found guilty of perjury. Cp. supr. 145 C, οὐδεὶς ἐπισκήψει, and note. The article refers to what has been already men- tioned. The feminine form ψευδομαρτυριῶν is used in Lege. 11, 037: x ’ “ / > LQ. Θάρρει τοίνυν περὶ σαυτῷ Kai τι οἴου Θεύ- 6 / \ Ν / ad Ὁ δωρον λέγειν, προθυμήθητι δὲ παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν TE Ya 7 / an Γ᾿ 7] ἄλλων πέρι καὶ ἐπιστήμης λαβεῖν λόγον, τί ποτε “ῷ 5᾽ τυγχᾶνει OV. 2: καί] τε καί Τ' 7. διαθέων͵ Running a course. Comp. Prot. 335 Εἰ : Νῦν δ᾽ ἐσ- τὶν ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ δέοιό μου Κρίσωνι τῷ ἹἹμεραίῳ δρομεῖ ἀκμάζοντι ἕἔπε- σθαι, ἢ τῶν δολιχοδρόμων τῳ ἢ τῶν ἡμεροδρόμων διαθεῖν τε καὶ ἕπεσθαι. 9. ἀληθῆ is cognate or adver- bial accusative, asin Menex. 242 D: Ὅτι οὐκ ἀληθῆ ἀμφισβητοῖεν. 11. ὥσπερ νῦν δή] Viz. above, 145 D: Σμικρὸν δέ τι ἀπορῶ. 12. τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων] The Bodl. MS. has ἄκριβῶν, with an accent over the a, and a dot over each of the letters 1, B. ἄκρων is required by the words which follow. Cp. Lach. 192 C: Τῶν πάνυ καλῶν πραγμάτων ἡγεῖ σὺ ἀνδρίαν εἶναι; ἘΠ᾿ μὲν οὖν ἴσθι ὅτι τῶν καλλίστων. The mistake perhaps originated in not per- ceiving that ἄκρων is masculine. ‘Knowledge is no trifling mat- ter to find out, but it belongs to men every way complete ;’ i.e. not, like the runner, ac- complished in one thing only. 14. καὶ μάλα ye τῶν ἀκροτάτων] ‘Most certainly, to men com- plete in the highest degree.’ The superlative of ἄκρος, swm- mus, 18 a kind of double su- perlative. Cp. Legg. 10. 906 B: Τῶν παντάπασιν ἀκροτάτων δεσποτῶν. 17. προθυμήθητι] Supr.145 D. 18. ἐπιστήμης is governed partly by πέρι, but chiefly by λόγον. aN OEAITHTOS. 25 p-148. OEAI. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, 6 ye ἐρωτᾷς περὶ But he c ᾽ ͵ 3 Ἂ , > , oe fears that ἐπιστήμης, οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀποκρίνασθαι, ὡσπερ the ques- Ν OE 3 aezs ΄ , ee tion about περὶ τοῦ μήκους καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως" καίτοι TV YE [OL knowledge n med A ¢ , 5 , is not so δοκεῖς τοιοῦτόν τι ζητεῖν. ὥστε πάλιν αὖ φαίνεται easy. ‘ e th ψευδὴς ὁ Θεόδωρος. 8 3, J A c ΣΏ. Τί δαί; εἴ σε πρὸς δρόμον ἐπαινῶν μηδενὶ δ nm 2 val di Ὁ οὕτω δρομικῷ ἔφη τῶν νέων ἐντετυχηκέναι, εἰτα δια- lal ς 12 © / θέων τοῦ ἀκμάζοντος καὶ ταχίστου ἡττήθης, ἧττον τι x 7 > a“ ΄ 9 / av οἰει ἀληθῆ Tovd ἐπαινέσαι ; 3s ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ eyoye. το : \ , A Te - “9g NR 2Q. ᾿Αλλὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ὥσπερ νῦν δὴ ἐγὼ 3, / 5) 53 3 las > ζω / ἔλεγον, σμικρόν τι οἴει εἶναι ἐξευρεῖν καὶ οὐ τῶν πάντῃ ἄκρων ; x \ » ZF. A 3 ΘΕΑΙ. Νὴ τὸν Δί ἐγωγε καὶ μάλα γε τῶν ἀκρο- iA τάτων. Socrates still urges him, He an- swers that he has tried ineffectu- ally before ; but is still anxious. ‘This is a sign, dear lad, that there is something in you, and that you ought to be made to feel the power of my art. You have heard that Tama strange fellow. but you were not aware that I prac- tised my σι 26 OEHAI. Προθυμίας μὲν evexev, ὦ Σώκρατες, φα- p. 148. νεῖται. MAATQNOS 2Q. ἼΘι δή: καλῶς yap ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω" πειρῶ / 24 ὧν an V4 3 , “ μιμούμενος τὴν περὶ τῶν δυνάμεων αποκρισιν, WOTTED / \ e / / ταυτας πολλὰς οὔσας Evi εἴδει περιέλαβες, οὕτω καὶ Ν \ 3 , Cie / a Tas πολλᾶς ἐπιστήμας Evi λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ εὖ ἴσθι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πολλάκις δὴ OFM 5 ,ὔ ’ ’ / \ \ “ αὐτὸ ἐπεχείρησα σκέψασθαι, ἀκούων τὰς παρὰ σοῦ > , > ’ 3 \ \\ y » ΝΛ , ἀποφερομένας ἐρωτήσεις: ἀλλὰ yap οὔτ᾽ αὐτὸς δύ- a 3 Ν ς e aA , Yo WS ναμαι πεισαι ἐμαυτὸν ὡς ἱκανῶς TL λέγω, OUT’ ἀλλου 3 a fe Ψ e \ lA 3 \ ἈΝ ἀκοῦσαι λέγοντος οὕτως ὡς σὺ διακελεύει: οὐ μὲν δὴ > 9 an na ’ αὖ οὐδ᾽ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλειν. 5 20. ᾿Ὠδίεις γάρ, ὦ \ 25 52 3 A 2 κενὸς ἀλλ ἐγκύμων εἶναι. I. Προθυμίας... ἕνεκεν] Cp. Phedr. 272 C: Πειρῶ λέγειν . . Ἕνεκα μὲν... πείρας ἔχοιμ᾽ ἄν. Polit. 304 A: Πείρας μὲν τοίνυν ἕνεκα. 3. καλῶς γὰρ ἄρτι ὑφηγήσω] Comp. Gorg. 455 D: Αὐτὸς γὰρ καλῶς ὑφηγήσω. ὑφηγεῖσθαι 15 sometimes ‘to set a pattern,’ as in writing or drawing. Rep. 3. 403 HE, Lege. 10. 890 C. 5. ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες... ἑνὶ λό- γῳ προσειπεῖν] The processes of generalizing and of defining or naming, although more clearly distinguished here than supr. 147 D (συλλαβεῖν εἰς ἕν... ὅτῳ προσαγορεύσομεν), are still consi- dered as different aspects of the same thing. 8. ἀκούων .. ἐρωτήσεις] Thus it is indicated that, although this is the first meeting be- tween Theztetus and Socrates, the curiosity of the youth had been previously awakened. Those whom Socrates had puz- zled, had puzzled their com- φίλε Θεαίτητε, διὰ τὸ μὴ panion in turn. See Apol. 23 C, Symp. 215 D. 12. μέλειν] The reading is doubtful. μέλειν has on the whole the best authority; but the reading of the Scholiast, εὑρεῖν, Which is found on the margin of several MSS., sup- posing it to have been origin- ally a gloss, agrees better with μέλλειν. There is an idea of uneasiness in μέλειν which suits well with the context. And although οὐδ᾽ ἀπαλλαγῆναι τοῦ μέλλειν (sc. ἱκανῶς τι λέγειν) is sufficiently Greek, yet ‘to get rid of a care’ is a simpler notion than ‘to get rid of an incipient act. For μέλειν used personally comp. Aesch. Ag. 370: Θεοὺς βροτῶν ἀξιοῦσθαι μέλειν. Soph. Electr. 342: Κείνου λαθέσθαι τῆς δὲ τικτούσης μέλειν (where it may be impersonal, as perhaps here). Eur. H. F. 7472: Θεοὶ θεοὶ τῶν ἀδίκων μέλουσι. 13. ᾿Ωδίνεις γάρ] Rep. 6.4998: “ ᾽ Καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ᾽ οὔ. p. 148. p- 149. OEAITHTOS. ad GEAI. Οὐκ οἶδα, ὦ Σώκρατες" ὃ μέντοι πέπονθα λέγω. ΣΏ. Eira, ὦ καταγέλαστε, οὐκ ἀκήκοας, ὡς ἐγώ εἰμι υἱὸς μαίας μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλοσυρᾶς, Φαι- ναρέτης 3 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἤδη τοῦτό γε ἤκουσα. ΣΏ. ἾΑρα καί, ὅτι ἐπιτηδεύω τὴν αὐτὴν τέχνην, ἀκήκοας 3 ΘΈΑΙ. Οὐδαμώς. ΣΏ. *AAN’ εὖ XN 3 53 ς na πρὺς τοὺς ἄλλους: λέληθα yap, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ταύτην x ns ἡ \ ,ὔ ἰσθ᾽ ort: μὴ μέντοι μου κατείπῃς y Χ ’ ε Ζ [σή Ε 5. 7 lay \ ἔχων THY τέχνην" οἱ δέ, ATE οὐκ εἰδότες, τοῦτο μὲν 3 ᾽ὔ \ 3 a σ“ \ 5 7 J 5 Ν Οὐ λέγουσι περὶ ἐμοῦυ, OTL δὲ ατοπώτατος εἰμι καὶι “ν᾿ Ν 3 / > a 3 ἊΝ na > z TOL@ TOUS ἀνθρώπους Q7TOPELV* ῇ Και TOUTO. ΑΚΉΚΟας 9 ΘΕΑΙ. "Eyaye. ΣΏ. Εἴπω οὖν σοι τὸ αἴτιον ; ΘΕΑΙ. [avy μὲν οὖν. 2Q. ᾿Εννόησον δὴ τὸ περὶ τὰς μαίας ἅπαν ὡς yf Nee ἤν τὲ ἃ 7 cy / EXEL, Καὶ ρᾷᾳον μαθήσει ὃ βούλομαι. οἰσθα γὰρ που e 3 7 > A yf SN “. / \ 7 ὡς οὐδεμία αὐτῶν ἐτι αὐτὴ κυϊσκομένη τε καὶ τίκ- 4. μάλα γενναίας τε καὶ βλο- συρᾶς] ‘Truly noble and va- liant,’ or ‘commanding,’ ‘ of no common or feeble mould.’ γενναίας ‘Of the right sort.’ βλοσυρᾶς, ‘burly.’ Comp. Rep. 7.535 B: Γενναίους τε καὶ βλοσυ- ροὺς τὰ ἤθη. 13. ἀτοπώτατος, κιτιλ.} ‘That I am the strangest of mortals, and bring men to their wit’s end.’ ἀτοπώτατος is the very word to express Socrates’ idea of himself,—airév τε καὶ τοὺς λό- yous. Symp. 215 A: Οὐ γάρ τι ῥάδιον τὴν σὴν ἀτοπίαν ὧδ᾽ ἔχοντι εὐπόρως καὶ ἐφεξῆς καταριθμῆσαι. ἀτοπώτατός εἰμι καὶ ποιῶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀπορεῖν] Comp. Men. 79, 80 : Ἤκουον μὲν ἔγωγε καὶ πρὶν ’ i A 5 4 ,ὕὔ συγγενέσθαι σοι ὅτι σὺ οὐδὲν ἄλλο Ἃ sesh > bal \ \ eh ἢ αὐτός TE ἀπορεῖς καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ποιεῖς ἀπορεῖν. . . καὶ δοκεῖς μοι παντελῶς, εἰ δεῖ τι καὶ σκῶψαι, ὁμοιό-: τατος εἶναι τό τε εἶδος καὶ τἄλλα ταύτῃ τῇ πλατείᾳ νάρκῃ τῇ θαλατ- ,’ bd . via, ‘This whole passage is at least as much in favour of the MS. reading ἀτοπώτατος, as of Stallbaum’s conjecture, ἀπορώ- τατος, Which was suggested by the former part of it. Men thought Socrates ἃ strange being, because he made them discontented with themselves. XD 20 mother’s trade. * Consider the mid- wives; they have once had chil- dren, but are now past the age. They have thus experience of child- birth and are also suchas the virgin Goddess approves. They per- ceive the state of those they meet with. They can arouse or allay the travail of a patient : and cause abortion when they think it meet. They are also naturally the best match- makers. 28 MAATONO2Z 2 , y+ » εἰ “ τουσα ἄλλας μαιεύεται, ἄλλ᾽ αἱ ἤδη ἀδύνατοι τειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. SQ. Αἰτίαν δέ γε τούτου φασὶν εἶναι τὴν ΓΑρτε- Ψ 2) 53 \ 7 5 } 5 μιν, οτι ἀλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἰλῆχε. στερίφαις \ 3 2, » y / / e 3 / μὲν οὖν ἄρα οὐκ ἔδωκε μαιεύεσθαι, ὅτι ἡ avOpwmivy te 5) / > a“ / Ὁ Ἂ 35. Ἢ φύσις ἀσθενεστέρα ἢ λαβεῖν τέχνην ὧν ἂν ἢ ἀπειρος" la x > ς ,ὔὕ 3 ἤ κά a \ ταῖς δὲ δι᾿ ἡλικίαν ἀτόκοις προσέταξε, τιμῶσα τὴν Εν € / QUTNS ομοιοτητα. ΘΕΑΙ. Eixos. » at Ν , 5". Ν 2 la \ YQ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ rode εἰκὸς TE καὶ ἀναγκαῖον, τὰς / Ν Ν ἐδ a e ἊΝ ἴω la κυούσας Kal μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν μαιὼν Ἃ na yf ἢ TOV ἄλλων; ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. SOQ. Καὶ μὴν καὶ διδοῦσαί ye αἱ μαῖαι φαρμάκια κὰ 3 v7 4 3 / \ >a Ν κὰὶ ἐπᾷδουσαι δύνανται ἐγείρειν TE τᾶς ὠδῖνας καὶ , “Δ / “- Ν 7 μαλθακωτερας, ἂν βούλωνται, ποιεῖν, καὶ τίκτειν TE \ \ / \ v4 XN “ / δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, καὶ ἐὰν νέον ὃν δόξῃ ἀμβλί- 3 / σκειν, ἀμβλισκουσιν 5 4. Αἰτία)]) An _ adjective agreeing as predicate with Αρτεμιν, ‘Artemis is said to be responsible for this.’ Cp. infr. 150 E: Τῆς μέντοι μαιείας ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. 5. ἄλοχος] Used etymologi- cally, as if from a priv., and λέχος Or λοχεύω. 6. ἄρα] According to this tale. Cp. φασίν supra. ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις, «.7.d.] ‘It is not in human nature to be- come skilful where it is not experienced.’ This point is dropped in the comparison : unless Plato means to hint that the art of Socrates was super- human. 8. ἀτόκοις] Bod]. p.m. ἀτόποις. The correction is by a recent hand. τιμῶσα THY αὑτῆς ὁμοιότητα] ‘In honour of their resemblance to herself.’ τιμῶσα, ‘ prizing. Cp. Symp. 179 D: Οὕτω καὶ θεοὶ τὴν περὶ τὸν ἔρωτα σπουδὴν. . . τι- μῶσιν. 15. φαρμάκια] The Diminutive is noticeable. ‘Gentle reme- dies.’ 17. τίκτειν τε δή] Sc. ποιεῖν. ΟΡ. Symp. 206 D: Σκυθρωπόν τε sc. γίγνεται) καὶ λυπούμενον συ- σπειρᾶται, K.T.A, 18. νέον ὄν] Sc. τὸ βρέφος, said here of the embryo, ‘At an early stage,’ i.e. before abor- tion is dangerous. Cp. Hipp. de Morb. Mul. ὃ 3, 97: Ἦν TIK- Pp. 149. Ρ. 149. OEAITHTOS. GEAI. ἜἜστι ταῦτα. 29 “- “- 7 “ oO LQ. Ap’ οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι, ὅτι Kal / / 3 / Ὁ 7 > προμνήηστριαί εἰσι δεινόταται, ws πάσσοφοι οὖσαι ἴω “ Υ͂ \ a περὶ τοῦ γνῶναι ποίαν χρὴ ποίῳ ἀνδρὶ συνοῦσαν ws A / ἀρίστους παῖδας τίκτειν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ τοῦτο οἶδα. 3 5... 58} ey, Saas / a A x DQ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ioO ὅτι ἐπὶ τούτῳ μεῖζον φρονοῦσιν ἢ a2 βὰς. 3 / 3 / , a a re \ »S Ἑ ἐπι Τῇ ὀμφαλητομίᾳ. ἐννοει γαρ' τῆς αὐτῆς ἢ ἄλλης Ῥ. 150. 57 / S / \ \ “-“ 3 οἴει τέχνης εἶναι θεραπείαν τε καὶ ξυγκομιδὴν τῶν ἐκ a an χυ ἊΝ , 7] ἴω) na γῆς καρπῶν καὶ αὖ TO γιγνώσκειν εἰς ποίαν γὴν ποῖον , Ν fi , φυτὸν τε καὶ σπέρμα KaTaBAnreov ; ΘΒΕΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς. LQ. Eis γυναῖκα δέ, ὦ φίλε, ἄλλην μὲν οἴει τοῦ τοιούτου, ἄλλην δὲ ξυγκομιδῆς ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκουν εἰκός γε. ΣΏ. Οὐ γάρ. ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἀδικὸν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον ξυναγωγὴν ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, ἢ δὴ προαγωγεία 57 / ἈΝ \ \ ad \ ονομα, φεύγουσι καὶ τὴν προμνηστικὴν ATE σέεμναι 5 ε a 7, \ 3 » 7, \ amet? οὖσαι al pata, φοβουμεναι μὴ εἰς ἐκείνην τὴν αἰτίαν Ν be > διὰ ταύτην ἐμπεσωσιν. 5" -- a x / e7EL TALS YE OVTWS μαιαις / 4 / » a μόναις που προσήκει καὶ προμνήσασθαι ὀρθῶς. OEAI. Φαννεται. μηνιαῖον φθείρῃ τὸ παιδίον, where the same thing is spoken of. (This explanation is adopted by Schaarschmidt, 1874, and by H. Schmidt, 1877.) For the ellipse, which is a little diffi- cult, ep. infr. p. 161 A, τό ye σόν, sc. κύημα. δύνανται is lost sight of as the sentence proceeds. The subject of ἀμβλίσκουσιν (used causatively) is still ai μαῖαι. 4. ποίαν χρή] ‘What woman should be married to what man, to produce the noblest off- spring.’ 13. Εἰς γυναῖκα simply repeats the construction of εἰς ποίαν γῆν. In such cases the construction is often elliptical, as here. TOU τοιούτου ]͵ Sc. τοῦ ποιὸν σπέρμα εἰς ποίαν καταβλητέον. τό. ἄδικόν τε καὶ ἄτεχνον] ‘Un- lawful and skill-less : contrary to morality and nature. So- crates, according to his wont, assumes that vice is simply ignorance, so that ‘vicious’ and ‘unscientific’ are convert- ible terms. σι 15 ‘They are slow, in- deed, to acknow- ledge the pride they take in this, though they bring people to- gether law- fully, and not unlaw- fully. 30 ΠΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ δ \ / a la lat yf >Q. To μὲν τοίνυν τῶν μαιῶν τοσοῦτον, EAATTOV Pp. 150. \ os a , 3 X / δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος. ov yap πρόσεστι γυναιξὶν a, \\ of / y 2 ὦ 3 ’ “ ἐνίοτε μὲν εἴδωλα τίκτειν, ἔστι O ὅτε ἀληθινα, τοῦτο 5 3 Ν “ if εἰ yap Tpoony, μέγι- Q 7 y 3 ὃ a 7 Ν 5 0TOV TE καὶ κάλλιστον Epyov ἣν av ταις μαίαις TO \ Ny ees 53 a δὲ μὴ ῥᾷάδιον εἶναι διαγνῶναι. ‘My art is greater still , ‘ > , Ἂς / κρίνειν TO ἀληθὲς TE καὶ μη. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΩΝ 3 oy Ε ἢ οὐκ OLEL 5 TQ. Τῇ δέ γ᾽ ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως τὰ μὲν 1. ἔλαττον δέ] There is a slight irregularity in the an- tithesis, occasioned by the stress on τοσοῦτον. The balance of clauses is, however, com- pleted with τῇ δέ γ᾽ ἐμῇ, κιτὰλ., 2. τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος] It is doubted whether δρᾶμα here and infr. 169 B, Rep. 5. 4510, is literal=‘ function’ or figura- tive=‘réle.” In either case the unusual word (‘ performance’ for ‘ work’) has here a humor- ously imposing effect. 8. Τῇ δέ γ᾽ ἐμῇ τέχνῃ τῆς μαιεύσεως] For the well-known metaphor,which is nowhere else so completely elaborated, com- pare Symp. p. 206, sqq. (where Diotima proceeds to explain the mystical expression τόκος ἐν καλῷ) κυοῦσι yap, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντες ἄνθρωποι καὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατὰ τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ ἐπειδὰν ἔν τινι ἡλικίᾳ γένωνται, τίκτειν ἐπιθυ- μεῖ ἡμῶν ἡ φύσις. τίκτειν δὲ ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται͵ ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο θεῖον τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τοῦτο ἐν θνητῷ ὄντι τῷ ζώῳ ἀθάνα- τόν ἐστιν, ἡ κύησις καὶ ἡ γέννησις. .. ὅθεν δὴ τῷ κυοῦντί τε καὶ ἤδη σπαργῶντι πολλὴ ἡ πτοίησις γέ- γονε περὶ τὸ καλὸν διὰ τὸ μεγάλης ὠδῖνος ἀπολύειντὸν ἔχοντα. Lb, 209: τούτων αὖ ὅταν τις ἐκ νέου ἐγκύμων ἦ τὴν ψυχὴν θεῖος ὦν, κ. τ.λ. to the end of the speech. Repub. 6. 490 B: Οὐκ ἀμβλύνοιτο οὐδ᾽ ἀπο- λήγοι τοῦ ἔρωτος, πρὶν αὐτοῦ ὃ eos τιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως ἅψασθαι ᾧ προσήκει ψυχῆς ἐφάπτεσθαι τοῦ τοιούτου: προσήκει δὲ συγγενεῖ" ᾧ πλησιάσας καὶ μιγεὶς τῷ ὄντι ὄντως, γεννῆσας νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, γνοίη τε καὶ ἀληθῶς ζῴη καὶ "pepe καὶ οὕτω λήγοι ὠδῖνος, πρὶν δ᾽ οὔ. So far of the relation of the mind to knowledge. For the relation of the teacher and the taught see Pheedr. 276 Εἰ, 278A: Todd δ᾽, οἶμαι, καλλίων σπουδὴ περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται, ὅταν τις τῇ διαλεκτικῇ τέχ- νῃ χρώμενος, λαβὼν ψυχὴν προσ- ἤκουσαν, φυτεύῃ τε καὶ σπείρῃ per’ ἐπιστήμης λόγους, ot ἑαυτοῖς τῷ τε φυτεύσαντι βοηθεῖν ἱκανοί, ἄκαρποι ἀλλὰ ἔχοντες͵ . δεῖν δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ οὐχὶ σπέρμα. λόγους αὑτοῦ λέγεσθαι οἷον υἱεῖς γνησίους εἶναι, πρῶτον μὲν τὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ, ἐὰν εὑρεθεὶς ἐνῇ, ἔπειτα εἴ τινες τούτου ἔκγονοί τε καὶ ἀδελφοὶ ἅμα ἐν ἄλλαισιν ἄλλων ψυχαῖς κατ᾽ ἀξίαν ἐνέφυσαν. For the theory of teaching and learning thus illustrated see Rep. " 518. B: Δεῖ δή, εἶπον, ἡμᾶς τοιόνδε νομίσαι περὶ αὐτῶν, εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἀληθῆ, τὴν παιδείαν, οὐχ οἵαν τινες ἐπαγγελλό- μενοί φασιν εἶναι, τοιαύτην καὶ εἶναι. φασὶ δέ που οὐκ ἐνούσης ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμης σφεῖς ἐντιθέναι, οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντι- θέντες, x.t.4.—where it occurs OEAITHTO2. 91 ΒΩ e Ze 4 > ’ , \ a + Ρ. 150. ἄλλα ὑπάρχει ὅσα ἐκείναις, διαφέρει δὲ τῷ TE ἀνδρας tAAG μὴ ΐ ιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τὰ , ἴω ἀλλὰ μὴ γυναίκας μαιεύεσθαι καὶ τῷ τας ψυχὰς αὐ an 7 > la 3 Ἁ \ \ P 4 τῶν τικτούσας ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ TA σώματα. μέ- δὲ ~~ 2 aS “ € J , β ζ γιστον € TOUT eV ΤΊ) NMETEPA TEXY)), ασανιίειν Ν 5 \ / / By] \ cOuvarov εἶναι παντὶ τρόπῳ, πότερον εἴδωλον καὶ an 3 / las 4 ε ἦ Ἃὃ , Υ ψεῦδος ἀποτίκτει τοῦ νέου ἢ διάνοια ἢ γόνιμον TE καὶ ’ lg ’ Ν / ‘ 3 Ν e , “ ro ἀληθές. ἐπεὶ TOOE YE καὶ ἐμοὶ ὕπαρχει, ὑπερ ταῖς / δ᾽ / 3 / WGA a / μαιαις" αγόονος εἰμι σοφίας, και O7TEP δὴ πολλοὶ μοι > / e Χ \ 2) » σι a τὶ" \ 3. ah ὠνείδισαν, WS TOUS μεν ἄλλους ερώτω, AUTOS δὲ οὐδὲν » Ἄ Ν 5 Ν \ ‘\ \ + / ἀποκρίνομαι περὶ οὐδενὸς διὰ TO μηδὲν ἔχειν coor, \ \ \ 7 / / ἀληθὲς ὀνειδίζουσι. τὸ δὲ αἴτιον τούτου τόδε: μαιεύ- XX v4 an \ / εσθαί pe ὁ θεὸς ἀναγκάζει, γεννᾶν δὲ ἀπεκώλυσεν. under a different metaphor, that. of the cave. It is always difficult to sepa- rate the Platonic from the real Socrates. In the present pass- ave they are indissolubly blend- ed. That men thought Socra- tes the strangest being, and that he brought them to their wit’s end, is matter of fact. The quaint humour, perhaps even the name ‘Son of a Mid- wife, is Socrates’ own. But it is impossible to determine how far the theory based upon his practice, that to teach is not to put something into the mind but to evolve something out of it, or to turn the mind from darkness to light, was con- sciously held by Socrates him- self, and how far it is Plato’s theory of the method Socrates pursued. It receives its full development in theseventh book of the Republic, but is not there, as here, combined with the Socratic confession of ig- norance. 3. μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἔνι] ἐ But as its greatest triumph my art comprises this.’ δέ answers to μέν above, the former δέ being parenthetical. μέγιστον recalls μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον supra. 5. δυνατόν] Se. τὸν ἔχοντα αὐὖ- τὴν. εἴδωλον] Comp. Symp. 212 A, Rep. 7. 520C. (From whence Bacon probably took his Idola.) Soph, 240 A, 264 B, 266C. 6. ἀποτίκτει] ‘Is delivered of.’ ἀπο- denotes completion or result, as in ἀποσαφεῖν, ἀποτε- λευτᾶν. 7. ἐπεὶ τόδε γε] ‘For I have the same previous condition which the midwives have, in being barren of wisdom.’ ἐπεί implies ‘This is our highest function, for like the midwives I cannot pretend to what is higher still, viz. origimal pro- duction.’ 12. ὁ θεός] Who presides over my art as Artemis does over that of the midwives. ὁ θεός must not be identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, though they are probably. connected (see below, σι ~ ie) than theirs, for it is ex- ercised upon the minds of men, and [ can also discern the false birth from the true. I am childless of discoveries, by the will of the Deity whom [ serve in this. But those we take in hand, how- ever stupid at first, make won- drous pro- gress and do great things. If they leave me too soon, their minds mis- carry: un- less they return to me, when, if I am permitted to receive them, they again im- prove. 32 MAATOQNO2 AA OFS aes \ 3 , , »»»ν»ῷ ἡ" εἰμὶ δὴ οὖν αὐτὸς μὲν οὐ πᾶνυ τις σοφός, οὐδέ TL μοι Pp. τδο. 9, o la “ a a 5, ἔστιν εὕρημα τοιοῦτο γεγονός, τῆς ἐμῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ-ν e > 9 Ν / % \ “ (és γόνον" Οἱ O ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνομενοι TO μὲν πρῶτον φαι- yf Ἁ Ν ? 3 a , \ ὧν", ἢ VOVTQL EVLOL μεν και TTAVU ἀμαθεῖς, σαντες δὲ 77 polou~ a / - x ε Ν / sons τῆς ξυνουσίας, olaTEp ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκῃ, θαυ- Ἂς lod 3 7 e e n AS fond 57 μαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὐτοῖς τε Καὶ TOLS ἄλλοις a \ A 3 Nie ve » > A At / δοκοῦσι: καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργές OTL TAP ἐμοὺ οὐδὲν TO- , e lal Ἁ Ν ποτε μαθόντες, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτοὶ παρ᾽ αὐτῶν πολλὰ καὶ \ ε / 4 a 4 Λ καλὰ εὑρόντες τε καὶ κατέχοντες. τῆς μέντοι μαιειᾶς and cp. Apol. 40 B: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον), but belongs rather to the belief expressed in Apol. 21, 23,where Socrates speaks of his cross-questioning as a Divine service, because occasioned by the oracle at Delphi; and Pheed. 85 B: Ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς ἡγοῦμαι ὁμόδουλος εἶναι τῶν κύκνων καὶ ἱερὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ θεοῦ, i.e. sacred to Apollo the god of the true μουσική (ib. 61 A: ‘Qs φιλοσοφίας οὔσης μεγίστης μουσικῆς): but here, as in one or two places of the Apology, the feeling is generalized. The impression remains, however, that Apollo’s part herein corresponds to that of his sister Artemis. 1. tts] This is preferred as the Bodleian reading. τι, the reading of T, etc., may possi- bly be right. C. F. Herm. compares Phedr. 228 B: Ei μὴ πάνυ τις ἦν μακρός. οὐδέ τί μοι] ‘Nor have di had such a prize of my inven- tion born to me, the offspring of my own mind.’ Perhaps there is a slight play upon the word εὕρημα. (μα. Tyr. 1107: EU’ 6 Βακχεῖος θεὸς [εὕρημα δέξατ᾽ ἔκ του ἸΝυμφᾶν “λικωνιδᾶν, αἷς πλεῖστα συμπαίζει; but the primary meaning 1s Compare Soph. | ‘invention.’ Cp. Phedr. 278A: Yleis γνησίους .. ἑαυτοῦ, ἐὰν εὑρε- θεὶς ἐνῇ, and εὑρόντες below. 2. ἔστιν .. γεγονός] This differs from γέγονεν as ἔχω with aor. or perf. partic. differs from the perf. act. This punctuation is upheld by Burger, De Theet. 47, who, however, suggests that γεγονός may be interpolated. Most editors place the comma after τοιοῦτο. Cp. Lach. 186 E: Οὔτε γὰρ εὑρετὴς οὔτε μαθητὴς ov- δενὸς ... γεγονέναι. The dior- thotes of the Bodl. MS. has placed a comma after γεγονός, as in the text. 6. émididdvtes| Se. φαίνονται. ἡ. καὶ τοῦτο ἐναργὲς ὅτι] ‘And that manifestly.’ τοῦτο, sc. ποι- ovow : Viz. ἐπιδιδόασιν. ἐναργὲς ὅτι] A strengthened form of δῆλον ὅτι. ‘As clear as day’ Plato frequently thus extends an idiom. C. F. Her- mann, Wohlrab, and Schanz agree in deleting the comma after ἐναργές. It must be ad- mitted, hgwever, that καὶ ταῦτα is more usual than καὶ τοῦτο in such a connexion. The Bodl. MS. favours the punctuation of the earlier editors. 9. εὑρόντες TE καὶ κατέχοντες ‘Holding as their own dis- SEAITHTOS. 33 . 150. ὃ θεός τε καὶ ἐγὼ αἴτιος. ὧδε δὲ. δῆλον: πολλοὶ ἤδη a , Vf XN 7 > an \ ETOUTO ἀγνοήσαντες καὶ ἑαυτοὺς αἰτιασάμενοι, ἐμοῦ δὲ 4 x > \ Ε, τῷ yf ’ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων πεισθέντες, 3 σ΄ oo ff ἴων yA > / \ ’ ἀπῆλθον πρωϊαίτερον τοῦ δέοντος, ἀπελθόντες δὲ τά Ν ’ \ / \ τε λοιπὰ ἐξήμβλωσαν διὰ πονηρὰν ξυνουσίαν καὶ τὰ δ'ὐ 3 3 “A Z “~ 4 3 ’ ὑπ ἐμοῦ μαιευθέντα κακῶς τρέφοντες ἀπώλεσαν, "ὋΣ Ν v \ / ͵ a Ψευδὴ καὶ εἴδωλα περὶ πλείονος ποιησάμενοι τοῦ 3’ na nan > nr Qn 3 ἀληθοῦς, τελευτῶντες δ᾽ αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις 151. ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. ὧν εἷς γέγονεν ᾿Αριστείδης ὁ 4 Va ? - fod , ‘Avowayou καὶ ἄλλοι πάνυ πολλοί. οἷς, ὅταν πάλιν coveries.. Schanz reads καὶ τε- κόντες, which is found in some inferior MS. authorities, and may possibly be right, but may also be due to corruption, through the accidental omis-— sion of καί, or to MS. conjec- ture. The v.r. καὶ ἑκόντες rather points to this; and κατέχοντες gives a perfectly good sense, expressing the satisfaction a man feels in the secure pos- session of that which he owes to the exercise of his own powers. Those who left So- crates too early had no such se- eurity. Wohlrab quotes Symp. 175 D: Δῆλον yap ὅτι εὗρες αὐτὸ καὶ ἔχεις. 3. ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ) ‘They left me, whether it was that they despised me, or were themselves won over by some one else.’ The needless emphasis has given rise to suspicion. Hein- dorf read ἢ αὐτοὶ ἤ (‘of their own accord, or through the in- fluence of others’), for which there is slight MS. authority. Schanz proposes ἢ ad, where αὖ is still more superfluous than the minute antithesis. If 4 αὐτοὶ ἢ is read, the clause may be either joined to καταφρονή- D σαντες or (with L. Dissen quoted by Wohlrab) to ἀπῆλθον. The latter is more probable. πεισθέντες] ‘ Attracted,’ ‘ cap- tivated ;’ cp. Thucyd. 6. 54. Ae τὰ Ὁ. λοιπά] ‘ What more they had in them.’ Op. infr. 210 B. 5. ἐξήμβλωσαν] Cp. Aristoph. Nub. 137: Φροντίδ᾽ ἐξήμβλωκας ἐξευρημένην (where, however, the verb is used causatively as above 149 D, ἀμβλίσκουσιν). διὰ πονηρὰν Evvovoiar | Symp. 206 ©: Tikrew δ᾽ ἐν μὲν αἰσχρῷ οὐ δύναται, ἐν δὲ τῷ καλῷ. Cp. infr. 151A Β. The image of μαιευτική is merged in that of προμνηστι- xn. The word ξυνεῖναι expresses more than one kind of inter- course. 9. ᾿Δριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου] We read of the introduction of this youth to Socrates in the Laches, 179 A: Avow. Ἡμῖν εἶσιν υἱεῖς οὑτοιΐ, ὅδε μὲν τοῦδε... ἐμὸς δὲ αὖ ὅδε' παππῷον δὲ καὶ οὗτος ὄνομα ἔχει τοὐμοῦ πατρός, ᾿Αριστείδην γὰρ αὐτὸν καλοῦμεν. Lysimachus and Melesias are consulting Nicias and Laches, in the presence of Socrates, about their sons, Ari- stides and Thucydides. an ‘ My pa- tients also are in tra- vail, and my art can rouse or allay this pain, And if some come to me whom 1 perceive not to need my skill, I give them away to Prodicus or to some other ; and in this de- partment .- @ 94 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ Ψ J a x WB / τ A) ἔλθωσιν δεομενοι τῆς ἐμῆς ξυνουσίας καὶ θαυμαστὰ Pp. τ51: ΄“ ϑι \ \ / / / δρῶντες, ἐνίοις μὲν TO γιγνομενον μοι δαιμονιον ἀπο- / an Soo, \ 9“ τον . @ 3 κωλύει ξυνεῖναι, ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾳ, καὶ παλιν OUTOL ἐπι- / / x XN e 3 \ / Q διδόασι. πάσχουσι δὲ δὴ οἱ ἐμοὶ ξυγγιγνομενοι καὶ ΄“ SN 5 , > / \ Ἂς 3 5 TOUTO TQAUTOV TALS TLKTOUVO QS” ὠδινουσι yap καὶ A7TO- Io plas ἐμπίπλανται νύκτας TE καὶ ἡμέρας πολὺ μᾶλλον NSD ζω / \ \ 5.“ 3 / \ 2 ἢ EKELVAL, ταύτην δὲ τὴν ὠδῖνα ἐγείρειν τε καὶ ἀπο- if εἰ ΟΝ ,ὔ / παύειν ἡ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται. ‘ Ky \ Ν ζ΄ καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ οὕτως. a ay , > 7 Ἄν» Ν / , 9 ἐνίοτε δέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οἱ αν μοι μὴ δόξωσί TOS εἐγ- / 53 \ σ ΣᾺΝ 3 ἴω Tia κύμονες εἶναι, γνοὺς OTL οὐδὲν ἐμοῦ δέονται, te TAVV » a ΄“ Q Ν “-“ 9 a Sf, e σι εὐμενως προμνώμαι, Και ξὺν θεῳ εἰπειν, πανυ ἱκανῶς ’ - ΔᾺ , 3, τοπάζω ols ἂν ξυγγενόμενοι OVQLVTO. JA χὰ Ν A ὧν πολλοὺυς μεν δὴ ἐξέδωκα Προδίκῳ, πολλοὺς δὲ ἄλλοις σοφοῖς τε ΩΝ / 3 , καὶ θεσπεσίοις ἀνδρασι. 1. θαυμαστὰ δρῶντες] ‘ Show- ing extraordinary solicitude.’ ‘Going on their knees to me.” Cp. Apol. 35 A: Ἑώρακά τινας... θαυμάσια ἐργαζομένους, ὡς δεινόν τι οἰομένους πείσεσθαι εἰ ἀποθανοῦνται. 2. τὸ .. δαιμόνιον] Here, as al- ways, not commanding, but for- bidding; and, as generally, neuter and impersonal. This is not the place to discuss the subject. It suits well with the intensely self-reflective nature of Socrates (lost sometimes for whole days in thought) that he should pause suddenly on the eve of doing something, with- out being able (at the time) to explain to himself and others the motives of reason or feeling which checked his impulse. 3. οὗτοι] This is the reading of Tand most MSS. The Bod- leian has αὐτοί, which is cer- tainly admissible, and is per- haps also preferable as the more an / icy Μ Ταῦτα δή σοι, ὦ ἄριστε, difficult reading. ‘In some cases I am permitted to do so, and the men themselves im- prove. But οὗτοι is on the whole more probable. 7. ἣ éxeiva| T has ἢ κεῖναι. Schanz reads ἢ ᾿κεῖναι. 9. πως] Qualifying μὴ δόξωσι. ‘Whom, somehow, I perceive not to be,’ ete. 13. ἐξέδωκα] For the word cp. Soph. 242 Ὁ : Δυὸ δὲ ἕτερος εἰπών (τὰ ὄντα), ὑγρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν ἢ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρόν, συνοικίζει τε αὐτὰ καὶ ἐκδίδωσι. For the thing ep. Lach. 200 D: Κὰν ἐγὼ τὸν Νική- ρατον τούτῳ ἥδιστα ἐπιτρέποιμι, εἰ ἐθέλοι οὗτος" ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἄλλους μοι ἑκάστοτε συνίστησι. For the ironical hyperbole in θεσπεσίοις cp. Euthyd. 289 E: Καὶ yap μοι οἵ τε ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ of λογοποιοί, ὅταν συγγένωμαι αὐτοῖς, ὑπέρσοφοι, ὦ Κλεινία, δοκοῦσιν εἶναι καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ τέχνη αὐτῶν θεσπεσία τις καὶ ὑψηλή. ι ὃν OSEAITHTOS. 35 oa a ae Κ ε 7 Ψ Se X ρ. 15. EVEKA τοῦδε ἐμήκυνα, ὑποπτεύων σε, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς δ“ >Q/ “- 4 , 5 / οἴει, ὠδίνειν TL κυοῦντα ἔνδον. προσφέρου οὖν πρός ε \ / eX Ν be AS / A XN C ME ὡς προς μαίας υἱὸν καὶ αὐτὸν μαιευτικόν, καὶ ἃ ἂν 3 a nad π᾿ 5 7 / ἐρωτῶ, προθυμοῦ ὅπως οἷος τ᾽ εἰ, οὕτως ἀποκρίνασθαι. A 5᾽ / 4 ic; SS / e / καὶ ἐὰν apa σκοπούμενος TL ὧν ἂν λέγῃς, ἡγήσωμαι / \ Χ 5) / 5 e a Ay εἰδωλον καὶ μὴ ἀληθές, εἶτα ὑπεξαιρῶμαι καὶ ἀπο- βάλλω, ’ Ν \ Ὑ{ 5 7 ’ Ψ παιδία. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἤδη, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πρός με οὕτω ὟΝ / σ ’ αὐ μὴ ἀγρίαινε ὥσπερ αἱ πρωτοτύκοι περὶ τὰ , 4 3 ἴω Ψ “ 3 3 διετέθησαν, ὥστε ἀτεχνῶς δάκνειν ἕτοιμοι εἶναι, ἐπει- , las na aa 3 dav τινα λῆρον αὐτῶν ἀφαιρῶμαι, καὶ οὐκ οἴονται » ’ὔ ἴω ἴω / 3, an ΕῚ 7 εὐνοίᾳ. τοῦτο ποιεῖν, πόρρω ὄντες TOU εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐδεὶς ον 4 ’ / SUN ae oN , ἴω D θεὸς δύσνους ἀνθρώποις, οὐδ᾽ ἐγὼ δυσνοίᾳ τοιοῦτον \ ΄“ ’ “ , nm οὐδὲν δρῶ, ἀλλά μοι ψεῦδός τε ξυγχωρῆσαι καὶ ἀλη- \ / a / 4 \ 53 an θες ἀφανίσαι οὐδαμῶς θέμις. Πάλιν δὴ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, 2 , Aap a ΨΓ ἋΣ Ν > / a , ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὃ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν: « > 3 « ιν {55 , 9 yy aN \ \ ὡς δ᾽ οὐχ οἷος τ᾽ εἶ, μηδέποτ᾽ eins. ἐὰν yap θεὸς U 4 er 2 Κ᾽ edn καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ᾽ ἔσει. > Ν ’ 32 4 a Ψ ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοῦ γε οὕτω ’ Χ δ Us TapaKerevopevov αἰσχρὸν μὴ ov παντὶ τρόπῳ προθυ- ox 7 ya / a 53 ε ’ EB μεῖσθαι ὃ τί τις ἔχει λέγειν. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ὁ ἐπιστά- VA A ἃ μενος τι αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦτο ὃ ἐπίσταται, καὶ ὡς γε \ J > + 5.5 > / Ἂ of νυνὶ φαίνεται, οὐκ ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη ἢ al- σθησις. I, ὥσπερ καὶ αὐτὸς οἴει] Cp ἀποβάλλω] ὑποβάλω Β. supr. 148 DE: ᾿Αλλ’ εὖ ἴσθι ΤΟ. τινα λῆρον] Some ‘ barren ... πέπονθα λέγω. stuff,’ a προσφέρου] Charm. 165 οἴονται] Plutarch in quoting BS Σὺ μὲν ὡς φάσκοντος ἐμοῦ εἰδέναι περὶ ὧν ἐρωτῶ προσφέρει i με. εἶτα] Cp. Apol. ia C: a. ἐμὲ μιμοῦνται, εἶτα ἐπι- χειροῦσιν ἄλλους ἐξετάζειν. ὑπεξαιρῶμαι)] The MSS. have ὑπεξαίρωμαι, Bekk. corr. See below, ἀφαιρῶμαι, where T and B pr. have ἀφαίρωμαι. this passage reads οἴονταί pe. 11. οὐδεὶς θεός] And therefore not the presiding genius of my Art: 18. σοῦ γε] 1. 6. ‘ You, whom I respect so. highly.’ 22. emiornun... αἴσθησις] The term αἴσθησις 1s more simple and more extensive than any one by which it could be ren- AD ee Io too I sel- dom fail. Take cou- rage then, and be not angry if I put aside your first- born as not worth rear- ing. Iam guided in this also by the Deity, who desires your good,’ Theetetus now ven- tures to answer, I. Know- ledge is Sensation. 1.* Why, Protagoras meant this when he said, ‘‘ The Man the Measure of what is.” 1.6. What appears to me, is real to me. 36 ΣΩ. Ed ye καὶ γενναίως, ὦ παῖ: χρὴ γὰρ οὕτως Pp. 181: MAATQNO2 2 U / x x Ν vas ἀποφαινόμενον λέγειν. ἀλλὰ φέρε δὴ αὐτὸ κοινῃ , / Xe Ὁ a » / 3 σκεψώμεθα, γόνιμον ἢ ἀνεμιαιον τυγχάνει ον. αἰσθη- 3 / σις, φής, ἐπιστημή 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. TO. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι λόγον οὐ φαῦλον εἰρη- dered in English or any mo- dern language, in which the notion of the five senses has be- come fixed. ‘Sense-perception’ is too definite for it here. See below, 156 B: Αἱ μὲν οὖν αἰσθη- σεις τὰ τοιάδε ἡμῖν ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις καὶ καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι, κι τ.λ. Perhaps ‘to see and feel is to know,’ is the nearest equivalent to what Thesetetus means. But ‘feel- ing’ has ethical associations which must be excluded here. The German word ‘Sinn’ pre- sents a nearer parallel. Before reflection begins, our individual impressionsare those of which we are most conscious and most certain. And sub- jective certainty is the primi- tive meaning of τὸ ἐπίστασθαι. Hence αἴσθησις seems at first sight identical with ἐπιστήμη. Cp. Pheed. 83 C: Ὅτι ψυχὴ παντὸς ἀνθρώπου ἀναγκάζεται ἅμα τε ἡσθῆ- ναι ἢ λυπηθῆναι σφόδρα ἐπί τῳ καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι, περὶ ὃ ἂν μάλιστα τοῦτο πάσχῃ, τοῦτο ἐναργέστατόν τε καὶ ἀληθέστατον, οὐχ οὕτως ὄν. Ari- stotle, Metaph. 3. 1009b: Ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια ἐνίοις ἐκ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐλήλυθεν... . ὅλως δὲ διὰ τὸ ὑπολαμβάνειν φρόνησιν μὲν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ταύτην δ᾽ εἶναι ἀλλοίωσιν, τὸ φαινόμενον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀληθὲς εἶναί φασιν. The saying of Theste- tus is shown to be the meeting point of two lines of specula- tion; the one of which may be termed in modern language, subjective, the other objective : the one regarding all know- ledge as relative and apparent to man: the other regarding things without reference to man as in a state of transience or relation: thus sense cannot be knowledge, unless knowledge is relative, and being is change. This leads to an analysis of Sensation. We are made aware of its real nature, and so taught to distinguish Knowledge from it. See Aristot. de An. 3. 3: Δοκεῖ δὲ τὸ νοεῖν καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ὥσπερ αἰσθάνεσθαί τι εἶναι' ἐν ἀμ- φοτέροις γὰρ τούτοις ἡ ψυχὴ κρί- νει τι καὶ γνωρίζει τῶν ὄντων" καὶ οἵ γε ἀρχαῖοι τὸ φρονεῖν καὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι ταὐτὸν εἶναί φασιν, ὥσπερ καὶ ᾿Ἐμπεδοκλῆς εἴρηκε, Πρὸς παρεὸν γὰρ μῆτις ἀέξεται ἀνθρώ- ποισιν, καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις . «Ὅθεν σφίσιν αἰεὶ καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν ἀλλοῖα παρίστα- ται. Τὸ δ᾽ αὐτὸ βούλεται τούτοις καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ὃμήρου, Τοῖος γὰρ νόος ἐστὶν ἐπιχθονίων ἀνθρώπων, οἷον ἐπ᾽ ἦμαρ ἄγησι πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶντε. I. Ed γε καὶ γενναίως} Supr. 146 Ο. 2. αὐτό here—sc. τὸ ἀποφαν- 6év—and supr. 148 E, has no distinctly expressed antecedent. 6. Κινδυνεύεις μέντοι] “ Well, after all, I should not wonder Lf pe OEAITHTOS. 37 , ἃ.» , 3 5 ἃ 3, \ / p. 152. κέναι περὶ ἐπιστήμης; ἀλλ᾽ ὃν ἐλεγε καὶ Πρωταγόρας. ΄ / ay 5, Ν oy eS! a Ν τρόπον δέ τινα ἄλλον εἴρηκε τὰ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. φησὶ , ᾽ὔ , , y Ὄ yap που παντῶν χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἰναι, a \ by 4 e yf ἴω \ Ἂ yf ε > TOV μὲν OVTWV, WS ἐστι, Τῶν δὲ μὴ οντῶν, ὡς OUK , ἐστιν. ἀνέγνωκας γὰρ που; / , ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ανέγνωκα καὶ πολλάκις. » a oe / e GS \ oS QO. Οὐκοῦν οὕτω πως λέγει, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἔκαστα » Ν 7 ἴω / 3 ᾽ 7 Ὁ \ / εμοι φαίνεται, Τοιαυτὰ LEV ἐστιν ἐμοι., OLA δε σοι, Τοι- - . 5 a \ , ΡΥ: αῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί: ἀνθρωπος δὲ σὺ τε κἀγὼ ; ΘΈΑΙ. Λέγει γὰρ οὖν οὕτως. LQ. Εἰκὸς μέντοι σοφὸν ἄνδρα μὴ ληρεῖν: ἐπα- lA 3 3 CG κολουθησωμεν οὖν αὑτῳ. μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα ; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα. 2. Πότερον οὖν τότε 2. ἄνθρωπον] Not ‘ Man,’ i.e. collective human nature ; nor yet exactly ‘Each man.’ As we have seen, p. 147, Thee- tetus is little conscious of the universal. Hence ἄνθρωπος sig- nifies to him not humanity, nor yet the individual, as opposed to it, but this or that man, ‘any man you choose.’ And whether or not it was so in- tended by Protagoras, it would certainly appear to have been so understood by his ‘disciples,’ to whom Socrates presently refers. ἡ. ὡς οἷα μέν, κι τ. λ.}] Cp. Cratyl. 385 E, 386 A: Ὥσπερ IIpwraydpas ἔλεγε, λέγων πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι ἄνθρωπον, ὡς ἄρα οἷα μὲν ἂν ἐμοὶ φαίνηται τὰ πράγματα εἶναι, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δ᾽ ἂν σοί, τοιαῦτα δ᾽ αὖ σοί, This repetition of 5 » 3 ΟΡ 7 ap OUK €EVLOTE TWYVYEOVTOS 3 , A 3 n ¢ \ ςε an e ἴω «ε ΕῚ yf Ἄν, € ἀνέμου TOU αὐτοῦ ὁ μὲν ἡμῶν plyol, ὁ δ᾽ οὖ; καὶ ὁ » N 3 > ε Ν \ “ αὐτὸ ep εαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα the same language affords a presumption that the explana- tion, as well as the original saying, is Protagoras’ own. ΓΙ. μέντοι] ‘ Well, atallevents.’ εἰκὸς μέντοι. μὴ ληρεῖν] Cp. Phaedr. 260 A: Οὐκ ἀπόβλητον ἔπος εἶναι δεῖ... ὃ ἂν εἴπωσι σοφοί, ἀλλὰ σκοπεῖν μή τι λέγωσι" καὶ δὴ καὶ τὸ νῦν λεχθὲν οὐκ ἀφετέον. 16. ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτό] ἐ ἑαυτοῦ Vindob. suppl. 7. ἑαυτό BT.’ Schanz. The accusative may be defend- ed from Thucyd.1.141: "Oray.. τὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸν ἕκαστος σπεύδῃ. 4. 28: Τὸ ἐπὶ σφᾶς εἶνα. The prep. is used in a slightly pregnant sense, =zpsotenus, ‘As far as to itself, and no further.’ Cp. infr. 160 A: οὐδὲ... ἐκεῖνο . . ἑαυτῷ τοιοῦτον γενήσεται. (Per- haps the accus. is also partly due to the idea of motion in πνεῦμα.) ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτό 15 sup- Io 15 ‘ E.g.When it is asked, Is the wind cold? Pro- tagoras would say it is cold to him who feels cold. A ppear- ance in this case is sen- sation. The wind is to me as I sensibly perceive it. i.e. Sensa- tion dis- covers Being. Τὼ 98 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν: ἢ πεισόμεθα τῷ p. 152. Π ὔ σ“ io \ e a / a : δὲ ρωταγορᾳ oTl τῷ μεν ριγουντι ψυχρὸν, τῷ O€ μὴ οὔ: ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. TO. Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρῳ : ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΩ. Τὸ δέ γε φαίνεται αἰσθάνεσθαί ἐστιν : ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι yap. i οὐ * Gh ond = ᾿ y ya TQ. Φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἐν TEC a N A vas J ie \ Z 10 θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις. οἷα Yap αἰσθάνεται oS a e Pi 7 S ἕκαστος, τοιαῦτα ἑκάστῳ καὶ κινδυνεύει εἰναι. ported by H. Schmidt. For ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ, which is preferred by Wobhlrab, Schanz and others, cp. Tim. 51 B: *Ap’ ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ. For the use of the reflexive pronoun cp. Rep. 4. 419 A: Kai ταῦτα dv ἑαυ- rovs. This notion is carried farther by Locke, Hum. Un- derst. 2. 8. ὃ 21: ‘The same water may produce the sensa- tion of cold in the one hand and heat in the other.’ 4. Τὸ δέ ye φαίνεται αἰσθάνε- σθαί ἐστιν] ‘When you say “appears, it is that he has a sensation.’ The example is kept in view throughout. ‘There 18 MS. authority for αἰσθάνεται, (Cp. inf. 164 B: Τὸ δέ ye οὐχ ὁρᾷ οὐκ ἐπίσταταί ἐστιν, εἴπερ καὶ τὸ ὁρᾷ ἐπίσταται) But the change of subject makes αἰσθά- νεσθαι preferable. Cp. inf. 186 D: Ti οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα κ. τ. λ.; Δἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε. Οταῦ. 410 C: Τὸ γὰρ γεγάασι γεγεννῆσθαι λέγε. And the re- petition of the termination is a more probable form of corrup- tion than the recurrence of of in the same word. φαίνεσθαι ap- pears as a correction for φαί- νεται in some MSS. Q. Φαντασία ἄρα] eo Gm regard to heat and cold and the like your theory and that of Protagoras agree. φαντασία occurs here simply as the noun of patverOar,=‘appearing, rather than ‘ appearance,’ and must be kept clear from the notion of faculty, and the associations due to Aristotle, (see de An. 3. 3, where he defines it, κί- mows ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν γιγνομένης.) Appearance (or relative being) becomes a middle term between sensation and being, so that all is merged in sensation. ‘Thus, while the answer of Theetetus 1s shown to coincide with the saying of Protagoras, the reader is gently led to acquiesce for the mo- ment in their common point of view. ἔν τε θερμοῖς] Cp. infr. 204 D: Ἔν ye τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστιν. These are instances of Plato’s tentative method. το. οἷα yap αἰσθάνεται] (1) Se. αὐτά, which however is purposely omitted; viz. τὰ θερμά, κ. τ. A. a | me) =——_r is = Ὁ. 152. SEAITHTOS. 39 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ΣΏ. Αἰσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι καὶ ἀψευδές, @ 3 if 3 ὡς ἐπιστημὴ οὖσα. GEAI. Φανφεται. ΣΏ. *Ap’ οὖν πρὸς Χαρίτων πάσσοφός τις ἦν ὁ / Ἂν n ea Ἁ >. " ἴω al [Iporayopas, καὶ τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἡνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, TOL δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ρ Ds S HAUNT ALS PPNT@ Τὴ 1) 53 ἐλεγεν 5 Or, (2) while τὰ θερμά, κι τολι are subj. οἵ κινδυνεύει, οἷα may be cogn. acc. ‘For they would seem to be to each according to his sensation.’ As we dwell upon the above example in support of the identification of appearance and sense, ὅτι τῷ μὲν ῥιγοῦντι ψυχρόν, τῷ δὲ μὴ οὔ, (where, however, ἐστί was care- fully excluded,) we are led in- sensibly to substitute ‘ relative being’ for ‘appearing,’ by a play of words, which may be preserved in English, ‘ What appears to me,isto me. And from relative being (ἑκάστῳ εἶναι) we argue at once to ‘being’ (αἴσθησις dpa τοῦ ὄντος). For a similar recapitulation, in which the argument is really carried a step further (with γάρ), ¢ cp. ee Ei: Οὔτε yap ταύτῃ οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται Ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα δόξα. For γάρ, introducing as a reason what is properly an inference, cp. also Gorg. 454 D. 2: Αἴσθησις ἄρα] ‘Sensation then is of Being, and is infal- lible, in accordance with your theory.’ Certainty is here implicitly assumed as the mark of ἐπιστήμη. 'The genuineness of the last words has been need- lessly questioned by Wolff and others. They are required in order to bring ‘the wheel full circle’ and to complete the identification of Protagoras’ theory with that of Theetetus. Compare with ὡς ἐπιστήμη οὖσα, infr. 160 C: Κατὰ τὸν Πρω- SES 5. “Ap” οὖν, x.t..] If sensa- tion is of Being, then Being is not Being but Change. dpa in such questions (cp. infr. 200 C) is more emphatic than ἄρ᾽ ov. Here it expresses delighted surprise. ‘In the name of all that is charming, was Prota- goras even wiser than we knew?’ For the Graces in this con- nexion cp. Prot. 320 C: Δοκεῖ τοίνυν MOL... χαριέστερον εἶναι μῦθον ὑμῖν λέγειν. ‘What? says Socrates, did Protagoras then teach an ob- scure exoteric doctrine to the multitude, and tell the truth in esoteric confidence to his dis- ciples? Did he teach the one to believe in ὄντα, the others in nothing but yyvopevat’ Prof. Kennedy. 7. τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ] He told the real truth, not in his book which is so πὸ (᾿Αλήθεια), but privately to his disciples. Cp. Crat. 413 A: ᾿Εγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, dre λιπαρὴς ὧν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυσμαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις. (So- crates has just given a deriva- tion of the word δικαιοσύνη, σι ‘ This theory of Know- ledge, then, depends upon a theory of Being, which Pro- tagoras re- served for his disci- ples, to whom he told the real truth in a mys- tery. 2, ‘If Sen- sation is Know- ledge, Being ἴδ᾽ Change. Things are not, but become. Heraclitus, Empedo- cles, Ho- mer, Epi- charmus, all agree in this. το 40 MAATOQNOZ OEAI. Πῶς δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο λέγεις ; TQ. ᾿Ἐγὼ ἐρῶ καὶ μάλ᾽ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον: ὡς apa ἃ Ν SiN 3 ἜΝ » 7 5 ΣῸϑ V+ ἐν μὲν αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐδέν ἐστιν, οὐδ ἂν τι προσ- / 3 las 5.» “se a > 3 aN e / εἶποις ὀρθῶς οὐδ᾽ ὁποιονοῦν TL, GAA, ἐὰν ὡς μέγα J ἐν \ an \ , 5 προσαγορεύῃς, Kal σμικρὸν φανεῖται, καὶ ἐὰν βαρύ, la) 7] uA oe ς XN 5 ξὺν κοῦφον, ξύμπαντά τε οὕτως, ὡς μηδενὸς ὄντος EVOS ei? N ’ e ἴω » \ \ “ a μήτε τινὸς μήτε ὁποιουοῦν: ἐκ δὲ δὴ φορᾶς TE καὶ γῇ \ / Ν Μ 7 ΄ κινησεως καὶ Κρασεῶς προς ἄλληλα γίγνεται παντα» ἃ / 53 3 » a / a δὴ φαμεν ειναῖ. οὐκ ὀρθῶς προσαγορευοντέφ᾽ ECT y A τι "ἃ , 2 "δέ LN \ , \ Ν μὲν γὰρ οὐδέποτ᾽ οὐδέν, ἀεὶ δὲ γίγνεται. καὶ περί τούτου πάντες ἑξῆς οἱ σοφοὶ πλὴν Παρμενίδου ξυμ- which he thus ironically at- tributes to the disciples of Heraclitus as an esoteric doc- trine.) By a similar irony, he says here that the ‘friends of Protagoras’ have learnt their doctrine from their master ‘in a mystery.’ Clearly then the doctrine which Socrates pro- ceeds to develop was not to be found in the written teaching of Protagoras, but in the in- terpretations of his reputed followers. The question, how far the Cyrenaics are indicated by the phrase, ‘disciples of Protagoras,’ has been discussed in the introduction. τὴν ἀλήθεια)])͵ There is a slight allusion here to the work of Protagoras of this name, which is more distinctly referred to afterwards. 2. καὶ μάλ᾽ οὐ φαῦλον λόγον “1 will tell you, and it is indeed a highargument.’ He hadspoken of a λόγος οὐ φαῦλος above (151 E). Cp. infr. 179 D. 3. οὐδ᾽ ἄν τι προσείποις] (1) ‘Nor can you call anything rightly by any name.’ Or (2) with H. Schmidt, making οὐδέν the object and τέ predicative, ‘Nor can you rightly call it anything or any kind of thing.’ But this is less prob- able, and is certainly not re- quired by what follows.— W ho- ever the contemporaries were to whom Plato refers as the disciples of Protagoras, he aims beyond them at the whole relative side of Greek thought, of which Heraclitus was the most prominent exponent. 8. καὶ κράσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα] These words are introduced in order to include Empedocles, whose elements, however, were not subject to growth and de- cay, and who was probably not independent of an Eleatic in- fluence. His Muse is called in the Sophist (242 E) μαλακωτέρα (in contradistinction to the συντονώτεραι povoa of Hera- clitus), because his two prin- ciples of friendship and strife do not possess the world to- gether, but alternately. 11. ξυμφερέσθων)] MS. autho- ity preponderates (numerically) in favour of ξυμφέρεσθον, which Stallbaum and Wohlrab have p. 152; E OEAITHTOS. 4] Ρ. 152. φερέσθων, Πρωταγόρας re καὶ Ἡράκλειτος καὶ Ἔμ- aA an an e yf “ , πεδοκλῆς, Kal τῶν ποιητῶν οἱ ἄκροι τῆς ποιήσεως [- / / , > / , ’ εκατέρας- κωμῳδίας μέν, ᾿Επίχαρμος, τραγῳδίας δέ, Ὅμηρος, [*ds] εἰπὼν ᾿ΩὨκεανόν τε θεῶν γένεσιν καὶ μητέρα Τηθύν, vainly attempted to defend. Even if it were clear that Em- pedocles was set over against Protagoras and Heraclitus, or that these (coupled with re καί) only counted for one, the use of the dual here would still be unnatural. Stobeus, who quotes this passage, has ξυμ- φέρονται, which is possibly right. In the Bodleian MS. there is an erasure to the right of the omicron, which seems origin- ally to have been o. An accent on the penultimate has also been erased. Thus évp- φερέσθων (or συμφερέσθων) is supported by the Bodleian first hand, besides three other MSS. ‘Be it assumed (since we can- not ask them) that the philo- sophers of all ages speak with one voice concerning this.’ For the imperative, denoting a pro- visional assumption, cp. infr. 187 B: Kai pot τοῦτο ἀποκεκρίσθω" 101 Εὶ : Πεποίησθω" Soph. 248 A: Ἡρὸς μὲν οὖν τούτους τοῦτο ἡμῖν μενέτω ξυνομολογηθέν" Rep. 6. 485A: Τοῦτο... ὡμολογήσθω ἡμῖν, ὅτι, K.T.r. Legg. 2. 672 E: Διαπεπεράνθω. Possibly the word ξυμφερέσθων retains here something of its literal meaning, ‘are gathered together,’ ‘move all one way.’ Thue. 7. 36. The boldness of the language, espe- cially the word στρατόπεδον, is in favour of this. 3. ‘Emiyappyos| Epicharmus, ed. Kriisemann, fr, 95: Suve- κρίθη, καὶ διεκρίθη, καὶ ἀπῆνθεν ὅθεν ἦνθε πάλιν γᾶ μὲν εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ᾽ ἄνω. Ib. fr. go: Φύσις ἀνθρώπων ἀσκοὶ πεφυσημένοι. The passage quoted by Diog. Laert. 3. 10 (who says that Plato borrowed from Epicharmus), though interesting, if authentic, is too long for quotation here, except the line ἐν peraddaya δὲ πάντες ἐντὶ πάντα τὸν γρόνον. (Cp. Mullach, Fragment. Phil. Gr. Epicharm. vv. 177-1 94.) Epicharmus (circ. 490 B.C.) is called a Pythagorean. One or two of his γνῶμαι remind us of Heraclitus, although, as only fragments from his Comedies are preserved, we cannot tell in any case how far the notions expressed are his own. τραγῳδίας δέ, “Ounpos| Where the form is in question, ἔπη are distinguished from τραγῳδία: as in Rep. 3. 394 C. Where this is not the case, they are combined as tragedy, this being another name for σπουδαία μι- μητική : e.g. Rep. 10. 605 C: ᾿Ακροώμενοι “Ounpov ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς τῶν τραγῳδοποιῶν. 4. *[ és] εἰπών] The best MSS, read Ὅμηρος εἰπών. A few add γάρ, aS in a similar passage, 175 D (ἰλιγγιῶν τε K.T.A.) γάρ is added in one MS. (Ven. =.) ὃς εἰπών is Heindorf’s very probable emendation. The MS. reading is to be defended, if at all, by supposing a ‘return to the indicative.’ 5. Qk. θ.γ.κιμ.1.] 11.14.20 1, 302. οι ‘Motion is the prin- ciple of growth, 42 MAATONOZ , 93) 3 en , xX πάντα εἴρηκεν ἔκγονα pons τε Kal κινήσεως. ἢ οὐ p. 152. δοκεῖ τοῦτο λέγειν ; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ἐμοιγε. πὸ νυ Or ’ A DO. Tis οὖν ἂν ἔτι πρός ye τοσοῦτον στρατό- p. 153. Ν Ν σ UV 5 , 5 πεδον καὶ στρατηγὸν Ὅμηρον δύναιτο ἀμφισβητῆσας Ν / μὴ καταγέλαστος γενέσθαι ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ ῥάδιον, ὦ Σώκρατες. 3 VA 9S / > ἊΝ Q / an IZ YO. Οὐ yap, ὦ Θεαιτητε. ἐπεὶ και τάδε τῷ λογῷ 6. μὴ .. γενέσθαι] A few MSS. have μὴ ov. But the omission of ob may be defended by the remoteness of the supposition. Cp. Sophist 241 E: Τούτων yap μήτε ἐλεγχθέντων μήτε ὁμολογηθέν- των σχολῇ ποτέ τις vids τε ἔσται ενον μὴ καταγέλαστος εἶναι : Soph. Ο. T. 76, 77. μή belongs to the adj. ‘Who could prove other than ridiculous?’ Com- pare with the whole passage Cratyl. 401 E, 402 A, where, after proposing first ‘Eoréa(fire) and then dcia (displacement), as derivations for οὐσία, So- crates says: °Q γαθέ, evvevd- nkd τι σμῆνος σοφίας. Epp. Ποῖον δὴ τοῦτο ; Σω. Γελοῖον μὲν πάνυ εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι μέντοι τινὰ πιθανότητα Ἕρμ. Τίνα ταύτην; Σω. Τὸν “Hpdkderrov μοι δοκῶ καθορᾶν eA X 4 > lal “παλαί᾽ ἄττα copa λέγοντα, ἀτεχνῶς wv ἔχειν. τὰ ἐπὶ Κρόνου καὶ Ῥέας, ἃ καὶ of ” ε Be Zz Opnpos ἔλεγεν. Epp. πῶς τοῦτο λέγεις ; Sw. λέγει που Ἡράκλειτος ὅτι πάντα χωρεῖ καὶ οὐδὲν μένει, καὶ ποταμοῦ ῥοῇ ἀπεικάζων τὰ ὄντα λέγει ὡς δὶς ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν +) PY 5 , οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης, κιτιλ. Two Orphic lines are then quoted besides this of Homer and Hesiod : ᾿Ωκεανὸς πρῶτος καλλίρ- poos ἦρξε γάμοιο, ὅς pa κασιγνή- την ὁμομήτορα Τηθὺν ὄπυιεν. So- crates adds, ταῦτ᾽ οὖν σκόπει ὅτι καὶ ἀλλήλοις συμφωνεῖ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τοῦ Ἡρακλείτου πάντα τείνει. The last words are a good commentary on ξυμφερέσθων. The theory of Knowledge, ‘All impressions are true,’ is shown to require the theory of Being, ‘All things come and go.” And thus of the Prota- gorean and Heraclitean tradi- tions there is woven a doctrine of sense, similar to that which was held by the Cyrenaics and perhaps others at this time. As a doctrine of sense it is re- ceived, as a doctrine of know- ledge and being it is negatived. Compare the way in which δόξα is treated in the Republic, 5. 479 A: Τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν μῶν τι ἔστιν, ὃ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν φανή- σεται; καὶ τῶν δικαίων, ὃ οὐκ ἄδικον; καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, ὃ οὐκ ἀνόσιον ; κι τ. ὰ. τί δέ; τὰ πολλὰ διπλάσια ἧττόν τι ἡμίσεα ἢ δι- πλάσια φαίνεται; Οὐδέν. Καὶ με- γάλα δὴ καὶ σμικρὰ καὶ κοῦφα καὶ βαρέα μή τι μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν φήσωμεν, ταῦτα προσρηθήσεται ἢ τἀναντία ; 8. ἐπεὶ καὶ τάδε, κ. τ᾿ Δ | The clause ὅτι... ἡσυχία is added in explanation of τῷ λόγῳ σημεῖα. ‘The theory is confirmed by the following indications of the fact that, etc. H. Schmidt quotes Menex. 237 EH: Μέγα δὲ τεκμήριον τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ, ὅτι, κι το λυ .. πᾶν γάρ, κι τὰ, Cp. OEAITHTOS. 43 A e σεν Χ A 5 a Q Ῥ. 153. ONMELA ἱκανὰ, OTL TO μὲν εἶναι δοκοῦν καὶ TO γίγνε- 7, 2 \ \ x 5 a 1.3 , σθαι κίνησις παρέχει, TO δὲ μὴ εἶναι καὶ ἀπόλλυσθαι ς , Ν \ J Ν “- ὰ \ Ν 9) ἡσυχία" τὸ yap θερμὸν τε καὶ πῦρ, ὃ δὴ καὶ τἄλλα “ Α 3 ld BON aA » an γεννᾷ καὶ ἐπιτροπέύει, αὑτὸ γεννᾶται ἐκ φορᾶς καὶ i; A \ / xX 3 @ / τρίψεως" τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις" ἢ οὐχ αὕται γενέσεις 5 , TUPOS 5 OEAI. Αὗται μὴν οὖν. Α \ Lf an 7 ’ὔ 3 A > a 2Q. Καὶ μὴν τὸ ye τῶν ζώων γένος ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ’ 7] τουτων φύεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δ᾽ οὔ; Thue. 1. 2: Καὶ παράδειγμα τόδε τοῦ λόγου οὐκ ἐλάχιστόν ἐστι, διὰ τὰς μετοικίας ἐς τὰ ἄλλα μὴ ὁμοίως αὐξηθῆναι" ἐκ γάρ, κ. τ.λ. I. δοκοῦν ] The expression has been thought harsh [δοκοῦν] Schanz; and Badham proposes to read ὁτιοῦν. But cp. supr. 152 D:°°A δή φαμεν εἶναι. Infr. 153 Εἰ; Καὶ ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί ῴαμεν χρῶμα : also 176 C: Δει- νότητές τε δοκοῦσαι. “ Being, so esteemed.’ ‘What passes for Being.’ 3. ὃ δὴ καὶ τἄλλα γεννᾷ] ‘Which our theory assumes to produce all other things.’ The symbol of fire as the primal element is elsewhere associated with the theory of a flux. See Cratyl. 401 (quoted above), ib. 413 B (speaking of the Hera- cliteans): ὋὉ μὲν γάρ ris φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον" τοῦ- τὸν γὰρ μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῳ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκοώς, καταγελᾷ μου οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπει-- δὰν ὁ ἥλιος δύῃ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὅ τι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί; τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥάδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι, 6 δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. ὁ δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει ᾿Αναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο, κιτιλ. Thus the mythology of the doctrine was rationalized by its ad- herents. In this dialogue every feature of it is presented, from the most sensuous symbolism (ἥλιος, χρυσῆ σειρά) to the most abstract principle (τὸ πᾶν κίνησις nv, 156), and its most remote application. See alsothefamous saying of Heraclitus (fr. By- water): Κόσμον τὸν αὐτὸν ἁπάν-- τῶν, οὔτε θεῶν τις οὔτε ἀνθρώπων ἐποίησεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ἦν τε ἀεὶ καὶ ἔσται πῦρ ἀείζωον ἁπτόμενον μέτρα καὶ σβεννύμενον μέτρα. But the symbol fire was by no means confined to Heraclitus (cp. the Atomists, Pythagoreans, etc.). 5. τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις] This is added parenthetically with re- ference to τρίψεως. Τούτω δὲ κινήσεις has been adopted by editors on the authority of the Bodleian MS. But τοῦτο is also the reading of the Bodl. first hand. The marginal note δυικῶς is due to the corrector (b) who changed τοῦτο into τούτω, in- stead of restoring κίνησις. rest of decay. Fire, the presiding element, is generated by friction, that is, by motion, * Living creatures owe their origin to a similar cause, ‘Exercise is essential to the preser- vation and improve- ment both of body and mind. 44 SOQ. Tide; ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ἜΘΟΥ δ᾽ , σ“ ᾽ e~ \ +e Ή TOV σωμάτων ἕξις ουχ ὑπο ἡσυ- jp. 153: A SD / ὃ / CEN , \ ἣν χίας μεν καὶ apylas ἰόλλυται, VITO γυμνασιων δὲ καὶ / es \ Me κινήσεων ἐπὶ TOAV σώζεται; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ, Ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις---οὐχ ὑπὸ μαθήσεως \ Ν / / 574 a / , μὲν καὶ μελέτης, κινησεων OVTOV, KTATAL TE μαθηματα \ 7 Ἂν “ και σώζεται καὶ γιγνεται 3. ἐπὶ πολύ] ‘To ἃ great extent ;’ or ‘for a long time.’ The MSS. vary between (as) ἐπὶ πολύ (T ete.), and ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ (B etc.), from which ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ has been conjectured. But ὡς in T was at first omitted, and ἐπὶ πολύ gives a better sense. Cp. Thuc. 8. 1: ᾿Επὶ πολὺ μὲν nri- Crat. 415 A: Tod dvew ἐπὶ πολύ. 5. Ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις] ἕξις in Plato, like φαντασία, is less technical than in Aristotle. It is simply the noun. of ἔχειν, whether transitive or not. The body is said ἔχειν πῶς, the mind is said ἔχειν τὰ pa- θήματα; hence ἡ τοῦ σώματος ἕξις, ‘the condition of the body;’ but ἡ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, ‘the having in the mind.’ Cp. Rep. 9. 591 B: Ἢ ψυχὴ τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν λαμ- βάνει σωφροσύνην τε καὶ δικαιοσύ- my... κτωμένη. Ar. Met. 4. 1022. 6: ἝἭξις δὲ λέγεται ἕνα μὲν τρόπον οἷον ἐνέργειά τις τοῦ . ἄλλον δὲ στουν. ἔχοντος καὶ ἐχομένου. τρόπον διάθεσις, kK. τ.λ. For a similar transition from one sense of a word to another cp. 158 H: Τὰ ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθῆ. ‘But with regard to the hav- ing the mind, is it not through learning and practice, which are motions, that it gains what it learns, and is preserved, and becomes better?’ The sentence , CUDGN 3. ΔῈ / βελτίων, ὑπὸ δ᾽ ησυχίας, proceeds as if ψυχή were the subject, at all events of the latter part. Cp. Rep. 7.532 B: Ἢ δέ ye, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, λύσις τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεσμῶν, κ. τ.λ. 6. κινήσεων ὄντων] Cp. Prot. 329 Ὁ : Ὅτι ἑνὸς ὄντος τῆς ἀρετῆς μόριά ἐστιν ἃ ἐρωτᾷς. ὄντων 15 neuter; ‘things which are of the nature of motion,’ like τοῦτο δὲ κίνησις above. Others sup- pose ὄντων to be the masculine form used for the feminine according to a well-known ten- dency of Attic Greek. But in this case it would be better to read κινησέοιν ὄντοιν with Butt- mann and Schanz. ἡ. σώζεταιἡ]! (1) “" Retains’ (middle), or, better, (2) “15 pre- served’ (passive). ἔξις, as above interpreted, the preceding κτᾶται τε... καί, and ἐπιλανθάνεται in the corresponding clause, may be urged in favour of the former : for which ep. 163 D: Ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην τούτου καὶ σωζό- μενον. Rep. 455 B: Mnd ἃ ἔμαθε σώζοιτο. But when σώ- ¢erar is rendered as passive, there is a more natural pro- gress in the thought, ‘gets knowledge, is preserved, im- proves,’ while ἐπιλανθάνεται May be as justly opposed to im- provement as to retention. And we avoid the difficulty of supposing that the word is used differently here, and a few lines OEAITHTOYX. 45 3 7 \ 3 , 3) 57 ’ Ρ. 1538. ἀμελετησίας τε καὶ ἀμαθίας οὔσης, οὔτε τι μανθάνει σ΄ “Δ 7 ’ / ca τε av μαθῃ emtrAavOavera ; ΘΕΑΙ. Kai μάλα. Χ \ yf 3 , ’ὔ’ , Χ ΣΩ. To μὲν apa ἀγαθὸν, κίνησις, κατά τε ψυχὴν — * Motion, N A π art ἢ , then, is καὶ κατὰ σώμα, TO δὲ τοὐναντίον ; 5 good, and x rest is evil. OEAT. “Eocxev. 3 3 / 7 \ , 2Q. “Er: οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ γαλήνας above and below: cp. Symp. — yield to my theory,’ cp. Pheedr. 208A: Medern . . σώζει τὴν 229 E: Als εἴ τις ἀπιστῶν προσ- ἐπιστήμην. See the whole pas- 84 κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἕκαστον.---- If sage. In the indeterminate state of grammar, may there not be a real, though not uncon- scious, ambiguity? H. Schmidt ‘thinks that σώζεται may be taken reflexively throughout sections B to D, ‘ Es lisst sich in allen drei stetter medial fassen, in der ersten und dritter als “servat se” und in der zweiten als “servat sibi.”’ This comes practically to the same thing as (1). 4. τὸ μὲν ἄρα] ‘The one, then, namely, motion, is good.’ There seems no reason to suspect a gloss. There would be a want of Plato’s usual ex- plicitness without κίνησις ; and the variety of genders presents no difficulty. Cp. Rep. 433 D: ᾿Ενάμιλλον ἄρα---ἡ---δύναμις ; inf. 156 B: To δὲ αἴσθησις. 7. Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω... ὅτι] (1) ‘Must I go on to men- tion still weather and calms, and the like, showing how quietness in every case cor- rupts and destroys, whilst its opposite preserves: and for my crowning instance, pressing it into the service, shall 1 insist . upon it that by his golden chain Homer means the sun 2’ For προσβιβάζων, ‘making it one is to force each of them (the mythes) to harmonize with probability.’ Cratyl. 427 C: Kai τἄλλα οὕτω φαίνεται προσβι- βάζων---ὁ νομοθέτης, ‘forcing the sound of words to square with the sense.’ Mythology, poetry, nature, body, mind, the ele- ments, had already been ‘ pressed into the service. But this final instance requires still greater force. Thus Plato glances, as he does elsewhere, at the absurd allegorical in- terpretations of Homer which were current (amongst Hera- eliteans and others) in his day. The position of theaccusative τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν is possibly due to the attraction of the active προσβιβάζων, and to the previous accusative, τὸν κολοφῶνα, which is in apposition to the sen- tence (Riddell, Digest of Idioms, §§ 11,13). For the transitive clause with ἀναγκάζω ep. Symp. 202 A: Μὴ τοίνυν ἀνάγκαζε, ὃ ὃ μὴ καλόν ἐστιν, αἰσχρὸν εἶναι. Parm. 13 46: Ὁ ἄγνωστα ἀναγ- κάζων αὐτὰ εἶναι. Or (2) ‘And finally, shall I clinch the proof (or shall I compel assent) by bringing on my crowning ar- gument (and showing) that by his golden chain Homer means ‘Water and air are pre- served by motion. The whole may be clinched with Ho- mer’s gold- ‘en chain, σι 40 TIAATQNOZ Ἂν 8 na Ψ e Ν e ,ὔ , καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, OTL AL μὲν ἡσυχίαι σηποῦσι καὶ Ῥ. 183: > / \\ o ὦ / Ν ΩΝ 7 Ν ἀπολλύυασι, τὰ ὃ ετερα σώζει 3; καὶ ἐπι TOUTOLS TOV κολοφῶνα ἀναγκάζω προσβιβάζων τὴν χρυσὴν σειρὰν ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ τὸν ἥλιον Ὅμηρος λέγει; καὶ δηλοῖ σ od \ x e Ν ὅτι ἕως μὲν ἂν ἡ περιῴορα the sun?’ For ἀναγκάζω here ep. Rep. το. 611 B: Ὅτι. .ἀθάν- ατον Ψυχὴ καὶ ὁ ἄρτι λόγος καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ἀναγκάσειαν ἄν. In (2) προσβιβάζων is not used as in Phedr. 229 EH, Crat. 4270, and the Bodleian reading προ- βιβάζων would do equally well. In either case ἀναγκάζω, like λέγω supra, is deliberative sub- junctive. Schanz brackets av- αγκάζω, and reads προσβιβάζω (‘Shall I adduce?’). Dobree conjectures ἀναγαγὼν προσβι- βάζω. τ. αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι] There is a slight redundancy of expression in order to bring the instance in question under the general theory. Here, as elsewhere, Hirschig prunes the text. 3. τὴν χρυσῆν σειράν] 1]. 8. 18, foll, At this point Socrates has entered fully into the He- raclitean vein; as when he says of himself in the Cratylus, 407 D: ἤοφρα ἴδηαι οἷοι Εὐθύφρονος ἵπποι, or in the Phedrus, 238 D: Οὐκέτι πόρρω Διθυράμβων φθέγγομαι. This is the crown- ing argument, because it ad- duces the capital fact of nature witnessed to by the oldest and gravest authority (στρατηγὸν “Ὅμηρον). ‘The lines chiefly ad- verted to are 23-26: ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὅτε δή Kev ἐγὼ πρόφρων ἐθέλοιμι ἐρύσσαι, | αὐτῇ κεν γαίῃ ἐρύσαιμ᾽ αὐτῇ τε θαλάσσῃ" σειρὴν μέν κεν ἔπειτα περὶ ῥίον Οὐλύμποιο | δησαί- μην, τὰ δέ κ᾽ αὖτε μετήορα πάντα γένοιτο. Cp. Heracl. fr. 31, By- 5 / Cee, ἢ κινουμενὴ Καὶ ὁ ἡλιος; water: Εἰ μὴ ἥλιος ἦν, εὐφρόνη ἂν ἦν. Fr. 29: ἥλιος οὐχ ὑπερ- βήσεται μέτρα, εἰ δὲ μή, Ἐρινύες μιν Δίκης ἐπίκουροι ἐξευρήσουσι. See also Eur. Orest. 982-4. As fire was the symbol of mo- tion, so the sun was the still more concrete symbol of fire. See Rep. 6. 508, where the sun is allowed to be paramount in the region of sense; being essential to vision and to life. For the way in which the au- thority of Homer and the poets is used, ironically by Plato, but seriously by those whom he imitates, cp. Cratyl. 391, where an argument is based upon the line ὃν Ξάνθον καλέουσι θεοί, ἄνδρες δὲ Σκάμανδρον, and infr. 194 EH: Ὅταν τοίνυν dowdy του τὸ κέαρ ἧ, ὃ δὴ ἐπήνεσεν ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής. 5. ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινουμένη καὶ ὃ ἥλιος] The motion of the whole universe, and the perpetual interchange of the different elements, was symbolized in the Heraclitean theory by the revolution of the sun, who not only rose and descended, tra- versing the sky, but was also quenched and rekindled daily, Νέος ἐφ᾽ ἡμέρῃ (fr. 32). Lassalle compares Ar. Meteor. 1. 9: Ἡ μὲν οὖν ὡς κινοῦσα Kal κυρία καὶ πρώτη τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁ κύκλος ἐστίν" ἐν ᾧ φανερῶς ἡ τοῦ ἡλίου φορὰ διακρί- νουσα καὶ συγκρίνουσα τῷ γίγνεσθαι πλησίον ἢ πορρώτερον, αἰτία τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς ἐστι ος “Ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος ἀναθυμία- ΟΝ, eA, Στὰ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 47 7 ay ἂν / A ΕῚ ἴω Q 5 ji 153. πάντα ἔστι καὶ σώζεται τὰ ἐν θεοῖς τε καὶ ἀνθρώποις" ry \ 7 na σ , / 7 > ἫΝ εἰ δὲ σταίη τοῦτο ὥσπερ δεθέν, πάντα χρήματ᾽ ἂν δια- θ Ν ’ 5. ἃ Ν λ / yy 7 Ζ . φ ἀρείῃ Καὶ γένοιτ ἂν TO AEYOMEVOY AVM κατὼ παντα: ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ταῦτα δηλοῦν, ἅπερ λέγεις. 53 \ \ XQ. Ὕπόλαβε τοίνυν, ὦ ἄριστε, οὑτωσί. κατὰ τὰ aoa) δ τ ἐξ 5» > AN σις, ἀτμίς" ἡ δ᾽ ἐξ ἀέρος εἰς ὕδωρ, , , A , > νέφος... Τίνεται δὲ κύκλος οὗτος ᾿ , we Le , μιμούμενος τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου κύκλον, ἅμα γὰρ ἐκεῖνος εἰς τὰ πλάγια μετα- ’ ‘ a 2) ‘ , ΄ βάλλει, καὶ οὗτος ἄνω καὶ κάτω. Δεῖ δὲ νοῆσαι τοῦτον ὥσπερ ποταμὸν ’, Y ῥέοντα κύκλῳ ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κοινὸν “ > 3}, . Ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ ΕΒ, \ 70) \ ¢ 7 ἡνίττοντο τὸν ᾿Ωκεανὸν οἱ πρότερον, »4 \ oe ἀέρος καὶ ὕδατος... τάχ᾽ ἂν τοῦτον τὸν ποταμὸν λέγοιεν τὸν κύκλῳ ῥέοντα περὶ τὴν γῆν. Cp. infr. 181): Τὴν δὲ περιφοράν, and note: Phil. 28 E. 2. εἰ δὲ σταίη] Cp. Pheedr. 245 C (where the point of view is nearer to Plato’s own): Τὸ ἀεικί- νητον ἀθάνατον, τὸ δ᾽ ἄλλο κινοῦν καὶ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλου κινούμενον, παῦλαν ἔχον κινήσεως, παῦλαν ἔχει ζωῆς .. οὕτω δὴ κινήσεως μὲν ἀρχὴ τὸ αὐτὸ αὑτὸ κινοῦν. τοῦτο δ᾽ οὔτ᾽ ἀπόλ- λυσθαι οὔτε γίγνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἢ πάντα τε οὐρανὸν πᾶσάν τε γένεσιν συμπεσοῦσαν στῆναι καὶ μήποτε αὖθις ἔχειν ὅθεν κινηθέντα γενέσθαι. In the text all is made to de- pend on change; in the above _ passage all change depends on that which is self-moving ; but in both, motion is essential to being. Cp. also Legg. το. 895 A: Ei σταίη πως τὰ πάντα ὁμοῦ γενόμενα, καθάπερ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τοιούτων τολμῶσι λέγειν, τίν᾽ ἄρα ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀνάγκη πρώτην κίνησιν γενέσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων; Ar. Met. 1.994 A: Τὸν μὲν ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀέρος κινηθῆναι, τοῦτον δ᾽ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου, τὸν δὲ ἥλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ νείκους, καὶ τούτου μηδὲν εἶναι πέρας. Ib. 11. 6-10. Simpl. in Aristot. Cat. p. 1056. Bas. (quoted by Las- salle): Εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἕτερον τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπιλείπει, οἴχοιτο ἂν πάντα ἀφανι- σθέντα' διὸ καὶ μέμφεται “Ομήρῳ Ἡράκλειτος εἰπόντι, ‘Qs ἔρις κιτιλ. Οἰχήσεσθαι, γάρ, φησι, πάντα. Schol. Ven. ad Iliad. 18. τοῦ : (Qs ἔρις ἔκ τε θεῶν ἔκ τ᾽ ἀνθρώπων ἀπόλοιτο) Ἡράκλειτος τὴν τῶν ὄντων φύσιν κατ᾽ ἔριν συνεστάναι νομίζων μέμφεται ἱΟμή- ρῷ, σύγχυσιν κόσμου δοκῶν αὐτὸν εὔχεσθαι. In the words ἄνω κάτω there is perhaps an allu- sion to Heraclitus’ ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω pia. See also Pheedo 72 Ὁ. Some of the latest guesses at truth have sometimes had a real or fanciful resemblance to the earlier ones. See Comte in Miss Martineau’s abridgment, vol.1.p. 429: ‘Amidst the con- fusion and obscurity which exist on this subject, [think we may conclude that no organism, even the simplest, could live in a state of complete immobility. The double movement of the earth, and especially its rota- tion, may probably be as ne- cessary to the development of life as to the periodical distri- bution of heat and light.’ 6. Ὑπόλαβε] If being then is motion, how are we to conceive of knowledge, i.e. of sensible perception? This is now evolved, a fresh appeal to ex- perience being made at every If the revo- lution of the sun and of the heaven were stop- ped, the order of the uni- verse would be over- thrown.’ 3. The theory is now ap- plied. (1) Colour is not something without nor in the eye, it arises be- tween, when the eye en- counters a particular motion. Hence it is different to man and other ani- mals, to different men, and 48 NAATQNOZ } ιν > ‘' M4 a a \ κ A , . 39 . ὄμματα πρῶτον, ὃ δὴ καλεῖς χρώμα λευκον, μὴ εἰναι P. 153: > ON oS / yf n ἴω 3 ’ > 3 ΄- αὐτὸ ἕτερόν τι ἔξω τῶν σῶν ὀμματων μηδ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι: μηδέ rw” αὐτῷ χώραν ἀποτάξῃς" ἤδη yap E Ἃ 57 xy 3 i τᾷ 4 \ > XN > QV €ly) TE OV που εν τάξει Και μένοι και οὐκ QV εν / / 5 YEVETEL YLYVOLTO. OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ πώς: TQ. Ἑπώμεθα τῷ ἄρτι λόγῳ, μηδὲν αὐτὸ kal? ἀν τον x Kee ce Ψ ΄ Ν αὑτὸ ev ὃν τιθέντες" καὶ μιν οὕτω μέλαν τε καὶ λευκὸν καὶ ὁτιοῦν ἄλλο χρῶμα ἐκ τῆς προσβολῆς a / N XN / \ na 10 τῶν ὀμμάτων πρὸς THY προσήκουσαν φορὰν φανεῖται ἃ Sun KG 3 , qn γεγενημένον, καὶ ὃ On ἕκαστον εἰναί φαμεν χρῶμα, 3, ἈΝ / yf Ν. / ΕΥΣ οὔτε TO προσβάλλον οὔτε TO προσβαλλόμενον ἔσται, ἰλλὰ Ev ε 4 10 ae. x ὺ δὲ ἊΒ α α μέτα υ TL εκάστῳ LOLOV yeyovos συ uo xupt step. Each sensation is the result of a double movement from within and from without. Hence all sensations are, (1) relative to the individual (ἑκά- στῳ ἴδιον γεγονός); (2) relative to each other. (1) is proved chiefly of the sensations of colour, warmth, etc.: (2) of the per- ceptions of size and number. κατὰ τὰ ὄμματα] ‘In the sphere of vision.’ 2. ἕτερόν τι] thing.’ 3. χώραν] Op. infr. 156 Ὁ. 4. Ἐδν] MSS. ἄν. Heind. corr. ὄν που ἐν τάξει: εἴ τις αὐτῷ χώρα ἀποταχθείη. The change from ἄν to ὄν is more probable than the repetition of ἄν in this place. For ἤδη τε“ 1 that were done,’ cp. infr. zo1 E: Ἤδη yap ἂν οὐσίαν. ‘A separate . προστίθεσθαι. 10. πρὸς τὴν προσήκουσαν φο- ράν] The theory does not con- sider the origin of this motion. The instinctive belief in the reality of external things is already weakened. 11. ὃ δὴ ἕκαστον εἶναί φαμεν] Ορ. 152 Ὁ : °A δὴ φάμεν εἶναι. τὸ προσβάλλον, SC. ἣ φορά. τὸ προσβαλλόμενον, 80. τὰ ὄμματα. Cp. infr. ἄλλῳ τῳ προσπεσόν . . ἄλλου προσελθόντος. 12. οὔτε τὸ προσβάλλον οὔτε τὸ προσβαλλόμενον] ‘Neither that which strikes, nor that which is struck,’ 1.6. Neither the motion from within nor that which meets it from without. Here, as elsewhere, ‘sight’ is conceived of as an act, and not as a passive impression. And τὸ προσβαλλόμενον is the object, τοῦτο, ᾧ προσβάλλει τὰ ὄμματα. This is a curious use of the passive voice. But the com- parison of other passages, esp. Tim. 45 C: ὅπῃπερ ἂν ἀντερείδῃ τὸ πρόσπιπτον ἔνδοθεν πρὸς ὃ τῶν ἔξω ξυνέπεσεν, excludes the pos- sibility of doubt, although the expression so understood is in- consistent with the theory of active and passive elements, which is afterwards introduced (infr. 156 A). | Ρ. 184: ως. οἷν ἐν ἐν χα. νυ ἃ Pe SEAITHTOS. 49 Δ - Ν oS A A Ρ. 154. σαιο ἂν ws οἷον σοὶ φαίνεται ἕκαστον χρώμα, τοιοῦτον x Ν Na Ἢ a“ 74 καὶ κυνὶ καὶ ὁτῳοῦν ζώῳ; OEAI. Μὰ Δί᾽ οὐκ ἔγωγε. XQ. Τί d€; ἄλλῳ ἀνθρώπῳ ap ὅμοιον καὶ σοὶ 7 e A y+ a 9 a xX \ ~ φαίνεται ὁτιοῦν ; ἔχεις τοῦτο ἰσχυρῶς, ἢ TOAD μᾶλλον, 5 Ψ“ »ῸΝ N > “ ΦΥΣῸΝ \ \ “ ς / ὅτι οὐδὲ σοὶ αὐτῷ ταὐτὸν διὰ τὸ μηδέποτε ὁμοίως αὐτὸν σεαυτῷ ἔχειν ; an “ f a KN “ OEAI. 'Γοῦτο μᾶλλον μοι δοκεῖ ἢ ἐκεῖνο. ἵ ς΄ A © / Xx - ϑ Β΄ ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα ἢ οὗ εἐφα- ᾿ ’, ἥ AN \ Ἂ ᾿ 3 » 5 πτομεθα, μέγα ἢ λευκὸν ἢ θερμὸν ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε LAA Ν χλλ “Ἃ ’ / es δὲ ἄλλῳ προσπεσὸν ἄλλο ἂν ἐγεγόνει, αὐτό γε μηδὲν , PPA Oa υχ , oF τὰ , μεταβαλλον" εἰ δὲ αὖ τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἢ ἐφαπτό- “ 3 7, 9 Nii, ΟΣ δῆ μενον ἐκαστον ἣν τούτων, οὐκ ἂν αὖ ἄλλου προσελ- / ὕ ’ Ν \ Ν ϑ, x Oovros ἢ τι παθόντος αὐτὸ μηδὲν παθὸν ἄλλο ἂν b eels 3 ἈΝ a 5 7 / \ a ἐγένετο. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε, ὦ φίλε, θαυμαστά τε καὶ γελοῖα 9. ᾧ παραμετρούμεθα] Corna- to suggest the notion that big- rius, followed by most editors, ness is in the eye. reads 6, taking παραμετρούμεθα We are introduced to a actively. Although (as H. new class of objects, and make Schmidt remarks) in the ex- a, transition in the argument ample giveninfr.155 Bthecase at the same time. All that is altered by the supposition I can see, hear, feel, etc., that Theztetus has grown, 1 is seen, heard, felt, etc. by still adhere to the MS. text and me alone, and arises solely in interpret (with Jowett) ‘that relation to me. Again, I view with which we compare our- the size of other bodies in rela- selves in size.’ The instance tion to my own, or I compare most in point is that ad- different quantities. I cannot duced in the Phedo, 102 think of any magnitude or B, where Simmias is shorter number as great or small, ex- than Soerates, but taller than cept in relation to some other Phedo. There is in any case magnitude or number. some confusion between rela- 12. τὸ παραμετρούμενον ἣ ἐφα- tivity and subjectivity. This πτόμενον] 1. 6. “1, the subject is partially evaded by making in the one case of self-mea- self the subject of comparison, surement, in the other of sensa- but would be increased if τὸ tion” Ορ. 182 Α, τὸ.. πάσχον. παραμετρούμενον meant ‘that ΑΥ, Eth. Ν. το. 4.δ 5: Αὐτὴν δὲ which perceives size,’ as it (τὴν αἴσθησιν) λέγειν ἐνεργεῖν ἢ ἐν must if 6 is read. None of ᾧ ἐστι μηδὲν διαφερέτω. the examples given are such as E Io 18 to the same man in dif- ferent states. (2) Warmth in like manner is relative to the touch, and size and num- ber are wholly relative. For want of observ- ing this, we allow ourselves to fall into manifest contradic- tions. E.g. We say that six dice are more and fewer ; more than four, fewer than twelve. Can any- thing be- come more unless in- creased ? 5 Io 15 νῦν ἐρώτησιν ἀποκρίνωμαι, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν: ἐὰν δὲ πρὸς ν 20 50 εὐχερῶς TOS ἀναγκαζόμεθα ae ὡς pain ἃ ἂν [Ipw- p. 154: MAATQNOZ Tayopas TE καὶ πᾶς ὃ τὰ αὐτὰ ἐκείνῳ ἐπιχειρῶν λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δὴ καὶ ποῖα λέγεις 5 TQ. Σμικρὸν λαβὲ παράδειγμα, καὶ πάντα εἴσει ἃ ο βούλομαι. ἀστραγαλοὺῦς γάρ που ἕξ, ἂν μὲν τέτταρας αὐτοῖς π οσενέ ΚΊ) πλείους α ἐν εἶναι τῶν τεττὰ ων 2 καὶ ἡμιολίους, ἐὰν δὲ δώδεκα, ἐλάττους καὶ ἡμίσεις" καὶ οὐδὲ ἀνεκτὸν ἄλλως λέγειν. ἢ σὺ ἀνέξει ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἀν ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; ἂν σε Πρωταγόρας ἔρηται ἢ τις ἄλλος, Ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἔσθ᾽ ὕπως τι μεῖζον ἢ πλέον γίγνεται ἄλλως ἢ αὐξηθέν: ie: aT OS : ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐὰν μέν, ὦ ZOKparEs, τὸ δοκοῦν πρὸς τὴν τὴν προτέραν, φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω, ὅτι ἔστιν. ΣΩ. Ed ye νὴ τιν Ἥραν, ὦ φίλε, καὶ θείως. ἀτάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐὰν ἀποκρίνῃ ὅτι ἔστιν, Εὐριπίδειον τι fone βήσεται: ἢ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα ἀνέλεγκτος ἡμῖν ἐσται, ἡ δὲ φρὴν οὐκ ἀνέλεγκτος. I. εὐχερῶς πως ἀναγκαζόμεθα] ‘We allow ourselves to be drawn into using strange and ridiculous expressions.’ Pro- tagoras would not find fault with us for calling the six dice more than the four, but for using the verb εἶναι to express the rela- tion. 6. ἀστραγάλους γάρ mov ἕξ] The difficulty has been stated with regard to size, it is now illustrated with regard to num- ber. 14. τὸ δοκοῦν] Cp. p. 157 C: Δοκοῦντά σοι, τό. φυλάττων] Not exactly ‘avoiding’ (φυλαττόμενος), but ‘being careful:’ keeping watch on one point only. Cp. Gorg. 461 D: Ἐάν μοι ἕν μόνον φυλάτ- της. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις ; Τὴν μακρο- λογίαν. ἢν καθείρξῃς : infr. Ῥ. 180 A: Εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι. Also infr, τόρ C: πάνυ τήρει τὸ τοιόνδε, μή, κιτιλ. 17. Ed ye... καὶ θείως] Thesete- tus’ answer showed great dia- lectical aptitude. He perceives the contradiction, and yet will not answer παρὰ τὸ δοκοῦν αὑτῷ. Cp. Rep. 1.346 A: cal, ὦ μακάρι, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. 19. ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλῶττα] ‘Our δ. 154. »155 ἴων ’ὔ \ E θόντες σοφιστικῶς εἰς μάχην τοιαύτην, ἀλλήλων τοὺς 5 . ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοὶ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ 51 > 7 \ nm a 3 J δ, x \ NEV, πάντα τὰ τῶν φρενῶν ἐξητακότες, ἤδη ἂν TO Υ̓ 4 , λοιπὸν ἐκ περιουσίας ἀλλήλων ἀποπειρώμενοι, ξυνελ- ’ a J 3 ΄ A \ “ > “ λογοὺυς τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρούομεν: νῦν δὲ ἅτε ἰδιῶται “ / ’ » \ Ν « ’ f mporov βουλησόμεθα θεάσασθαι αὐτὰ πρὸς αυτα, τί ἃ J ’ὔ ς 4 7 ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἃ διανοούμεθα, πότερον ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις ξυμφωνεῖ ἢ οὐδ᾽ ὁπωστιοῦν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε τοῦτ᾽ ΣΩ, Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε. ὅτε δ᾽ οὕτως ἋἋ / av βουλοίμην. 3 y xX ἔχει, ἄλλο τι ἢ > ’ ε ’ἢ \ Χ yf ie > NPEMA, ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες, πάλιν ἐπανα- A 3 \ al 32) e an σκεψόμεθα, ov δυσκολαίνοντες, ἀλλὰ τῷ OVTL ἡμᾶς tongue will be unconvinced, but not our mind.’ Eur. Hipp. 612: Ἡ γλῶσσ᾽ ὀμώμοχ᾽, ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος. : 3. πάντα... ἐξητακότες] ‘ Hav- ing ransacked every mental problem,’ 4. ἐκ περιουσίας] “ Out of our superfluity,’ ‘for mere pastime.’ Dem. de Cor. 226: οὗτος δ᾽ ἐκ περιουσίας ἐμοῦ κατηγορεῖ. 5. τοιαύτην] Se. σοφιστικήν. Cp. Symp. 210 BC: Ὥστε καὶ ἐὰν ἐπιεικὴς dv τὴν ψυχήν τις καὶ σμικρὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ἐξαρκεῖν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐρᾶν καὶ κήδεσθαι καὶ τίκ- τειν λόγους τοιούτους, VIZ. ἐπιεικεῖς. Plato is thinking of such en- counters as those which he has satirized in the Euthydemus. τοὺς λόγους τοῖς λόγοις ἐκρού- oper | Ar. Nub. 321: Kat γνωμι- δίῳ γνώμην νύξασ᾽, ἑτέρῳ λόγῳ ἀν- τιλογήσω. 6. ἐκρούομεν] “ Would have knocked our arguments to- gether, like swords in a sham fight; ‘would have bandied arguments.’ 7. αὐτὰ πρὸς αὑτά] ‘Com- pared with one another.’ The reading of the old edd., αὐτὰ πρὸς αὐτά, might be defended, but αὑτά is the Bodleian read- ing. 8. ἡμῖν] Cp. Rep. 1.343 A. 11. Καὶ μὴν ἔγωγε] Ver. Kat μὴν ἐγώ (B pr. ὙΠ.) The abrupt- ness of ἐγώ without ye may be defended from Rep. 6. 500 A: Kai ἐγώ, ἀμέλει, ἔφη, συνοίομαι, infr. 164 A, Eur. Med.1375: Καὶ μὴν ἐγὼ σήν. Alcest. 369: Καὶ μὴν ἐγώ σοι πένθος... συνοίσω. But the correction of the Bodleian MS. is in the ancient hand. In either case καί belongs to the pronoun. 12. ὡς πάνυ πολλὴν σχολὴν ἄγοντες] Plato does not forget, either here or infr. 172 E, that Socrates has been summoned to appear before the King Archon. 13. ov δυσκολαίνοντες] ‘With no feeling of impatience.’ Cp. Hens 35 Ὁ Ὁ: Ei μέν ye τῶν σοφῶν τις εἴη καὶ ἐριστικῶν ὁ ἐρό- μενος, εἴποιμ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ, ὅτι Ἐμοὶ E 2 - fe) Let us con= sider this, not in the spirit of contro- versy, but with calm inquiry. What are these ap- paritions that have been raised within us? One voice says, No- thing can become more or fewer, greater or less, while it is equal to itself. Another : —That to which no- thing is added, and from which nothing is taken, re- mains equal to itself. 5 10 52 \ ’ αὐτοὺς ἐξετάζοντες, ἐν ἡμῖν ; ὧν πρῶτον ἐπισκοποῦντες ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ a 9 > Ν a) Ἁ i ἅττα TOT ἐστὶ ταῦτα TA φασματα P. 155- φήσομεν, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, μηδέποτε μηδὲν ἂν μεῖζον μηδὲ ἔλαττον γενέ- ~ / 7 4 3 σ΄ ἡ BY Oe ss σθαι pyre OyK@ μῆτε ἀριθμῷ, ἕως ἴσον εἴη αὐτὸ Ἑ ΄“ 3 σ €AUT@. οὐχ OUTOS 9 ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Δεύτερον δέ γε, ᾧ μήτε προστίθοιτο μήτε “- a 4 ? i , ἀφαιροῖτο, τοῦτο μήτε αὐξάνεσθαί ποτε μήτε φθινειν, aA \ of 9 ἀεὶ δὲ ἴσον εἰναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΏΩ. ἾΑρ᾽ οὖν οὐ καὶ μὲν εἴρηται" εἰ δὲ μὴ ὀρθῶς λέγω, σὸν ἔργον λαμβάνειν λόγον καὶ ἐλέγχειν. εἰ δὲ ὥσπερ ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ νυνὶ φίλοι ὄντες βούλοιντο ἀλ- λήλοις διαλέγεσθαι, δεῖ δὴ πραότε- ρόν πως καὶ διαλεκτικώτερον ἀπο- κρίνεσθαι. τι φάσματα] Thesemental phe- nomena (that have started ito prominence). The ἀπορίαι just stated have made us aware of certain ‘facts of consciousness * or postulates of our own minds. These are here called φάσματα, but presently, when they have been expressed and assented to, ὁμολογήματα. ΟΡ. Polit. 268 E: τὸ περὶ τὴν ᾿Ατρέως τε kal Θυέστου λεχθεῖσαν ἔριν φάσμα. Meno 85 Ο: “Ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίν- nvra αἱ δόξαι αὗται, κατὰ. For the thought cp. infr. 203 A: Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαβόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. Prot. 331 C: οὐδὲν γὰρ δέομαι τὸ εἰ βούλει τοῦτο καὶ εἴ σοι δοκεῖ ἐλέγχεσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἐμέ τε καὶ σέ. 2. ὧν πρῶτον... φήσομεν] ‘The first of which, as we look stea- dily at it, we shall thus put into words.’ 8. ἀφαιροῖτο] Sc. ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ. UY & τρίτον, ὃ μὴ A , = πρότερον ἢν, Or, possibly, the pronoun is here the subject : ‘And it suf- fers no diminution.’ Cp. infr. B: ἀφαιρεθέντος. 11. ὃ μὴ πρότερον ἦν] This may be construed in two ways. (x) ‘ What existed not before, but (exists) afterwards, this cannot be, without production and a process of becoming.’ (2) ‘ What was not before, neither can that be afterwards, without production,’ ete. The latter is the more subtle interpretation, but 15 probably right. Schol.: ὋὉ Πρόκλος TO ἀλλὰ παρέλκειν λέγει. ‘ Prorsus- que ita Latine dixeris quod non prius erat at postea id esse. Heindorf.—‘ Nay but, if it was not before, it cannot be afterwards. Cp. Soph. 265 B: Ἥτις ἂν αἰτία γίγνηται τοῖς μὴ πρότερον οὖσιν ὕστερον γίγνεσθαι. The position of ἀλλά in the MSS., however (ὕστερον ἀλλά libri omnes, W.), throws some doubt upon the reading, and ἄρα may be suggested. ὕσ- τερον “dpa τοῦτο εἶναι, κιτιλ,, ‘that, as our postulate runs, this cannot afterwards be with- B a OEAITHTO®. γνεσθαι ἀδύνατον ; ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ γε δή. 53 A 53 V4 a 4 Q , 0.155. *aAAA ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι ἄνευ τοῦ γενέσθαι καὶ γί- A 53 ’ , , LQ. Ταῦτα δή, οἶμαι, ὁμολογήματα τρία μάχεται A la) ς , “ (v4 \ ‘ a αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς ἐν TH ἡμετέρᾳ ψυχῇ. ὅταν τὰ περὶ τῶν ἀστραγάλων λέγωμεν, ἢ ὅταν φῶμεν ἐμὲ τηλικόνδε of ’ 3 y ’ » / 60 3 OVTA, [ANTE αὐξηθέντα BYTE τουναντιον πάθοντα, ἐν > a A an ἢ π᾿ \ 7 3 σ΄ δὲ ἐνιαῦτῳ σοὺ TOV VEOV νυν μὲν μείζω ELV QL, VOTEPOV € 2 \ an A f 3 ’ 5 Ν ἐλάττω, μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαιρεθέντος ἀλλὰ a » ’ x ἃ Ἂς ἌΧ ὦ ἃ ’ » σου αὐξηθέντος. εἰμὶ γὰρ δὴ ὕστερον ὃ προτερον οὐκ 3 > 7 yf Ν a , , 9, οὐ γενομεένοφ' avev yap του γίγνεσθαι γενέσθαι out becoming and having be- come. For the addition of γίγνεσθαι cp. infr. Ὁ. H. Schmidt observes that the contradiction is not be- tween the assumptions them- selves, but between the as- sumption and the fact. But μάχεται αὐτὰ αὑτοῖς can only mean ‘fight amongst them- selves,’ and if the logic of such a half-humorous passage is to be pressed, No. 3 may be sup- posed to say ‘ Socrates is what he was not; he must have changed.’ ‘No,’ says No. 2, ‘he cannot have changed, for nothing has been taken from him, therefore he is not dimin- ished. No. 1 then comes to the aid of No. 2. 6. τηλικόνδε] ‘Of the height you see me.’ 7. ev ἐνιαυτῷ] ‘In the space of a year. ‘Within a year.’ This very natural expression has somehow given offence, and Madvig conj. παθόντα ἐν ἐμαυτῷ, an emendation which appears to have been antici- pated by the copyist of Par. 1814. 9. μηδὲν τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαι- ρεθέντος] ‘ My size having been stripped of nothing,’ i.e. ‘ With- out anything being taken from my height.’ Badham conjec- tures μηδὲν ἐμοῦ τοῦ ὄγκου ἀφαι- ρεθέντος. But this is unneces- sary. 11. ἄνευ yap τοῦ γίγνεσθαι γενέ- σθαι ἀδύνατον] This axiom is sup- plementary to the three former. In the first, the aorist was used (γενέσθαι), the present in the second (αὐξάνεσθαι, φθίνειν). Both (γενέσθαι καὶ γίγνεσθαι) are ac- cordingly combined in thethird, by means of which the two former are applied. It is now shown that the aorist implies the present. To us such re- finements are difficult, because needless. The subtlety is car- ried still further in the Par- menides, until it is reduced to the formula, ‘That which is, is. Parm. 156 C: ‘Eords τε πρότερον ὕστερον κινεῖσθαι πρότερον κινούμενον ὕστερον ἑστά- Ν Και 2 A A 4 > vat, ἄνευ μεν Tov μεταβάλλειν οὐχ es »” a , = IAN οἷόν Te ἔσται ταῦτα πάσχειν"... a οὐδὲ μὲν μεταβάλλει ἄνευ τοῦ με- ταβάλλειν, 5 A third: Nothing can be what it was not, with- out be- coming. These seem to jar, when we say that the dice which were fewer are now more without being in- creased ; or that I, who was taller than you, am now short- er, without becoming 80. Theztetus is tull of wonder and bewilder- ment at this contra- diction :— a sign of his philosophic nature. . 5 10 54 \ \ “3 » ἀδύνατον, μηδὲν δὲ ἀπολλὺς τοῦ ὄγκου οὐκ ἄν ποτέ p- 155: ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ : 3 / 3 7 \ » \ / ae. / ἐγιγνόμην ἐλάττων. καὶ ἄλλα On μυρία ἐπὶ μυριοις 3 3 a oS οὕτως ἔχει, εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτα ὑπαραδεξόμεθα. δ έπει » [ον ἴω A“ » γάρ που, ὦ Θεαίτητε: δοκεῖς γοῦν μοι οὐκ ἀπειρος .-“᾿ tA 53 τῶν τοιούτων εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ νὴ τοὺς θεούς γε, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὑπερ- aA e / / 9 3 ἣν A ἐν SAD [2 duos ως θαυμάζω τι WOT ἐστί Ταῦτα, Και EVLOTE ὡς a \ a ἀληθῶς βλέπων εἰς αὐτὰ σκοτοδινιώ. TO. Θεόδωρος γάρ, ὦ φίλε, φαίνεται οὐ κακὼς υ τοπάζειν περὶ τῆς φύσεώς σου. μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου a \ / Ν “ > \ δ, >’ \ τοῦτο To πάθος, TO θαυμάζειν’ οὐ yap ἀλλη ἀρχὴ 3. καί, which implies a subtle connexion between ταῦτα and ἄλλα μυρία, can only be express- ed in English by the emphasis on ‘these.’ Cp. Soph. Cid. Col. 276: “Ὥσπερ pe κἀνεστήσαθ', ὧδε σώζετε. Ἱπαραδεξόμεθα] Se. παρὰ τοῦ Πρωταγόρου. ‘ If we are to take this at his hands;’ i.e. not only accept, but adopt this as our own difficulty. Cp. infr. 161 B, Charm. 162 E: Ei οὖν ξυγχωρεῖς τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι σωφροσύνην ὅπερ οὑτοσὶ λέγει, καὶ παραδέχει τὸν λόγον, ἔγωγε πολὺ ἂν ἥδιον μετὰ σοῦ σκοποίμην. .. ᾿Αλλὰ πάνυ ξυγχωρῶ, ἔφη, καὶ παραδέχομαι. But it must be admitted that εἴπερ καὶ ταῦτ᾽ “ἄρ᾽ ᾿ἀποδεξόμεθα would give a plainer sense. Ἐξπει yap που] “1 assume this (δή), for I suppose 1 take you with me.’ Cp. Euthyph, 12 C: Ἕπει γάρ που νῦν ye: Εὐὖθ. πά- νυ γε. The MSS. have εἰπέ, but there can be little doubt of the truth of Heindorf’s emenda- tion. The six dice are more when compared with four. They were fewer when compared with twelve. They cannot be more without having become more, and they cannot have become more without increase. Pro- tagoras would say: It is true the same thing cannot be more without addition, but the dice in the two cases are not the same thing, for they are in a differentrelation.—The distinc- tion between relative and abso- lute quantity is so familiar to us, that this is apt to appear a mere verbal quibble. But the solution of such difficulties was one of the steps by which the Greeks arrived at that distinc- tion. 9. ov κακῶς τοπάζειν] ‘ Theo- dorus is evidently right in his surmise about you. For this Wonder is a true symptom of the philosophic nature.’ 11. ov yap ἄλλη ἀρχὴ φιλοσο- φίας ἢ αὕτη] Arist. Metaph. 1. 2: Διὰ τὸ θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρῶτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν, κ. τ. A. Aristotle also observes that if wonder is the beginning, cessation of wonder is the end of philosophy ;—so reconciling Plato’s saying with that of OEAITHTOS. 55 ᾿ ἊΝ ; 4 \ 53 ν . 155. φιλοσοφίας ἢ αὕτη, καὶ ἔοικεν ὁ τὴν Ἶριν Θαύμαντος av / 3 iad a 3 \ / exyovoy φῆσας ov κακῶς γενεαλογεῖν. ἀλλὰ πότερον 4 a» > A an n°) 3 > © Ἂς μανθάνεις ἤδη Ov ὃ ταῦτα τοιαῦτ᾽ ἐστιν ἐξ ὧν τὸν Πρωταγόραν φαμὲν λέγειν, ἢ οὔπω; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔπω μοι δοκῶ. ΣΏ. Xapw οὖν μοι εἴσει, ἐάν σοι ἀνδρός, μᾶλλον Ne) an > a a , \ 3 7 » δὲ ἀνδρῶν ὀνομαστῶν τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπο- / / > ἴω κεκρυμμένην συνεξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν ; GEAI. [las γὰρ οὐκ εἴσομαι, καὶ πάνυ ye πολλήν; LQ. Αθρει δὴ περισκοπῶν, μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων 3 te 3. ἃ \ @ e IAN 57 s/ 5 ΟΝ €MQKOUN. εἰσι δὲ οὗτοι οἱ οὐδὲν ἄλλο OLOMEVOL εἰναι ἢ e oN VA o “ οὗ ἂν δύνωνται ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι, πράξεις Democritus, who made ἀθαυ- paciahisaim. See K. F. Herm. Gesch, d. Plat. Phil. p. 153. 1. τὴν Ἶριν Θαύμαντος ἔκγονον Hes. Theog. 265: Θαύμας δ᾽ *Oxeavoio βαθυρρείταο Ovyarpa | nyayer Ἤλέκτρην' ἡ δ᾽ ὠκεῖαν τέκεν Ἶριν" cp. v. 780. 2. πότερον μανθάνεις ἤδη] ‘Do you begin to perceive what is the reason of this, according to the theory we attribute to Protagoras ?” Aristotle, Met. το. 1063 A, points out that the Protagorean doctrine rests very much on the relativeness of quantity: Φαί- vovTal yap οὐχ ἥκιστα τὰ κατὰ τὰς ἀντιφάσεις ταὐτοῦ κατηγορεῖν ἐκ τοῦ τὸ ποσὸν ὑπειληφέναι μὴ μένειν ἐπὶ τῶν σωμάτων διὰ τὸ καὶ εἶναι τετρά- πήχυ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι. ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία κατὰ τὸ ποιόν, τοῦτο δὲ τῆς ὡρισμένης φύσεως, τὸ δὲ ποσὸν τῆς ἀορίστου. 6. Χάριν, κ. τ. λ.] ‘Shall I then earn your gratitude, if in regard to a man, or rather men, of high renown, I help you to elicit the truth of their meaning from its hidingplace in their minds ?’ μᾶλλον δὲ ἀνδρῶν] Viz. Hera- clitus, Homer, and the others mentioned above, 152 E. 7. ἀνδρῶν... αὐτῶν] The two genitives are not precisely in the same construction: ἀνδρῶν is governed by διανοίας, αὐτῶν by ἐξίῃ συνεξερ. The pronoun αὐτός, however, is frequently used to recall a noun, which, forthe sake of emphasis, has been placed in the forepart of the sentence, e.g. Rep. 5.477 Ὁ : Ἐπιστήμην πότερον δύναμίν τινα φὴς εἶναι av- τήν, x.t.X. Cp. Shak. Winter’s Tale, 5.1: ‘ Whom | Though bearing misery, I desire my life | Once more to look on him.’ ἀποκεκρυμμένην 1s to be taken closely with ovvefep., as the order shows. Cp. Phed. 89 A: πεφευγότας ἀνεκαλέσατο. 12. ἀπρὶξ τοῖν χεροῖν λαβέσθαι] What may be ‘grasped thus.’ The extreme materialists are here discarded ; in the Sophist they are made better for the μι fe) 4. To meet these and other difficulties the ‘ Pro- tagorean’ doctrine is further de- veloped. It must be concealed, however, from the uninitiate, those ‘im- penetrable’ men, who believe in no unseen operations, but only in what they can clutch with both hands. 56 MAATQNOZ \ κ᾿ , Xa \ (se ss / δὲ και VEVETELS Και παν TO αορᾶτον ουκ ἀποδεχόμενοι p- 155- e > > ’ὔ if ὡς EV οὐσίας μέρει. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μὲν δή, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκληρούς γε , ἈΓΨ ’ > 4 λέγεις καὶ ἀντιτύπους ἀνθρώπους. 53 a Z 5 » \ ΣΩ. Εἰσὶ yap, ὦ παῖ, μάλ᾽ εὖ ἄμουσοι. ἄλλοι δὲ argument’s sake, that we may be able to discourse with them. The description there is very similar. Soph. 246 AB: Oi μὲν eis γῆν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἀοράτου πάντα ἕλκουσι, ταῖς χερσὶν ἀτεχνῶς πέτρας καὶ δρῦς περιλαμ- βάνοντες. τῶν γὰρ τοιούτων ἐφα- πάντων διισχυρίζονται τοῦτο εἶναι μόνον ὃ παρέχει προσ- βολὴν καὶ ἐπαφήν τινα, ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων εἴ τίς φησι μὴ σῶμα ἔχον εἶναι, καταφρονοῦντες τὸ παράπαν καὶ οὐδὲν ἐθέλοντες ἄλλο ἀκούειν. 241 Ο: τούτων οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἕν ἐπαι- σχυνθεῖεν οἵ γε αὐτῶν σπαρτοί τε καὶ αὐτόχθονες, ἀλλὰ διατείνοιντ᾽ ἂν πᾶν ὃ μὴ δυνατοὶ ταῖς χερσὶ ξυμπιέζειν εἰσίν, ὡς ἄρα τοῦτο οὐδὲν τὸ παράπαν ἐστίν. πράξεις) H.g. δικαία καὶ ἄδικος πρᾶξις. Cp. Soph. 247 AB. τ. γενέσεις] HE. g. αἴσθησις, κί- νησις, ἡδονή. Sensationalism ishere treated as already a kind of idealism, whereas in the corresponding passage of the Sophist, p. 246, the doctrine of an unseen yéve- σις is regarded as an inference which the idealist by his dia- lectic compels the reluctant materialist to accept. See In- troduction. 3. σκληροὺς . . καὶ ἀντιτύπους] ‘Hard and repellent,’ i. 6. stub- born and impenetrable. Cp. Soph. 246 B: Ἦ δεινοὺς εἴρηκας ἄνδρας" ἤδη yap καὶ ἐγὼ τούτων συχνοῖς προσέτυχον. For the verbal climax ep. Tim. 62 BC: TT OMEVOL Σκληρὸν δέ, ὅσοις ἂν ἡμῶν ἡ σὰρξ imetkn .. τὸ δὲ ἐκ τετραγώνων ὃν βάσεων .. ἀντιτυπώτατον εἶδος. There is perhaps a humorous intention in the application of these material attributes to the men in question, similar to the play of words by which the Heracliteans are called ῥέοντες, infr. 181 A. 5. ἄλλοι δὲ πολὺ κομψότεροι] Tn comparison with these advo- cates of gross bodily ‘ matter,’ Protagoras is almost an idealist. His disciples believe not indeed in a world of νοητὰ εἴδη, but in a hidden process underlying appearances. Cp. Rep. 5. 477 C: δυνάμεως yap ἐγὼ οὔτε τινὰ χρόαν ὁρῶ οὔτε σχῆμα, κ. τ. A. ἄλλοι δέ] Viz. the μαθηταὶ Πρωταγόρου, to whom he com- municated his doctrine ἐν amop- pyro, 1520. Schleiermacher (who isfollowed by Schanz) con- jectured ἀλλ᾽ οἵδε : but the men would then be apt to be con- fused with the ἄνδρες ὀνομαστοί above. The ‘ disciples of Prota- goras’ are evidently contempo- raries of Plato. Aristippus is probably included. (Κομψός and oupperds are opposed, Hippias Maj. 288 Ὁ: Οὐ κομψὸς ἀλλὰ συρφετός.) The word κομψός is used similarly of certain name- less (Pythagorean?) philoso- phers in Polit. 284 E, 285A: Πολλοὶ τῶν κομψῶν λέγουσιν ws ἄρα μετρητικὴ περὶ πάντ᾽ ἐστὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα. Cp. Phil. 53 ΟΣ κομψοὶ γὰρ δή τινες (Megarians!?) αὖ Ῥ. 156. OEAITHTOX. 57 .156. πολὺ κομψότεροι, ὧν μέλλω σοι τὰ μυστήρια λέγειν. VY A " 7 δέ, ἐξ ἣ ὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέ ν πάντα ἤρτηται ἀρχὴ δέ, ἐξ ἧς καὶ ἃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν πάντα ἤρτηται, σ΄“ 2 A e \ A , 5 ςζς 3 A a NOE αὐτῶν, WS TO πᾶν κίνησις ἣν καὶ ἄλλο παρὰ τοῦτο a \ , / 7 / 4 οὐδέν, THs δὲ κινήσεως δύο εἴδη, πλήθει ply ἄπειρον ε 2 i \ Ν A “ 5, Ν \ Yi ἑκάτερον, δύναμιν δὲ TO μὲν ποιεῖν ἔχον, TO δὲ πά- 3 \ a , € / \ / Ν σχειν. EK δὲ τῆς τούτων ὁμιλίας τε καὶ τρίψεως προς Β ἄλληλα γίγνεται ἔκγονα πλήθει μὲν ἄπειρα, δίδυμα iy Ν \ > / Χ \ 57 Lae / δέ, TO μὲν αἰσθητὸν, τὸ δὲ αἴσθησις, ἀεὶ συνεκπί- ἊΝ Ui \ A a πτουσὰ καὶ γεννωμένη μετὰ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ. e \ αι μεν 3 9 / Ἁ ’ few yf so By οὖν αἰσθήσεις τὰ τοιάδε μιν ἐχουσιν ονοματα, owels ee) Ν δον ὙΝ Ue A A Ν. / τε καὶ ἀκοαὶ Kai ὀσφρήσεις καὶ ψύξεις τε Kal καύσεις καὶ ἡδοναί γε δὴ καὶ λῦπαι καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καὶ φόβοι , , » Dy ews \ a. EJ ees κεκλημέναι καὶ ἀλλαι, ἀπέραντοι μὲν αἱ ἀνώνυμοι, τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ἐπιχειροῦσι μην- ὕειν ἡμῖν" οἷς δεῖ χάριν ἔχειν. 3. ἦν] ‘Reallyis,—according to the well-known idiom, which becomes more frequent in Ari- stotle. What a thing proves to be when an inquiry is finished, that it was before the inquiry began. It is a transference of the reality of history to a ge- neral statement. H. Schmidt’s argument for taking jy literally, ‘In the beginning all was mo- tion, is not convincing.—The doctrine asserted above is now more minutely developed. ἄλλο... οὐδέν] Se. ἦν. 8. συνεκπίπτουσα] ‘Tumbling forth to light at the same mo- ment.’ Compare the lively ex- pression in Rep. 4. 432 D, when justice is discovered: πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται mpd ποδῶν ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς κυλινδεῖσθαι. For the insertion of καὶ γεννωμένη cp. Soph. Ant. 537: Καὶ ξυμμετίσχω καὶ φέρω τῆς αἰτίας. Aesch. Prom. 331: Πάντων μετασχὼν καὶ τε- τολμηκὼς ἐμοί. The present tense denotes a process that is always in transition. 10. TaTodde . . ἔχουσιν ὀνόματα, ὄψεις... κεκλημέναι] The slight redundancy helps to connect the sentence. 11. The senses of taste and touch are added in the version of Ficinus: ‘olfactus, gustus, tactusque frigidorum et cali- dorum, and Cornarius inserted καὶ γεύσεις καὶ θίξεις after ὀσφρή- σεις, perhaps with reference to the false interpretation of infr. CD, βραδὺ... θάττω. 12. ἡδοναί γε δή] The particles mark the transition to a class of things less familiarly known by the name αἴσθησις. 13. ai ἀνώνυμοι] See Locke, Hum. Und. b. 2. 6:3: ‘I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense, nor in- deed is it possible if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for.” Also Spinoza, Eth. 3 5 μι Ό Far more refined are those whose mys- teries we now reveal. Their first principle, upon which the whole depends, is that All is motion, Motion is active and passive, and each kind is infinite. These meet and pro- duce in- numerable twin births: sensation and sen- sible thing springing forth to- gether. Sensations include pleasures, pains, de- sires and fears, and there are many with- outa name, Sensible things are colours, sounds, and the like. All the things now spoken of 2 10 58 A \ ᾽ ἈΝ 9 “4 Ἵ Ἁ παμπληθεῖς δὲ αἱ ὠνομασμέναι: τὸ δ᾽ αὖ αἰσθητὸν p. 156. ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 7 / ες , € lf AA \ 7 γένος τουτῶν EKATTALS OMOYOVOV, ὄψεσι μεν χρωματα va , 3 a \ e / / παντοδαπαῖς παντοδαπά, ἀκοαῖς δὲ ὡσαύτως φωναὶ, καὶ ταῖς ἄλλαις αἰσθήσεσι τὰ ἄλλα αἰσθητὰ ξυγγενῆ γιγνόμενα. Τί δὴ οὖν ἡμῖν βούλεται οὗτος ὁ μῦθος, 3 if Ν \ / “5 la ὦ Θεαίτητε, πρὸς τὰ πρότερα ; apa ἐννοεῖς 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ πάνυ, ὦ Σώκρατες. SOQ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄθρει ἐάν πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. βούλεται \ Χ ’ Ἑ an / / “ ig yap δὴ λέγειν ὡς ταῦτα TAVTA MEV, WOTEP λέγομεν, nan 7 \ ἊΝ" Ν yf a f > A“ κινεῖται, τάχος δὲ καὶ βραδυτὴς Eve TH κινήσει αὐτῶν. “ \ 3 ὃ ’ 5 “ ee ta \ Ν \ λ (¢ ὅσον μέν οὖν Bpadu, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ πρὸς TA T ησια- Χ , 3, ἈΝ oS Ν “ NS \ Covra τὴν κίνησιν ἰσχει καὶ οὕτω δὴ γεννᾷ, τὰ δε (quoted by H. Schmidt): ‘ uni- cuique ex jam dictis clare con- stare credo, affectus tot varia- tiones oriri, ut nullo numero definiri queant ... pleraque animi fluctuationes nomina non habent.’ 2. The Bodleian, with most other MSS., has ἑκάστης, 5. οὗτος ὁ μῦθος] Cp. Soph. 242 0: Μῦθόν τινα ἕκαστος φαίνε- ταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν, κι τὰ. For the spirit with which all this is done compare Rep. 8. 545 DE: Φῶμεν αὐτὰς τραγικῶς, ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἐρεσχηλούσας, ὡς δὴ σπουδῇ λεγούσας, ὑψηλολογου- μένας λέγειν ; 6. πρὸς τὰ πρότερα] ‘In rela- tion to what came before,’ viz. from 153 D, Ὑπόλαβε---ἴο 155 C, παραδεξόμεθα. 8. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄθρει ἐάν] “ Well, look attentively ; perhaps we shall be able to finish it.’ Cp, infr. 192 Hi: ‘Ide δή, ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπισπῇ. ἐάντε ἴῃ the hope that.’ 9. ταῦτα] ποιοῦντα, πάσχοντα, αἰσθητά, αἰσθήσεις. πάντα... κινεῖται] Cp. Locke : ‘The next thing to be con- sidered is, how bodies produce ideas in us, and that is mani- festly by impulse, the only way which we can conceive bodies operate in.’ 11. ὅσον μὲν οὖν βραδύ] ‘The slower have their motion in one spot, and in relation to what is in contact with them, and are thus the producing elements ; but those which are [thus] produced are swifter ; for they are carried about, and their motion is from place to place.’ For ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ cp. infr. 181 CD: Ὅταν ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, K.T.A. 12. τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δὴ] Schol.: Εἰς τὸ δὴ ὑποστικτέον. This only means that οὕτω δή is to be taken with the pre- ceding words. The phrase has been felt to be somewhat harsh ; and perhaps the second οὕτω may have crept in from the preceding clause. The (prob- ably conjectural) interpolation of Cornarius after οὕτω δὴ [βραδύτερά eorw* ὅσον δὲ αὖ Q OEAITHTOS. 59 , Ψ \ 7 5) , Ζ \ Se? 156. γεννώμενα Τοὕτω δὴ θάττω ἐστί: φέρεται γὰρ καὶ ἐν Cal 3 “- ε 7 Uy » δὰ 3 ay φορᾷ αὐτῶν ἢ κινησὶις πέφυκεν. επειθόαν OVY ομμαὰ \ LA Ἂ nr , E I 4 λ / ΠΑ καὶ ἄλλο τι τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων πλησιάσαν γεν ταχύ, πρὸς τὰ πόρρωθεν τὴν κίνη- σιν ἴσχει καὶ οὕτω γεννᾷ, τὰ δὲ γεννώμενα οὕτω δή] is quite un- necessary, and confuses the real sense. It was occasioned by the condensation of the lan- guage and the inversion or ‘chiasm’ in what follows, which, to correspond exactly, should have been τὰ δ᾽ αὖ θάττω φέρεται καὶ γεννᾶται. ‘The slower mo- tions are the ποιοῦντα and πά- σχοντα, which, when in con- tact, produce (without changing place) the αἰσθητά and αἰσθήσεις (i.e. qualities and sensations), which are the ‘quicker mo- tions,’ and pass to and fro be- tween the ποιοῦν and πάσχον. Cp. inf. p. 159 C D: mae yap δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογη- μένων τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθησιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, Qualities and sensations are in locomo- tion, because existing merely in the act of flowing from sub- ject to object, and from object to subject, perhaps also because they are realized now here, now there. Cp. 153 ἢ E. When it is said that they are the swifter motions, the theory is vaguely connected with Heraclitean doctrine. Sensations and qua- lities are drops in the ever- flowing river of succession. The man or the tree is like the dull weed that clogs it, itself to be carried down in time. Subject and object are more of the nature of Earth, sensation and quality are sparks of the everliving Fire. That the ποιοῦν and πάσχον are both Ἔγέν- from 1659 ’ TO TE γεννῶντα appears CD: Ἐγέννησε yap δὴ... ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον, quoted above. Sensational idealism is ham- pered by the necessity of dis- solving ‘substance’ (whether matter or mind) into a series of transient processes, without too violently contradicting ex- perience. An instance of this logical necessity has appeared since the above note was written, in Mr.J.S.Mill’s ‘ Per- manent possibilities’ (Mill on Hamilton, ch. XI.), a device which unintentionally throws a vivid hicht on Plato’s meaning here. Perception and attribute are conceived as momentary ; things and persons are imagined as a gradual growth and decay. By ‘slow’ and ‘ swift’ are really meant ‘lasting’ and ‘momen- tary.’ The distinction of kinds of motion (ἀλλοίωσις, φορά) is purposely slurred over here, that it may come in as a fresh point at a later stage of the dis- cussion, 181 C. Cp. 157 B. See also Kant, Krit. ἃ, r. Vern. B, 230: 3. τῶν τούτῳ ξυμμέτρων] Men. "ό D: Ἐστὶ γὰρ χρόα ἀπορροὴ σχήματος ὄψει σύμμετρος καὶ ai- σθητός. This definition is said to be ‘ xara Γοργίαν. In Tim. 67 C Plato calls colour φλόγα av σωμάτων ἑκάστων ἀπορρέουσαν, ὄψει ξύμμετρα μόρια ἔχουσαν πρὸς αἴσθησιν. Cp.ib. 45, 6. Plato’s account of sensation in the Timeus coincides in many points with this part of the Theetetus, showing that, al- are in mo- tion. But the motion of some is swift and of others slow. Those which pro- duce are slow, and their mo- tion de- pends on juxta-posi- tion. The things pro- duced are swifter, for they are in locomotion, and do not merely σι 60 / \ λ “ if \ 7 6 s 4 Ev 6 νήσῃ THY λευκοτητὰ TE καὶ αἰσύησιν AUTH ὑμῴυτον, Pp. 156. MAATOQNOZ a > ΒΩ 3 , e Ig ’ / Ν 3, ἃ οὐκ ἂν ποτε ἐγένετο εκατέρου εκείνων προς ἄλλο ἐλθόντος, τότε δὴ μεταξὺ φερομένων τῆς μὲν ὄψεως πρὸς τῶν ὀφθαλμών, τῆς δὲ λευκότητος πρὸς τοῦ. / Ν a ε Ν 3 Ν + συναποτίκτοντος TO χρωμαᾶ, O [EV ὀφθαλμος apa 5) yf > 4 ἐν ς a x , Ἄν EN 3 ὄψεως ἔμπλεως ἐγένετο καὶ Ope δὴ τότε καὶ ἐγένετο 4 if \ Ν an Ν δ a οὔ τι ὄψις ἀλλὰ ὀφθαλμὸς ὁρῶν, TO δὲ ζυγγεννῆσαν Ν ἴω , , Ν. > , > TO χρῶμα AevKoTyTOS περιεπλησθὴ καὶ ἐγένετο οὐ , 5 κ᾿ ; 5 7, ἢ y λευκότης αὖ ἀλλὰ λευκον, εἶτε ξύλον εἴτε λίθος εἴτε though rejected as ἃ theory of knowledge, the hypothesis is retained as a ‘probable’ doctrine of sense. See also Phil. 34. 3. TOTE δή, κιτλ.] ‘Then it is that while these are issuing in the midst, sight from the eyes, whiteness from that which helps to create the colour, the eye 18 filled with seeing, and sees now, and becomes not sight indeed, but seeing eye, and that which helps to give the colour birth +s covered with whiteness, and it too becomes not whiteness but white, whether stick or stone, or whatever it is that happens to have been coloured with this hue.’ μεταξὺ depopevov| It is doubtful whether this means ‘whilst they are moving, or ‘as they are moving in the midst.’ The former is idiomatic Greek, but the latter seems preferable if we turn to 154 A: Meragu τι ἑκάστῳ ἴδιον γεγονός, and infr. 182 A: Φέρεσθαι ἕκαστον τού- των ἅμα αἰσθήσει μεταξὺ τοῦ ποι- οὔὖντός τε καὶ τοῦ πάσχοντος. And the idiomatic use οἵ μεταξύ be- longs rather to cases in which one action supervenes upon another, than where both are simultaneous, as here. 9. εἴτε “ὁτῳοῦν, κτλ] The MS. reading is ὁτουοῦν ξ. χρῶμα. Heind. who receives ὁτιοῦν... χρῆμα from Cornarius, adds, ‘ne ipso quidem χρῆμα opus fue- rit, h.l’ But ὁτιοῦν has scarcely more authority ἐπα χρῆμα. One MS. (Par. H.) has σῶμα on the margin, but ὁτουοῦν . . σῶμα, though it. has thus some slight authority, is not satisfactory. The real text is perhaps re- stored by dropping χρῶμα, and reading ὁτῳοῦν as in the text (ὁτωοῦν Par. F.) ‘White, whether stick or stone, or whatsoever happens to be coloured with that colour”. The repetition of similar consonants is a fre- quent form of corruption; cp. esp. 158 C; ὅτῳ χρή, KTA. 5 where three MSS. (Bodl. Vat. Ven. 11.) read ὅτῳ χρόνῳ χρή, κιτλ. (Χρόνου, χρόνον, χρόνου, χρόνου, occurring within the next few lines.) Also, 149 C, ἀτόποις for ἀτόκοις Bodl. pr. Vat. pr. Ven. II. with dromo- raros a few lines above. . Another way is opéned by the ingenious conjecture of Schanz, who reads ὁτουοῦν . « σχῆμα. Cp. esp. Men. 75 B: Ἔστω γὰρ δὴ ἡμῖν τοῦτο σχῆμα, ὃ s OEAITHTOS. 61 ΕἾ: a ’ θη a) 4 / . 156. *or@movv ξυνέβη χρωσθῆναι τῷ τοιούτῳ χρώματι. . 157. 3 \ 4 Ν Ν / καὶ τάλλα δὴ οὕτω, σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα N aS / e / > i ae, Ἃ > eX τὸν αὑτὸν τρόπον ὑποληπτέον, αὐτὸ μὲν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ \ 53 ἃ Ἁ / 5] , \ ΄“ μηδὲν εἰναι, ὃ δὴ καὶ τότε ἐλέγομεν, ἐν δὲ τῇ πρὸς , ἢ; 7 qn ἄλληλα ὁμιλίᾳ πάντα γίγνεσθαι καὶ παντοῖα ἀπὸ na 7 ΕῚ ἣν οὖ Ν a “2 7 ἃ ς΄ KLWHOEWS* ETTEL Καὶ TO ποιουν εἶναι TL καὶ ΤΟ υ v4 x, A ae ς € .N A od 9 3 πάσχον αὑτῶν ἐπὶ EVOS νοῆσαι, ὡς φασιν, οὐκ εἶναι / ͵ \ “ bd / \ a‘ “ 7’ παγίως: οὗτε yap ποιοῦν ἐστί τι, πρὶν ἂν τῳ πα- ξ ING) ITE πάσγον. TOW ἂν TO DVTL* σχοντι ξυνέλθῃ, οὔτε πάσχον, πρὶν ἂν τῷ ποιοῦντι / / \ a y 53 \ τὸ τέ τινι ξυνελθὸν καὶ ποιοῦν ἄλλῳ αὖ προσπεσὸν 7, 3 14 σ 3 ε , 7 rod » πάσχον ἀνεφάνη. MOTE ἐξ ATAVTWV Τούτων, O7TEP ἐξ μόνον τῶν ὄντων τυγχάνει χρώματι ἀεὶ ἑπόμενον. But the language is clearer and simpler without introducing the notion of ‘form.’ For εἴτε ξύλος εἴτε λίθος ΟΡ. infr, ἄνθρωπόν τε καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος. Hipp. Maj. 292 D: Καὶ λίθῳ καὶ ξύλῳ καὶ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ θεῷ, k.7.A. The sentence is turned like Phedr. 237 A: Εἴτε δὲ ᾧδης εἶδος λιγεῖαι, εἴτε διὰ γένος μουσικὸν τὸ Λιγύων ταύτην ἔσχετε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν. Rep. το. 612A: Εἴτε πολυειδὴς εἴτε μονοειδὴς εἴτε ὅπῃ ἔχει καὶ ὅπως. The aorists, while marking the moment- ariness of each act of sense, give picturesqueness to the expression, referring, as in the Homeric similes, to an ima- ginary case. 4. τότε] Supr. 152 Ὁ. 6. ἐπεὶ καὶ τὸ ποιοῦν] A fur- ther effort is here made to melt away the ‘category of sub- stance’ into thin air. The ‘permanent possibility’ (which is only relatively permanent) is incognizable in itself, ‘For it 1s impossible to have a firm notion (they say) even of the active and passive elements as existing separately in any sin- gle case. αὐτῶν, sc. τῶν κινου- μένων, “ΤῸ distinguish in them the active or passive element as existing.’ αὐτῶν refers, as H. Schmidt points out, to σκληρὸν καὶ θερμὸν καὶ πάντα, k.T.A., 1. 6. sense-phenomena generally. It depends rather on τὸ ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον than on ἑνός. Op. Arist. Met. 5. 20: Μηδὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ Ev ἐφ᾽ ἑνός. For αὐτῶν Cornarius sug- gested αὖ τι. Ifa change were necessary, αὖ τῶν would seem more probable. τῶν ἐπὶ ἑνός, ‘of things taken singly,’ might then be compared with τῶν ἕν ἐκείνων, Phil. 16 Ὁ. (Wohlrab joins ἐπὶ ἑνός αὐτῶν, ‘in the case of any one of them.’) For ἐπὶ ἑνός cp. infr. 186 A, ἐπὶ πάντων. 7. νοῆσαι... παγίως] Rep.5.479 C: Καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα ἐπαμφοτερίζειν, καὶ οὔτ᾽ εἶναι οὔτε μὴ εἶναι οὐδὲν αὐτῶν δυνατὸν παγίως νοῆσαι, οὔτ᾽ ἀμφότερα οὔτε οὐδέτερον. The word is used by Aristotle. 11. πάσχον ἀνεφάνη] E. g. The same eye, when seen, is active, when seeing, passive. 5 Io become. —The eye and its appropri- ate active motion come in contact. Then sight begins to flit from the eye and colour from the object of sight ; the eye be- comes a seeing eye, and the object be- comes 60- loured. Neither seeing eye nor colour- ed object can be thought of as existing independ- ently of this mutual process. We must not speak of anything as existing, but only as becoming this or that, arising, perishing, or chang- ing. This applies not only to sin- gle things, but to those 62 ἀρχῆς ἐλέγομεν, aN / τινι ἀεὶ γίγνεσθαι, ΠΛΑΤΏΩΝΟΣ οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν αὐτὸ Kab” αὗτό, ἀλλά ν. 137- ᾿ τὸ 5 , 9 , τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, 5 > Ὡ e ἴω Q y Ψ 3 4 e ‘\ οὐχ OTL NMELS πολλα καὶ αρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα υπο συνὴη- 7 7 “ 9 a θείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὑτῷ. τὸ δ᾽ οὐ 5 δεῖ, ὡς ὁ τῶν σοφῶν λόγος; οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε Io Sf3) 3 a 5, ὈΥ του οὔτ᾽ ἐμοῦ οὔτε τοδὲ OUT an + Ἁ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδεν 3 e a \ δ , / ὄνομα ὅ τι av ἱστῇ, ἀλλὰ κατὰ φύσιν φθέγγεσθαι if Ν / \ Ω , Sy 3 γιγνόμενα καὶ ποιουμενὰ Καὶ ἀπολλύμενα καὶ ἀλλοι- / ουμενα" A a ΄σ \ Ων \ / ΄ , τοῦτο ποιῶν. δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν κα περὶ πολλῶν ἁθροισθέντων, ε 8. 7 / δ. / 5} ὡς ἐάν τί τις στήσῃ τῷ λόγῳ; εὐελεγκτος « O Ν ἰ ᾧ δὴ ἁθροίσματι ἄνθρω- t / , Ν / Ν rd at ‘ πόν τε τίθενται Kal λίθον καὶ EKaTTOV ζῷον TE καὶ ο εἶδος. Ταῦτα δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, Gap ἡδέα δοκεῖ σοι S / x oA e 3 7 εἶναι, καὶ YEVOLO ἂν αὐτῶν ὡς αρεέσκοντων 5 4. οὐχ ὅτι ἡμεῖς] ‘Though, as T need not observe. The irony of this appears very clearly, if we compare 197 A: Ei μέντοι ἣν ἀντιλογικός, K.T.A. 4. τὸ δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ] Sc. ποιεῖν. Or rather τό is an accusative in opposition to the active of ξυγχωρεῖν, K.T.A. 5. οὔτε του] The genitive is a point of transition to ἐμοῦ, ἡ. φθέγγεσθαι. | “ὦ gee the expression.’ (‘Man muss Ausdriicke wie γιγνόμενα ff. brauchen.”’ H. Schmidt.) 9. ὁ τοῦτο ποιῶν] For the redundancy cp. Rep. 6. 506A : Δίκαια καὶ καλὰ ἀγνοούμενα ὅπῃ ποτὲ ἀγαθά ἐστιν, οὐ πολλοῦ τινος ἄξιον φύλακα κεκτῆσθαι τὸν τοῦτο ἀγνοοῦντα. 11. ᾧ δὴ ἁθροίσματι .. τίθενται} So, ὄνομα. The subject of τί- θενται is indefinite. From our Protagorean point of view, that which answers to ἃ common name, or which counts for one, is not ἕν ἐπὶ πολλῶν, nor ἕν mapa τὰ πολλά, but an arbitrary or conventional aggregate of phe- nomena. Op. Parm. 165 A, where the word ὄγκος answers to ἄθροισμα here, but implies something even more vague and formless. ‘The same termino- logy recurs infr, 182 A, od μανθάνεις ἁθρόον λεγόμενον, where it denotes genus as opposed to species. A doubt may be raised whether the wholes here in- tended are general (a class=an aggregate of individuals) or particular (a thing or person= an ageregate of attributes). The former is preferable. Cp. however Tim. 56 C: #uva- θροισθέντων δὲ πολλῶν τοὺς ὄγκους αὐτῶν ὁρᾶσθαι (of the invisible particles of bodies). 12. καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος] These words, which have occasioned needless difficulty, are to be explained by the common ellipse of ἄλλο, ‘Men and other animals,’ ‘animals and other forms,’ 0 187. OEAITHTOS. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ οἶδα ἔγωγε, ὦ Σώκρατες: καὶ yap Ν an ω / a 7 οὐδὲ περὶ σοῦ δύναμαι κατανοῆσαι, πότερα δοκοῦντά 63 ΤΆ ὌΝ δὲ 9 ~ 3 “- σοι λέγεις αὑτὰ ἢ ἐμοῦ ἀποπειρᾷ. ΄ 2 / “ ἌΝ \ 3 2Q. Οὐ μνημονεύεις, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ 3 a “ Vd »Q\ 3 ἣ » > οἶδα OUTE ποιοῦμαι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν ἐμὸν, ἀλλ᾽ 5 >, 4 > A yA \ A We 4 [Ἢ / oc ειμι αὐτῶν ayovos, σε δὲ μαιευομαι καὶ τουτοῦυ ἐνεκα 3... / Ν Υ Che las - > ἐπᾷδω TE καὶ παρατίθημι ἑκάστων τῶν σοφῶν ἀπο- ’ Ψ Ἃ 3 a \ \ / ἊΨ Ὁ γεύσασθαι, ews ἂν εἰς φῶς τὸ σὸν δόγμα ξυνεξαγάγω-" ’ 4 / Let 5. , 9), χ 8 las 7 ἐξαχθέντος δέ, τότ᾽ ἤδη σκέψομαι εἴτ᾽ ἀνεμιαῖον εἴτε ᾽ \ “~ Lal γόνιμον ἀναφανήσεται. ἀλλὰ θαρρῶν καὶ καρτερῶν 10 53 Ἂς ἢ 7 3 , A oN , / , Ὁ €U Και ἀνδρείως αἀποκρινου a αν φαίνηταί σοι ΖΤέρι ων a > na ἂν ἐρωτῶ. ΟΘΕΑΙ. Ἔρώτα δή. , , » δ 2Q. Λέγε τοίνυν πάλιν, εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει τὸ μή τι 93 \ \ \ Ν ’, εἰναι ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαι ἀεὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλὸν καὶ πάντα a »ν lad ἃ ἄρτι διῇμεν. 5. ποιοῦμαι] ‘Tanquam pro- prium mihi vindico, velut dici- tur ποιεῖσθαί τινα υἱόν. Heind. Is it not rather, ‘give birth to?’ ‘Produce as mine?’ Cp. Rep. 2. 372 C: Ποιούμενοι τοὺς maidas. Crit. 45 D: Ἢ yap οὐ χρὴ ποιεῖσθαι παῖδας. 7. παρατίθημι] Supr. 149 C: Διδοῦσαί ye ai μαῖαι φαρμάκια καὶ ἐπάδουσαι. See the description of the education of a Greek youth in the Protagoras, 325 E: Παρατιθέασιν αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῶν βάθρων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ποιητῶν ἀγαθῶν ποιήματα. The genitive is perhaps partitive with παρα- τίθημι, but more probably go- verned by ἀπογεύσασθαι. 10. καὶ καρτερῶν] ‘And with perseverance.’ Boldness was all he required at first ; 148 O, θάρρει : 151 D, ἐὰν... ἀνδρίζῃ. 14. εἴ σοι ἀρέσκει] ‘ Whether you are pleased with the idea that nothing is, but is ever becoming, good and noble, as well as what we have just enumerated.’ 15. ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν] As in 156 B αἴσθησις is made to include de- sire, fear, etc., so, by the subtle introduction of these words, the doctrine is pushed to its far- thest limits, and thus its chief fallacy is hinted at—that of arguing from sense to higher things. So afterwards Prota- goras 1s made to assume that the doctrine applies to states as well as individuals. ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν are brought in as it were accidentally, merely as a fresh example, like κοροπλαθῶν supr. 147 B. But this, to the Platonic reader, was already a tacit ‘reductio ad absurdum,’ and for all readers | | 5 bundles of things, which men call sorts or natures. Theztetus is invited to acknow- ledge the theory so far devel- oped. So- crates dis- claims having any share in it, ex- cept that he has helped to bring it to the birth. The Good and Noble must be thought of with other things, as not exist- ing, but arising con- tinually. Te ete oe 64 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἔμοιγε, ἐπειδὴ σοῦ ἀκούω οὕτω Ol- Ρ' 157: / , { e 2᾽ ’ Ne εξιόντος, θαυμασίως φαίνεται ὡς ἔχειν λόγον καὶ ὑπο- ληπτέον ἧπερ διελήλυθας. » \ , ef » lay > -ἴ SQ. Μὴ τοίνυν ἀπολίπωμεν ὁσον ἐλλεῖπον αὑτοῦ. E 5 / \..3 / λείπεται δὲ ἐνυπνίων TE / id καὶ μανίας ὅσα TE παρακ / \ / a JA πέρι καὶ νόσων, TOV TE ἄλλων / x a yf y ovely ἢ παρορᾶν ἢ TL ἄλλο ΄, / 3 / 14 » ca s Afor- παραισθάνεσθαι λέγεται. οἶσθα yap Tov ὁτι ἐν πᾶσι midable 7 - , Poy rN RY, a Class of ob- τούτοις ὁμολογουμένως ἐλέγχεσθαι δοκεῖ ov ἄρτι διῃ- jections is 4 é < = a 2 Ν J now ae μεν AOYOV, ὡς TAVTOS μᾶλλον ηἡμιν ψευδεῖς αἰσθησεις osed Ol. > > va / a o Ν / fiscom- 10€) αὕτοις YLYVOPEVaS, καὶ πολλοῦ δεῖ τὰ φαινομεναὰ P. 158. monly said Sate ὩΣ ΝΥΝ ἢ ern Ἢ . ; εἰν 3 that in ἑκάστῳ ταῦτα καὶ εἰναι; ἀλλὰ πᾶν τουναντίον οὐδὲν dreams and - , 3 madness ὧν φαίνεται εἰναι. it prepares the way for the pivot-argument from the δόξα rod ὠφελίμου in what follows, 177 ff H. Schmidt, how- ever, approves of Heindorf’s proposal to cancel these sig- nificant words. 2. θαυμασίως φαίνεται ws ἔχειν] The order is φαίνεται θαυμασίως ὡς ἔχειν. θαυμασίως ὡς is stronger than θαυμασίως, and is formed by attraction of the antecedent from θαυμάσιόν ἐστιν ὡς. 4. Μὴ τοίνυν] The doctrine is now so far developed that we have only to notice an objec- tion, and it will be complete. As false opinion is our stum- bling-block afterwards, 80 now false impressions have to be accounted for. The solution is a simple one, and confirms our theory—they are not false to him who is the subject of them. The position, Sense is know- ledge, was at first made equi- valent to the reality of the object of sense (p. 152). But are dreams real? Are the illu- sions of madness true? Is that really bitter which tastes so to the diseased palate ?—If truth is wholly relative, if nothing is but what becomes, this must be so. 5. καὶ νόσων, τῶν TE ἄλλων καί] ‘And disease, especially mad- ness and its delusions of sight, hearing, and other senses.’ pavia is the subject of λέγεται, and ὅσα is cogn. accus. Cp. Soph. Trach. 406: Λεύσσων μάταια. 6. ὅσα... τί ἄλλο] The double cognate accusative is also no~ ticeable. ‘The cases in which it is said—to have any other illusory impression. το. πολλοῦ δεῖ] This phrase has become equivalent to an adverb. Hence it is unneces- sary to adopt δεῖν from Hein- dorf’s conjecture. τι. ἀλλὰ πᾶν τοὐναντίον οὐδὲν ὧν φαίνεται εἶναι] ἘΠ. g. Democritus (who is believed to have written against Protagoras) said of all sensations except hardness and weight : Σημεῖον δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ εἰσὶ φύσει τὸ μὴ ταὐτὰ πᾶσι φαίνεσθαι τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλ᾽ ὃ ἡμῖν γλυκύ, τοῦτ᾽ OEAITHTOS. 65 OEAI. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. ΣΏ. Tis δὴ οὖν, ὦ παῖ, λείπεται λόγος τῷ τὴν δ᾽ θ 3 / 6 4 Q \ / e Ae αισνησιν ἐπιστημὴν τιθεμενῷ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα εκα n 3 4 στῳ ταῦτα Kal εἶναι τούτῳ ς @ [4 ὁ Φαίνεται ; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Εγὼ μέν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὀκνῶ εἰπεῖν ὅτι » ya / , / a a Ve ee ὦ οὐκ ἔχω TL λεγω, διότι μοι νῦν δὴ ἐπέπληξας εἰπόντι 4 e a 3 » BQUTO. ἐπεὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς γε οὐκ ἂν δυναίμην ἀμφισβη- a e e , x en 3 7 » A THTAL ὡς οἱ μαινομένοι ἢ OL OVELPOTTOVTES OV ψευδὴ ΄ 4 e \ Q » A 5“ 53 ε δοξαζουσ ἐν. ΟΤαν οἱ μεν θεοὶ αὐτῶν OLWYTAL ELVAL, Οἱ \ , \ € , » ee “ δὲ πτηνοί τε, καὶ ὡς πετόμενοι ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ διανο- @OVTAL. 2Q. *Ap’ οὖν οὐδὲ τὸ τοιόνδε ἀμφισβήτημα ἐννοεῖς \ > a γᾷ \ \ a ey VN og περι αὑτῶν, μάλιστα δὲ περὶ TOU οναρ τε καὶ ὕπαρ: ΘΙΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; ἃ 2 5 4 7 20. "“Ο πολλάκις σε οἶμαι ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων , yf 7 > a af 3 A Tl αν Τις εχοι τΤεκμηριον ἀποδεῖξαι, ει Τίς €POlTO νυν σ΄ a / ’ / , οὕτως ἐν τῷ παρόντι, πότερον καθεύδομεν καὶ πάντα ἃ / 3 VA X\ >’ ’ / \ a διανοούμεθα OVELDMTTOMEV, ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν τε καὶ σ ὕπαρ ἀλλήλοις διαλεγόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπορόν γε ὅτῳ χρὴ ἄλλοις πικρὸν καὶ ἑτέροις ὀξὺ καὶ ἄλλοις δριμύ, τοῖς δὲ στρυφνόν' καὶ τὰ ἄλλα δὲ ὡσαύτως. 6. νῦν δή] Supr. τρι D. 9. οἱ μὲν... αὐτῶν] 1.6, the madmen. : 10. mrnvoi τε] Sc. οἴωνται εἶναι. Cp. supr. 149 D: τίκτειν τε δή, and note. ἔς 15. Ὃ πολλάκις] ὅ 18 not ex- actly governed by ἀκηκοέναι ἐρωτώντων, but is cognate ac- cusative in apposition with the whole sentence which follows. ‘What question do you allude to? This. I dare say you have often heard it asked, etc.’ Rid- dell’s Digest, §15, b. Cp. 165 D: “ἃ ἐλλοχῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοις ἐρόμενος, καὶλ. Rep. 4. 443 Β: Τὸ ἐνύ- πνιον, ὃ ἔφαμεν ὑποπτεῦσαι, κ.τ.λ. Arist. Met. 3. 6. torr A: Ta δὲ τοιαῦτα ἀπορήματα ὅμοιά ἐστι τῷ ἀπορεῖν πότερον καθεύδομεν νῦν ἢ ἐγρηγόραμεν. ΤΌ. Tinh. 20. ἄπορόν ye ὅτῳ χρὴ ἐπιδεῖξαι] Descartes de la Méthode, p. 164 (Cousin) : ‘ Et que les meilleurs esprits y étudient tant qu’il leur plaira, je ne crois pas qu’ils puissent donner aucune raison, qui soit suffisante pour δέου cette doute, 5158 ne présup- posent l’existence de Dieu.’ Des- cartes, however, would not say — 5 nothing of what ap- pears is real, Pro- tagoras says, All that ap- pears to me is real to me. What account does he then give of these pheno- mena ? There is a doubt which is often raised about them: e.g. when it is asked, Can we prove that we are not dreaming now ? Dreams have as much real- ity to the dreaming mind, as daylight impressions have to 66 > o , ἐπιδεῖξαι τεκμηρίῳ. A > \ 46 τὰ QUTA παρακολουθεῖ. sak v2 ed a oS οὐδὲν κωλύει καὶ EV τῷ ὑπνῷ εσθαι: καὶ ὅταν ΝΣ $2 ” MAATOQNO> & τε yap νυνὶ διειλέγμεθα, δοκεῖν ἀλλήλοις διαλέ- / > / a ὃ a ὄναρ ὀνείρατα δοκῶμεν διηγει- θ + ee ’ ν, 3 / εσθαι,---ἄτοπος ἡ ὁμοιότης TOUT OP ἐκείνοις. € ° 3 σ Ι » “ » ΣΩ. ‘Opas οὖν ort τὸ γέ ἀμφισβητησαι ov χαλε Io “ σ πον. OTE \ UL / 3 (4 \ »S > an καὶ πότερον ἐστιν UTEP ἢ ovap ἀμφισβητει- ς Ν NOs δ," a / a 6 ὃ Q ται, και δὴ ἰσου οντος του Xpovov ov καῦευ OPEV @ ἐγρηγόραμεν, ἐν ἑκατέρῳ διαμάχεται ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ Voces / / τὰ ἀεὶ παρόντα δογματὰ πὰ ὁμοίως ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέροις διἰσχυριζόμεθα. Attention was of course early attracted by the phenomena of dreams. See esp. 1]. 22. 199: Ως δ᾽ ἐν ὀνείρῳ οὐ δύναται φεύ- γοντα διώκειν. B has ὅτῳ χρόνῳ χρή, whence Schanz formerly conjectured ὅτῳ χρώμενον χρή, and now reads ὅτῳ χρεών. But T gives χρή, and χρόνου occurs a few lines below. ἄπορον] Se. τὸ ἀμφισβήτημα γίγνεται. ὅτῳ, K.T.A., explains the point of the difficulty. 1. πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα τὰ αὐτὰ παρακολουθεῖ] ‘for everything corresponds in each exactly, as if one series was the counterpart of the other.’ 3. ἐν τῷ ὕπνῳ] This is the reading of the best MSS.,though ἐνυπνίῳ is supported by the. greater number. Tf the latter reading were adopted, ἐν τῷ must be changed to ἔν τῷ. 4. καὶ ὅταν δή] ‘And when in a dream we do seem to be relating ἢ dreams,—it is strange, the re- semblance of this state to that.’ ὀνείρατα .. διηγεῖσθαι) Either (x) ‘to tell dreams,’ or (2) ‘to give utterance to thoughts which are only dreams. Op. gupY. πάντα ἃ διανοούμεθα ὀνειρώτ- ντὸς μᾶλλον εἶναι ἀληθὴη, τομεν. ὀνείρατα in (2) is a sort of cognate accusative, or rather, is in apposition to the suppress- ed object of διηγεῖσθαι. dvap 18 adverbial to δοκῶμεν. (Meno 85 Ο: Ὥσπερ ὄναρ ἄρτι ἀνακεκίνηνται αἱ δόξαι αὗται). But the former explanation (1) 18 simpler and is really free from objection. ὅταν δή has a different force in (1) and (2). Either, (1) ‘ When it comes to this,’ marking @ climax, or, (2) ‘ When in fact,’ marking the correspondence to the previous clause. The second interpretation (2), although in some ways plausible, seems to require Hirschig’s emendation διαλέγεσθαι for διηγεῖσθαι. τού- των refers to the waking, ἐκεί- νοις to the sleeping state, like ἐνθάδε and ἐκεῖ of the visible and invisible world. There is a slight break in the sentence before ἄτοπος, K.T.A. Heindorf’s conjecture ἄττα (for ὀνείρατα), approved by Cobet, and adopted by Schanz, (Ἢ and when in dreams we do seem to be re- lating something’), is rather flat, but is more plausible if we adopt Hirschig’s emendation : ‘when we seem to have ἃ con- versation in our dream.’ , \ a 9 πάντα γὰρ ὥσπερ ἀντίστροφα P- 158: D & SEAITHTOS. 67 σ 5) \ 4 ’ \ 5, 5 Sf \ . 158. ὥστε ἰσὸν μὲν χρόνον τάδε φαμεν ὄντα εἶναι, ἴσον δὲ 3 ἴω \ we / a he ἃ v4 oo / EKEWA, καὶ ὁμοιως Ep ἑκατέροις διϊσχυριζόύμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ, Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. “ ‘A \ 4 \ “ « SN 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ νόσων τε καὶ μανιῶν ὁ αὐτὸς , Ν A 7 σ 2X of Aoyos, πλὴν τοῦ χρονου, OTL οὐχὶ ἰσος: ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθώς. na . 2Q. Ti οὖν: πλήθει χρόνου καὶ dr OTNTL τὸ 3 ω) XP 7 ἀληθὲς ὁρισθήσεται : ΘΕΑΙ. Γελοῖον μέντ᾽ ἂν εἴη πολλαχῇ. 2Q. ᾿Αλλά τι ἄλλο ἔχεις σαφὲς ἐνδείξασθαι, « “ ’ “A 7 3 a ὁποία τούτων τῶν δοξασμάτων ἀληθῆ ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔ μοι δοκῶ. : ’ “ ’ y - Ἂς te. x S ΣΩ. Ἐμοῦ τοίνυν ἄκουε οἷα περὶ αὐτῶν ἂν λέγοιεν ε Ἁ x ,;\ “ ε 7 ~ A 5 > ~ οἱ TA ἀεὶ δοκοῦντα ὁριζόμενοι Τῷ δοκοῦντι εἶναι ἀληθὴ. i , e oe. X 5 [2 3 A oY f λέγουσι δέ, OS ἐγὼ οἰμαι, οὕτως ἐρωτῶντες, (2 Θεαί- A KN oS 53 ’ 4 7 / THTE, ὁ ἂν ἐτερον ἢ παντάπασι, μή πῇ τινα δύναμιν Ἁ SN (od A c.f Q \ e 7 “ THY αὐτὴν ἕξει Τῷ εἐτέρῳ ; καὶ μὴ υπολάβωμεν ΤΉ ἐν ταὐτὸν εἶναι ὃ ἐ D 7 δὲ ἕτερον. ἀλλ᾽ odo μεν ταῦτον εἰναι ὃ ἐρωτῶμεν, τῇ δὲ ἕτερον, & ς Ψ ἐτερον. 7. πλήθει χρόνου καὶ ὀλιγότητι] The supporters of the same doctrine as quoted by Aristotle extended this argument to meet that from general consent. Met. 3-5. 1009 B: Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὲς οὐ πλήθει κρίνεσθαι οἴονται προσή- κειν οὐδὲ ὀλιγότητι. IO. tt ἄλλο... σαφές] * Any other certain test,’ 14. ὁριζόμενοι] ‘Who deter- mine.’ Perhaps there is a touch of irony in the application of this word to the Protagoreans. 17. μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτόν] These words expand παντάπασι, and are required in order to place Thestetus at the right point of view. Megarian subtlety is here ironi- cally brought to the help of Protagoras, by the introduction of a fallacy in the Euthydemus vein. The language of logic is applied to the sensible world : the language of ideas to things which admit of degrees, And the idea dwelt upon throughout is that of difference. The lan- guage is humoured accordingly. Socrates ill can hardly be said to be ὅλως ἕτερον, wholly dif- ferent, from Socrates well, but they differ when taken each as a whole, ὅλον τοῦτο ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ (159 Β). Cp. Democritus ap. Ar, de Gen. et Cor. 1. 2: Kal ὅλως ἕτερον φαίνεσθαι ἑνὸς perakt- νηθέντος" ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ τραγῳδία καὶ κωμῳδία γίγνεται γραμμάτων, F 2 the waking mind. And half our life is spent in dreaming, The im- pressions of madness, too, though more short- lived, are real at the time to him who expe- riences them. In both cases it is impossible to demon- strate which is the real world. Our theory resolves this doubt as follows: 68 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ ) x 3» That which ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδύνατον τοίνυν ταὐτόν τι ἔχειν ἢ ἐν δυ- p- 158- is different “ Ἐν aoe Ν th Se Ξ Ris has a dif- νάμει ἢ ἐν AAD OTPOVY ὅταν ἢ κομιδῇ ἐτερον. p. 159. ferent 5 9 3 ’ ee ὁ » ad XN a power, ΣΩ. 7Ap οὖν ov καὶ ἀνόμοιον, ἀναγκαῖον TO TOLOU- τον ὁμολογεῖν 5 s @EAI. “Epovye δοκεῖ. SQ. Εἰ ἄρα τι ξυμβαίνει ὅμοιόν τῳ γίγνεσθαι ἢ ἀνόμοιον, εἴτε ἑαυτῷ εἴτε ἄλλῳ, ὁμοιούμενον μὲν ταὐ- τὸν φήσομεν γίγνεσθαι, ἀνομοιούμενον δὲ ἕτερον 5 ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. a ε Ν ia 10 ΣΏ. Quxouy πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν ὡς πολλὰ μὲν εἴη this be \ n . Ὁ ε , , \ , active or TA MWOLOVVTA και QTTELPOy @MOAVTWS δέ γε τα πτα- passive. σχοντα: And the ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. same thing Re 5 shire 9 » , in combi- SQ. Kat μην ore γε ἄλλο ἄλλῳ συμμιγνύυμένον nation with mete ? 5 Cay ere , different 15 καὶ ἄλλῳ ov TAUTO GAN ἕτερα γεννήσει: τ, τοίνυν] ‘Then,’ i.e. tak- 8. ἀνομοιούμενον ἀνομοιῶ 18 ing the question as you put it used several times by Plato, in their behalf. The particle but is not found in other is added with reference to the writers. It seems to be a coin- words καὶ μή, k.T.A., above. age of some philosopher. See 2. ὅταν] Hirschig «πα Schanz esp. Rep. 8. 547 A. read ὃ ἄν from Badham’s con- το. πρόσθεν ἐλέγομεν] Soph. jecture. But the subject of 259 Ci: °O καὶ πρόσθεν εἴρηται. ἔχειν is easily supplied from the 14. ἄλλο ἄλλῳ. - καὶ ἄλλῳ] ΟΡ. preceding sentence, leaving t+ Rep. 2. 369 C: Παραλαμβάνων joined to ταὐτόν as the object. ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ᾽ ἄλλου, τὸν δ᾽ ew : 6. Εἰ ἄρα] ‘ What is the same ἄλλου χρείᾳ. ‘The combina- : is like, therefore what is like is tion of one element with this | the same.’ This is one of many and another with that, and : examples of the imperfect state again with another different of logic, which puts Socrates’ from all.’ Compare with what respondent at his mercy. He follows, Ar. Met. 5. 2: 1026 does not always escape Un- B: Εἰσὶ yap οἱ τῶν σοφιστῶν checked, however, see Prot. λόγοι περὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ὡς 350C: "Eywye ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ εἰπεῖν μάλιστα πάντων, πότερον εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὧμο- ἕτερον i) ταὐτὸν + + μουσικὸς Κορί- Adynoa’ εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι σκος καὶ Κορίσκος, κιτιλ. ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην" εἰ γάρ με 18. γεννήσει) The future is , τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες. used because συμμιγνύμενον = ἐὰν And Socrates is not now speak- συμμίσγηται. ing in his own name. OEAITHTOS. GEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 69 ΣΩ. Λέγωμεν δὴ ἐμέ τε καὶ σὲ καὶ τἀλλ᾽ ἤδη \ \ iL uN 7 V4 e 7 X κατὰ Tov αὑτον Aoyov: Σωκράτη ὑγιαίνοντα καὶ Σω- , 5 an , ad A 5 7 Ἃ κράτη αὖ ἀσθενοῦντα: πότερον ὅμοιον τοῦτ᾽ ἐκείνῳ ἢ ὅς ἢ , ἀνόμοιον φησομεν 5 ΘΕΑΙ. ἾΑρα τὸν ἀσθενοῦντα Σωκράτη, ὅλον τοῦτο λέγεις ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ, τῷ ὑγιαίνοντι Σωκράτει ; 2Q. Κάλλιστα ὑπέλαβες: αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγω. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ανόμοιον δή που. [κέ a ὦ 2Q. Καὶ ἔτερον ἄρα οὕτως ὥσπερ ἀνόμοιον ; OEAT. ᾿Αναγκη. ΣΏ. Kai καθεύδοντα δὴ καὶ πάντα ἃ νῦν διήλ- θΘ e / , “ θομεν, ὡσαύτως φήσεις ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Ἕκαστον δὴ τῶν πεφυκότων τι ποιεῖν, ἄλλο σ \ ’ e if: ’ ε ἘΣ τ, Tl, ὁταν μεν λάβῃ υγιαίνοντα Σωκράτη, ὡς ἑτέρῳ μοι , oS δὲ > 6 aA e Εν A χρήσεται, ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα, ws ἑτέρῳ 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει; ΣΩ. Καὶ ἕτερα δὴ ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρου γεννήσομεν ἐγώ ς ’ ee a Ν aA TE O TACK@V και EKELYVO TO TWOLOVY 5 2. Δέγωμεν δή] Pheed. 100 Καὶ πάντα δὴ οὕτω λέγω. Σωκράτη is in an imperfect con- struction, governed partly by λέγωμεν, partly by φήσομεν. The object here is to impress us with the assumption of the ab- soluteness of difference. ἤδη] 1. 6. Having laid down these premises. We now ven- ture to apply our theory uni- versally : not as supr. 153 D: Kara τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον. 12. καθεύδοντα] Par. F’. marg. add. καὶ éypyyopotvra. Bod. καθεύδοντι, Is it possible that καθεύδοντα δὴ ἐγρηγορότι may be the true reading? But cp. supr. 149 E: Εἰς γυναῖκα δέ, and see Riddell’s Digest, § 232. —‘ Platoni satis visum est res quasdam significasse. Wohl- rab. 13. ὡσαύτως φήσεις] Se. ἀνό- μοιον καὶ ἕτερον εἶναι τοῦ ἐγρηγορό- τος, K.T.A, 15. τι ποιεῖν] ‘To act upon something ;’ to be agents. So τὸ ποιοῦν ἐμέ, below. Soph. 247 D: Εἴτε εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν ἕτερον ὁτιοῦν. 19. ἐφ᾽ ἑκατέρου In either case. Cp. Parm. 130 A: Aé- yovros δὴ τοῦ Σωκράτους... ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστου ἄχθεσθαι τόν τε Παρμενί- δὴν καὶ τὸν Ζήνωνα, 5 10 20 things has different products. Socrates ill, is a dif- ferent man from So- crates well, Socrates sleeping from So- crates wak- ing, and so on. Therefore, in combi- nation with the same active mo- tion they will pro- duce dif- ferent re- sults, According- ly, wine both seems and really is pleasant to me when well, But the game wine both seems and really is distaste- ful to me when ill. For Lam then a dif- ferent man, ts ime ees 70 IAATQNOS ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; SO. Ὅταν δὴ οἶνον πίνω ὑγιαίνων, ἡδύς μοι φαί- Pp: 159: νεται καὶ γλυκύς ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. 5. ΣΩ. Ἐγώνησε γὰρ δὴ ἐκ τῶν προωμολογημένων τό τε ποιοῦν καὶ τὸ πάσχον γλυκύτητά τε καὶ αἴσθη- D σιν, ἅμα φερόμενα ἀμφότερα, καὶ ἡ μὲν αἴσθησις πρὸς τοῦ πάσχοντος οὖσα αἰσθανομένην τὴν γλῶσ- σαν ἀπειργάσατο, ἡ δὲ γλυκύτης πρὸς τοῦ οἴνου περὶ το αὐτὸν φερομένη γλυκὺν τὸν οἶνον τῇ ὑγιαινούσῃ γλώττῃ ἐποίησε καὶ εἶναι καὶ φαίνεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν τὰ πρότερα ἡμῖν οὕτως ὡμολόγητο. SO. Ὅταν δὲ ἀσθενοῦντα,---ἄλλο τι πρῶτον μὲν 157TH ἀληθείᾳ οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν ; ἀνομοίῳ yap δὴ προσῆλθεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. ἝἭτερα δὴ αὖ ἐγεννησάτην ὃ τε τοιοῦτος Σω-Ἐ κράτης καὶ ἡ τοῦ οἴνου πόσις, περὶ μὲν τὴν γλῶτταν 20 αἴσθησιν πικρότητος, περὶ δὲ τὸν οἶνον γιγνομένην καὶ φερομένην πικρότητα, καὶ τὸν μὲν οὐ πικρότητα ἀλλὰ πικρόν, ἐμὲ δὲ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἀλλ᾽ αἰσθανόμενον ; ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. 9. ἀπειργάσατο] ‘The sen- sation, arising on the side of the subject, renders the tongue The dual is ‘They produce ‘active motion.’ expressive. when paired.’ percipient.’ 14. ἀσθενοῦντα] The former construction is resumed from ὅταν... λάβῃ, supr. C. 18. ἐγεννησάτην] The use of the third pers. helps to support the notion of ‘Socrates being a different man.’ Observe, too, the accuracy with which not the wine, but the drinking of the wine, is spoken of as the For this whole example cp. Symp. 186 B, where the same thing is briefly stated by Ery- ximachus: Td yap ὑγιὲς τοῦ σώματος καὶ τὸ νοσοῦν ὁμολογου- μένως ἕτερόν τε καὶ ἀνόμοιόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἀνόμοιον ἀνομοίων ἐπιθυμεῖ καὶ ἐρᾷς ἄλλος μὲν οὖν ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ ὑγιεινῷ ἔρως, ἄλλος δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τῷ νοσώδει, p. 159. p. 160. oie OEAITHTOS. (al A \ ’ 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ἐγώ τε οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποτὲ γενήσομαι a 5, y+ 5 οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος" τοῦ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλη αἴσθησις, “κ᾿ f σι A / yf καὶ ἀλλοῖον καὶ ἄλλον ποιεῖ τὸν αἰσθανόμενον: οὔτ᾽ A Ν A my Ta! / ἐκεῖνο TO ποιοῦν ἐμὲ μήποτ᾽ a an Z: γεννῆσαν τοιοῦτον γένηται" 3, Ν. ἣν ἄλλῳ συνελθὸν ταὐτὸν \ y 39) ἀπὸ γὰρ ἄλλου ἄλλο a o [4 γεννῆσαν ἀλλοῖον γενήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ΣΩ Οὐδὲ \ yf > ἴω an Δ “ἢ . UVOE μην EYWYE ἐμαυτῷ TOLOUTOS, EKELVO TE e lal lay / EAUT@ TOLOUTOV γενησεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. ΣΏ. ᾿Ανάγκη δέ γε ἐμέ τε τινὸς γίγνεσθαι, ὅταν 9 4 / 9 ὁ ig Ν \ αἰσθανομενος γίγνωμαι": αἰσθανόμενον yap, μηδενὸς δὲ 9 ’ » 7 7 3 a f \ 2 αἰσθανόμενον ἀδύνατον γίγνεσθαι: ἐκεῖνο τε τινὶ γι- I, οὐδὲν ἄλλο. . γενήσομαι οὕτως αἰσθανόμενος] ‘There is nothing else from which I can receive the same _ sensation.’ That ἄλλο is the object of αἰσθανόμενος is evident from what follows. For the accu- sative see 185 A: °A δι᾽ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δ ἄλλης ταῦτ᾽ αἰσθέσθαι, and elsewhere. There is a stress on οὕτως, For γενήσομαι... αἰσθα- νόμενος see a few lines below, ὅταν αἰσθανόμενος γίγνομα. The words γίγνεσθαι, αἰσθανόμενος, have become in a manner technical ; cp. infr. 182. γενήσο- μαι αἰσθανόμενος answers to ἐγεν- νησάτην . . αἰσθανόμενον above. The point insisted on is not the identity of the subject while in the same combination, but the difference which arises with every new combination. For ἄλλον ποιεῖ (the Bodleian reading) cp. supr. οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν ἔλαβεν. ‘For a different ob- ject implies a different sensa- tion, and makes him who per- ceives it a different man:’ i.e. I and my sensation become different with every change in the object of sense. The intention of these words is to mark the incommunicable individuality of every act of sense: 1.6. not wine or bitter- mess, but the peculiar bitter- ness of a particular wine to a particular palate at a particular moment. (This view of the passage is disputed by H. Schmidt, but accepted by Wohl- rab and Prof. Jowett.) 4. TO ποιοῦν ἐμέ] ‘Which (in this case) affects me.’ It is unnecessary to supply ai- σθανόμενον. Supr.159 C. Ag the sensation changes with the object, so the quality changes with the subject. 8. τοιοῦτο] Viz. οὕτως ai- σθανόμενος. 11. τινός] The genitive is caused by αἰσθανόμενος, but cp. Rep. 4.438 A: Τοιαῦτα οἷα εἶναί του. Op. also 10. 5.478 B: Δοξά- ζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν, 5 1o I should never re- ceive the same im- pression from any- thing else. And it would never pro- duce the same im- pression upon an- other per- son. Nor could either sub- ject or ob- ject become separately what they become to- gether, I become percipient of some- thing. It becomes sweet or bitter or the like to some one. Subject and object in percep- tion are thus mu-- tually de- pendent and inse- parable. Thatwhich sensibly affects me, is to me alone and T alone perceive it. My sensa- tion there- fore is true, for it is in- separable from my present 72 Φ NOK ἣν , A f Ἴ γνεσθαι, ταν γλυκυ ἡ πικρὸν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον γιγνηται" Pp. τόο. ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ γλυκὺ γάρ, μηδενὶ δὲ γλυκύ, ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι. ΘΈΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. SQ. Λείπεται δή, οἶμαι, ἡμῖν ἀλλήλοις, εἴτ᾽ ἐσμέν, “- “- 7 3 ἐξ 5 εἶναι, εἶτε γιγνόμεθα, γίγνεσθαι, ἐπείπερ ἡμῶν ἡ 10 15 > ’ Χ ΕΣ 7] a 7 ἀνάγκη τὴν οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν; συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς. ἀλλήλοις δὴ λείπεται t cA 3) 5) , 5 / \ 9 συνδεδέσθαι. ὥστε ELTE τις εἰναι TL ὀνομάζει, τινὶ εἰναι xX Ν ΕΝ J e / > a 5) , 6 eX ἼΤ ἐνὸς ἢ 7 pos Tl pyT €OV QUT, E€LTE γιγνεσ ale αὐτο δὲ ἐφ᾽ αὑτοῦ τι ἢ 3, 57) Ἅ > , οὔτ᾽ ἄλλου λέγοντος ἀποδεκτέον, λύθαμεν σημαίνει. ἌΤΙ / δ ὅν x ὃν ἢ γιγνομενον OUTE αὐτῷ λεκτέον © ὡς ὁ λόγος ὃν διελη- ΘΈΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες. > ἴω “ Ν Ν » Ν ἴω 3 / 5 Ν, SQ. Οὐκοῦν ὅτε δὴ τὸ ἐμὲ ποιοὺυν ἐμοὶ ἐστὶ Καὶ ἢ ουκ ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὖ: y si EN N i ἘΞ ,ὔ » ἄλλῳ, ἐγὼ καὶ αἰσθάνομαι αὐτοῦ, ἄλλος δ᾽ οὔ: a) TQ. ᾿Αληθὴς ἄρα ἐμοὶ ἡ ἐμὴ αἴσθησις: τὴς γὰρ 2. ἀδύνατον γενέσθαι) ‘Tt is impossible a thing should ever become, ete.’ Heindorf and others would change γενέσθαι here to γίγνεσθαι, to avoid the change of tense. But, as H Schmidt points out, such varia- tions are too common to allow room for objection here. And it may fairly be maintained that the aorist has the effect of making the negation more absolute in the second state- ment. 8, εἶναί τι ὀνομάζει) ‘Uses the term Being in reference to anything.” Infr. 201 1: Οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων. Parm. 133 Ὁ: Ὧν ἡμεῖς μετέχοντες, εἶναι ἕκαστα ἐπονομαζόμεθα. Cp. Phed. 92 D: Ἡ οὐσία ἔχουσα The alternative is repeated below, > , “a é » ἐπωνυμίαν του ὁ εστιν. D: τὰ ὄντα ἣ γιγνόμενα. Schanz, from Frei’s conjecture, unneces- sarily repeats γίγνεσθαι. The ellipse is easily supplied. The doctrine at first rejected the verb ‘to be’ (157 Bom grown bolder, it professes in- difference as to the language employed, seeing that the fact has been made so clear, and the consideration of the most formidable objection has ended in triumph. 14. ὅτε δὴ] ‘Since it is SO.’ Cp. supr. 154 H, Symp- 206 A: ὅτε δὴ τούτου ὁ ἔρως ἐστιν. 17. τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς οὐσίας ἀεί ἐστι] (1) ‘ Since it is inseparable from my being at the particular time’ Op. supr. B: “Hpév ἡ ἀνάγκη THY οὐσίαν συνδεῖ μέν, συνδεῖ δὲ οὐδενὶ τῶν ἄλλων. ‘Denn sie ist immer ein Stiick OEAITHTOS. 13 9. oA > ’ὔ xf 3 Waar A Ἃ QA Q p. 160. EuNs ovolas ἀεί ἐστι. καὶ ἐγὼ Κριτὴς Κατα TOV Πρω- nw By 7 32᾽ Q na A Tayopav τῶν TE ὄντων ἐμοί, ὡς ἐστι, καὶ τῶν μὴ 4 », ὄντων, ὡς οὐκ ἐστιν. " ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. a δ 3 3 \ Ἂ \ Ἁ , “- ΣΩ. Πῶς av οὖν ἀψευδὴς ὧν καὶ μὴ πταίων Τῇ / Ν Ny 55, xX / > > / Ἃ διανοίᾳ περὶ τὰ ὄντα ἢ γιγνόμενα οὐκ ἐπιστήμων ἂν “ @ 4 εἴην ὦνπερ aia Onrns ; al Φ By 4 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ὅπως ov. in yf yy [γέ 5 , > 20. Παγκάλως ἄρα σοι εἴρηται ὅτι ἐπιστημὴ οὐκ » 285 9 xX By Ν 3 EN / ἄλλο τί ἐστιν ἢ αἴσθησις, καὶ εἰς ταὐτὸν συμπέ- Ἁ \ “ κι ε Ψ Q A MTOKE, κατὰ μὲν Opnpov καὶ Ἡράκλειτον καὶ πᾶν Ν ra aA - δἰ 4 ἴω A ͵ TO τοιοῦτον φῦλον οἷον pevpara κινεῖσθαι τὰ πάντα, \ \ 7 Ν 7 ’ κατὰ δὲ ἸΤρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρη- 7 y ’, 5 X \ / μάτων ἀνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι, κατὰ δὲ Θεαίτητον 4 (od eis / 3 / / τούτων οὕτως ἐχοντῶν αἰσθησιν ἐπιστήμην γίγνεσθαι. 3 , 5 , a a \ \ 3 - ἢ γαρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε; φῶμεν τοῦτο σὸν μὲν εἶναι οἷον \ / 2° ΧΝ \ / Ἃ ἴω Zz veoyeves παιδίον, ἐμὸν δὲ μαίευμα ; ἢ πῶς λέγεις ; ΘΕΑ͂Ι. Οὕτως ἀνάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες. meines Seins.’ Deutchle. Other- wise (2), making οὐσίας a geni- tive of the object :—‘ For it is conversant with the Being of that which is to me.’ Supr. 152 C: Αἴσθησις dpa τοῦ ὄντος ἐστι καὶ ἀψευδές, For a some- what similar use of οὐσία (with a play upon the word) cp. Gorg. 472 B: Vevdoudprupas πολλοὺς κατ᾽ ἐμοῦ παρασχόμενος ἐπιχειρεῖς ἐκβάλλειν με ἐκ τῆς οὐ- σίας καὶ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς. 7. αἰσθητής] The newly-coined word helps to celebrate the establishment of the theory. Cp. infr. 208 EB: Αὐτοῦ ἐπιστή- μὼν γεγονὼς ἔσται, οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξαστής. 13. Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον] Prot. 309 D: Σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι Πρωταγόρας. Perhaps Plato is ironically preparing the way for what follows, p. 161 D, 162 C. 15. αἴσθησιν ἐπιστήμην yiyve- σθαι] The proposition which Theetetus ventured ‘out of his own consciousness’ now ap- pears as the resultant of pre- existent tendencies of thought. The doctrine ‘Sense is know- ledge’ is the meeting-point of the two theories ‘Man is the measure,’ and ‘ All is motion.’ The several topics are recapi- tulated in the reverse order. So Ar. Eth. N. 1. 3.8: Περὶ μὲν ἀκροατοῦ καὶ πῶς ἀποδεκτέον καὶ τί προτιθέμεθα. γίγνεσθαι here nearly=oup- βαίνειν. Op. Soph. 260 C; Δόξα ψευδὴς γίγνεται καὶ λόγος. σι 5 being: and Τ am the judge, as Protagoras says, of what is and is not to me. Surely what I thus perceive [ may be said to know. Theetetus then was right. Sen- sation is knowledge. And in this formula the doctrines of Heracli- tus and Protagoras meet. 1. a. First criticism the doctrine of sense. σι TA ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ A 3, , \ / . TQ. Τοῦτο μὲν δή, ὡς ἔοικε, μόλις ποτε ἐγεννησα- σ ὃ / Ν ΄ 4 prev, O TL OF ΠΟΤΕ Kal τυγχᾶνει OV. SS \ Ν / μετὰ δὲ TOV TOKOV τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρε- 14 ἴω λό κτέον τῷ λογῷ; a7 Ἂ a XN ἄξιον ov Tpopys τὸ 1. Τοῦτο μὲν δὴ . «΄. eyer- νήσαμεν͵]Π Our theory is now complete. (1) First the hy- pothesis was ventured, Sensa- tion is knowledge. (2) This was at once identified with the axiom of Protagoras, ‘The man the measure of what is:’ and their common meaning was brought home to us by the analysis of a familiar example. (3) The mystery was revealed which lay beneath this saying, but had been reserved for certain ‘disciples of Protago- ras, the Heraclitean theory of the universe that ‘ All is mo- tion;’ in which all philosophers save Parmenides concur : which is witnessed to by poetry; and confirmed by the observation of nature. (4) This theory of be- ing was then applied to the phenomena of sense ; by which means the contradictions of common language were fe- moved; and (5) in meeting the formidable objection drawn from what are commonly called false impressions, the doctrine was still further developed, and shown to be universally applicable. ‘At each step it has grown in distinctness, and boldness, and apparent certainty. At first only warmth, colour, and the like were spoken of ; gradually our eyes were opened to the relativeness of size and number. By and by it was assumed that the term αἴσθησις includes plea- iy XN ’ οἷ Σ 3 σκοπουμένους μὴ λάθῃ ἡμᾶς οὐκ » Ἂν al γιγνόμενον, ἄλλα ἀνεμιαῖον TE sure, pain, hope, fear, etc. Then we are quietly asked to concede that things good and beautiful have only a relative existence. And, being now fairly at the mercy of the argument, we can- not resist the admission that the illusions of dreams and madness are as real as our waking and sane impressions. They are real to us at the time when we experience them ; which is all the reality any thing is permitted to claim. 3. Ta ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ] Accu- sativein apposition to the action of περιθρεκτέον, K.TA., like τὸν κολοφῶνα, supr. 153 Ὁ. ‘And now to celebrate its birth in due form, we must really in our argument “run round about ” with it, and consider, etc.’ Schol.: Ἡμέρα πέμπτη τοῖς βρέ- φεσιν ἐκ γενέσεως οὕτω κληθεῖσα : Ὁ > ’ , \ map ὅσον ἐν ταὐὑτῃ καθαίρουσι τὰς χεῖρας αἱ συνεφαψάμενοι τῆς μαι- εύσεως, καὶ τὸ βρέφος περὶ τὴν ἑστίαν φέρουσι τρέχουσαι κύκλῳ, καὶ τοὔνομα τίθενται τούτῳ, δῶρά τε πέμπουσι τῷ παιδίῳ, ὡς ἐπὶ πλεῖστον πολύποδας καὶ σηπίας, οἵ τε φίλοι καὶ οἰκεῖοι καὶ ἁπλῶς οἱ προσήκοντες, ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον] ‘All yound;’ i.e. leaving out no point of view. 4. T λόγῳ] ‘In our argu- ment.’ | 5. τὸ γιγνόμενον] ‘That which is now born to us. In this and in some other cases where the reading has been ques- p. 160. p. τότ. OEAITHTOS. (63) A x \ 7 ’ a 7 Ἁ he 161, καὶ ψεῦδος. ἢ σὺ οἴει πάντως δεῖν τό γε σὸν τρέφειν Q Nee) ’ Ἃ \ eS; > / Co A καὶ μὴ ἀποτιθέναι ; ἢ καὶ ἀνέζξει ἐλεγχόμενον ὁρῶν, an ’ ἴω καὶ οὐ σφόδρα χαλεπανεῖς, ἐάν τις σοῦ ὡς πρωτοτό- \ na κου αὐτὸ ὑφαιρῇ ; ty a“ OEO. ᾿Ανέζεται, ὦ Σώκρατες, Θεαίτητος": otda ῶς 9 ’ μ Ἁ ze 3 \ Ν - 9 IG 5 3 Φ γὰρ δύσκολος. ἀλλὰ πρὸς θεῶν εἰπέ, ἢ αὖ οὐχ οὕτως EXEL 5 5 7 > 5 a ’ 2Q. Φιλολόγος γ᾽ εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ / σ“ 5, / \ 3, / \ Θεόδωρε, ὅτι με οἴει λόγων τινὰ εἶναι θύλακον καὶ ε ,ὔ » ΄ SA € 5 > »~ Ψ A \ ῥᾳδίως ἐξελόντα ἐρεῖν ὡς οὐκ αὖ EXEL οὕτω ταῦτα: τὸ \ J la) ,ὔ ἴω ἐξ Zz Β δὲ γιγνόμενον οὐκ ἐννοεῖς, ὅτι οὐδεὶς τῶν λόγων ἐζέρ- 35. » ~ 9» ον \ Col ee ἈΝ χέται πὰρ ἐμοὺ ἀλλ ἀεὶ παρὰ τοῦ ἐμοὶ προσδιαλεγο- Ψ SN \ Ql ere th Χ A μένου, eyo δὲ οὐδὲν ἐπίσταμαι πλέον πλὴν βραχέος, σ / SS NY 2 a ca \ 3 / ὁσον λόγον παρ᾽ ἑτέρου σοφοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἀποδέ- A a \ na 7 ξασθαι μετρίως. καὶ νῦν τοῦτο παρὰ τοῦδε πειρά- ,ἷ a2 N\ a σομαι, OV TL αὐτὸς εἰπεῖν. tioned, the present or imper- fect tense really gives addi- tional vividness. 2. τις σοῦ] The Bodl. first hand gave ricrov? ὡς πρωτοτόκου] Although these words are added to the second clause, they belong in sense rather to the first, i.e. χαλεπανεῖς ὡς πρωτοτόκος. Cp. Ssupr. rer C. 5. οὐδαμῶς δύσκολος] 144 Β: Μετὰ πολλῆς πραότητος. 1 55 A: Ov δυσκολαίνοντες, κιτ.λ. 6. αὖ] ‘ You have proved that it is so.—lIs this position now to be reversed 2’ 8. Φιλολόγος γ᾽ εἶ ἀτεχνῶς καὶ χρηστός, ὦ Θεόδωρε] Pheedr. 235 E: Φίλτατος εἶ καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς χρυ- σοῦς, ὦ Φαῖδρε. Ib. 264 Β: Χρη- στὸς εἶ, ὅτι, K.T.A, χρηστός 15 said in a tone of good-humoured pleasantry. ‘You are truly a patient inquirer and an ingenuous per- son, Theodorus, if you take me for a sack full of differ- ent theories; and expect me without any difficulty to pull out the refutation of what has been now stated. But you do not perceive what is really taking place all the while (τὸ γιγνόμενον).᾽ 10. οὐκ αὖ] The transposition of αὖ (to vary the expression and emphasize the negative) has caused needless embarrass- ment. Cp. Rep. 3. 393 D, 4. 442 A, 6. 499 ἘΣ, Crat. 391 C, infr. 195 E, μόνον αὖ. 13. ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδέν] “Βιι I have no advantage in wisdom be- yond this simple skill, to re- ceive a theory from some wise person, and accept it on fair conditions,’ Cp. Rep. 7. 531 15. μετρίως] ‘In a spirit of 5 τ. Why did not Protagoras say that a pig or a tadpole was the mea- sure of 5 76 oS OUTO@S. MAATOQNOZ TO. Οἶσθ᾽ οὖν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ὃ θαυμάζω τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου: GEO. To ποῖον ; SQ. Ta μὲν ἄλλα μοι πάνυ ἡδέως εἴρηκεν, ὡς τὸ ὃ “-Ἔ ε / a ἧς oS . Ν δ᾽ ϑ Ν ζω οΚουν εκαστῷ τοῦτο και €OTL THV αρχην του ᾿ς ,ὔ ὔ 53 , na λόγου τεθαυμακα, ὅτι οὐκ εἶπεν ἀρχόμενος TNS ἀλη- oA / / / @ Ss θείας ὅτι πάντων χρήματων μέτρον ἐστὶν ὗς ἢ κυνο- fairness. 179 A: Μετρίως ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου εἰρή- σεται. παρὰ τοῦδε] From Theetetus. Or is Protagoras meant ἢ 3. ὦ Θεόδωρε] Theodorus is now gradually drawn into the discussion, but proves a shy respondent. He shrinks from being made the instrument of his friend’s defeat (162 A), 15 not moved by Socrates’ hu- morous challenge (ib. C), will not accept the responsibility of ‘guarding the orphan > (165 A),—he is a mere geometrician and unused to dialectic (ibid.), and only when Socrates de- clares that with no one else ean he conduct the argument with becoming gravity (168 D E) is he induced to come forward and discuss the ques- tion so far as his own subject is involved in it, but no further (169 C). He listens quietly to the long digression (172-177); but evinces some impatience when the discussion is resumed (177 C), and although at one point (181 B) he shows un- expected eagerness, he refuses to be drawn into further argu- ment (183 D). ὃ θαυμάζω] A courteous way of expressing strong dissent. Prot. 329 B: Εἴπερ ἄλλῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπων πειθοίμην ἄν, καὶ σοὶ πείθομαι" ὃ δ᾽ ἐθαύμασα σοῦ λέγον- Gorg. 458 E: ” AKove δή, ὦ Topyia, ἃ θαυμάζω ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ὑπὸ σοῦ. No fault is found with the arguments of Protagoras, only if we follow his doctrine to its results, all creatures that have sense must be equally infallible. Hence there can be no teaching and no discussion. 6. τὰ .. ἄλλα ... εἴρηκεν, ὡς] ‘For the most part I am charmed with his statement of the theory that, etc.’ os, κιτιλ. explains εἴρηκεν and not the whole clause. 8. τῆς ἀληθείας] ᾿Αλήθεια seems to have been the title, or at least one title, of Prota- goras’ work. Tt is often co- vertly alluded to in this and other dialogues. See esp. supr. 152 OC, and cp. Cratyl. 391 C: Εἰ τὴν μὲν ἀλήθειαν τὴν Πρωταγόρου ὅλως οὐκ ἀποδέχομαι, τὰ δὲ τῇ τοιαύτῃ ἀληθείᾳ ῥηθέντα ἀγαπῴην ὥς TOU ἄξια. 9. is] Thetype of stupidity. Lach. 196 C: Kara τὴν παροιμίαν οὐκ ἂν πᾶσα bs γνοίη. κυνοκέφαλος] Something more TOS . .- ΘΕΟ. Sd κάλλιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεις: καὶ ποίει p. 161. σ OEAITHTOS. 7% Z Va yy 7 A ’ 7 τότ. κεῴαλος 7 τι ἄλλο ἀτοπώτερον τῶν ἐχόντων αἴσθη- A 4 a σιν, ἵνα μεγαλοπρεπῶς καὶ πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς τς » (hee , » 7 o e rn ry Tee. ἤρξατο new λέγειν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὅτι ημεῖς μὲν αὐτὸν ; Qo Ἁ ΕῚ iA ae. 7 e ϑ ΒΩ » 7] ὥσπερ θεὸν ἐθαυμάζομεν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ, ὁ ὃ apa ἐτυγ- Ἵ Ἃ 9 J xa\ / "2 7 Ὁ xavev ὧν εἰς φρονησιν οὐδὲν βελτίων βατράχου γυρί- Ν ὦ 3Ξ, ΕῚ 7 EN A , νου, μὴ τι ἄλλου Tov ἀνθρώπων. ἢ πὼς λέγωμεν, 53 / 9 \ \ (ey? 3 \ yf Sous > @ Θεόδωρε 3 εἰ yap δὴ εκάστῳ ἀληθες ἔσται ὃ ἂν δι , ᾽7 7 AQ 37 4 2, αἰσθήσεως δοξαζῃ, καὶ μήτε τὸ ἄλλου πάθος ἄλλος 4 na 7) \ / 4 yf βέλτιον διακρινεῖ, μῆτε τὴν δόξαν κυριώτερος ἔσται {2 ΄σ A « , Vv x 7 ἐπισκέψασθαι ETEPOS τὴν ἑτέρου, ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδὴς, ἀλλ᾽ ἃ ’ 5, Ν A e A 4 ῇ 0 πολλακις εἴρηται, αὐτὸς τὰ αὑτοῦ εἐκαστος μόνος 4 n \ ’ὔ’ 3 A ἣν 5» “ 7 / δοξάσει, ταῦτα δὲ πᾶντα ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀληθῆ, τί δὴ ποτε, 53 ε an J \ J lo Q yy ὦ eraipe, Πρωταγόρας μὲν σοφός, ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων 4 A \ , A Β διδάσκαλος ἀξιοῦσθαι δικαίως μετὰ μεγάλων μισθῶν, e a \ / ὧν 7 Com 3 ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀμαθέστεροί τε καὶ φοιτητέον ἡμῖν ἣν παρ᾽ > lal , yf 35 Cok ΓΕ 7 “ e A 7 EKELVOV, μέτρῳ OVTL αὐτῷ ἑκάστῳ τῆς αὑτοῦ σοφίας: n a Ἂ A 7 7 A ταῦτα πῶς μὴ φῶμεν δημούμενον λέγειν τὸν ΠΡρωτα- remote even than the Μυσῶν ἔσχατος, infr. 209 B. As we might say, Why not the lemur or the chimpanzee ? 2. πάνυ καταφρονητικῶς | ‘Show- ing a magnificent contempt for our opinion of him,’ 3. ἤρξατο] This use of the aorist indicative with ἵνα, ὅπως, etc., is not infrequent. Euthyd. 304 D: Kai μήν, ἔφη, ἄξιόν y ἦν ἀκοῦσαι. Ti δέ; ἣν δ ἐγώ. Ἵνα ἤκουσας ἀνδρῶν διαλεγομένων, οἱ νῦν σοφώτατοί εἶσιν. AXsch. Prom. 749: Ὅπως πέδῳ σκήψασα τῶν πάντων πόνων | ἀπηλλάγην. 5. βατράχου has been rejected by several editors as a gloss on yupivov. It is sufficiently de- fended by Stallbaum, who quotes Bernhardy, Syntax, p.193. The introduction of yvpivov alone would be too abrupt, and the reference in infr. 167 B would not be clear. 7. ἀληθὲς ἔσται, κιτιλ.] The future indicative with εἰ is often used in dwelling on a supposi- tion which is unendurable. Cp. Sophocl. Philoct. 988: Εἴ μ᾽ οὗτος ἐκ τῶν σῶν p ἀπάξεται βίᾳ; 10. ὀρθὴ ἢ ψευδής] For εἴτε omitted cp. infr. 169 D, 203 A. 13. σοφός Sc. ἢν, anticipated from below. ὥστε καὶ ἄλλων διδάσκαλος] The negative form of the same saying, viz. Οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, is in like mannerturned against itself, Euthyd. 287 A: Ei yap μὴ ἁμαρτάνομεν μήτε πράττοντες μήτε λέγοντες μήτε διανοούμενοι, ὑμεῖς, ὦ πρὸς Διός, εἰ οὕτως ἔχει, τίνος διδάσκαλοι ἥκετε ; 15. ἦν] Viz. in his life-time. 17. ταῦτα] The old edd. with σι || ο things? His principle clearly in- cludes all creatures that have sense; and destroys his own pretension to superior wisdom :— Not to say that it cuts at the root of dialectic and of all discussion. 78 , Ν Ἁ XN 3 , x “ Jeo. 4 nw yopav; τὸ δὲ δὴ ἐμόν TE καὶ τῆς ἐμὴς τέχνης TIS P- 161. NAATQNOZ a rn Ὁ aN > x / * 5 μαιευτικῆς σιγῶ, ὅσον yeAwTa ὀφλισκάνομεν" οἶμαι Q δὲ Q / e A , ’ ἑ καὶ ξύμπασα ἢ TOU διαλέγεσθαι πραγματεια. τὸ x a / XS / / γὰρ ἐπισκοπεῖν καὶ ἐλέγχειν TAS ἀλλήλων φαντασίας some inferior MSS. read καὶ ταῦτα. Ι. τῆς μαιευτικῆς]} Here Na- ber would again prune the text. 2. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ ξύμπασα] Locke, Hum. Und. 13. ὃ 88: ‘ But if it should so happen that two thinking men have dif- ferent ideas, I do not see how they could argue or discourse with one another. 3. ἡ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι πραγμα- τεία] Ar. Met. 3.4. τοοό: Τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἕν τι σημαίνειν οὐδὲν σημαΐνειν ἐστίν, μὴ σημαινόντων δὲ τῶν ὀνο- μάτων ἀνήρηται τὸ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς ἀλλήλους, κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἀλήθειαν καὶ πρὸς αὑτόν: οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν. Kuthyd. 286 C: Τοῦτόν γε τὸν λόγον πολλῶν δὴ καὶ πολλάκις ἀκηκοὼς ἀεὶ θαυμάζω. καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν σφό- δρα ἐχρῶντο αὐτῷ καὶ οἱ ἔτι πα- λαιότεροι' ἐμοὶ δὲ ἀεὶ θαυμαστός τις δοκεῖ εἶναι καὶ τούς τε ἄλλους ἀνατρέπων καὶ αὐτὸς αὑτόν. οἶμαι δὲ αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀλήθειαν παρὰ σοῦ κάλλιστα πεύσεσθαι. ἄλλο τι ἢ ψευδῆ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι; τοῦτο γὰρ δύναται ὁ λόγος. Gorg. 481 C: Εἰ μή τι ἦν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις πάθος, τοῖς μὲν ἄλλο τι, τοῖς δ᾽ ἄλλο τι, τὸ αὐτό, ἀλλά τις ἡμῶν ἴδιόν τι ἔπα- σχε πάθος ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ῥάδιον ἐνδείξασθαι τῷ ἑτέρῳ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πάθημα. 4. ἐπισκοπεῖν] ‘To contem- plate’ or ‘consider. Supr. 168 A, infr. 207 Ὁ. 5. μακρὰ μὲν καὶ διωλύγιος] Ν / > \ Care, yf 3 N \ Q 5 TE Και δόξας, ὀρθὰς ἑκάστου οὐσας, οὐ μακρὰ μὲν Και ‘Great, nay enormous. μέν points forwards to the alterna- tive implied in ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα, «td. *But then perhaps he was in jest. Others, with Buttmann on Men. 82 A, Ἕλλην μέν ἐστι, take μέν to mean, εἰ presume.’ But ἴῃ that and simi- lar passages the question is the first of a series, or at least pre- liminary to something which is to follow. διωλύγιος, Schol.: Μεγάλη, ἡ ἐπὶ πολὺ διήκουσα. ἀντὶ τοῦ περιβόητος .. σημαίνει δ᾽ ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ τὸ σκοτεινὸν καὶ τὸ νυκτερινόν. The meaning, ‘loud’ (if it really existed, but it is perhaps due to a fanciful deri- vation from ὀλολύζω), must have been derived from the meaning ‘long.’ Cp. Μακρὸν dureiv, φωνὴ οὐρανομήκης. The idea of vast size, or length, may again have arisen from the association of infinity with gloom. If so, the word is possibly related to ἠλυγή, Avy. Compare pag, ῥώξ' πτήσσω, πτώσσω, etc. ‘Vast in extent’ is the only mean- ing admissible here and in de Legg. 10. 890 D: Ti & od χαλεπά τε ἐστὶ ξυνακολουθεῖν λόγοις οὕτως εἰς πλήθη λεγόμενα, μήκη τε αὖ κέκτηται διωλύγια ; This, too, is the meaning in which it is used by Neopla- tonist writers. For the climax with καί compare 155 ΕἸ: Σκληρούς τε. . kal ἀντιτύπους. 175 Εἰ : Σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν. Rep. 5. 449 D: Μέγα καὶ ὅλον. p. 162% OEAITHTOS. 1g ». τό. διωλύγιος φλυαρία, εἰ ἀληθὴς ἢ ἀλήθεια ἸΤρωταγόρου, ἀλλὰ μὴ παίζουσα ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου ἐφθέγ- ξατο; ΘΕΟ. ᾽Ὦ Σώκρατες, φίλος ἁνήρ, ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν \ 5 2 x 3 / > 5» a e A δὴ ELTTES. οὐκ ἂν οὖν δεξαίμην δὶ ἐμου ομολογοῦντος 5 ἐλέγχεσθαι Πρωταγόραν, οὐδ᾽ αὖ σοὶ παρὰ δόξαν 3 ᾽ \ 3 / ΄, ,ὔ , ἀντιτείνειν. Tov οὖν Θεαίτητον πάλιν λαβέ: πάντως \ an N 4x9 9 an 3 / ς / καὶ νῦν δὴ par’ ἐμμελῶς σοι ἐφαίνετο ὑπακούειν. ΣΏΩ. ἾΑρα κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐλθών, ὦ Θεύδωρε, 2. ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βίβλου] ‘If the Truth of Protagoras is sincere, and was not laughing when she uttered this from be- hind her impenetrable screen of written words.’ There is an allusion to the etymology of ἄδυτον. Cp. the celebrated passage in the Phedrus, about written teaching, 275 D: Δεινὸν γάρ που, ὦ Φαῖδρε, τοῦτ᾽ ἔχει γραφή, καὶ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὅμοιον ζωγραφίᾳ" καὶ γὰρ τὰ ἐκείνης ἔκγονα ἕστηκε μὲν ὡς ζῶντα, ἐὰν δ᾽ ἀνέρῃ τι, σεμνῶς πάνυ σιγᾷ, «tA. For the imagery which is here resumed see above, 152 C: Τοῦτο ἡμῖν μὲν ἠνίξατο τῷ πολλῷ συρφετῷ, τοῖς δὲ μαθηταῖς ἐν ἀπορρήτῳ τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἔλεγε. 155 E: Τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀποκε- κρυμμένην. .. μή τις τῶν ἀμυήτων ἐπακούῃ... ὧν μέλλω σοῖ τὰ μυσ- τήρια λέγειν... οὗτος ὁ μῦθος. At first Protagoras himself spoke in riddles—now his ‘ Truth’ is personified, and speaks ob- scurely from her hidden shrine. Plato often thus follows up a metaphor. Compare the well- known image of the wave Rep. 4.441 Ο: Ταῦτα μὲν μόγις διανε- νεύκαμεν. 5. 453 Ὠ: "Ay τέ τις εἰς κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἄν τε εἰς μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως 457 Β: Ἕν ὥσπερ κῦμα φῶμεν διαφεύγειν ὥστε μὴ κατακλυσθῆναι. 472 A: Té μέγιστον τῆς τρικυμίας. 473-0: “Ὥσπερ κῦμα ἐκγελῶν κατακλύσειν. 4. ὥσπερ σὺ νῦν δὴ εἶπες] 161 : Τοῦ ἑταίρου σου Πρωταγόρου. 6. παρὰ δόξαν] ‘Against con- viction.’ Rep. 1.346 A: Καί, ὦ μακάριε, μὴ παρὰ δόξαν ἀποκρίνου, ἵνα τι καὶ περαίνωμεν. 7: πάντως καί] See above, 143 A, and note. 8. ἐμμελῶς... ὑπακούειν] Cp. Soph. 217 1): Πάντες γὰρ ὑπα- κούσονταί σοι πράως. Rep. 5. 474 A: Glaucon says, ᾿Αλλά τοί. σὲ ov προδώσω, ἀλλ᾽ ἀμυνῶ οἷς δύνα.-- γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον. μαι. δύναμαι δὲ εὐνοίᾳ τε καὶ τῷ παρακελεύεσθαι, καὶ ἴσως ἂν ἄλλου του ἐμμελέστερόν σοι ἀποκρινοίμην. The notion is not that of a respondent who assents to everything, but of one who apprehends the drift of each question in turn, See 145 DE, 155 D E, 1509 B. 9. "Apa κἂν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα] It appears from this, and 169 B, that the Lacedemo- nians used to compel bystaud- ers to join in their gymnastic exercises. ("EAkew πρὸς τὸ γυμ- νάσιον. .. ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσιν.) This is probably According to this theory, Theztetus is as wise as any God. 53, Ν 15 τι οἴει TO LI 80 πρὸς τὰς παλαίστρας ἀξιοῖς ἂν ἄλλους θεώμενος ΡῬ. 162. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ , τ Ν / aN \ > / Ν γυμνους, ενιους φαύλους, αὐτὸς μὴ ἀντεπιδεικνυναι TO 5 ' εἶδος παραποδυομενος 5 ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλὰ τί μὴν δοκεῖς, εἴπερ μέλλοιέν μοι , 5) AN \ 9“ an πείσειν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐᾶν θεᾶσ > Ie Ν / θ Ε « a 53 Εἰς δὰ ς ἐπιτρέψειν καὶ πείσεσθαι: ὠσπὲρ νὺν οἶμαι ὑμᾶς X Se ‘\ Ν θαι καὶ μὴ ἐλκειν πρὸς TO ’ x XN “fy 57 “ δὲ δὴ Ve γυμνασίιον σκ N pov 1 1) OVTQ, T@ € 07) VEMTEPD Te / + / καὶ ὑγροτέρῳ ὄντι προσπαλαίειν. SO. AAA’ εἰ οὕτως, ὦ Θεόδωρε, σοὶ φίλον, οὐδ᾽ ΣΙΝ ΧΝ X / Ὁ UL, ἐπὶ τὸν σοφὸν Θεαίτητον treor. A Ν ἃ a / TNTE, πρῶτον μέν ἃ VUV διήλθομεν, 7 > Mi [χά 3 / \ paces εἰ ἐξαίφνης οὑτως ἀναφανήσει μηδὲν 5) , ε a 3 A Ss Ν a εἰς σοφίαν οτουοὺυν ἀνθρώπων ἢ Kal θεῶν 5 πους λέγεσθαι 5 the point of the allusion here. There is no reason to suppose that the human form was less visible in an Athenian than in a Lacedemonian palestra. The law observed in severer times at Athens, which for- bade adults to enter a gym- nasium where boys were eX- ercising, perhaps throws some light on this Spartan custom. (Aisch, c. Tim. p. 2. § 12.) 2. ἐνίους φαύλους] Socrates courteously implies his own in- feriority. H. Schmidt objects that Socrates, although pretend- ing ignorance, professes to have a special gift in dialectic. But the words have the same ironi- cal tone as supr. 154 EH, dre ἰδιῶται, Rep. 2. 368 D, ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἡμεῖς οὐ δεινοί, and are used with reference to the failure of Socrates and Thesetetus to come to any conclusion hitherto. Ν / e , / Νὴ 3 10 ἐμοὶ ἐχθρόν, φασὶν οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι. πάλιν δὴ οὖν Λέγε δή, ὦ Θεαί- ἄρα οὐ συνθαυ- χείρων Xx - ie ἢ ἧττον fi / 3 Ag? Sages > / ρωταγύρειον μέτρον εἰς θεοὺς ἢ εἰς ἀνθρὼ- 2: παραποδυόμενος] ‘Stripping beside them,’ i.e. to compare with them. ἡ. σκληρόν] ‘Stiff,’ opposed to ὑγροτέρῳ, ‘more supple.’ Symp. 196 A: 'γγρὸς τὸ εἶδος (ὁ ἔρως) οὐ γὰρ ἂν οἷός τ᾽ ἦν πάντῃ περιπτύσσεσθαι ... εἰ σκληρὸς ἦν. Cp. Rep.3.410D, where σκληρόν is metaphorically applied to character: ᾿Αγριότητός τε καὶ σκληρότητος καὶ αὖ μαλακίας τε καὶ ἡμερότητος. See too Hor. Od. 4.1: ‘Desine.. flectere molli- bus Jam durum imperiis.’ 8. προσπαλαίειν] Se. σε. ‘ Let more supple youth try a fall with you, and do not drag me into the gymnasium.’ (J owett.) 11. σοφόν] ‘Qui scientiam αἴ- σθησιν esse ponendo repente βὰ- piens evasit.’ Heind. 12. συνθαυμάζεις] Cp. Supt. ὃ θαυμάζω. 15. εἰς θεούς] Contrast with Q — ae ». 162. OEAITHTOS. 81 OEAI. Ma A’ οὐκ ἔγωγε. \ 7 (a καὶ ὅπερ γε ἐρωτᾷς, ’ ΄ (iy J \ “ A / ’ὔ πάνυ θαυμάζω. ἡνίκα yap διῆμεν ὃν τρόπον λέγοιεν 3 ΄ : μοι εὖ ἐφαίνετο λέγεσθαι: an μεταπέπτωκεν. Δ 2Q. Νέος γὰρ εἶ, ὦ φίλε παῖ: » ’, « hi \ U4 ὀξέως ὑπακούεις καὶ πείθει. Ν ἴων e , a ἣν 53 la A 7 Ὁ TO δοκοῦν εκαστῷ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τῷ δοκοῦντι, πάνυ nN \ > / 7 νῦν δὲ τοὐναντίον τάχα τῆς οὖν δημηγορίας if 3, 3, ec > A 3 a Πρωταγόρας ἢ τις ἄλλος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ, “Q γενναῖοι παῖδές τε καὶ γέροντες, δημηγορεῖτε ξυγκαθεζόμενοι, / 5) \ , yay θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, this Legg. 4. γ16 Ο: Ὁ δὴ θεὸς ἡμῖν πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἂν εἴη μάλιστα, καὶ πολὺ μᾶλλον ἢ πού τις ὥς φασιν ἄνθρωπος, -- 8, truth of which Plato here throws out a distant hint. 4. τοὐναντίον] Viz. οὐκ εὖ φαι- νόμενον λέγεσθαι. This word is not the subject of μεταπέπτωκε, but in apposition with the sub- ject, forming part of the predi- cate. ‘Nunc autem res subito in contrarium vertit. Ut Me- mon 7O C:; “Evédde δὲ. τὸ ἐναντίον περιέστηκεν Heind.— Riddell (Dig. of Idioms, § 13) would treat all such examples as accusatives. But with verbs of becoming, etc., the above ex- planation appears more prob- able. τάχα] So the Bodleian MS. with Vat. Ven. I. Other MSS. have ταχύ. 6. Néos yap εἶ] Parm. 130 E: Νέος yap εἶ ἔτι, φάναι τὸν Παρμενίδην, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ οὔπω σου ἀντείληπται φιλοσοφία ὡς ἔτι ἀντιλήψεται. THs .. δημηγορίας ὀξέως ὑπα- κούεις καὶ πείθει] ‘Your ear is quickly caught, and your mind influenced, by popular argu- ments.’ ovs ἐγὼ ἔκ TE τοῦ 9. δημηγορεῖτε] ‘You talk clap-trap.’ Io, ἄγοντες] Hip. Maj. 298 D: Μηδὲν τὸ τῶν νόμων εἰς μέσον παρ- ἄγοντες. Pheedr. 267 A: Tov δ᾽. . Ἐὔηνον eis μέσον οὐκ ἄγομεν. The Bodl. MS. with its two followers, Vat. and Ven. Π., gives λέγοντες. But the tend- ency to the repetition of consonants, already noticed, weakens its testimony in this instance with λέγειν and λέγετε following. Compare, besides the instances adduced in the note on 156, τόρ C: ᾿Αντιλέγω, ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε, Bodl. Vat. Ven. π. ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλὰ λέγε. As regards the sense there would be a slight awkwardness in the re- petition of the same common word, which it is in Plato’s Manner to avoid, though, on the other hand, the expression ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγειν καὶ τοῦ γράφειν is made more pointed at first sight. But the general sense with Onunyopeire is enough to occasion this, without the in- troduction of λέγοντες. And if we look closely at the expres- sion ἐς τὸ μέσον λέγειν θεούς, it is hardly supported by comparing Herod. 6, 129: Ἔριν εἶχον Ν \ -~ ~ προς yap ταῦτα ἐρεῖ The confi- dence of the youth is shaken by these objections, but they are dis- missed by Socrates, who points out that argument should be met with argument and not with ridi- cule, 82 λέγειν καὶ > 5 ΕΝ > “ ἊΝ οὐκ εἰσίν, ἐξαιρῶ, καὶ > / / an ἀκούοντες, λέγετε ταῦυτα; ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ A 7 ν 3 an e . A xX e τοῦ γράφειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὡς εἰσὶν 7) OS Ῥ' τό2. ἢ ἃ ε Ἂ΄. ἢν » , E ἃ οἱ πολλοὶ av ἀποδέχοιντο ὡς δεινὸν εἰ μηδὲν διοίσει 3 / oS a ’ / / ¢ εἰς σοφίαν ἕκαστος τῶν ἀνθρώπων βοσκηματος οτου- » \ a 5... Μ' ta) ἀλλὰ τῷ €ELKOTL χρῆσθε: na 3 7 \ Ν 5» Fe sw ¢ an , ε οῦν: ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀναγκὴν οὐδ᾽ ἡντινοῦν λέγετε, ὯΝ " 9527 / ae ᾧ εἰ ἐθέλοι Θεόδωρος ἢ ἄλλος τις τῶν γεωμετρῶν χρώμενος γεωμετρεῖν, ἄξιος Sind, ἘῸΝ “ Ἃ 3) οὐδ᾽ ἑνὸς μόνου ay El). ἀμφὶ μουσικῇ καὶ τῷ λεγομένῳ ἐς τὸ μέσον; Legg. 7. 817 © (the poets are addressed) : My δὴ δόξητε ἡμᾶς . . ἐπιτρέψειν ὑμᾶς δημηγορεῖν . . πρὶν κρῖναι τὰς ἀρ- χὰς εἴτε ῥητὰ καὶ ἐπιτήδεια πε- ποιήκατε λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον εἴτε μή. Here λέγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον 15 not equivalent to δημηγορεῖν, but means rather to ‘recite in public.’ Cp. ib. 2. 664 C: Eis ro μέσον dodpevos. The passages already quoted show that ἄγειν εἰς τὸ μέσον, meaning ‘ to ad- duce in illustration or argu- ment,’ is quite Platonic. See also Phil. 57 A: οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα ταῦτα προηνεγκάμεθα εἰς τὸ μέσον. There is a slight expression of violence in θεοὺς. ‘dragging in the gods,’ which suits the context well. I. os εἰσὶν ἢ ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν] Here, as 152 Δ, Protagoras’ opinion is quoted in his own words. Diog. Laert. 9: Περὶ 6 “ ay ἀμ) Qs 40 Δὲ ¢ ἢ. ὃ εων OUK EX@ εἰδέναι, οὐθ ως εἰσιν . ἄγοντες, oi ὡς οὐκ εἰσίν. πολλὰ γὰρ τὰ κωλύοντα εἰδέναι, 7 τε ἀδηλότης, καὶ βραχὺς ὧν ὁ βίος 6 τοῦ ἀν- θρώπου. 2. ἐξαιρῶ] Rep. 6.402: Θεῖον μέντοι κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν ἐξαιρῶ- μεν λόγου. 5. ἀπόδειξιν δὲ καὶ ἀνάγκην] In dealing with a metaphysical theory it is not enough to have nr 3 7 \ / σκοπεῖτε οὖν σὺ TE καὶ Θεο- shown its inconsistency with common sense. It must be met upon its own ground, and the truth which it contains, as well as the sources of falsehood, clearly distinguished. This, and not merely, as the Scholiast says, that he may draw out Thezetetus further, is Socrates’ motive in relinquishing the ground he had taken in I51 ὦ. This point of method has two aspects, the Socra- tic defiance of opinion and the Sophistic contempt for ob- vious facts. Gorg. 472 B: ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγώ σοι εἷς Sv οὐκ ὁμολογῶ" οὐ γάρ με σὺ ἀναγκάζεις. Soph. 293 ΕἸ: Hep. φανερός, ὦ Θεαί- τητε, εἶ σοφιστὴν οὐχ ἑωρακώς. Gc. τί δή; Bev. δόξει σοι μύειν ἢ παντάπασιν οὐκ ἔχειν ὄμματα τς τὸ δ᾽ ἐκ τῶν λόγων ἐρωτήσει σε μόνον. 8, οὐδ᾽ ἑνὸς μόνου] Schol.: ᾿Εκ τῆς τῶν κυβευόντων συνηθείας ἔλαβε τὸ οὐδενὸς μόνου; ὅταν ἐκεῖ πέσῃ ἐν τῷ παίζειν ἕν τὸ ἐλάχιστον. 1) ‘Not worth an ace. Or, if, as Wyttenbach thought, the phrase originated in the line of Homer, Il. 8. 234: Nov δ᾽ οὐδ᾽ ἑνὸς ἄξιοί εἰμεν Ἕκτορος, (2) ‘No better than a single man,’ whereas he is now ἑτέρων ποὰ- λῶν ἀντάξιος. Cp. Polit. 297 BE: Tov ἑτέρων πολλῶν ἀντάξιον OEAITHTOS. 83 P 163. Owpos εἰ ἀποδέζεσθε πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι περὶ τούτων λεγομένους λόγους. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ’ οὐ δίκαιον, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὔτε ἂν ἡμεῖς φαῖμεν. XQ. Αλλῃ δὴ σκεπτέον, yf ἊΣ OUTE συ ε yx ε σ“ \ ως EOLKEV, WS O TE OOS 5 ’ καὶ ὁ Θεοδώρου λόγος. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν ἄλλῃ. See above, 145 D: ἼΑξιος γὰρ... γεωμετρίας ἕνεκα, and below, 167 C: Ὁ σοφιστὴς εν, ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοῖς παιδευθεῖσιν. Bonitz questions such a use of ἄξιος = (ἀντάξιος), and would read οὐδενὸς λόγου. I. πιθανολογίαις τε καὶ εἰκόσι] The Bodleian reading in the ancient hand. (Schanz doubts of this, but the erasure of or is quite discernible.) Most MSS. have πιθανολογίᾳ. Cp. Ar. Eth. N. 1.2: Παραπλήσιον γὰρ φαί-- νεται μαθηματικοῦ τε πιθανολογοῦν-- 3 / taTpov. Tos ἀποδέχεσθαι καὶ ῥητορικοῦ ἀπο-- δείξεις ἀπαιτεῖν. 2. τούτων] Several MSS. have τηλικούτων, 5- ὅ τε σὸς καί] Theatetus has answered for both. See above, σύ τε καὶ Θεόδωρος. 9. ἢ ἕτερον] πότερον Β. IO. τὰ πολλὰ καὶ ἄτοπα] The novel doctrine of active and passive motions, the reality of dreams and phantasies, etc. II. ἐκινήσαμεν Rep. 5. 450 A: Ὅσον λόγον πάλιν, ὥσπερ ἐξ ἀρχῆς, κινεῖτε περὶ τῆς πολιτείας ! 18. Ἦ οὖν, κιτ.λ.] The argu- ment is in brief as follows: ‘Tf sensation is knowledge, we can know and not know the Same thing ; since (1) we have perfect sensible perception of things we do not know tho- roughly; and (2) we remember (1.e. know) things which we do not sensibly perceive.’ Ge2 a \ ἴω 5 .37 3 \ 3 / 20. Tide δὴ σκοπῶμεν, εἰ Apa ἐστίν ἐπιστήμῃ TE ,, "The doc. \ > SN XN o& δ \ “ὦ trine is καὶ αἰσθησις ταὐτὸν ey es γὰρ Τοῦτο που, — thersfare = , ae \ ,ὔ ΄ὕ ᾿ κ᾿ examined mas ὁ λόγος ἡμῖν ἔτεινε, καὶ τούτου χάριν TA TOAXG 10 jn the Nee oP n 3 7 » ΄,ὕ shape in . Καὶ aroma ταῦτα ἐκινῆσαμεν. οὐ yap; which i , \ > first ap- ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μεν οὖν. peared ; > Ἢ 53 « x /, ἃ “ e A 3 θ / viz. ‘ Sense Q. OvY ὁμολογήσομεν, ἃ τῷ ὁρᾶν αἰσθανό- τὸ ἐσ x y's , ΄ Ξ “ vr ey ledge.’ μεθα ἢ τῷ ἀκούειν, TAVTA ταῦτα ἅμα καὶ ἐπίστασθαι ἜΣ 1] Ξ 4 , " a \ \ / and hear is olov τῶν βαρβάρων πρὶν μαθεῖν τὴν φωνὴν TOTEPOV 15. 46 know, 3 ,ὔ > , “ , ἈΠ ἐδ ΄ when a ov φήσομεν ἀκούειν, orav φθέγγωνται, ἢ ακουειν. τὲ δον Ne AR θ A HZ A \ > , \ hears a Kal ἐπιστασῦαι ἃ λέγουσι; Kal ad Ypappara μὴ Seance 3 7 , 3 SN J 5 ¢ Ww δ language, ἐπίσταμενοι, βλέποντες εἰς αὐτὰ MOTEPOV OVX Opav, ἢ ἃ oe ae 5 . κα *° ΄ ς characters ἐπίστασθαι, εἴπερ ὁρῶμεν, διἰσχυριούμεθα ξ ἐν ἡ τς has never learned, does he know or not know what is said and written ? Allowing this to pass, Can I be ignorant of what I re- member ? ————— ΝΠ ΜΡ 84 ΘΕΑΙ. Αὐτό ye, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο αὐτῶν, ὅπερ ν. τό3. ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ ε a / Ἂς 3 ’ 5 , / A ορωμεν TE Kal ἀκουομεν, ἐπίστασθαι φησομεν" τῶν μὲν γὰρ τὸ σχῆμα καὶ \ a δ᾿ κα τὸ χρῶμα ὁρᾶν τε καὶ ἐπί- o \ XN > “ \ / 5 7 στασθαι, τῶν δὲ τὴν ὀξύτητα καὶ βαρύτητα ἀκούειν © fof iN "50. 7 ἃ " ec Ν Ν 5τε ἅμα καὶ εἰδέναι" ἃ δὲ οἵ τε γραμματισταὶ περί Io 5 “ Ἂς eee ἴω αὐτῶν καὶ Ol ἐρμῆηνεις διδάσκουσιν, οὔτε αἰσθάνεσθαι oe, aN ΕΞ: if af SW τῷ ὁρᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν οὔτε ἐπίστασθαι. ΣΩ. ἴΑριστά γ᾽, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐκ ἄξιόν σοι \ “-“ > “ ἘΝ Ν 3 / » "5" ὦ προς ταυτὰ ἀμφισβητησαι, wa Kat αὐξάνῃ. ἀλλ opa ϑ J ἴω δὴ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, καὶ σκόπει πῇ αὐτὸ διω- σόμεθα. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή 5 TO. Τὸ τοιόνδε: εἴ τις ἔροιτο, apa δυνατόν, ὅτου / 7] , τις ἐπιστήμων γένοιτο ποτε, 9. ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ] ‘That I may let you grow,’ 1. 6. ἡ That I may not be always stunting and stopping you.’ Cp. Lys. 206A: Oi καλοί, ἐπειδάν τις αὐτοὺς ἐπαινῇ καὶ αὔξῃ. Also Pheedr. 246 Ei: Τούτοις δὴ τρέφεταί TE καὶ αὔξεται μάλιστά γε τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς πτέρωμα. Rep. 497 A: Ἔν yap προσηκούσῃ αὐτός τε μᾶλ- λον αὐξήσεται. Symp. 210 1: "ANN ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ πέλαγος τετραμ- μένος τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ θεωρῶν πολ- λοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους τίκτῃ - . ἕως ἂν ἐνταῦθα ῥωσθεὶς καὶ αὐξη- θείς, κατὰ. The expression in Aristoph. Vesp. 638, Ηὐξανόμην ἀκούων, though more humorous, also affords an illustration. We may naturally ask what objection Socrates would have raised, had he not feared to check Theetetus’ growing in- telligence. ‘This may perhaps be gathered from below, where he ventures to puzzle him a little further, 165 Ὁ : Ἴσως δέ γ᾽, ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ᾽ + + / >’ a ἔτι ἔχοντα μνήμην avToOV P ἔπαθες, κιτιλ. Socrates might have asked, Does every one who sees the forms of the let- ters, or who hears the sounds, possess the sciences of them (γραμματική, μουσική, 145 A)? Could he give an account, e. g. of the ὀξύτης and βαρύτης of what he hears? Cp. Rep. 7. 524 CG: Μέγα μὴν καὶ ὄψις καὶ σμικρὸν ἑώρα, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κεχωρισμένον ἀλλὰ συγκεχυμένον τι. Not even the objects of sense are known by sense, but by a higher faculty. το. τόδε ἄλλο προσιόν, K.T.A. | The implied metaphor is prob- ably that of the wave. It is continued below, 172 B: Aoyos δὲ ἡμᾶς. . ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος, καταλαμβάνει : and is slightly varied, 177 C: πλείω ἀεὶ ἐπιρρέοντα καταχώσει ἡμῖν τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον. 14. ἔτι ἔχοντα] The Bodl. MS. has ἐπέχοντα, for which errot cp. Rep. 7. 532 B. H. Schmidt (as Schanz formerly) defends ἐπέχοντα, in the sense of " main- OEAITHTOS. 85 μέμνηται μὴ ἐπί- μακρολογῶ δέ, ὡς Pp. 103. τούτου καὶ σωζόμενον, τότε ὅτε x an A ’ὔ στασθαι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ὃ μέμνηται. 357 i Lr 4 3 4 / ἔοικε, βουλόμενος ἐρέσθαι, εἰ μαθὼν τίς τι μεμνη- tA \ 5 μένος μὴ οἶδεν. Ν a 5 / SEAT. Καὶ πῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες; WA \ Ἃ y+ Tepas yap av €(y 5 Surely not. ὃ λέγεις. ΣΏ. Μὴ οὖν ἐγὼ ληρῶ ; σκόπει δέ. dpa τὸ ὁρᾶν And yet, » 3 / 7 \ \ yy af οὐκ αἰσθανεσθαι λέγεις καὶ τὴν ὄψιν αἴσθ σιν; od 5. 6 σιν 9 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔγωγε. yoy 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ὁ ἰδών τι ἐπιστήμων ἐκείνου γέγονεν το aS A Ν δ / 0 εἰδε κατὰ τὸν ἄρτι λόγον; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 202. Τί δέ; μνήμην οὐ λέγεις μέντοι τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 2Q. Πότερον οὐδενὸς ἢ τινὸς : ΘΕΑΙ. Twos δή που. 20. Οὐκοῦν ὧν ἔμαθε καὶ ὧν ἤσθετο, τοιουτωνί τινων ; SEAL. Τί μήν ; 2Q. Ὃ δὴ εἶδέ τις, μέμνηταί που ἐνίοτε: when I shut my SEAT. Μέμνηται. eyes and 5 ᾿ς ΄ὕ \ ΄ \ ἈΝ dant aa ματῶν ὁμολογίας ἀνομολογησάμενοι καὶ τοιούτῳ τινὶ ee ἘΝ / ~ Ie lal / περίγενομενοι Tov λόγου ἀγαπᾶν, καὶ οὐ φάσκοντες \ / 5 7 ᾿ἀγωνισταὶ ἀλλὰ φιλόσοφοι εἶναι λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ > / a la 3 7 A Ὁ E€KELVOLS τοις δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι ποίουντες. 2. πάλιν] μὴ πάλιν Bod. (μη), Vat. Ven. 0. The Bodleian margin however says, ἐν ἑτέρῳ λείπει τὸ μή. Τῇ μή were right, the subjunctive 7 would be re- quired to complete the sense. 7. ἀπὸ τοῦ λόγου] Viz. the theory of Protagoras, which we have been trampling upon. Cp. infr, E : Προπηλακίζομεν. 10. ᾿Αντιλογικῶς ἐοίκαμεν] Rep. 5- 453 E, 454: Ἦ yevvaia, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ Γλαύκων, ἡ δύναμις τῆς ἄντι- λογικῆς τέχνης. Τί dy; Ὅτι, εἶπον, οκοῦσί μοι εἰς αὐτὴν καὶ ἄκοντες πολλοὶ ἐμπίπτειν καὶ οἴεσθαι οὐκ ἐρίζειν ἀλλὰ διαλέγεσθαι, διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι κατ᾽ εἴδη διαιρούμενοι τὸ λεγόμενον ἐπισκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ Kar’ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄνομα διώκειν τοῦ λεχθέν-. τος τὴν ἐναντίωσιν, ἔριδι, οὐ δια- λέκτῳ, πρὸς ἀλλήλους χρώμενοι. ὯΒ. 2τό A: Καὶ ἡμῖν εὐθὺς ἄσμενοι ἐπιπηδήσονται οὗτοι οἱ πάνσοφοι ἄνδρες, οἱ ἀντιλογικοί, καὶ ἐρήσονται εἰ οὐκ ἐναντιώτατον ἔχθρᾳ φιλία; The tendencies of ᾿Αντι- -ylas | λογική are, first, to argue from contradictions of language, lead- ing in the last resort to scep- ticism. Phed. go B: Kai μά- λιστα δὴ οἱ περὶ τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς λόγους διατρίψαντες οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι τε- ευτῶντες οἴονται σοφώτατοι yeyo- νέναι τε καὶ κατανενοηκέναι ὅτι τῶν πραγμάτων οὐδενὸς οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς οὐδὲ βέβαιον οὔτε τῶν λόγων. Secondly, to confuse ideas or principles with facts or results. Ib. 101 E: “Awa δὲ οὐκ ἂν φύροιο ὥσπερ οἱ ἀντιλογικοὶ περί τε τῆς ἀρχῆς δια- λεγόμενος καὶ τῶν ἐξ ἐκείνης ὡρμη- μένων, εἴπερ βούλοιό τι τῶν ὄντων εὑρεῖν. πρὸς τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων ὁμολο- ‘With a view to mere verbal consistency. The whole fallacy of such formal reasoning is elaborately exposed in the Sophist. 12. ov φάσκοντες] Viz. supr. 154 D: Οὐκοῦν εἰ μὲν δεινοὶ καὶ σοφοί, κιτιλ., echoed in ἐκείνοις τοῖς δεινοῖς ἀνδράσι, below. Protagoras might still have much to say. 5 10 im) © Χ 15 λουσιν, ὧν Θεόδωρος εἷς ὅδε. ἀλλὰ δὴ αὐτοὶ κινδυ- 88 MAATONOZ 3 ’ 3 / ΘΈΑΙ. Οὔπω μανθάνω ὅπως λεγεις. > \ , a - a σ SO. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἐγὼ πειράσομαι δηλῶσαι περὶ αὐτῶν O \ a ee Ν δ 3 \ Ν ἢ γε δὴ νοῶ. ἠρόμεθα γὰρ δὴ εἰ μαθὼν καὶ μεμνημένος >, ff XN / / τίς τι μὴ ἐπίσταται, καὶ TOV ἰδόντα καὶ μύσαντα με- / ε a \ yf » » "507 μνημένον, ὁρῶντα δὲ Ov, ἀποδείξαντες, οὐκ εἰδοτα 3 7 ς Ἔν | on a > 53 ϑ / ἀπεδείξαμεν καὶ ἅμα μεμνημένον" τοῦτο δ᾽ εἶναι ἀδυ- ἊΝ σ΄ δὴ la 3 / «ε / varov. καὶ οὕτω δὴ μῦθος ἀπώλετο ὃ Mpwrayopeos, Nv Ἔ ἊΝ 4 e A ’ / N » σ“ καὶ ὃ σὸς ALA O τὴς ἐπιστημης Και αἰσθησεως; OTe Ὁ ταυτον ἐστιν. CEAI. Φαίνεται. TO. OF τι ἄν, οἶμαι, ὦ φίλε, εἴπερ γε ὃ πατὴρ a , / 3, Ν xX yf a \ τοῦ ἑτέρου μυθου ἔζη, ἀλλὰ πολλὰ ἂν ἡμυνε; νὺν δὲ > XN ys ς a / Ὡς Ἂ >’ oppavov αὐτὸν nels προπηλακίζομεν. καὶ γὰρ οὐδ ων ὰ οἱ ἐπίτροποι ovs IIparayo Uy a / (4 9 » “ a νεύσομεν τοῦ δικαίου ἕνεκ᾽ αὐτῷ βοηθεῖν. GEO. Οὐ γὰρ ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον 7 ee / a ὅτ 5, ἢ cases Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου τῶν ἐκεινοῦ ἐπίτροπος" 7HELs 7. μῦθος ἀπώλετο] Schol. : Παροιμία ἐπὶ τῶν τὴν διήγησιν μὴ ἐπὶ πέρας ἀγόντων. Hence prob- ably the absence of the arti- cle. Cp. Rep. 10. 621 B: Kai οὕτως, ὦ Γλαύκων, μῦθος ἐσώθη Cp. also Phil. 14 A: Ὁ λόγος, ὥσπερ μῦθος, ἀπολόμενος οἴχοιτο. μῖθος... ὁ Πρωταγόρειος] Cp. supr. 157 CG: Οὗτος 6 μῦθος. Soph. 242 CG: μῦθόν τινα ἕκα- στος φαίνεταί μοι διηγεῖσθαι παισὶν Arist. Met. 1.1 A Ψ > if: καὶ οὐκ ἀπώλετο. ὡς οὖσιν ἡμῖν. 993 ἃ: Ψελλιζομένῃ γὰρ ἔοικεν ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία. Gorg. 485 B. 11. εἴπερ ὁ πατήρ] See the passage of the Pheedrus already quoted, 275 Τὶ : Πλημμελούμενος δὲ ὁ λόγος καὶ οὐκ ἐν δίκῃ λοιδορη- θεὶς τοῦ πατρὸς ἀεὶ δεῖται βοηθοῦ, ρας κατέλιπε, βοηθεῖν ἐθέ- «rd. Op. Soph. 241 D: My με οἷον πατραλοίαν ὑπολάβῃς γίγ- νεσθαί τινα. Τί δή ; Τὸν τοῦ πατ- ρὸς Παρμενίδου λόγον ἀναγκαῖον ἡμῖν ἀμυνομένοις ἔσται βασανίζειν. It is in another sense that Phedrus in the Symposium (177 D) is πατὴρ τοῦ λόγου. 15. κινδυνεύσομεν] Not, ‘Twill undertake the risk,’ but =«wdv- vero βοηθήσειν, ‘ It seems I shall have to take his part myself.’ Cp. Cratyl. 399 A: Kat κινδυ- νεύσω ἐὰν μὴ εὐλαβῶμαι, ἔτι τήμε- ρον σοφώτερος τοῦ δέοντος γενέ- σθαι. Symp. 174 C: Ἴσως μέντοι κινδυνεύσω καὶ ἐγὼ οὐχ ὡς σὺ λέ- γεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ καθ᾽ “Ὅμηρον φαῦλος ὧν ἐπὶ σοφοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἰέναι θοινὴν ἄκλητος. 18. Καλλίας ὁ Ἱππονίκου] With whom Protagoras stayed p- 164. 0. 165. OEAITHTOS. 89 A a an , Ἁ \ δέ πως θᾶττον ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων πρὸς τὴν γεω- / eae μετρίαν ἀπενεύσαμεν. 5Ν 5 “ la ἐὰν αὐτῷ BonOns. 2Q. Καλῶς λέγεις, ὦ Θεόδωρε. γ᾽ ἐμὴν βοήθειαν. τῶν γὰρ ἄρτι χάριν γε μέντοι [σοὶ] ἕξομεν, Ie " 7 σκέψαι οὖν τὴν \ / a MA \ tal χὰ ὁμολογήσειε μὴ προσέχων τοις ρήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἡ Ν Ἁ 3 " 7 - \ 3 ἴω τς τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα φάναι τε καὶ ἀπαρνείσθαι. σοὶ , σ Ἂ Θ lA ξ λέγω ὅπῃ, ἢ εαἰτήτῳ 5 when he came to Athens. Apol. 20 C: ᾿Ανδρί, ds τετέλεκε χρήματα σοφισταῖς πλείω ἢ ξύμπαντες οἱ ἄλλοι, Καλλίᾳ τῷ Ἱππονίκου. Prot. 311 A, 315 D: Xen. Symp. 1. 5. It hardly needsto beobserved that ἐπίτροποι, like ὀρφανόν, is used figuratively, with refer- ence to doctrines. I, ἐκ τῶν ψιλῶν λόγων] ‘From the abstractions of dia- lectic.’ We are accustomed to speak of Geometry as a purely abstract science, but see Arist. Met. 1.2: αἱ yap ἐξ ἐλαττόνων ἀκριβέστεραι τῶν ἐκ προσθέσεως λεγομένων, οἷον ἀριθμητικὴ γεωμε- tptas. The expression ψιλοῖς λόγοις iS used differently in Symp. 215 C: ψιλοῖς λόγοις ἄνευ ὀργάνων, but’ ep. Pheedr. 262 C: Nop yap ψιλῶς πως λέ- γομεν οὐκ ἔχοντες ἱκανὰ παραδείγ- ματα. Antisthenes is said to have called the Ideas of Plato Ψιλαὶ ἔννοια. For λόγοι Ξ::- δια- λεκτικῆ cp. Pheed, 99 E: Ἔδοξε δή μοι χρῆναι εἰς τοὺς λόγους κατα- φυγόντα ἐν ἐκείνοις σκοπεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν. See also Arist. de An. I. 1, where a distinction is drawn between φιλόσοφος, μαθηματικός, and φυσικός. 2. μέντοι] σοί is omitted in Bod. Vat. Ven. m1. Although retained in the text by Schanz, it is not necessary to the sense, If retained, it should be accent- ed, as H. Schmidt observes. e£onev] Theodorus speaks on behalf of the ἐπίτροποι Πρω- Tayopov. 4. τήν γ᾽ ἐμήν] Cp.infr. 168 Β: Kar’ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, and, for the ‘modest’ use of ye, Crat. 44K, Rep. 1. 329A: Οἷόν γέμοι φαίνεται. 6. μὴ προσέχων τοῖς ῥήμασι τὸν νοῦν, ἣ τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] By freeing ourselves from the ha- bitual oppositions of words, we are sometimes reconciled to what at first appears a pure con- tradiction. Spinoza(Cog.Met.1 .) shows: a still loftier indifference to common language: ‘At vero sl rem accuratiu, examinare vellemus, possemus forte osten- dere Deum non nisi improprie unum et unicum vocari; sed res non est tanti imo nullius momenti iis qui de rebus non vero de nominibus sunt solli- citi.’ Many of the difficulties in Greek philosophy arose, as Plato himself points out in the Sophist, from the too great stress laid upon logical altern- atives ; while the complexity and variety of things as they exist was lost sight of. 7 τὸ πολὺ εἰθίσμεθα] “Αο- cording to our common mode of affirming and denying :’ viz, with a view to words. , ay δεινότερα QV τις 5 The ‘ cru- cial’ ques- tion is this, Is it pos- sible for | the same person to know and not to know the same thing ? You are bound to say it is, if sight be knowledge. Nay, you may be driven to it without reference to memory, within the sphere of sense itself. A relent- less adver- sary will pin you down, Co- vering one eye with his mantle, 10 15 90 ΘΕΌ. Els τὸ κοινὸν μὲν οὖν, ἀποκρινέσθω δὲ ὃ ν. τόδ.. ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ ζ - ᾽ νεώτερος" σφαλεὶς γὰρ ἧττον ἀσχημονήσει. > a TQ. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτημα. ἔστι δὲ 53 / οἶμαι τοιόνδε τι’ - Δ ΣΡ NINE τοῦτο ὃ οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι 5 5 el XN vo oN "507 dpa οἷον τε τὸν αὑτὸν εἰδοτα τι ΘΕΟ. Τί δὴ οὖν ἀποκρινούμεθα, ὦ Θεαίτητε; OEAL. ᾿Αδύνατόν που, οἶμαι ἔγωγε. ΣΩ. Οὔκ, εἰ τὸ ὁρᾶν γε ἐπίστασθαι θήσεις. τί Ν / 3 / 3 7 Ν r / > yap χρήσει apuKT@ ἐρωτήματι, To A€EyopEvov eV / Υ 4 » = 3 7 » / φρεατι συνεχόμενος, OTAV ἐρωτᾷ ἀνέκπληκτος AVP; A an na Ν 2 / καταλαβὼν τῇ χειρὶ σοῦ τὸν ἐτέρον ὀφθαλμὸν, εἰ Cees Vike / o , ὁρᾷς TO ἱμάτιον τῷ κατειλημμεένῷ § » 7 3 ᾽ὔ a , ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φήσω, οἰμαι, τουτῷ Ye, TP μέντοι εἰ ετέρῷ. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὁρᾷς τε καὶ ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτω γέ πως. TQ. Οὐδὲν ἐγώ, φήσει, ἠρόμην, 3. Λέγω δὴ τὸ δεινότατον ἐρώτη- μα] Cp. Rep.5.47 3C: Ἐπ᾿ αὐτὸ δή, nv δ᾽ ἐγώ, εἶμι ὃ τῷ μεγίστῳ προσεικάζομεν κύματι. Where So- crates assumes the same ‘tragic’ tone as here. 4. ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι ον μὴ εἰδέναι] = This (Megarian) question les at the root of most of the ἀπορίαι which follow. 9. ἀφύκτῳ] Euthyd. 276 τ: Τοιαῦτα ἡμεῖς ἐρωτῶμεν ἄφυκτα. ἐν φρέατι συνεχόμενος | Caught in a pit, 1.6. unable to stir hand or foot. 11. καταλαβὼν .. Tov. . ὀφθαλ- μόν... εἰ ὁρᾷς τὸ ἱμάτιον] The fal- lacy called ἐγκεκαλυμμένος (‘ob- velatus’), which has been called the invention of Eubulides, seems to be here anticipated. 3 εἰ Ὁ σ » , ουχ Opes αμὰ ταῦυτον 3 4a yy 4 ΚΣ TOUTO OUTE TATTW OUT Ἀπ ἫΝ » > 9 Ὰ » / la \ » τὸ ὕπως, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ, ὃ ἐπίστασαι; TOUTO Καὶ Οὐκ 17. οὐδὲν... τοῦτο, Kt. | Tatra, 50. ἀποκρίνεσθαι. Cp. Rep.5-473 As’ Ἐξευρηκέναι ὡς δυνατὰ ταῦτα γε- νέσθαι ἃ σὺ ἐπιτάττεις (SC. ἐξευρεῖν). For the sense ep. supr. 158 Εἰ: Μὴ ὑπολάβωμεν τῇ μὲν ταὐτὸν εἶναι, κιτιλ. Cp. Euthyd. 295 Εἰ: Πότε- ρον ἐπίστασαί τῷ ἃ ἐπίστασαι, ἢ οὔ; "Eyoye, ἔφην, τῇ γε Wuxi Οὗτος αὖ, ἔφη, προσαποκρίνεται τοῖς ἐρωτωμένοις. οὐ γὰρ ἔγωγε ἐρωτῶ ὅτῳ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰ ἐπίστασαί τῳ, K.T.A. For the intentional abruptness of the expression (‘None of that! I never asked you for it’) cp. Phil.. 28 EK: Οὐδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν. τοῦτο... τὸ ὅπως] τοῦτο, al- though presently explained by τὸ ὅπως, is in the first instance pronominal for οὕτω γέ πως. P- 165. ἐπίστασαι. \ > 3 / Ἑ καὶ οὐκ Qvlels, ΘΕΑΙΤΉΤΟΣ. \ \ , XN nN ynkws δὲ τυγχάνεις τὸ ὁρᾶν ¢ nN NYE τ 3 > opav μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ἐξ οὖν ,ὔ συμβαίνει. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ λογίζομαι θέμην. 20. Ἴσως δέ γ᾽, ἔπαθες, 91 “ x oA 3 Ε “ e ΄“ 4 «ες νῦν δ᾽ ὃ οὐχ ὁρᾷς, ὁρῶν φαίνει. ὧμολο- 3 7 Ν Ν Ὶ ἐπίστασθαι καὶ τὸ μὴ / / / τούτων λογίζου τί σοι "4 3 7 - ς ὅτι τἀναντία οἷς ὑπε- 5 ᾽’ὔὕ 7 a ~ 3 ὦ θαυμάσιε, πλείω ἂν τοιαῦτ , / 7 ἈΠῸ ἢ yy \ εἰ Tis σε προσηρώτα εἰ ἐπίστασθαι ἐστι μὲν / 7 \ / \ ὀξύ, ἔστι δὲ ἀμβλύ, καὶ ἐγγύθεν μὲν ἐπίστασθαι, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή, ἄλλα μυρία, \ , Yi 9 / »\ 5 / \ καὶ σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτο, καὶ a. "5 “ Ey \ See's a ἐλλοχὼῶν ἂν πελταστικὸς ἀνὴρ μισθο- / 3 / Seay « es > φόρος ev λόγοις ἐρόμενος, ἡνίκ ἐπιστήμην καὶ αἴσθησιν eS) ΣΝ 2) 3 XN a 3 Ν > / Any Κ᾿ / TQUTOV εθου, ἐμβαλὼν ἂν εἰς τὸ AKOVELY καὶ OO Ppaive- \ \ if > ᾽ + EY 5. τῇ σθαι καὶ τὰς TOLAUTAS αἰσθήσεις, ἤλεγχεν αν ἐπέχων 7. ὦ θαυμάσιε Such ad- dresses interposed give a tone of increased earnestness, ex- pressing the interest of Socrates in what he is about to say. 9. ὀξὺ... ἀμβλὺ] These terms are properly applicable to Vision. ἐγγύθεν μὲν, πόρρωθεν δὲ μή] This probably refers to the sense of smell, cp. τὸ ὀσφραίνεσθαι below, perhaps also to taste and touch (so H. Schmidt). Or ἐγγύθεν... τὸ αὐτό may refer to all the senses except sight. 10. σφόδρα καὶ ἠρέμα τὸ αὐτό] “To know the same thing strongly and feebly:’ e. g. To Wuxpdvy,p—152 B: “Pryor. . ὃ μὲν ἠρέμα, ὁ δὲ σφόδρα; but the re- ference here is probably to sound, cp. τὸ ἀκούειν below. (H. Schmidt takes τὸ αὐτό ad- verbially, ‘ stark und leise eben- so: but cp. infr. 166 B.) Aris- totle does not feel the difficulty. \ , \ ΄ , πρὶν θαυμάσας τὴν Todvaparov σοφίαν Met. 6. 1029 Ὁ: Τὰ δ᾽ ἑκάστοις γνώριμα καὶ πρῶτα πολλάκις ἠρέμα ἐστὶ γνώριμα. καὶ ἄλλα μυρία] Cp. Phil. 14 1): Βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτόν, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. 11. ἅ] An accusative depend- ing chiefly on ἐρόμενος, but vaguely also on all that fol- lows. μισθοφόρος ἐν λόγοι] “Α logical mercenary.’ μισθοφόρος is aimed at the Sophist’s fee. 13. ἐμβαλών] ‘ Making his assault.’ 14. ἐπέχων καὶ οὐκ aneis| Rep. 3-411 B: Ὅταν δ᾽ ἐπέχων μὴ avin ἀλλὰ κηλῇ. ‘Keeping up the attack.’ Cp. Odyss. 10. ur: Τί μοι ὧδ᾽ ἐπέχεις κεκοτηότι θυμῷ; 16. πολυάρατον͵] Buttmann conjectures πολύκροτον, “ cun- ning,’ which occurs as ἃ v. ]. for πολύτροπον in the first line of the Odyssey. Heind. conjectures πολυήρατον, but adds, ‘ne hoc = 5 to confess that you see and do not see, and therefore know and do not know. And thus you will be proved to know both vividly and dimly, near but not far off, softly and vio- lently. ‘How would Protagoras defend his own against the attacks of such a light- armed mer- cenary ? 3. He would say σι 92 MAATQNOZ / e 9 9 a @ 7, ’ , ξυνεποδίσθης ὑπ΄ avTov, οὐ δὴ σε χειρωσάμενος TE P- 165. Ν / + x / BN YZ “4 σ καὶ ξυνδήσας ἤδη ἂν τότε ἐλύτρου χρημάτῶν ὁσῶν / 5 / 3 , σοί TE κἀκείνῳ ἐδοκει. Ti’ οὖν δὴ ὁ Πρωταγόρας, / ΕΝ 3) / Ss taf a ε A 3 a φαίης av ἴσως, λόγον ἐπίκουρον τοις αὐτοῦ ἐρεῖ: ἄλλο τι πειρώμεθα λέγειν 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. a , \\ ’ Φ id lol ϑ ’ SQ. Ταῦτά τε δὴ TavTa ὁσὰ ἡμεις ἐπαμυνοντές » ἴω 7 Ἀ ε / 5S / αὐτῷ λέγομεν, Καὶ OMOTE, οἶμαι, χωρήσεται, κατα- φρονῶν ἡμῶν καὶ λέγων, Οὗτος δὴ ὁ Σωκράτης ὃ χρηστός, quidem satisfacit.’ In Ven. Il. both a@’s are written over era- sures. πολυάρητος occurs twice in the Odyssey, 6. 280; 19. 404 : “Ovop’ ὅττι ke θείης | παιδὸς madi φίλῳ πολυάρητος δέ τοί Protagoras seems to have affected certain rhetorical expressions, and he or some other Sophist perhaps may have used thisword. See Pheedr. 267 D : ᾿Ορθοέπεια, etc, Stallbaum quotes Themist. Orat. 22. 328. 19. ed. Dindorf.: Tov πο- λυάρατον πλοῦτον τί ἂν καὶ λέγοιμεν ἐστιν. ὁποίων ἀγωνοθέτης πολέμων ἔστιν. Forthe sense cp. Euthyd. 272 Β: Τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἔγωγε ἐπιθυμῶ, τῆς ἐριστικῆς. Lb. 2753 KE: Εἰ δὲ νῦν ἀληθῶς ταύτην τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔχε- τον, thew εἴητον. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ ἔγωγε σφὼ ὥσπερ θεὼ προσαγορεύω. 296 Ὁ : ᾿Αλλὰ βουληθείης, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ὦ πολυτίμητε Εὐθύδημε. Ib. 301 Β; "Ἤδη δὲ τοῖν ἀνδροῖν τὴν σοφίαν ἐπεχείρουν μιμεῖσθαι, ἅτε ἐπιθυμῶν αὐτῆς. 2. χρημάτων... ἐδόκει] Protag. 328 B: Kai τὸν τρόπον τῆς πράξεως τοῦ μισθοῦ τοιοῦτον πε- ποίημαι, ἐμοῦ μάθῃ, ἐὰν μὲν βούληται, ἀπο- δέδωκεν ὃ ἐγὼ πράττομαι ἀργύριον' ᾽ \ , > ἐπειδὶν yap τις map 5 Χ 90 ἂν / : 3 \ RA > ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ παιδίον τι ἐρωτηθεν ἐδεισεν. εἰ ἐὰν δὲ μή, ἐλθὼν εἰς ἱερόν, ὀμόσας, ὅσου ἂν φῇ ἄξια εἶναι τὰ μαθήματα, τοσοῦτον κατέθηκεν. 3. re] Bodl. ye, which Wohl- rab defends. 4, Ταῦτά τε πάντα] From 162 D onwards. 8. ὁμόσε... χωρήσεται] ‘He will grapple with us.’ There is a change of construction similar to that in supr. 149 D: Καὶ τίκτειν τε δὴ τὰς δυστοκούσας, kat. . ἀμβλίσκουσι. Protagoras is first imagined as pushing his adversary ‘over a precipice, by stating the Eristic objection to his doctrine in an extrava- gant form, and then as turning from arguments to facts, and showing the bearing of his theory not on truth and false- hood, but on (relative) good and evil. το. χρηστός] Here almost= εὐχερής, ‘Good easy man ig ἐπειδὴ αὐτῷ, KT. | ‘When he had found a child who was terrified by the question,’ ete. For the dative ep. Rep. 1. 343 A: ὅς ye αὐτῇ . . γιγνώσκεις. madiov]| Cp. infr. 168 Ὁ, where the same exaggeration is used. p- 166. ree a a eee a a Me ἽΝ ᾿ : er \ aN \ SEEN . 166. οἷον TE τὸν αὐτὸν TO αὐτο t SEAITHTOS. 5 tA Ν εἰδέναι, καὶ 99 μεμνῆσθαι ἅμα καὶ μὴ δεῖσαν ἀπέφησε διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι A 7 \ δ ee an / >’ / προορᾶν, γέλωτα δὴ TOV ἐμε ἐν τοις λογοις ἀπέδειξε. XN ’ὔ 3 ς / Ζ' τὸ δέ, ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες, nw ἴω , ΄“ τῶν ἐμῶν Ov ἐρωτήσεως σκοπῆς, a a yx Y Yi Hf EXEL. OTQY TL Loyd “δ ON 3 / 3 7 / OlATTED ἂν ἐγὼ ἀποκριναίμην ἀποκρινάμενος σφαλλη- \ A an BTQL, ἐγὼ ἐλέγχομαι, εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα, / δὰ a αὐτίκα yap δοκεῖς ΞΟ ΑΝ, cs / AUTOS ὁ ἐρωτηθείς. τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι μνήμην “ , Ὁ y - / 53 7 - παάρειναί τῷ ὧν ἐπαθε τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος, οἷον lod +S (‘sh ee n ~ OTE CMATXE, MNKETL πάσχοντι ; πολλοῦ γε δεῖ. ’ a er ἀποκνήσειν ὁμολογεῖν οἷόν 7’ / Ἃ ἊΝ \ » "ἢ δέναι τὸν αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτο; Ἂ 53 ἢ αὖ “5 2Q7 \ ᾿ > εἰναι εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰ- Me SZ, A ὃ / ὃ f 7) €QAVTTED TOUTO elon), @- ον 5. ἃ 3 \ > ΄, a \ σειν ποτε TOY auToV εἶναι TOV ἁνομοιουμενον T@ TT pu “ 57 an ἀνομοιοῦσθαι ὄντι: μᾶλλον δὲ 3. τὸν éué] The use of the article has a humorously pa- thetic rather than a pompous effect. Cp. Soph. 259 6B: Tov μὲν τοίνυν ἐμέ γε ἔτι τί τις ἂν λέγοι: Pheedr, 258 Α: Τὸν αὑτόν. Ib. 20 Β: Τὸν ἐμέ. Ib) 59 B: Τοὺς μὲν δὴ σὲ καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ Τοργίαν καὶ Φίληβον. 4. ὦ ῥᾳθυμότατε Σώκρατες] ‘Slovenly Socrates !’ 7. εἰ δὲ ἀλλοῖα] Se. ἀποκρινάμε- νος σφάλλεται. The former case, ἐὰν σφάλληται, was contingent. This is present fact. For the sense cp. Charm. 162 C Ὁ. 8. αὐτίκα) ‘To begin with,’ τινά σοι ξυγχωρήσεσθαι] Te. ἐμέ. ‘Do you think a man would admit ?’ μνήμην] ‘That the memory ἃ man has of an impression when it is past, ig anything like what he experienced at the time.’ 9. τοιοῦτόν τι οὖσαν πάθος] Hume, Inquiry Concerning Hu- man Understanding; ‘ Every one \ 5 7 » TOV εἰναί τινα, ἀλλ᾽ will readily allow that there is a considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind, when a man feels the pain of excessive heat, or the pleasure of moderate warmth, and when he afterwards recalls to his me- mory this sensation, or antici- pates it by his imagination,— ‘We may observe a like dis- tinction to run through all the other perceptions of the mind,’ —‘ When we reflect on our past sentiments and affections, our thought is a faithful mirror, and copies its objects truly ; but the colours which it employs are faint and dull, in comparison of those in which our original perceptions were clothed.’ 14. τὸν εἶναί twa] τίνα ἴΒ sub- ject, τόν predicate, Cp. Phil. 14 OC: *Ap’ οὖν λέγεις, ὅταν τις ἐμὲ φῇ Πρώταρχον ἕνα γεγονότα φύσει πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν, τοὺς ἐμὲ καὶ ἐναντίους ἀλλήλοις μέγαν καὶ σμικρὸν τιθέμενος, καὶ βαρὺν καὶ κοῦφον τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἄλλα μυρία. dN \ ἔν 3 Ν ἐὰν μεν ὁ ἐρωτηθεὶς 5 μι ie) that he is notrefuted, because not fairly re- presented by you. He would urge that memory is far less vivid than sensation. And, while not fearing to admit that it is possible to know and not to know the same thing, he would assert that the man knowing is different from the man ignorant, and that every man becomes as many as the changes he undergoes. More seri- ously, he would chal- lenge us to prove either that each man’s sensations are not pe- culiar to him, or that it does not follow from this, that what ap- pears to each man, is to him. 94 TAATOQNO2 Sa / Ἂν , Ψ 3 , > ’ 66. οὐχὶ τούς, καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ATELPOVS; ἐάνπερ Pp. 166. | ΄ 2 4 ἀνομοίωσις γίγνηται, εἰ δὴ ὀνομάτων γε δεήσει θη- © “-“ / 3 ) 3 / ρεύσεις διευλαβεῖσθαι ἀλλήλων ; ἀλλ ὦ μακάριε, ῇ / > 9 ἘΚ ἐλθὼν ὃ AE’ ; δύνα- φησει, YEVVALOTEPWS ET AUTO ἐλθων 0 AEY@, εἰ ουνὰ σι We e 3 f «ε / e a σαι, ἐξέλεγξον ws οὐχὶ ἴδιαι αἰσθήσεις EKATT@ ἡμῶν x‘ / ’ 5.5. 7) x a γίγνονται, ἢ ὡς ἰδίων γιγνομενὼν οὐδέν τι ἂν μᾶλλον , Ψ, ie ee 2 / x 3 3 a“ τὸ φαινόμενον μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ γίγνοιτο, 1) εἰ εἶναι δεῖ > , By ται 7 Ὁ δὲ δὴ Ν ὀνομάζειν, εἴη, ᾧπερ φαίνεται. vs VE 01) Καὶ κυνοκε- 7 Ι͂ ΕΝ ε tay ’ \ Ν δὰ φάλους λέγων οὐ μόνον αὐτὸς υηνεῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ TOUS / a la Ν Υ͂ Ἷ 5 10 ἀκούοντας τοῦτο δρᾶν εἰς τὰ συγγράμματα μοὺ AVA~ ral “ Ἂς ὟΝ Ν Ν \ \\ πείθεις, ov καλῶς ποιῶν. ἐγὼ Yap φημὶ μὲν τὴν » ᾿ ΒΩ 4 , Ν χά ἀλήθειαν ἔχειν ὡς γέγραφα: μέτρον γὰρ ἐκαστον ς la S “ +S Ν / / ia ἡμῶν εἶναι τῶν TE ὄντων καὶ μὴ: μυρίον μέντοι δια- / oS i 3: ies , Ψ “ \ ay φέρειν ἕτερον ἑτέρου αὐτῷ TOUT, OTL TP HEP ἄλλα 4 / “ \ 7 Ν \ τ ἔστι τε καὶ φαίνεται, τῷ δὲ ἄλλα. καὶ σοφίαν Kal Ἂς yf a 4 Ἂν x / 3 > > σοφὸν ἄνδρα πολλοῦ δέω τὸ μὴ φάναι εἶναι, ἀλλ 5. a Ν , / A + eA © αὐτὸν τοῦτον Kat λέγω σοφον, os av τινὰ ἡμῶν ᾧ “ Xo) 5} ΄ ΄ / 3 θὰ φαίνεται καὶ ἐστι KAKA, μεταβάλλων ποιήσῃ ayave “ e id / Se GS Ν \ , 53 \ / φαίνεσθαί τε καὶ εἶναι. TOV δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ρὴη- Compare a strange fancy of Comte’s, Catéchisme Posit. p. 2: ‘For each man differs from himself successively as much as he differs simultaneously from other men.’ τ. καὶ τούτους γιγνομένους ἀπεί- ρους] ‘Which become multi- plied to infinity, if only alter- ation take place.’ 2. ἀνομοίως γίγνηται, the reading of Bodl. Vat., admits of a pos- sible rendering, ‘If only the man become in a different way:’ 1.6. when he is the subject of a dif- ferent process. But the read- ing in the text (that of T and other MSS.) is probably right. OVOPATOV.. « θηρεύσεις] “ Kn- tanglements of words.’ The genitive 1s not objective but de- scriptive. Cp. Euthyd. 295 D: Βουλόμενός pe θηρεῦσαι τὰ ὀνόματα περιστήσας. ‘If we must really be on our guard against being entangled by each other with words.’ 3. ὦ μακάριε] ‘ By all that is sincere. Protagoras is sup- posed here to appeal to Socrates as an ingenuous, single-minded person. In other cases & pa- κάριε conveys a hint of εὐήθεια (‘Bless your simple heart 1), Phaedr. 236 D. 4. γενναιοτέρως] ‘Tn a nobler spirit,’ viz. than that of mere verbal dispute. 8. ὀνομάζειν] Supr. 160 B. 1g. τῷ ῥήματι) ‘In a verbal p. 166. E 10%. OEAITHTOS. 95 / Ὁ ͵ , 4 / Hart pov δίωκε, ἀλλ’ ὧδε ert σαφέστερον μάθε ri Ms - \ 3 a / ’ Ls / λέγω. οἷον yap ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ἐλέγετο ἀναμνή- Υ (4 nan A 3 ἴω | / a > / σθητι, ὅτι TO μὲν ἀσθενοῦντι πικρὰ φαίνεται ἃ ἐσθίει, SA 7S Nie / > / yy x 4 καὶ ἐστι, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνοντι τἀναντία ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται: ‘6 \ 3 ’ὔ’ » / a A σοφώτερον μὲν οὖν τούτων οὐδέτερον δεῖ ποιῆσαι: I O\ N [έ 5ῸΧΝ / ε ς A , οὐδὲ yap δυνατόν. οὐδὲ κατηγορητέον ὡς ὁ μὲν κάμ- νων ἀμαθής, ὅτι τοιαῦτα δοξάζει, ὁ δὲ ὑγιαίνων σοφός, lad 7] ’ὔ ὅτι ἀλλοῖα" μεταβλητέον δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερα: ) ἑτέρα ἕξ ὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδεί ἢ ἑτέρα ἐξις. οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῇ παιδείᾳ XN Ve > ᾽ ἕξεως ἐπὶ τὴν ἀμείνω μεταβλητέον. ἀλλ᾽ ὁ / \ ἀμείνων γὰρ » Ἂς e / ἀπὸ ἑτέρας \ Ν μεν ἰατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὔ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τίς τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ϑ eZ ΄ y \ \ δΝ BA \ ἐποίησε δοξαζειν. OUTE γὰρ τὰ μὴ OVTA δυνατὸν δοξάσαι, οὔτε ἄλλα Tap ἃ ἂν πάσχῃ" ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ “ 5 53 a lay © J ἀληθῆ. ἀλλ᾽ οἶμαι, πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἔξει δοξάζοντας way.’ Λέγομεν τῷ ῥήματι οὕτως, κιτιλ. I. pov] To be taken with λόγον. 3. Φαίνεται... καὶ ἔστι... ἔστι καὶ φαίνεται] What is to the healthy man, also appears to him. Protagoras asserts that what appears to the sick man also is to him. 6. κατηγορητέον] Se. τοῦ κάμ- νοντος, ‘The word has here its proper vernacular meaning ‘to accuse,’ although this is inapplicable to the succeeding’ clauses, where a more general notion has to be supplied. 8. peraBryréov . , ἕξι] This ‘practical’ view of education is in close accordance with that which Plato attributes to Pro- tagoras in the dialogue which bears his name. See esp. 328 A: ᾿Αλλὰ κἂν εἰ ὀλίγον ἔστι τις ὅστις διαφέρει ἡμῶν προβι- βάσαι εἰς ἀρετήν, ἀγαπητόν, Cp. Rep. 1. 340 ar 15. πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζον- τας συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς] πονηρᾶς 1s the reading of all the MSS., δοξάζον- τας of Bodl. (with marks over o by b) Vat. Ven. π. ἑαυτῆς 18 found in all the MSS. but one (Flor. b. αὐτῆς). πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξει, ‘through having a bad or Vicious soul.’ ἕξις, like φαντα- σία, isnot with Plato, ἃ5 σι ἢ Ari- stotle, a term of art, it is simply (as observed above on 153 B) the noun of the verb ἔχειν, and accordingly has two meanings, ‘condition,’ ἀπὸ rod ἔχειν πως, and ‘having;’ and, like πρᾶξις, it sometimes wavers between both. Forinstances of the active sense cp. Rep. 4. 433 Εἰ: Ἢ rod οἰκείου Te καὶ ἑαυτοῦ ἕξις καὶ πρᾶξις. Soph. 247 A: Δικαιοσύνης ἕξει καὶ παρουσίᾳ, and infr. 107 Β: ᾿Επιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν εἶναι. Also Crat. 414 B, de Lege. Ι. 6250, Tim. 73 A, 74 Β, 87 E. For an instance where it seems on T5 He would tell us that he is far from dis- paraging the wis- dom of the wise: but he would define wis- dom as the power of bringing men over, not from false ideas to true ones, but from a worse to a better state. Un- 96 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι ἕτερα τοι- Pp. 167- ἐς an ἃ / Χ Up Sree IN 9 7 » lal αῦτα, ἃ On τινες τὰ φαντάσματα ὑπο απειριας ἀληθὴ to waver cp. Rep. 509 A: Ἔτι μειζόνως τιμητέον τὴν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ Zev. Ib. got B: “H ψυχὴ -- τιμιωτέραν ἕξιν λαμβάνει, σωφρο- Gorg. 524 B: , σύνην κτωμένη. Ἔχει τὴν ἕξιν τὴν αὑτοῦ. And above, 153 B: Ἢ τοῦ σώ- ματος ἕξις... ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις, we seem to pass from one meaning to the other within a few lines, as here. Comp. also Gorg. 523 C: Ψυχὰς πονηρὰς ἔχοντες. ἑαυτῆς presents more difficulty, but it may still be genuine. The transition is easy and not unfrequent from the person thinking to the mind thinking. Cp. Phedo. 82, where the change from the masculine to the feminine, 1. 6. from the persons to the souls, occurs several times together. Gorg. 526 B: Τοιοῦτόν twa. . Infr.. 173 A: Σμικροὶ de καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχάς. τὴν γὰρ αὔξην καὶ τὸ εὐθύ... ἡ ἐκ ἐνίοτε δ᾽ ἄλλην. κινδύνους , ἔτι ἁπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλ- λουσα, os οὐ δυνάμενοι, κιτὰλ, See also, for an instance of a like change of subject, Rep. 4. 441 Εἰ: Μουσικῆς καὶ γυμναστικῆς κρᾶσις... προστήσετον. Thatsuch a change of subject does occur here, is evident from the noml- native χρηστή. The reflexive pronoun is also facilitated by συγγενῆ, being a correlative word. Op. Phedr. 238 C: Τῶν ἑαυτῆς συγγενῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν. Compare also for the use of the reflexive pronoun, where it cannot be strictly referred to the subject of the sentence, Rep. 419 A: Ἐάν tis σε φῆ μὴ ἢ a πάνυ εὐδαίμονας ποιεῖν τούτους νέων δουλεία ἀφήρηται... ‘ " Ν a 9 e , τους ἄνδρας, και ταυτα Ou €avuTous, Supr. 152 B: Πότερον . . ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτὸ τὸ πνεῦμα ψυχρὸν ἢ οὐ ψυχρὸν φήσομεν. δοξάζοντας is preferable as the reading of the best MS., as the harder reading, and be- cause the change to δοξάζοντα was so easy with the same word occurring a few lines above. For the change from the sin- gular τινὰ to the indefinite plural cp. Rep. 1.344 B: Ἐπειδὰν δέ τις. δουλώσηται _ ἀντὶ τούτων τῶν αἰσχρῶν ὀνο- μάτων .. μακάριοι κέκληνται, οὐ μόνον ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν ἀλλὰ καὶ > \ « QUTOVS ο. ὑπὸ τῶν ἄλλων, ὅσοι ἂν πύθωνται αὐτὸν τὴν ὅλην ἀδικίαν ἠδικηκότα : et passim. ‘For it is not to be supposed that anybody ever makes one who thinks falsely afterwards think truly. For it is impos- sible eitherto think what 15 not, or to think anything beyond the present impression, which is always real, But, I suppose, whereas men through having an inferiormind entertain thoughts of a kindred nature, a good mind causes them to have good thoughts, those, namely, which men in ignorance call true.’ Tf any change of reading were required, the most probable would be the transposition of ξυγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς and ἕτερα τοιαῦτα, ---πονῆρας ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντας ἕτερα τοιαῦτα χρηστὴ ἐποίησε δοξάσαι συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς. 1. χρηστή] Se. ψυχή. ἕτερα τοιαῦτα] Se. χρηστά. ‘Whereas inferior minds have opinions kindred to themselves, a superior mind creates in them opinions which resemble it.’ 2. φαντάσματα] This word here Q OEAITHTOS. Bis P1607. καλοῦσιν, ἐγὼ δὲ βελτίω ἀληθέστερα δὲ oddéy, \ A v4 A Εἰ τ μὲν τὰ ἕτερα τῶν ἑτέρων, \ / 5 ὦ ψ. καὶ τοὺς σοφούς, ὦ φίλε Σώ- A Ui 3 Kpares, πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν , 3 \ M4 \ \ \ hd Ν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργους. φημὶ \ vA aA an » Yap καὶ τούτους τοῖς φυτοῖς ἀν oe 5 a 3 “ Ἁ τ ue \ 4 OTQAV τι αὐτῶν ἀσθενῇ, χρήστας καὶ υγιεινὰς αἰσθήσεις contains no association of false- hood, seeing that φαίνεσθαι and εἶναι are identified; but neither does it imply truth. 2. ἀληθέστερα δ᾽ οὐδέν] Τ᾽ ς, ‘all are equally real.’ 4. κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς] The theory is exposed by being gravely carried to the farthest point. Man is reduced to a level hot only with brutes but with vegetables. Cp. Ar. Met. too8b: Ei δὴ μηθὲν ὑπολαμβάνει ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίως οἴεταί τε καὶ οὐκ οἴεται, τί ἂν δια- Φερόντως ἔχοι τῶν φυτῶν: This however is only remotely hinted at. At present we are to re- ceive this as an additional proof of Protagoras’ boldness. F ora more serious use of the analogy between human nature and the vegetable world see Rep. 6. 401 : Σπέρματος πέρι ἢ φύτου εἴτε ἐγγείων εἴτε τῶν ζώων, κιτιλ. and, for a still closer parallel, Tim. 77 A: Tis yap ἀνθρωπίνης Evy- γενῆ φύσεως φύσιν ἄλλαις ἰδέαις καὶ αἰσθήσεσι κεραννύντες, ὥσθ᾽ ἕτερον ζῶον εἶναι, φυτεύουσιν ἃ δὴ νῦν ἥμερα δένδρα καὶ φυτὰ καὶ σπέρματα παιδευθέντα ὑπὸ γεωρ- γίας τιθασῶς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἔσχε' πρὶν δ᾽ ἦν μόνον τὰ τῶν ἀγρίων γένη, πρεσβύτερα τῶν ἡμέρων ὄντα. Heind. quotes Aristot. de Plant. I. I, where, after mentioning the opinions of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the question, ‘Do plants feel?’ he adds, ’ “ Ὡσαύτως καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἐπιθυμεῖν μόνον αὐτὰ διὰ τὴν σφοδρὰν τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως ἀνάγκην ἔφησεν, ὃ ἐὰν συσταίη, ἥδεσθαι ὄντως αὐτὰ καὶ λυπεῖσθαι αἰσθάνεσθαί τε σύμ- povor ἔσται. Op, Alsch. Eumen. 9IT: ΑΘ. στέργω γάρ, ἀνδρὸς φιτυποιμένος δίκην, ] τὸ τῶν δικαίων τῶνδ᾽ ἀπένθητον γένος. 6. χρηστὰς καὶ ὑγιεινὰς αἰσθή- σεις τε καὶ Τάληθεῖς] ‘Impart to them good and healthy sen- sations and real ones too Ade: not only real (which they all are), but also good and healthy. The difference of idiom by which in Greek what is most emphatic is put first, though well known, is often a source of difficulty. Cp. supr. 10 ἘΠ: Αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἔδοξαν ἀμαθεῖς εἶναι. Schleiermacher’s conjecture, ἀληθείας, has been generally re- ceived, but ἀληθεῖς (in which Wohlrab agrees) is very pos- sibly right. For the difficult position of re ep. Rep. 4. 465 E: ' Kai γέρα δέχονται παρὰ τῆς αὑτῶν πόλεως ζῶντές τε καὶ τελευτήσαντες ταφῆς ἀξίας μετέχουσιν. 10. 5.472 A: Εἰκότως ἄρα ὥκνουν τε καὶ ἐδε- δοίκη οὕτω παράδοξον λέγειν λόγον TE καὶ ἐπιχειρεῖν διασκοπεῖν. The objection drawn from Supr. ἃ δή tives . ὑπὸ ἀπειρίας ἀληθῆ κα- λοῦσιν is cancelled by the pre- ceding ταῦτα δὲ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ, The state of plants has as much reality as that of the wise man; Ν aA , τι πονηρῶν αἰσθήσεων, 5 til this is disproved, Socrates must be content to be a ‘measure of things,’ Protagoras would be willing to proceed by question and answer, only he would de- mand fair treatment, eee Sg eee eee ee ee ee ee eee eee σι 10 15 ΒΩ 98 MAATOQNO2 3 ἴω 3 n A aa 7 TE καὶ Ταληθεῖς ἐμποιεῖν, τοὺς δέ γε σοφοὺς τε καὶ \ e/ lal 7 ΝΥ N a ἀγαθοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς πόλεσι τὰ χρηστὰ ἀντὶ τῶν an n 9S qn 3 -7 “δ πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ἐπεὶ ola γ᾽ ἂν Cue ἧς 7 Ν \ a a Ν 53 ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ; ταῦτα καὶ εἰναι 3 ΝΠ oS Ἃ : ΡΨ / ’ 5.χ 3 ἊΝ » \ an αὐτῇ; EWS ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ: ἀλλ᾽ 6 σοφὸς ἀντὶ πονηρῶν 3 3 lo e -, A ΟῪ ὄντων αὐτοῖς ἑκάστων χρῆστα ἐποίησεν εἶναι καὶ qn A \ Ν SSN ͵ Q e δ δοκεῖν. κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ ὁ σοφιστῆς A tA C 4 ᾿ nan TOUS παιδευομένους οὕτω δυνάμενος παιδαγωγεῖν 7 57 lal , an σοφός τε καὶ ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων τοις παιδευ- a Q of 4 / Va) oS © oF \ θεῖσι- καὶ οὕτω TOPOTEPOL TE εἰσιν ἕτεροι ETEPMV καὶ σ΄. ’ὔ +t ΓΔ 7 Od / οὐδεὶς ψευδὴ δοξάζει, καὶ σοί, ἐὰν τε βούλῃ ἐὰν τε μὴ, » 3, 7 7 A 3 vA / ἀνεκτέον ὄντι μέτρῳ" σώζεται γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ὃ Aoyos @ ᾿ - \ > \ 7 ξ 3 a > β a οὗτος: ᾧ σὺ εἰ μὲν ἐχεις εξ ἀρχῆς ἀμφισβητεῖν, 7 7 A > 4 ἀμφισβήτει, λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, εἰ δὲ Ov ἐρωτησεων 7 7] 5 \ A an , QA βουλει, δι ἐρωτήσεων. οὐδὲ yap τοῦτο φευκτέον ἀλλὰ 7 Ξ , lal nA yy / πάντων μάλιστα διωκτεον τῷ νοῦν ἔχοντί. ποίει 4 / \ / 9 ΄“ lal ἣν μέντοι οὑτωσί: μὴ ἀδίκει ἐν τῷ ἐρωτᾶν. καὶ γαρ Ἧς 7 “ 4 4 \ πολλὴ ἀλογία ἀρετῆς φάσκοντα ἐπιμελεῖσθαι μηδὲν > 95 xX A / na “A > A ἀλλ᾽ ἢ ἀδικοῦντα ἐν λόγοις διατελεῖν. ἀδικεῖν δ᾽ ἐστὶν and the latter has no advantage in point of truth. 2. ταῖς πόλεσι] A further step is thus made in advance. Hav- ing already (supr. 157 D) in- cluded the good and noble amongst the things of which each man is judge for himself, it is natural to apply the same theory to the State, and to law and justice. It is on this point that the dialectic of Socrates afterwards lays hold :—infr. 172 A, 1747 Ὁ; 3. εἶναι has been needlessly suspected. 9. ἄξιος πολλῶν χρημάτων] Prot. 328 B. 12. ev τούτοις] f Through the instances herein adduced.’ 14. λόγῳ ἀντιδιεξελθών, K.T.A. | Protagoras himself is repre- sented as master of both styles (Prot. 329 B: Ἱκανὸς μὲν μακροὺς λόγους... εἰπεῖν... ἱκανὸς δὲ kai ἐρω- τηθεὶς ἀποκρίνασθαι κατὰ βραχύ), and in the Phedrus Socrates: himself adopts both, of course to the implied disadvantage of the rhetorical. See also Gorg. 449 BC, Soph. 217 Οὐ τερον εἴωθας μακρῷ λόγῳ διεξιέναι .. ἣ Ot ἐρωτήσεων ; εἰ δὲ δύ ἐρωτήσεων βούλει] Se. διεξελθεῖν. Protagoras is sup- posed to add this out of com- pliance with Socrates’ humour. pevin the preceding clause really looks forward to ποίει μέντοι, K.T.A, Ρ. 167. ἢ ι D E SEAITHTOS. 99 3 A Ὡς / \ fe 2 oS MEVOS, καὶ ἐν μὲν τῷ παίζῃ τε καὶ TPAAXy καθ᾽ ὅσον 5 a 4 , Ἂ ἂν δύνηται, ἐν δὲ τῷ διαλέγεσθαι σπουδαζῇ τε" καὶ 3 / A ΄ ἃ ἥν Loree σι \ ἐνδεικνύμενος τα σφάλματα, *% Qros ud! ἑαυτοῦ καὶ a is a / a\ \ .! TOV προτέρων συνουσιῶν Ταρεκέκρουστο. ἂν μεν γὰρ I. ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ] Se, ἐν τῷ ἐρω- 8. ἐκεῖνα , τὰ σφάλματα τᾶν, ἐν λόγοις, supr. ‘To Play © Those slips and deviations false in this particular game." which are due to himself and to Pp. infr, 187D: Ἔν τοῖς Τοιοῖσδε, the company he hag Previously 207 E: ’R, τῷ τοιούτῳ Kap. . kept,’ Ππαρακρούειν (to deflect) ig Ast and others take τοιούτῳ of Said to have been a wrestler’g L what follows : ‘There ig false term, Thelanguagerecallssupr, Viz. when,’ ete. This is also τ, ἵν’ Oro. . ἦσαν] Prota- Possible, but the Context points goras here applies hig theory. Sage contains 8, covert censure 15. μισοῦντας τοῦτο τὸ πρᾶγμα] of the eristic method which hag Viz. τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, i. @. μισο- pervaded the argument hither- λόγους Yeyovoras, See the re- to. Op. Rep. 6. 487 B, where markable Passage in the Phasdo perhaps Socrates himself jg on this Suvject, 80, 9°; where gently criticized : “Hyotvra a Parallel is draw; between εν ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου παρ᾽ ἕκαστον the growth of misanthropy and TO ἐρώτημα σμικρὸν παραγόμενοι, Scepticism, ++ ἐπὶ τελευτῆς τῶν λόγων μέγα τὸ 16. ὃ καὶ πρότερον ἐρρέθη] Viz. σφάλμα καὶ ἐναντίον τοῖς πρώτοις supr. 166 6: Γενναιοτέρως ἐπὶ > te Se ὁ ἐδ XN ἃ 4 ἀναφαίνεσθαι, αὐτὸ ἐλθὼν ὃ λέγω. H 2 σι For 1)18.- lectic, if fairly used, leads to sincere jn- quiry: if controver- Sially, to the hatred of inquiry, Ile would invite us to examine the mean- ing of his own say- ing, and of the princi- ple of mo- tion, and thus to meet the doctrine of sense on its own ground, avoiding the cap- tiousness of verbal criticism. 100 me a / f : 4 ἵλεῳ τῇ διανοίᾳ συγκαθεὶς ὡς ἀληθῶς σκέψει τί ποτε p. 168. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 7 an 7 3 lA \ ’ὔ’ κα λέγομεν, κινεῖσθαί τε ἀποφαινόμενοι τὰ πάντα TO TE an εἰν 7 a Ν 53 3 / Ν U δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο Kal εἶναι ἰδιώτῃ TE καὶ πόλει. Q 3 ͵ 3 / 3, >, N 5) ἣν 37 καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἐπισκέψει εἶτε TAUTOV εἴτε καὶ ἀλλο 5 , \ 3, > 9 > σ ΕΝ > 5 ἐπιστημη Και αἴσθησις, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ; ὥσπερ ApTl, εκ / e , x3 ’ ἃ ε NS o. συνηθείας ρημάτων τε KAL ονομάτων, ἃ OL πολλοὶ πῃ © δ , oS / » / \ av τύχωσιν ἕλκοντες ἀπορίας adAnAois παντοδαπὰς if παρέχουσι. = 5 , Ὡ- ,ὔ 3 Ταῦτα, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τῷ εταίρῳ σοὺ εἰς βοήθειαν ἱππροσηρξάμην κατ᾽ ἐμὴν δύναμιν, σμικρὰ αὑτοῦ ἐβοήθησεν. 9 ἐν “Ἄ 9 > Sa ὃς “ tf x a 10 ἀπὸ σμικρῶν: εἰ δ᾽ αὐτὸς ἐζη, μεγαλειοτερον ἂν τοῖς ΘΕΟ. Παίζεις, ὦ Σώκρατες: πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀνδρὶ βεβοήθηκας. “' 7 τας rot , - / , SO. Ed λέγεις. ὦ ἑταῖρε. καί μοι εἰπέ: ἐνενοησας 9 v4 9, aN if NS 3 / 15 που λέγοντος ἄρτι τοῦ IIpwrayopov καὶ ὀνειδίζοντος ¢ a “Ψ Ν (2 \ / , a an ἡμῖν OTL πρὸς παιδίον τοὺς λόγους ποιουμενοι τῷ TOU Ὁ παιδὸς φόβῳ ἀγωνιζοίμεθα εἰς τὰ ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ χαρι- I. ἵλεῳ τῇ διανοίᾳ ovyKabeis | Se. σεαυτόν. Cp. infr. 174 A: Αὑτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα. ‘ Meeting us without reserve, in a candid and good-humoured spirit.’ 6. ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσιν ἕλκοντες] Soph. 259 Ο: Τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς Phil) 7 =D: Τοῖς δεινοῖς περὶ λόγων ὁλκήν. Infr. 195 C, 199 A. Q. Ἰπροσηρξάμην] ‘T havecon- tributed as a beginning.’ Not- withstanding Buttmann’s in- genious defence of this word, Lexil. 1. 103, it is difficult not to incline to the conjecture of Coraiussuggested by Schneider, προσήρκεσα μέν. Οὐ. Legg. 6. 754 B: Σμικρὰ μὲν ἐπαρκεῖ, πᾶν δ᾽ ὅσον ἂν ἐπαρκέσῃ : Soph. did. Col. 42: Ὡς ἂν προσαρκῶν σμικρά, κερ- δάνῃ μέγα. See however infr. 171 λόγους ἕλκων. E: Ὑπεγράψαμεν βοηθοῦντες, ---- and cp. the use of ἐπάρχεσθαι in the Homeric hymn to Apollo, |. 125: Οὐδ᾽ dp ᾿Απόλλωνα χρυσάορα θήσατο μήτηρ, | ἀλλὰ Θέμις νέκταρ τε καὶ ἀμβροσίην ἐρατεινὴν ἀθα- νάτῃσιν χέρσιν ἐπήρξατο, and the use of ὑπαρξάμενος in Tim. 41 C. 10. μεγαλειότερον] A rheto- rical word, used probably in ironical imitation of Protagoras’ style. See note on πολνάρατον, τόρ KE. Cp. Xen. Mem. 2.1. § 3.4: Οὕτω πῶς διώκει Πρόδικος τὴν im ᾿Δρετῆς Ἡρακλέους παίδευσιν, ἐκόσμησε μέντοι τὰς γνώμας ἔτι μεγαλειοτέροις ῥήμασιν ἢ ἐγὼ νῦν. 12. πάνυ γὰρ νεανικῶς τῷ ἀν- Spi βεβοήθηκας] ‘Your defence of our friend has been most vigorous. For τῷ ἀνδρί cp. supr. 162 A: Φίλος ἁνήρ. 17. χαριεντισμόν τινα... λόγον] p- 168, OEAITHTOS. 10] EVTLT [LOY τινα ἀποκαλῶν, ἀποσεμνύνων δὲ τὸ πάντων μέτρον, σπουδάσαι ἡμᾶς διεκελεύσατο περὶ τὸν αὑτοῦ λόγον ; ΘΕΟ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐνενόησα, ὦ Σώκρατες: 2Q. Ti οὖν ; κελεύεις πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ: GEO. Σφόδρα γε. 2Q. Ὁρᾷς οὖν ὅτι τάδε πάντα πλὴν σοῦ παιδία 5 5 3 5 Ip “~ 15 , ΞΥΠΝ N \ an COTW; € οὖν πεισομεθα τῷ ἀνδρί, ἐμὲ καὶ σὲ δεῖ > an i Q ’ / » 7 / Ὁ ἐρωτῶντας TE καὶ ἁποκρινομένους ἀλλήλοις σπουδά- Pp. 169. > a ἣν Ν / 4 / ey κ > +S σαὶ avTov περι Tov λογον, ἵνα μή τοι τοῦτό γ ἔχη a e ,ὔ x , 7 > 3 ἐγκαλεῖν, ὡς παίζοντες πρὸς μειράκια διεσκεψάμεθ᾽ αὖ a ἊΝ , 5 Ττοῦτον τὸν λογον. eno. Τί δ᾽: πώγωνας ἐνόντων ὦ εἰσον ἂν ἐπακολουθήσειε λόγῳ γι S €xoOV Ape ἢ YG a , ov πολλῶν τοι Θεαίτητος μεγάλους / διερευνωμένῳ ; 20. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὔ τι σοῦ ye, ὦ > / BN ἣ a ΚΝ τ , , A ουν οιου εμε μεν Τρ. σῳ ἑταίρῳ TETEAEVTNKOTL δεῖν Θεόδωρε, ἄμεινον. μὴ / ,ὕ > 5 παντὶ τρόπῳ ἐπαμύνειν, σὲ δὲ μηδενί, ἀλλ᾽ ἴθι, ὦ 3 > , 3 tf 4 / > ἴω ΄σ ES ἄριστε, oAtyov ἐπίσπου, μέχρι τούτου αὐτοῦ ἕως ἂν εἰδῶμεν, ‘Giving a bad name of “ quib- bling” to our argument and exalting the respect due to his maxim, he bade us be in earnest when we are dealing with his theory.’ For τὸ πάντων μέτρον ep. Phil. 20 B: Τὸ... εἰ βούλει. The*sentence continues as if ἐνενόησας ὅτι had preceded. For χαριεντισμόν cp. supr. 167 Εἰ, and for ἀποσεμνύνων 1660. τοι (which Schanz omits with pr. T.) adds a touch of humorous earnestness to the request of Socrates. 7. τάδε πάντα] Viz. Thee- tetus, the younger Socrates, and their companions. Supr. 144 C, 146 B. 5, y \ lal 4 ’ὔ’ lA εἰτε APA GE δεῖ διαγραμμάτων πέρι μέτρον 11. αὖ +rovrov τὸν λόγον] Coisl. p.m. Αὐτοῦ τὸ λόγον. The Bodl. p. m. had αὐτοῦ τὸν τὸν λόγον. Cp. 166 D: τὸν δὲ λόγον αὖ μὴ τῷ ῥήματί μου δίωκε. τοῦτον τὸν λόγον, if correct, refers to the fresh arguments which Protago- ras had assumed in his defence, and the discussion founded on them. 18. σὲ δὲ μηδενί] The pronoun is simply used to strengthen the negative. Cp. Soph. Cid. Tyr. 1019; Καὶ πῶς ὃ φύσας ἐξ ἴσου τῷ μηδενί; 20. διαγραμμάτων.. ἀστρονομίαν] Note the variety, and cp. supr. 147 B, 15 That Pro- tagoras may be treated with due gravity, Theodorus is at last compelled to join in the discus- sion, 102 5 3) / e 7 Ne. ie Ν ε a 3) Ἢ εἰναι, ELTE TAVTES OMOL@S σοι lKQAVOL EAUTOLS εἰς TE Pp. 169. - A MAATONO®D > / Ἂν Ὁ Ky Χ XN ’ὔ Siwy, 35, ἀστρονομίαν καὶ τάλλα ὧν δὴ σὺ πέρι αἰτίαν ἐχεις διαφέρειν. e/ 5 , | 4 SEO. Οὐ padiov, ὦ Σώκρατες, σοὶ παρακαθήμενον \ / ͵ Ἵ ΄, 5 μὴ διδοναι λόγον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ ἀρτι παρελήρησα φάσκων 3 ,ὕ XN » ἿΝ , θ \ . SES , σε ἐπιτρέψειν μοι μὴ ἀποδύεσθαι, καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναγκάσειν / / x VA ΄“ \ SN καθαπερ Λακεδαιμόνιοι: σὺ δέ μοι δοκεῖς πρὸς τὸν / a , Σκίρρωνα μᾶλλον τείνειν. Λακεδαιμόνιοι μὲν γὰρ 5 / x 3 / / Ἂ \ Ὶ πο τς ἀπιέναι ἢ ἀποδύεσθαι κελεύουσι, σὺ δὲ κατ᾽ ᾿Ανταῖον το τί μοι μᾶλλον δοκεῖς τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν: τὸν γὰρ προσ- , > δ Ν 3 "Ὁ 3 / > a ἐλθόντα οὐκ avins πρὶν avayKaons ἀποδυσας ἐν τοῖς 7 val Ξ λογοις προσπαλαίσαι. 7 5 2Q. "Αριστά γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τὴν νόσον μου ἀπεί- > / / aN s κασας" ἰσχυριίκῶτέρος μέντοι ἔγω ἐκείνων. μυρίοι 15 γὰρ ἤδη μοι Ἡρακλέες τε καὶ Θησέες ἐντυγχά- 2. αἰτίαν ἔχεις] ‘ You are re- puted.’ Rep. 4.435 E: Οἱ δὴ καὶ ἔχουσι ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν (τοῦ θυ- μοειδεῖς εἶναι), Gorg. 503 B. Cp. the use of αἰτιῶμαι in Rep. ro. 599 EH, 4. 435 E. 8. τείνειν] Cp. Pheed. 65 A: ᾿Εγγύς τι τείνειν τοῦ τεθνάναι. ‘You come nearer to the an- alogy of Sciron.’ 9. kar’ ᾿Ανταῖον] The allusion to the Lacedsemonian custom (supr. 162 B) is repeated, but, as usual, with fresh imagery, and additional point. The Lacedemonians tell one to strip or go away. But you, like Sciron, strip all you meet with, and, like Anteus, force them to wrestle with you. H. Schmidt needlessly suspects κατ᾽ ᾿Ανταῖον. ‘There is a slight inversion for the sake of em- phasis. The natural order would be μᾶλλόν τι κατ᾽ ᾿Ανταῖον. 10, τὸ δρᾶμα δρᾶν] (1) ‘'To go about your work.’ Or (2) ‘To perform your part.’ Cp. supr. 150 A: Ἔλαττον δὲ τοῦ ἐμοῦ δράματος, and note. II. πρὶν dvaykdons| Schanz, following Heindorf, thinks it necessary to read πρὶν ἄν. ἄν might of course easily fall out before dvayxaons. But its omis- sion may be defended on the ground that dvins contains a general statement. ἀποδύσας] ‘Having stripped him of every pretext.’ 13. For νόσον Heindorf aptly compares Phedr. 228 B: Τῷ νοσοῦντι περὶ λόγων ἀκοήν. 14. ἰσχυρικώτερος μέντοι ἐγὼ ἐκείνων] ‘But I have more of the athlete in me than they had ;’ (ἰσχυρικός =‘ given to trials of strength.’) 15. Ἡρακλέεξ τε. καὶ Θησέες Winkelmann (Fr. fer suspects an allusion to Antis- thenes here. But the Scholiast SEAITHTOS. ἀλλ᾽ ἐγὼ οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ἀφίσταμαι: οδεινὸς ἐνδέδυκε τῆς 103 Χ ον ΧΆ, I) , P. 109. νοντες καρτεροὶ πρὸς τὸ λέγειν μάλ᾽ εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν, γᾷ y οὕτω τις ἔρως Ἂς ““ / \ = περι TAVTA γυμνασίας. μῇ οὖν \ N ld Sf : , μηδὲ σὺ φθονήσῃς προσανατριψάμενος σαυτόν re σ ΝΥΝ Ὁ, ἃ AMA και ELE OVNT AL, \ y o ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν er ἀντιλέγω, ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε ὅπῃ ἐθέλεις" \ a e a 3 \ πάντως THY περὶ ταῦτα εἱμαρμένην, ἣν [ἂν] σὺ ἐπικλώ- ὃ ox 5 An 2 , OMS, Oe ἀνατλῆναι ἐλεγχόμενον. 3. 5 τ ΄, OU μεντοι TEPALTEN@ Ὁ ᾽ -᾿ἢ yf a ’ , Ye wv προτίθεσαι οἷός τ᾽ EO OMAL παρασχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. 20. ᾿Αλλ’ ἀρκεῖ καὶ μέχρι τούτων. / fe Καὶ [LOL Travu , Χ , 7 ͵ , 53 THPEL TO τοιονδε, μὴ Tov παιδικὸν τι λαθωμεν εἶδος al lé / , DT@Y λόγων ποιούμενοι, Kal 5 | a ὀνειδίσῃ. I fw ϑύψον τις πάλιν ἡμῖν αὐτὸ ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ πειράσομαί γε καθ᾽ ὅσον ἂν δύ- VOCAL. 20. Τοῦδε is probably nearer the mark: Oi Θρασύμαχοι, Καλλικλεῖς, Διω- νυσόδωροι, Εὐθύδημοι καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι. Cp. Euthyd. 297. I. kaprepot πρὸς τὸ λέγειν] ‘Men of valour in the art of controversy.’ μάλ᾽ εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν] ‘ Have bruised me well.’ 2. οὕτω τις ἔρως δεινὸς ἐνδέ- δυκε] Se. με implied in ἐγώ supr, It is left doubtful whether οὕτω Is to be joined with δεινός or ἐνδέδυκεν. ‘So strong a passion for this kind of exercise has taken possession of me.’ It is not forgotten that Socrates says this at the close of his career. For ἐνδέδυκε ep. Pheed. 89 D: Ἥ τε γὰρ μισανθρωπία ἐνδύεται. 3. δεινός] For the inversion (Ξξ οὕτω δεινός τις ἔρως) cp. Rep. 3. 391 D, 6. 500 A, 4. προσανατριψάμενος] ‘Giving / a J τοίνυν πρώτον πάλιν ἀντιλαβώμεθα me a grip,’ ‘trying one fall with me,’ 6. ἀλλ᾽ ἄγε] The Bodl. has ἀλλὰ λέγε. See above 162 D: Εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες, and note. ἄγε 15 more vivid and in better agreement with the image which follows. Hermann’s ob- jection is well answered by H. Schmidt. 7. [av] ] ἄν has, weak MS. authority. Cp. supr. B: II piv, κι τ᾿ ὰ, and note. 9. ὧν προτίθεσαι] Viz. διαγραμ- μάτων πέρι, supr. A. TI. λάθωμεν] Cp. supr. 164 Gy Λανθάνομεν ταὐτὰ. ποιοῦντες. There is exquisite humour in Socrates’ warning Theodorus against being sportive in ar- gument. 15 12. tus] Somebody; i.e, Pro- tagoras. 16, ἀντιλαβώμεθα] ‘Let us at- 104 MAATONOZ @ \ / \. 19h > al x 3 9 a οὗπερ TO πρότερον, καὶ ἴδωμεν, ὀρθῶς ἢ οὐκ ὀρθῶς 9 7 3 A a 4 “ 3 ’ὔ ἐδυσχεραίνομεν ἐπιτιμῶντες τῷ λογῷ, OTL avTapKH eon 7 ἕκαστον εἰς φρόνησιν ἐποίει, καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν ὃ / a Πρωταγόρας περί τε τοῦ ἀμείνονος καὶ χείρονος δια- Uf ,ὔ ἃ x Q 5 / > ¥, 5 φέρειν τινάς, ods δὴ καὶ εἶναι Topous. οὐχι: , GEO. Nai. - 4." \ e / I. B. Pro- YQ. Ei μὲν τοίνυν αὐτὸς παρὼν apodoyet, ἀλλὰ tagoras’ own maxim Ἂς δ nr ~ ε \ 9 et , ὃ eee: | Re RES βοηθοῦντες ὑπέρ αὑτοῦ ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐ- E 3 7 yf / an an δὲν ἂν πάλιν ἔδει ἐπαναλαβόντας βεβαιοῦσθαι: νῦν A “9 δ᾽ ε oa 3 , ( ~ e Ἁ 3 / 10 δὲ τάχ᾽ ἄν τις ἡμᾶς ἀκύρους τιθείη τῆς ὑπέρ ἐκείνου e , Ν ’ y Λ Ν. / ὁμολογίας. διὸ καλλιόνως EXEL σαφέστερον περὶ TOU- an / ΄ N του αὐτοῦ διομολογήσασθαι: ov yap τι σμικρὸν παρ- ’ὔ o yf ΔΨ» αλλάττει οὕτως ἔχον ἢ ἄλλως. GEO. Λέγεις ἀληθῆ. \ / ϑ, 3 a SQ. Μὴ τοίνυν δ᾽ ἄλλων, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἐκείνου λόγου ὡς διὰ βραχυτάτων λάβωμεν τὴν ὁμολογίαν. Ῥ' 179. tack the question from the same point as before.’ Cp. Rep. 8.544 B: TdAw.. ὥσπερ παλαιστὴς τὴν αὐτὴν λαβὴν πάρεχε. 3. καὶ ἡμῖν ξυνεχώρησεν] The sentence breaks and reverts to the direct form, Cp. Rep. 6. 489 D: Ods δὴ σὺ φής, κιτιλ. κἀγὼ ξυνεχώρησα ἀληθῆ σε λέγειν. (Others, with Heindorf, ‘and whether Protagoras was right in admitting.) In conceding for Protagoras that some men are wise, we went beyond his own words. We must try to prove it out of his own mouth. He says, What appears to each man, is to him. Now it cer- tainly appears to every man that some are wiser than him- self, and some less wise; that some think truly, others falsely. Therefore, whether Protagoras be right or wrong, it is the case that some think truly, and some falsely. II. καλλιόνως ἔχει] ‘It would seem the less exceptionable course. The rare form of the adverb in -ws avoids the ambi- guity of κάλλιον ἔχει. 12. διομολογήσασθαι implies greater thoroughness than ἀν- oporoynodpevor, supr. 164 C. οὐ γάρ τι σμικρὸν παραλλάττει] ‘It is of no small importance to the question at issue. So- crates appeals again to the eeometrical consciousness of Theodorus, to whom possibly παραλλάττει, ἃ half-technical word, may express more than the simple διαφέρει. 15. Ov ἄλλων... ἐκ τοῦ... λόγου] ‘Not through any third person, but from the data supplied by himself.’ SEAITHTOS. 105 SEO. Ids ; ΄“- 7 A 5 / 20. Οὑτωσί, Τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναί φησί που ᾧ δοκεῖ: \ \ 5 ΘΕΟ. Φησὶ γὰρ οὖν. ΄“ 5 ἤ e an 7 20. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἀνθρώπου, A 3 / / / μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ἀνθρώπων δόξας λέγομεν, καὶ \ \ ΠΝ ς an A φαμὲν οὐδένα ὅν τινα οὐ τὰ μὲν αὑτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν \ \ 2) ε an \ » ἄλλων σοφώτερον, τὰ δὲ ἄλλους εαυτου, καὶ ἐν γε na σ / Ἃ J τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις, ὅταν ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις Nees , , o \ \ y ἢ ἐν θαλαττῃ χειμάζωνται, ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν Me y a a Brovs ἐν ἑκάστοις ἄρχοντας, σωτῆρας σφῶν προσδο- an » 3 “Δ “ 9 vA κῶντας, οὐκ ἄλλῳ τῳ διαφέροντας ἢ τῳ εἰδέναι. καὶ ’ὔ Ἁ » 7 , , πάντα TOV μεστὰ τἀνθρώπινα ζᾧγτούντων διδασκάλους A “a yf Vd A TE καὶ ἄρχοντας ἑαυτῶν τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τῶν a 5 ¢ na \ 7 TE ἐργασιῶν, οἰομένων τε αὖ ἱκανῶν μέν διδάσκειν, ε a \ y 5 \ 9 / “ , .5) ἱκανῶν δὲ APXELV εἰναι. καὶ ἐν τούτοις ἁπασι τί ἄλλο ΄ x > \ Ν > / ε va , φήσομεν ἢ αὐτοὺς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἡγεῖσθαι σοφίαν Ἀ 53 2 \ / kat ἀμαθίαν εἶναι παρὰ σφίσιν; ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. OQ. Οὐκοῦν τὴν μὲν σοφίαν ἀληθῆ διάνοιαν a \ 3 a 7] ἡγοῦνται, τὴν δὲ ἀμαθίαν ψευδῆ δόξαν ; / , CEO. Τὶ μην; 5 5 7 7 A , 2Q. Ti οὖν, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, χρησόμεθα τῷ λόγῳ; 6. καὶ φαμέν is paratactic for λέγοντες. Io. χειμάζωνται] There is a zeugma only in so far as the verb is used literally with ἐν θαλάσσῃ and figuratively with ἐν στρατείαις ἢ νόσοις. Cp. Lach. 104 Β: ᾿Ανδράσι φίλοις χειμαζο- μένοις ἐν λόγῳ... βοήθησον. ὥσπερ πρὸς θεοὺς ἔχειν] Cp. Rep. 6. 489 C: Ts δ᾽ ἀληθὲς πέφυκεν, ἐάν τε πλούσιος ἐάν τε πένης κάμνῃ, ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι ἐπὶ ἰατρῶν θύρας ἰέναι, καὶ πάντα τὸν ἄρχεσθαι δεόμενον ἐπὶ τὰς τοῦ ἄρ- χειν δυναμένους On the omis- sion of πρός with the second word see Cobet, Var. Lect. Pp. 163 sqq. 23. ὦ Πρωταγόρα] Bodl. Vat. pr. Ven. II. have τῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ. But the Bodleian has ὦ in the margin by an ancient hand. The reading τῷ may have been suggested by ri δὲ αὐτῷ ΤΠρωτα- γόρᾳ infr, ἘΣ. μα 5 ‘What ap- pears to each man, is to him,’ And does it not, then, appear to every man that some know more than he does and some less: so that in the great- est dan- gers, they look up to the wise man as to a God, sub- mitting to be taught and ruled by him ? And they account wisdom to be true thought ; and folly to be false Opinion, Tt follows that, if all men think truly, some men think falsely. As a mat- ter of fact men do become judges of one an- other’s im- pressions. 106 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ πότερον ἀληθῆ φῶμεν ἀεὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους δοξάζειν, ἢ ποτὲ μὲν ἀληθῆ. ποτὲ δὲ ψευδῆ ; ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων γάρ που ξυμβαίνει μὴ ἀεὶ ἀληθῆ ἀλλ᾽ ἀμφότερα αὐτοὺς / 3 - an δοξάζειν. σκόπει yap, ὦ Θεόδωρε, εἰ ἐθέλοι ἂν τις τῶν 5 ἀμφὶ Πρωταγόραν ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς διαμάχεσθαι ὡς οὐδεὶς 10 ἡγεῖται ἕτερος ἕτερον ἀμαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΟ. ’AAN ἄπιστον, ὦ Σώκρατες. SQ. Καὶ μὴν εἰς τοῦτό γε ἀνάγκης ὁ λόγος ἥκει ὁ πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον λέγων. GEO. Πῶς δή: fof Ν 7 \ ra , 3 >Q. Ὅταν σὺ κρίνας τι παρὰ σαυτῷ προς με ἀπο- / , ΄ N \ Χ A \ Ν φαίνῃ περί τινος δόξαν, σοὶ μὲν δὴ τοῦτο κατὰ TOV ἐκείνου λόγον ἀληθὲς ἔστω, ἡμῖν δὲ δὴ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἣν ne σ᾿ x / » yay “ , περι TNS ONS KPLOE@S πότερον Οὐκ €OTL Κριταις γενε- 15 σθαι, ἢ ἀεί σε κρίνομεν ἀληθῆ δοξάζειν ; ἢ μυρίοι «ες is 7 / 3 ’ὔ’ id 7 EKAOTOTE DOL μάχονται ἀντιδοξάζοντες, ηγουμενοι ψευδῆ κρίνειν τε καὶ οἴεσθαι ; ΘΕΟ. Νὴ τὸν Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλα μυρίοι π δῆτα, φησὶν Ὅμηρος, οἵ γέ μοι τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ’ὔ 20 πράγματα παρέχουσιν. , πῶ ΄, ἜΝ a LQ. Τί οὖν; βούλει λέγωμεν ws σὺ TOTE σαυτῷ μὲν ἀληθὴ δοξάζεις, τοῖς δὲ μυρίοις ψευδῆ ; 3 a 53 GEO. Ἔοικεν ἔκ γε τοῦ λόγου ἀνάγκη εἶναι. 8. εἰς τοῦτο... ἀνάγκης .. ἥκει} ‘Is driven to this.” ‘Is re- duced to a point where this is inevitable.’ Cp. Soph. Cid. Tyr. 687 : Ὁρᾷς ἵν᾿ ἥκεις ; 18. Νὴ τὸν Δία... παρέχουσιν ‘Yes, truly, Socrates, I have opponents more than I can tell, as Homer says, and they give me worlds of trouble.’ 19. φησίν Ὅμηρος] Od. 16. 121: Τῷ viv δυσμενέες μάλα μυρίοι εἴσ᾽ ἐνὶ οἴκῳ. τὰ ἐξ ἀνθρώπων πράγματα] ‘The trouble of the world,’ i.e. troubles, the greatest that can come from all men. Cp. Aéschin. c. Timarch. 9: Τὸ δὲ τελευταῖον δήσαντες πρὸς τὸν κίονα αὐτὸν τὸν Πιττάλακον ἐμαστίγουν τὰς ἐξ ἀν- θρώπων πληγὰς οὕτω πολὺν χρόνον ὥστε, κιτιλ. A somewhat similar use of ἀνθρώπων occurs in Soph. Phil. 305: Πολλὰ γὰρ rade | ev τῷ μακρῷ γένοιτ ἂν ἀνθρώπων χρόνῳ. ‘Respondet vulgare illud nostratium, alle menschenmd- gliche. Heindorf. D p. F709. θ΄. 71. Β ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 20. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ; μὲν μηδὲ αὐτὸς ᾧετο μέτρον εἶναι a \ 7 πολλοί, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ οἴονται, 107 ap οὐχὶ ἀνάγκη. εἰ ἄνθρωπον μηδὲ οἱ Ν \ 5 i μηδενὶ δὴ εἶναι ταύτην \ > ’ A ble τς 5) 5 \ Ψ.0Ὁ \ τὴν ἀληθειαν ἣν ἐκεῖνος ἐγραψεν ; εἰ δὲ αὐτὸς μὲν x Ν δὲ An@ \ 7 5 θ᾽ σ“ a ETO, TO O€ 7. 7 os μῇ συνοιεται, οισ OTL 77 P@TOV \ σ“ ΕἾ 7 - ὡ } a NK - ὃ a 7 Mey ὁσῷ πλείους ois μη δοκεῖ ἢ οἷς δοκεῖ, τοσούτῳ a 5 y \ » μᾶλλον οὐκ ἐστιν ἢ ἔστιν. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Ανάγκη, εἴπερ γε καθ᾽ y Nee? <3 €OTAL Και οὐκ εσται. 2Q. ᾿"Ἐπειτά γε τοῦτ᾽ EXEL κομψότατον" , ἑκάστην δόξαν 3 ἴω EKELVOS \ AS a e tat 37 \ a 3 / μέν TEPL τῆς AVTOU οἰήσεως THY τῶν ἀντιδοξαζόντων 5) ἜΣ» al ε σι 7 οἴησιν, Ἢ EKELVOY ἡγοῦνται ψεύδεσθαι, συγχωρεῖ που Lal 53 aq », “ ἀληθῆ εἶναι ὁμολογῶν τὰ ὄντα δοξάζειν ἅπαντας. ΘΕῸ. Πάνυ μὲν οὗν. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν τὴν αὑτοῦ ἂν ψευδῆ συγχωροῖ, εἰ τὴν τῶν ἡγουμένων αὐτὸν ψεύδεσθαι ὁμολογεῖ ἀληθῆ εἰναι: SEO. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΌ, Οἱ δέ γ᾽ ἄλλοι οὐ συγχωροῦσιν ἑαυτοὺς ψεύ- δεσθαι ; SEO, Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 20. Ὁ δέ γ᾽ αὖ ὁμολογεῖ καὶ ταύτην ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν ἐξ ὧν γέγραφεν. SEO. Φαώεται. I. Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Ἰπρωταγόρᾳ 3] Se. ἀνάγκη ἐστίν; Or rather, as H. Schmidt points out, a more general notion: ‘ What follows for Protagoras? Is he not com- pelled 1’ 2. μηδὲ... μηδέ] “Τῇ Protago- ras himself also did not think so, nor yet the majority, as indeed they do not,’ 5. συνοίεται] This is present, because it has been asserted just above in ὥσπερ... οἴονται. 10. Ἔπειτα... κο μψότατον] ‘Now followsthe most exquisite touch of all’ Cf. Rep. 5. 558A: Ti δέ; ἡ πραότης ἐνίων τῶν δικασθέντων οὐ κομψὴ ;----ἔχει, SC. τὸ πρᾶγμα, 5. ὁ λόγος. μέν points forward to the antithesis, which is ex- pressed in of δέ γ᾽ ἄλλοι, κιτ.λ. »ι [9] — 5 20 For in- stance, they con- demn Pro- tagoras. His opinion therefore may be true for him, but, on his own showing, it is false for all men be- sides. Its truth is to its falge- hood, as one man ig to all man- kind. But further, in saying that they think truly, he confirms them in saying that he thinks falsely : and up- holds them in denying that they are wrong, Thus the unanimity | of dissent igs not broken even by Protagoras himself. The saying of Protago- ras is true for nobody. 5 Io 108 ITAATOQNOZ DQ. EE ἁπάντων apa ἀπὸ Πρωταγόρου ἀρξαμέ- p. 171. 7 an \ / 7 νων ἀμφισβητήσεται, μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπὸ γε ἐκείνου ὃμο- / “ ΄ν > / / =~ λογήσεται,---οταν τῷ TavavTia λέγοντι συγχωρῃ ἀλη- “ Ἂ, 4 Z \ On αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγ- 7 / / ? ‘ / yy χωρήσεται μήτε κύνα μήτε τὸν ἐπιτυχόντα ἄνθρωπον / ὋΣ \ Ν SEN @ nN \ , ’ μέτρον εἶναι μηδὲ περὶ ἑνὸς οὗ ἂν μὴ μαθῃ. οὐχ oS οὕτως: SEO. Οὕτως. LQ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφισβητεῖται ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδενὶ ἂν εἴη ἡ ἸΠρωταγόρου ἀλήθεια ἀληθής, οὔ τέ 32) 9.8 > ἴω 3 / τινι ἄλλῳ OUT αὐτῷ ἐκείνῳ. SY Cad GEO. ἤΑγαν, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὸν Eraipov μου KaTa- θέομεν. ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλά τοι, ὦ φίλε, 1. Ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα] ‘ So then, the result obtained from them all is this. Cf. Soph. 245 E: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον, ἵν ἐκ πάντων εἰδῶμεν ὅτι τὸ ὃν τοῦ μὴ ὄντος οὐδὲν εὐπορώτερον Ar. Met. 988 a: Τοσοῦτόν γ᾽ ἔχομεν ἐξ The prepo- sition is probably suggested by ἐξ ὧν immediately preceding. ‘On all hands, then, including Protagoras, we find it disputed, or rather on his part it is ad- mitted.’ This use of ἐξ has been needlessly disputed by Heindorf and _ others, and Schanz reads ὑφ᾽ ἁπάντων, Bad- ham suggests ἐξ ἁπάντων ἄρα ἀπὸ τῶν Πρωταγόρου. 3. ὅταν .. συγχωρήσεται] These words are explanatory of ὑπὸ ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, and what follows, from μήτε onwards, de- pends immediately on συγχωρή- σεται, but really also on all that precedes. The construction of a sentence is frequently thus Sei ae ae » ειπειν O TL ποτε ἐστιν. > “ Ὁ αὐτῶν, ὅτι, K.T.A. lf , ἄδηλον εἰ καὶ παραθέομεν disturbed by the introduction of an explanatory or appositional clause. Cp. Rep. 7.529 B: Ov δύναμαι ἄλλο τι νομίσαι ἄνω ποιεῖν ψυχὴν βλέπειν μάθημα ἢ ἐκεῖνο, ὃ ἂν περὶ τὸ ὄν τε ἦ καὶ τὸ ἀόρατον, ἐάν τέ τις ἄνω κεχηνὼς ἢ κάτω συμ- μεμυκὼς τῶν αἰσθητῶν τι ἐπιχειρῇ μανθάνειν, οὔτε μαθεῖν ποτέ φημι αὐτόν, οὔτε ἄνω ἀλλὰ κάτω αὐτοῦ βλέπειν τὴν ψυχήν, Kav ἐξ ὑπτίας νέων ἐν γῇ ἢ ἐν θαλάττῃ μανθάνῃ. The futures middle are «used with passive meaning. 5. pyre κύνα] Supr. 154 A. 12. ΓΑγαν] ‘ We are urging my friend too vehemently,’ ‘running him very hard,’ καταθέυμεν] Cp. Lege. 7. 806 C: Ti δράσομεν, ὦ Κλεινία ; τὸν ξένον ἐάσομεν τὴν Σπάρτην ἡμῖν οὕτω καταδραμεῖν ; 14. ’ANAd . . ἄδηλον] ‘But it does not appear that we are outrunning what is right,’ i, e. I do not see that we are trans- eressing any rule of truth or fairness. τὸ ὀρθόν means simply te ἀρνὸς Ἢ Ὁ lek Ρ. 171. τὸ ὀρθόν. OEAITHTOS. 109 , 57 3 a vA 32) εἰκὸς γε ἄρα ἐκεῖνον πρεσβύτερον ὄντα σο- rs € a“ “5 \ Ὁ 3, 3 an » J D φώτερον ἡμῶν εἶναι" καὶ εἰ αὐτίκα ἐντεῦθεν ἀνακύψειε VL A 3 7 AX \ nN > / > 7 - λ la μέχρι Του αὕὔχενος, 77O Qa av EME TE € έγξας NPOVVTAa, ε Ν ὃς 1 \ Ay. Ge a ὡς TO εἰκος, καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα, 74 ἀποτρέχων. αὐτοῖς, ’ λέγειν. δ “ VA «ς “ αν Τοῦτο γΕε OVTLVOUY, \ a‘ 57 καταδὺς ἂν οἴχοιτο > 9 € “ » / S lal « ἴω ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀνάγκη, ola, χρῆσθαι ἡμῖν of , 3 \ Ν A ἴω ὁποῖοί τινές ἐσμεν, καὶ τὰ δοκοῦντα ἀεὶ ταῦτα lal ΝΥ an 537 “ ~ καὶ δῆτα καὶ νῦν ἄλλο τι φῶμεν ὁμολογεῖν \ 5 ΄ “ SF TO εἰναι Gopwrepoy ἕτερον éré- 5 \ , pov, εἶναι δὲ καὶ ἀμαθέστερον ; GEO. Ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ. 5 x ΄, 0 2Q. Ἢ καὶ ταύτῃ ἂν μάλιστα ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον, (as in Rep. 7. Ρ4ο Ὁ: Τὸ ὀρθὸν περὶ πλείστου ποιησάμενοι. Meno, 99 A: Ἡγεμὼν... ἐπὶ τὸ ὀρθόν), ‘What is just and true.’ There is no necessity therefore for making παραθεῖν (with the accu- sative) mean ‘to swerve from,’ I. εἶκός γε ἄρα] Socrates ad- mits that there is some ground for Theodorus’ remonstrance. ‘It is reasonable, I grant, to presume that as he is older so he is wiser than we are.’ dpa refers to an implied argument ; ‘as your words imply.’ For εἰκός ye cp. infr. 202 D. 4. καὶ σὲ ὁμολογοῦντα] Se. λη- ρώδη. Steinhart suggests that the notion of Protagoras put- ting up his head and disap- pearing again is perhaps taken from the use of ‘Charon’s steps’ in the theatre. Η. Schmidt well observes that Karadvs .. . ἀποτρέχων implies that the Sophist would not have waited for a rejoinder, Cp. Rep. 1. 344 C D, esp. the words ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε, οἷον ἐμβαλὼν λόγον ἐν νῷ ἔχεις ἀπιέναι, πρὶν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς ἢ μαθεῖν εἴτε οὕτως εἴτε ἄλλως ἔχει. 5- ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν] Socrates returns to the charge with the second ἀλλά. 6. τὰ δοκοῦντα] 154 C: Ἐὰν μὲν τὸ δοκοῦν, κτλ. Men. 83 D: Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. =. Καλῶς" τὸ γάρ σοι δοκοῦν τοῦτο ἀποκρίνου. Cp. esp. Crat, 386 Βα 11. ταύτῃ ἂν , Πρωταγόρᾳ] ‘Will be most likely to take up this position, which we sketched out for it in our de- fence of Protagoras.’ Cp. IL TI. 570, 1: Αὐτὸς δὲ Τρώων καὶ ᾿Αχαιῶν θῦνε μεσηγὺς | ἱστάμενος. Tb. 590, τ: ᾿Αλλὰ μάλ᾽ ἄντην | ἵσ- τασθ᾽ ἀμφ᾽ Αἴαντα μέγαν. Parm, 130 D: Ὅταν ταύτῃ στῶ. - The argument’ is personified, as so often in Plato (ep. Rep. 6. 484 : Διὰ μακροῦ τινος διεξελθόντος λόγου. Ib. 503 A: Τοιαῦτ᾽ ἄττα ἦν τὰ λεγόμενα παρεξιόντος καὶ παρακαλυπτομένου τοῦ λόγου), and is the subject of συγχωρήσεται, ἐθελῆσαι, ὁμολογήσει and τολ- μήσειε, in what follows. (If Protagoras were the subject, as H. Schmidt suggests, the da- tive Πρωταγόρᾳ should have been αὐτῷ). ἵστασθαι depends on Io Could he put his head above the ground, no doubt he might convince us of much folly. But we have done our best. No onewill deny that one man is Wiser, and another less wise, than his neighbour, It is clear, too, that the strength of the posi- tion lies in the region of sensible things, which we made the basis of our defence of Protagoras. (Transi- tion to the conception of the Bene- Jicial.) If the the- ory would concede any thing, Io 110 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 7 nels ὑπεγράψαμεν Ponisi: Ἡρωταγόρᾳ, ὦ ὡς τὰ i 171. - μὲν πολλὰ ἡ δοκεῖ ἐν τὰς καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, " a λυκέα πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου" εἰ δέ 9 2 : 6 / Ὑ 3 που ἐν τισι συγχωρήσεται διαφέρειν ἄλλον ἄλλου, Ν Nee \ x / » a Ἂ ΄ \ a περὶ τὰ ὑγιεινὰ καὶ νοσώδη ἐθελῆσαι ἂν φαναι μὴ πᾶν ΄ \ , \ / δὲ ε Ν > 55 ae καὶ παιδίον καὶ ase € ἱκανὸν εἰναι ἰᾶσθαι αὑτὸ γιγνῶσκον ἑαυτῷ τὸ ὑγιεινὸν, ἀλλὰ ἐνταῦθα δὴ ἄλλον ἄλλου Deere τ που: ΘΕΟ. ἜἜμοιγε δοκεῖ οὕτως. a a \ \ 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ πολιτικῶν, καλὰ μὲν καὶ 3 \ \ / \ »” Se, Ν ;» ae a αἰσχρὰ καὶ δίκαια καὶ ἀδικα Kal ὅσια Kal μή, οἷα ἂν ε ¥ / 9 a “- / e o a Q εκαστὴ πολις οἰηθεῖσα θῆται νομιμα εαυτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ 3 Ὡς 5 / ἘΠ \ > / \ 3 a\ εἶναι τῇ ἀληθείᾳ ExaoTH, καὶ ἐν τούτοις μέν οὐδὲν / 57 > / > / δ᾽ / / σοφώτερον οὔτε ἰδιώτην ἰδιώτου οὔτε πόλιν πόλεως immediately on φῶμεν.---- ΝΑ there also be ἃ slight play upon the word ἵστασθαι ἢ ‘This un- stable theory will make a stand hereabouts if anywhere.’ See also Thuc. 6. 34: Πρὸς τὰ λε- γόμενα. καὶ αἱ γνῶμαι ἵστανται. I. 7 ἡμεῖς ὑπεγράψαμεν βοη- θοῦντες Πρωταγόρᾳ] This ‘new wave’ of discussion rises upon the last, 167 B, 168: Kara μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργούς... στὰ ἀντὶ τῶν πονηρῶν δίκαια δοκεῖν εἶναι ποιεῖν. ταῖς πολέσι τὰ χρητ ἐπεὶ οἷά γ᾽ ἂν ἑκάστῃ πόλει δίκαια καὶ καλὰ δοκῇ, ταῦτα καὶ εἶναι αὐτῇ, ἕως ἂν αὐτὰ νομίζῃ. The argument is beginning to relax a little under the influ- ence of the ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν thrown carelessly in, 154 D. 4. συγχωρήσεται] Se. ὁ λόγος. Others go back for a subject to ὁντινοῦν, SUpY. D. But if the im- aginary opponent were wholly indefinite, why should a doubt be expressed whether he would make a reasonable admission ? So in what follows, 172 A, the words εἴπερ που, οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε, imply certain pre- conceptions and tendencies. 6. καὶ θηρίον δέ] ; Nay, even every inferior animal.’ Vege- tables might have been in- cluded. Supr. 167 BC. 10. Οὐκοῦν... περὶ πολιτικῶν] The distinction in the case of sensible things between the im- pressions of sense, and the knowledge of what is good, is evident enough. The analo- gous distinction in the case of things moral and social is less obvious. See, amongst other passages, Rep. 6. 505 D: Ti de; τόδε οὐ φανερόν, ws δίκαια μὲν καὶ καλὰ πολλοὶ ἂν ἕλοιντο τὰ δοκοῦντα κἂν μὴ ἢ ὅμως ταῦτα πράττειν καὶ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ δοκεῖν, ἀγαθὰ δὲ οὐδενὶ ἔτι ἀρκεῖ τὰ δοκοῦντα κτῶ- σθαι, ἀλλὰ τὰ ὄντα ζητοῦσι, τὴν δὲ δόξαν ἐνταῦθα ἤδη πᾶς ἀτι- μάζει; 12. οἰηθεῖσα] Se, καλά, δίκαια, K.T.A. ΡΥ ΤᾺΣ (ia Se | p. 172. εἶναι" OEAITHTOS. 111 2) δὲ Lal 4 e a KX \ tA ἐν O€ τῷ συμφέροντα ἑαυτῇ ἢ μὴ συμφέροντα , > nn? of 3 ε , 7 τίθεσθαι, ἐνταῦθ᾽, εἴπερ που, αὖ ὁμολογήσει σύμβου- / / / / Cus, Aov τε συμβούλου διαφέρειν καὶ πόλεως δόξαν ἑτέραν Cu f, \ 3 4 \ > Ἂ ΄ J eTepas πρὸς ἀληθειαν, καὶ οὐκ ἂν πάνυ τολμήσειε “ ἃ ἊἋ “ , 4, σι c a Β φῆσαι, ἃ ἂν θῆται πόλις συμφέροντα οἰηθεῖσα αὑτῇ, Χ a a ἈΝ / > et aS ec mavros μᾶλλον ταῦτα καὶ συνοίσειν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ οὗ 4 3 a J Ἂν » / ἣν 3 λέγω, ἐν τοῖς δικαίοις καὶ ἀδίκοις καὶ ὁσίοις καὶ ἀνο- / 52 7 > / e > δ, / σίοις, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζξεσθαι ὡς οὐκ ἔστι φύσει = as ΣῸΝἝΝ Bie oy ¢€ A 2) 3 \ \ a / αὐτῶν οὐδὲν οὐσίαν ἑαυτοῦ ἐχον, ἀλλὰ τὸ κοινῇ δόξαν Ge / 3 \ / a , ὟΣ ΟἹ a Touro γίγνεται ἀληθὲς τότε ὅταν δόξῃ καὶ ὅσον ἂν ὃ a / Ny: δὴ \ 7 \ II Ξ ΟΚΊ) XpPovov. Και OO OL γε 7) BY) TAaVTATAGL TOV po / ’ 7 re S x / 37 ταγορου λόγον λέγουσιν, ὧδέπως τὴν σοφίαν ἀγουσι. Mey \ e aA 53 / 3 3 » , Λόγος δὲ ἡμᾶς, ὦ Θεόδωρε, ἐκ λόγου, μείζων ἐξ ἐλάτ- 7 στόνος, καταλαμβάνει. 8, ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι] He drops the figure, and passes from whatthe ‘argument’ would be apt to say, to what certain persons, who are presently de- fined, actually do say. For a somewhat similar transition from ‘arguments’ to ‘certain persons” cp. Gorg. 457 Q: Οἶμαι, ὦ Topyta, καὶ σὲ ἔμπειρον εἶναι πολλῶν λόγων καὶ καθεωρα-- κέναι ἐν αὐτοῖς τὸ τοιόνδε, ὅτι οὐ ῥαδίως δύνανται περὶ ὧν ἂν ἐπι- χειρήσωσι διαλέγεσθαι διορισάμε- vor πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ μαθόντες καὶ διδάξαντες ἑαυτοὺς οὕτω δια. λύεσθαι τὰς συνουσίας, καὶ ἔνιοί γε τελευτῶντες (ep. καὶ ὅσοι γε in the present passage), κιτιλ. 11. μὴ παντάπασι] ‘In part only.’ For the negative form ep. Soph. 247 B: Τοῦτο οὐκέτι κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀποκρίνονται πᾶν (‘here they make a certain distinc- tion’). Aristotle (Met. 1008 a) uses the expression τοῖς τὸν Πρω- ταγόρου λέγουσι λόγον. 12. ὧδέ πως τὴν σοφίαν ἄγουσι] ‘Conduct their philosophic pro- cedure thus.’ ‘Proceed some- what on this wise in their philosophy.’ Cp. Men. 80 E: Ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστικὸν λόγον κατάγεις : ὧδε refers either to the pre- ceding sentence, or to the ex- position which is broken off by the digression -—certainly not (with H. Schmidt) to the di- gression itself. The digression which follows is not merely an ornament. ΑΒ in the Sophistesthe philosopher and the sophist are the counter- part of being and not-being re- spectively, so here the man of the world and the philosopher represent the contrast between the life of sense and the life of knowledge. 13. μείζων ἐξ ἐλάττονος] The question of Justice and In- Justice, etc. is greater than the question of the relativity of Sense. The greater question is not fully resumed in the pre- σι it would be this, that all are not equally judges of what is wholesome: and in the case of states, that although honour and justice are matters of convention merely, yet in deciding what is ex- pedient, mistake is possible both to in- dividuals and states. This is the atti- tude of some who have par- tially relin- quished the Protago- rean doc- trine. They offer us a new and important handle for discussion. (Digres- sion.) Before en- tering upon this, however, \ if s/ 5TH OLKATTN PLO ἰόντες γέλο to 112 GEO. Οὐκοῦν σχολὴν ἄγομεν; SO. Φαινόμεθα. καὶ πολλάκις μέν γε δῆ; “ Ny, , μόνιε, καὶ ἄλλοτε κατενοησᾶ;, ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ ὦ Σώκρατες : 1 ὦ δαι- νων Ν an ε 5. ατὰρ και νυν. ὡς €LKOT@S a \ / / οἱ ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις πολὺν χρονον διατρίψαντες εἰς a ε΄ ἴοι φαίνονται ρητορές. ΘΕΟ. Πῶς δὴ οὖν λέγεις 5 ΣΟ: Κινδυνεύουσιν οἱ τῷ δικαστηρίοις καὶ τοῖς ΕΣ 3 ’ ’ \ Ν 3 τοιούτοις ἐκ νεῶν κυλινδούμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐν φιλο- J Ν ”~ σοφίᾳ καὶ Τῇ πρὸς ἐλευθέρους τεθράφθαι. sent dialogue, but is treated at large in the Gorgias and Re- public. τ. Οὐκοῦν ἄγομεν Compare the opening of the digression in the Pheedrus, 268 ΕἸ: Σχολὴ μὲν δὴ ὡς ἔοικε...» and Cic. de Amic.5: ‘ Etsumus, ut dixit Fannius, otiosi. We must suppose that the impend- ing trial of Socrates, although not alluded to until the end of the dialogue, is n Plato’s mind throughout this passage: Cp. Gorg. 522 B. 2. ὦ δαιμόνιε] ‘In sober truth.” The words add a touch (not here of expostulation but) of solemnity. 4. ἐν ταῖς φιλοσοφίαις] ‘In scientific pursuits, Supr. 143 D: Tewperpiay ἤ τινα ἄλλην φιλο- σοφίαν. Tim. 88 CO: Μουσικῇ καὶ πάσῃ φιλοσοφίᾳ. Socrates takes common ground with Theo- dorus. Op. infr. 173 ἘΠ: Ta te yas ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα γεω- σχολὴν μετροῦσα, οὐρανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρο- νομοῦσα. Compare with the whole passage the opening words of the Apology (esp. ὁμολογοίην ἂν ἔγωγε οὐ κατὰ τού- τους εἶναι ῥητωρ), and the dispute of Socrates with Callicles in τοιᾷδε διατριβῇ τεθραμμένους ὡς οἰκέται the Gorgias. 8, ἐκ νέων κυλινδούμενοι] “Who have knocked about from their early days. Compare Aristo- phanes’ περίτριμμα δικῶν (Nub. 447), and Dem. de Cor. 269. κυλινδούμενοι] The word ex- pressescontemptfor the‘ casual, ‘hand to mouth,’ intellectual existence of the lawyer. Cp. Rep. 5: 479 D: Μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται, Pheedr. 257 A, Polit. 309 A. το. πρὸς ἐλευθέρους Soph. 253 C (referring to this): Ἢ πρὸς Διὸς ἐλάθομεν εἰς τὴν τῶν ἐλευ- θέρων ἐμπεσόντες ἐπιστήμην, καὶ κινδυνεύομεν ζητοῦντες τὸν σοφι- στὴν πρότερον ἀνευρηκέναι τὸν φιλόσοφον; Rep. 6.499 Δ: Οὐδέ γε αὖ λόγων, ὦ μακάριε, καλῶν τε καὶ ἐλευθέρων ἱκανῶς ἐπήκοοι γε- γόνασιν, οἵων ζητεῖν μὲν τὸ ἀληθές, κτλ. ἡ BIO mee Οὐδὲν μάθημα μετὰ δουλείας τὸν ἐλεύθερον χρὴ μανθάνειν---ἃ the whole image of the cave with its captives and their liberation. See also Aristot. Met. 1. 2: Δῆλον οὖν ὡς δι οὐδεμίαν αὐτὸ ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἑτέραν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἄνθρωπος φάμεν ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου ὦν, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν. p. 172s ). 172, SEAITHTOS. SEO. Πῇ δή; 2Q. “He τοῖς μέν, 119 A ἃ Ἁ S ιν ’ὔ TOVTO ὃ σὺ εἰπες, ἀεὶ πάρεστι ὟΣ Q XQ Se 3 ΓΝ SEAN An δὰ σχο Ὦ Καὶ τους ογους EV εἰρη νῃ €7TL σχο ἢ5 ποι οὔνται, A 4 A 4 ς σ΄ TOV προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, a e a iN / yf / 5 ὥσπερ ἡμεις νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λογου i, [2 » a 5" ’ \ ει 9 \ μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κάκεινοι, ἐαν αὐτοὺς ὃ ἐπελθὼν 5 os ἡ \ ἀρεσῃ" Και ὃ \ o ἊἋ J “λ δὲ λέ Ἃ / la μακρων 7) βραχέων βέλει OQUOEV eyely, QV μόνον ᾽ An V4 τύχωσι τοῦ ὄντος- \ / οἱ δὲ ἐν ἀσχολίᾳ τε ἀεὶ λέγουσι \ C7 ‘ “ Ὁ (κατεπείγει. γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον) καὶ οὐκ ἐγχωρεῖ περὶ οὗ “Οὃ ϑ3 / \ / a 3 > 3 ᾽ὔ ἂν ἐπιθυμήσωσι τοὺς λογους ποιείσθαι, ἀλλ αναγκὴην 2. τοῦτο ὃ σὺ eines] HH. Schmidt would delete the commas, because Theodorus had only spoken of himself and Socrates. But such ‘apposition of general and particular’ is common in Plato. 4. τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου] ‘We are for the third time be- ginning a fresh argument,’ The first fresh λόγος was the criti- cism of Protagoras and his de- fence; the second begins where Theodorus is induced to ac- cept Socrates’ challenge (see the doubtful words, 168 ἘΠ: A3 τοῦ. Tov τὸν λόγον): the third and greatest (μείζων, supr. B) arises with the mention of the whole- some and expedient, and the partial supporters of Protago- ras. Cp. Rep. 1. 354, where Socrates owns to a similar discursiveness, and is by no means exact in recapitulating. 5. οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι] Sc. μεταλαμ- βάνουσι. This part of the sen- tence (from ὥσπερ... .) stands in apposition to what precedes, Cp. supr. 171 Ὁ: Tére καὶ 6 Πρωταγόρας... and note ; also Rep. 8. 554 C: Κινδυνεύει, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, καλλίστη αὕτη τῶν πολιτειῶν εἶναι" ὥσπερ ἱμάτιον ποικίλον πᾶσιν ἄνθεσι πεποικιλμένον, οὕτω καὶ αὕτη πᾶσιν ἤθεσι πεποικιλμένη καλλίστη ἂν φαίνοιτο. Also ib. 7.532 Α: Οὕτω καὶ ὅταν τις τῷ διαλέγεσθαι ἐπιχειρῇ, ἄνευ πασῶν τῶν αἰσθή- σεων διὰ τοῦ λόγου ἐπ’ αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ὁρμᾷ, καὶ μὴ ἀποστῇ πρὶν ἂν αὐτὸ ὃ ἔστιν ἀγαθὸν αὐτῇ νοήσει λάβῃ, ἐπ’ αὐτῷ γίγνεται τῷ τοῦ νοητοῦ τέλει, ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνος ἐπὶ τῷ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. But as the verb is omitted in the second clause, the comma is preferable to a colon after ποιοῦνται. 6. καθάπερ ἡμᾶς] Such slight redundancies are natural in conversation. ἀρέσκειν governs the accu- sative where it means fo sat- esfy. It has the dative supr. 157 D. The whole sentence is in construction with ἯΙ. ἢ. διὰ μακρῶν ἢ βραχέων] See Polit. 286, ΤΟ. ἀνάγκην] Hesych.: Ἀνάγκη" ἡ δικαστικὴ κλεψύδρα. Pollux, Sit ee Boia. O° ovfovd: καὶ ἀνάγκην σκεῦος εἶναι δικαστικόν, The latter quotation expresses doubt. May not the notion men- tioned by the grammarian have arisen from the present passage? The structure of the sentence (τε----καί) forbids our identifying = οΟ we pause to reflect upon the happiness and free- dom of the philosophic life, which has leisure to take up fresh topics or to lay them down at will. Not so the mind which is exercised in the courts of law. The one is the training of a freeman, the other of a slave— σι 114 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ. y ς ΕῚ 7 3 be \ τ δ EX@V 0 ἀντίδικος εφέστηκε καὶ ὑπογραφὴν παραναγι- ,7ὔ τ > \ » e 7 γνωσκομένην, ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ρΉΤΕεοΟνΡ" A > / (nv ἀντωμοσίαν A \ , καλοῦσιν") οἱ δὲ λόγοι ἀεὶ περὶ ὁμοδούλου πρὸς δε- ΄ A σπότην καθήμενον, 5 ’ » + \ ε εν χειρί τινα δίκην ἔχοντα, καὶ οἱ δον σὺ ΣᾺ \ Ὑ > DF τς ἐς \\ Ν > a ἄγωνες οὐδέποτε τὴν ἄλλως ἀλλ᾽ ἀεὶ Τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ" πολλάκις δὲ καὶ περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος: ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἁπάν- ἀνάγκη here with the clepsydra, which has been already alluded to. It is rather ‘the strong arm of the law,’ which the ad- versary could bring to bear, if the speaker wandered from the indictment. (So also Ast and H. Schmidt.) ‘But the other sort are always pressed for time: for the ebbing water hurries on the speaker: and he has no liberty to follow whither fancy leads him, but the adversary is at hand to wield over him the resistless logie of coercion, holding a written outline of the points to which he must confine him- self, which forms a running commentary to his oration,’ 2. ὧν ἐκτὸς οὐ ῥητέον] ὑπογραφήν retains its verbal force nearly as if it were ὑπογεγραμμένα, but is not the antecedent to ὧν. See 147 Εἰ, note on ὅτῳ. ἣν ἀντωμοσίαν καλοῦσιν] ‘What they call their affidavits,’ The affected unfamiliarity with legal terms is in good keeping. Com- pare Rep. 3. 400 B: Kai, ὡς ἐγῷ- μαι, ἴαμβον καί τιν᾽ ἄλλον τροχαῖον ὠνόμαζε. 3: πρὸς δεσπότην] Not simply the δικαστής, but rather δῆμος or νόμος, whom herepresents, Com- pare the passages in the Repub- lic in which Δῆμος is spoken of as the master of the ship (488), as the great Sophist (492), and asa mighty beast(493); andep. Eu- thyphr, 2 C: Ἔρχεται κατηγορή- Tov μου, ὥσπερ πρὸς μητέρα, πρὸς τὴν πόλιν. Algo Herodotus, a: 104 (of the Spartans) : Ἔπεστι yap σφι δεσπότης, νόμος, τὸν ὗπο- δειμαίνουσι πολλῷ ἔτι μᾶλλον, ἢ οἱ σοὶ σέ. Pindar, 3. 38: Νόμος πάντων βασιλεύς. 4. τινα δίκην] So the Βοά- leian MS. ‘Some cause or other.’ This reading suits the distant, unfamiliar tone, in which judicial proceedings are here described. The other reading, ἐν χειρὶ τὴν δίκην ἔχοντα (T'etc.), gives ἃ different _ force to ἐν χειρὶ... €yovra,—not merely ‘engaged with’ but ‘having in his power,’ καὶ οἱ ἀγῶνες] ‘And the trial is never for an indifferent stake, but always immediately con- cerns the speaker,’ αὐτοῦ 15 surely masculine not neuter (as Stallb. and Wohlrab). 6. περὶ ψυχῆς ὁ δρόμος] Tl. 22. 161 (of Achilles and Hector): ᾿Επεὶ οὐχ lepniov, οὐδὲ βοείην ἀρνύσθην, ἅτε ποσσὶν ἀέθλια γίγνεται ἀνδρῶν" ἀλλὰ περὶ ψυχῆς θέον Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο. In He- rodotus, 7. 57: Περὶ ἑαυτοῦ τρέχων (said of Xerxes), the metaphor is already softened down. Op. Aristoph. Vesp. 375: Ποιήσω δακεῖν | τὴν καρδίαν καὶ τὸν περὶ ψυχῆς δρόμον δραμεῖν. The expression τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ig Suggested by τὴν ἄλλως, ἘΞ 75: P- 173. Pp. 173. OEAITHTOS. 115 4 BY AN a τῶν TOVT@Y EVTOVOL καὶ δριμεῖς γίγνονται, ἐπιστάμενοι Ν / / A NS if / Tov δεσπότην λόγῳ τε θωπεῦσαι καὶ EPY@ χαρίσασθαι, ᾿ \ " τὴν γὰρ αὔξην Ν ’ὔ’ Χ >’ / καὶ τὸ εὐθύ τε καὶ τὸ ἐλεύθερον ἡ ἐκ νέων δουλεία \ \ Ν > > 8 \ , σμικροὶ δὲ καὶ οὐκ ὀρθοὶ τὰς ψυχας. 3 ’ Ι΄ 7, ’ V4 Zz adnpnrat, ἀναγκάζουσα πράττειν σκολιὰ, μεγάλους 5 7 J yf ς a σι κινδύνους καὶ φόβους ἔτι ἁπαλαῖς ψυχαῖς ἐπιβάλ- ἃ 3 » AY ἴω ἴω λουσα, ovs οὐ δυνάμενοι μετὰ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ ἀληθοῦς e 4 5 \ Ν Ἂς σι ee y \ ὑποφέρειν, εὐθὺς ἐπὶ τὸ ψεῦδός τε καὶ τὸ ἀλλήλους a / \ ἀνταδικεῖν τρεπόμενοι πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγ- A Ψ a \ IQ\ ᾿Ξ, a , > κλώνται, ὥσθ᾽ ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔχοντες τῆς διανοίας εἰς »” 3 , - , \ N avopas ἐκ μειρακίων τελευτῶσι, δεινοί τε καὶ σοφοὶ , 7 YEYOVOTES, ὡς οἴονται. τις ἔντονοι καὶ δριμεῖς] ‘ Keen and shrewd.’ As H. Schmidt observes, the former epithet points to concentration of will, the latter to mental penetra- tion. 3. τὴν yap αὔξην... ἐλεύθερον] ‘Of all mental growth, and all honest and liberal culture pe Mot self-respect and the spirit of upright independence.’ Both meanings are expressed in the Greck. 7. οὗς οὐ δυνάμενοι] ‘So that, not being able to undergo these consistently with righteousness and truth, they betake them- selves forthwith to falsehood, and to avenging themselves on one another by wrong, and soare repeatedly bent and stunted ; whence they pass from youth to manhood with no soundness in their mind, but supposing themselves to have become ca- pable and accomplished men,’ Spe ivep. 7. G19 A: Ἢ οὔπω ἐννενόηκας τῶν λεγομένων πονηρῶν μὲν σοφῶν δέ, ὡς δριμὺ μὲν βλέπει τὸ ψυχάριον καὶ ὀξέως διορᾷ ταῦτα ep ἃ τέτραπται, ὡς οὐ φαύλην ΤΥ ΣΝ \ \ ᾿Ξ 53 Καὶ οὗτοι μὲν δὴ τοιοῦτοι, ὦ ἔχον τὴν ὄψιν, κακίᾳ δ᾽ ἠναγκασμέ- vov ὑπηρετεῖν ὥστε ὅσῳ ἂν ὀξύ- τερον βλέπῃ, τοσούτῳ πλείω κακὰ ἐργαζόμενον. . Τοῦτο μέντοι, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, τὸ τῆς τοιαύτης φύσεως, εἰ ἐκ παιδὸς εὐθὺς κοπτόμενον περιεκόπη τοὺς τῆς γενέσεως συγγενεῖς ὥσπερ μολυβδίδας, αἱ δὴ ἐδωδαῖς τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἡδοναῖς τε καὶ λιχνείαις προσφυεῖς γιγνόμεναι, περὶ τὰ κάτω στρέφουσι τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ὄψιν, K.T.A, 9. πολλὰ κάμπτονται καὶ συγ- κλῶνται]Ϊ ͵ “Αγ continually thwarted and cramped in their growth.’ Rep.6.495 D: ᾿Ατελεῖς μὲν ras φύσεις, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τε καὶ βαναυσιῶν ὥσπερ τὰ σώματα λελώβηνται οὕτω καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ξυγκεκλασμένοι τε καὶ ἀποτεθρυμ- μένοι διὰ τὰς βαναυσίας τυγχάνου- σιν. 10. ὅτι C: Τεθεάμεθα μέντοι διακειμένον αὐτό, ὥσπερ οἱ τὸν θα- λάττιον Ῥλαυκὸν ὁρῶντες οὐκ ἂν ἔτι ῥᾳδίως αὐτοῦ ἴδοιεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν, ὑπὸ τοῦ τά τε παλαιὰ τοῦ σώματος μέρη τὰ μὲν ἐκκεκλάσθαι, τὰ δὲ συντετρίφθαι καὶ πάντως λε. λωβῆσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν κυμάτων. Gorg. 525 C-E 12 Whose mind be- comes in- evitably dwarfed and crook- ed and servile, Turn we now from them ; and let us still use our liberty to describe the leaders of our own band. 116 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ Θεόδωρε: τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει Ρ. 113: J xX 57 ν» x Ν , ’ὔ διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λογον τρεπὼ- Ν ἃ A \ > / / \ a μεθα, iva μὴ Kal, ὃ νῦν δὴ ἐλέγομεν, λίαν πολὺ TH ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει τῶν λόγων καταχρώμεθα : ΘΕΟ. Μηδαμῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀλλὰ διελθόντες. ’ \ 5 a , “ 3 ε a e 3 a πάνυ yap εὖ τοῦτο εἰρηκας, OTL οὐχ ἡμεῖς OL EV TOC ayo) } ἣν λό ἡπηρέται. ἀλλ᾽ οἱ λόγοι τοιῷδε χορεύοντες τῶν λόγων ὑπηρέται, ἀλλ᾽ οἱ Aoy e / A , \ τς κα 3. ὯΝ fou ἡμέτεροι ὥσπερ οἰκέται, καὶ ἑκαστος αὐτῶν περι- ένει ἃ λεσθῆναι ὅ ἡμῖν δοκῇ: οὔτε γὰρ δικα- μένει ἀποτελεσθῆναι ὅταν ἡμῖν δοκῇ" ovTE yap ΒΥ 3 a 9 e a ἄρξων ἐπιστατεῖ παρ᾽ ἡμῖν. I. τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ] Phedr. 247 A: Φθόνος γὰρ ἔξω θείου χοροῦ ἵσταται. Polit. 291 B: Ἠμφεγνόησα κατιδὼν τὸν περὶ τὰ τῶν πόλεων πράγματα χορόν. The metaphor is.continued in the words οἱ ἐν τῷ τοιῷδε χορεύ- οντες, . . οὔτε θεατὴς ὥσπερ ποιη- ταῖς... περὶ τῶν κορυφαίων... 2. διελθόντες 'ΤἼ]Θ expression is a little confused: for the words πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώ- μεθα, as understood with διελ- θόντες, are unemphatic, while in the second part of the clause they are emphatic. Probably but for the attraction of the other participle, διελθόντες would have been διέλθωμεν. (Coisl. τραπώμεθα.) ἐάσαντες] Since here, as in the ‘Sophist’ (253 D), we have stumbled prematurely on the philosophic life. 3. ὃ νῦν δὴ μεταλήψει] ‘Our freedom,.which consists, as we have said, in the power of ranging from one topic to another. The words ὃ viv δὴ ἐλέγομεν belong to ἐλευθερίᾳ καὶ μεταλήψει and not to λίαν πολὺ καταχρώμεθα, But in deleting \ / ivf lal 3 4 \ το στῆς οὔτε θεατῆς, ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς, ἐπιτιμήσων TE καὶ the comma H. Schmidt is again led by too strict a requirement of minute logical coherence. Cp. Tim. 26 E: Kai τῷ ad, ὦ Κριτία, μᾶλλον ἀντὶ τούτου pe- ταλάβοιμεν; Polit.257C: Διανα- παύσωμεν αὐτὸν μεταλαβόντες av- τοῦ τὸν συγγυμναστὴν τόνδε Σώ- κράτη ;.. Καθάπερ εἶπες, μετα- λάμβανε. 8. toi ἡμέτεροι] The article is rather doubtful. If genuine, it still belongs to the predicate, —‘our servants,’ i.e. those which, as philosophers, we have. περιμένει] * Waits our plea- sure for its completion.’ 9. The word δικαστής re- calls the previous description. With οὔτε θεατὴς ὥσπερ ποιηταῖς a new illustration is brought in. Cp. supr. 147 Byee tne θεατής is the same δεσπότης (viz. Δῆμος) in another aspect, The image of dramatic poetry was suggested by Socrates using the expression τοὺς τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ. IO, ἐπιτιμήσων.. «. arse ‘ Stands over us to criticise an to compel.’ OEAITHTOS. Ile 20. Λέγωμεν δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπεὶ σοί γε δοκεῖ, περὶ a / / \ yf / / τῶν κορυφαίων" τί yap av τις τούς γε φαύλως δια- , @ ΄, τρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι; Οὗτοι δέ που ἐκ νέων an A 3 >’ \ > oS N 50 IZ Oe “ D 7 P@TOV μέν εἰς ἀγορὰν Οὐκ ισασι THV O OV, OUVOE O7TOU ’ DN ' , yf Ν yf A 7 δικαστήριον ἢ βουλευτήριον ἤ τι κοινὸν ἄλλο TNS 1C- Aews συνέδριον" νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσματα λεγόμενα Ἂ / Ἐπ π᾿ , / ᾿ Ν ἢ γεγραμμένα οὗτε ὁρῶσιν οὔτε ἀκούουσι. σπουδαὶ \ a ΝΥ ͵ an A δὲ ἑταιρειῶν ἐπ᾽ ἀρχὰς καὶ σύνοδοι καὶ δεῖπνα καὶ σὺν aA \ 7 "2 αὐλητρίσι κῶμοι, οὐδὲ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται » a 5 Ν ἊΝ a iy : a Υ͂ x / αὑτοῖς. εὖ δε Gy enms Te γεγόνεν ev wore, 77 Τί Τῷ I. ὡς eoxev}] The sentence continues as if λέγωμεν had been λεκτέον. 2. τοὺς. φαύλως διατρίβοντας ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λέγοι] ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ is emphatic, i.e. ‘who are fri- volous in such a pursuit.’ For an account of these gentry see Rep. 6. 489 D-496, where they are called παμπόνηροι... ὥσπερ οἱ ἐκ τῶν εἱργμῶν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ ἀποδιδράσκοντες, kK... 3. Οὗτοι δέ που] Compare the less ironical description in the Republic, 6. 488 A: Νόησον yap τοιουτονὶ γενόμενον, κιτιλ. The contradiction between philoso- phy and common life is here stated in its most paradoxical aspect. No existing common- wealth is great enough to in- terest the philosophic mind. Cp. Rep. 6. 496 Β: Ἢ ἐν σμικρᾷ πόλει ὅταν μεγάλη ψυχὴ φυῇ καὶ ἀτιμάσασα τὰ τῆς πόλεως ὑπερίδῃ. 7. σπουδαὶ δέ, κιτελ.}: “Βαΐ the ambitious striving of poli- tical clubs for power, and pub- lic meetings and banquets and revellings with minstrelsy, are actions which do not occur to them even in dreams.’ For προσίσταται cp. Hyperides (Ὁ) Pro Euxenippo sub init. ; Εἰ μὴ προσίστανται ὑμῖν αἱ τοιαῦται εἰσαγγελίαι, κιτ.λ. For a similar ‘nominativus pendens’ cp. Rep. 7. 532°B: Ἢ δέ ye λύσις... ἡ πραγματεία τῶν τεχνῶν... ταύτην ἔχει τὴν δύναμιν. The irregularity is softened in the present instance by the fact that the earlier part of the sen- tence forms a sort of collec- tive nominative to προσίσταται. With this list of < worldly goods’ compare Rep. 6. 491 C: Πάντα τὰ λεγόμενα ἀγαθά, κ iAXos καὶ πλοῦτος καὶ ἰσχὺς σώματος καὶ ξυγγένεια ἐρρωμένη ἐν πόλει καὶ πάντα τὰ τούτων οἰκεῖα. 8. ἑταιρειῶν͵] ‘Clubs’ or ‘leagues. See Rep: 2. 365 Ὁ: ᾿Επὶ yap τὸ λανθάνειν ξυνωμοσίας τε καὶ ἑταιρείας συνάξομεν. . . Thucyd. 8. 54: Καὶ. ὁ μὲν Πεί- σανδρος τάς τε ξυνωμοσίας, αἵπερ ἐτύγχανον πρότερον ἐν τῇ πόλει οὖσαι ἐπὶ δίκαις καὶ ἀρχαῖς, ἁπάσας ἐπελθών, κιτιὰ 10. τι γέγονεν | So the Bodleian and several other MSS., in- cluding the first hand of Τὶ But Clement in quoting the passage reads ms with the ma- jority of manuscripts. This, however, may easily have arisen out of what follows. Stallbaum They know nothing of politics or of public life, still less of revels and intrigues for power, The philo- sopher’s ignorance of these things and of his neighbour's pedigree, is not ironical but real. His body is at home in the city, but his mind is 5 ἀλλὰ 118 TTAATONOS , , x a x κακὸν ἐστιν ἐκ προγόνων γεγονὸς ἢ πρὸς ἀνδρῶν ἢ A A Ν ἢ a” γυναικων, μᾶλλον αὐτὸν λέληθεν ἢ οἱ τῆς θαλάττης , a4 λεγόμενοι χοες. οἶδεν" Ν A 7 > 709 ὦ > 3 Καὶ ταυτὰ TavT οὐδ᾽ ὅτι οὐκ οἶδεν, 3-A\ \ > “~ > 4 A > a 4 οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, “ιν \ an tA 3 font ’ an > τῷ ὄντι TO σῶμα μόνον ἐν TH πόλει κεῖται αὐ- an Ἂς 3 aA e \ , A 7 e TOU καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια, ταῦτα πάντα ηγησα- , \ \ >Q7 3 μένῃ σμικρὰ καὶ οὐδέν, ari 7 a » μᾶσασα πανταχῇ φέρεται \ / ων “- e ᾽ὔ Ν Ν pe 2 κατὰ Πίνδαρον, τά τε yas ὑπένερθε καὶ τὰ ἐπίπεδα says, ‘Si quis alius, certe phi- losophus scit, quid recte, quid secus in republica fiat.’ But if he is ignorant of what is pass- ing, how can he judge of it? See above, νόμους δὲ καὶ ψηφίσ- ματα, κιτιλ., and infr. 1740: Οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκένα. And cp. Rep. 6. 496. This reading is consistent with the spirit of paradox which ig unmis- takably present throughout. No part of the description ex- cept the absence of rhetoric would apply to the real So- crates. Even in this dialogue we have seen that he knows Some of the antecedents of Theeetetus and is interested in knowing more, 2. οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι χόες] Aristid. Or. 8. εν, «2 30. ed. Dind.: Τὸ λέγειν περὶ τούτων καὶ ἐγχειρεῖν ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις ἐξαριθμεῖσθαι βούλοιτο χύας τῆς θαλάττης. (Stallb.) 4. οὐδὲ yap αὐτῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν] Cp. Ar, Eth. Ν, 4. 3. δὲ 27, 28 (of the high- minded man )--πρὸς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι... εἴρωνα πρὸς τοὺς πολλούς, ue ἀτιμάσασα] Cp. Rep. 6. 496 B, quoted above. 8. κατὰ Tivdapor | The frag- ment is thus quoted by Clem, Alex. Str. 20, 707: Πέταται κατὰ τοὺς Πίνδαρον τᾶς τε γᾶς ὑπένερθεν οὐ- βανοῦ τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομῶν, καὶ πᾶ- σαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνάμενος (νυ. 1. €pevvapevos), He seems to have had the poet’s words, as well as this passage, in his mind. Plato therefore seems to have changed πέταται into the more prosaic φέρεται (πέτεται occurs as a mar- ginal reading), and to have in- troduced the words καὶ τὰ ἐπί- meOa γεωμετροῦσα (perhaps also ἀστρονομοῦσαλ, in compliment to Theodorus, adding τῶν ὄντων ἑκά- στου, κατιλ, Plato almost always thusinweaves quotation with his own language, and accommo- dates the poet’s measures to the rhythm of prose; .9. g. Rep. 2. 365 B: Πότερον δίκᾳ τεῖχος ὕψιον ἢ σκολίαις ἀπάταις ἀναβὰς καὶ ἐμαυ- τὸν οὕτω περιφράξας διαβιῶ ; ΤΌ. 364 D: Τῆς δ᾽ ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν καί τινα ὁδὸν μακράν τε καὶ ἀνάντη. Protag. 340 D: Ὅταν δέ τις αὐτῆς εἰς ἀκρὸν ἵκηται, ῥηϊδίην δ᾽ ἤπειτα πέλειν, χαλεπήν περ ἐοῦσαν, ἐκτῆσθαι. τά τε γᾶς] Bodl. rare (but with an erasure over a). Is it possible that Plato wrote τᾶς τε, aS in the quotation of Cle- ment? This seems probable, when it is considered that ra ἐπίπεδα, κιτιλ, ig an afterthought, to which the transition as the words stand in the text is Ρ. 173. Ρ. 173. γεωμετροῦσα, a vA 7 4 ~ Sf e ΄ Ρ. 174. πᾶσαν πάντη φύσιν ἐρευνωμένῃη τῶν ὄντων εκαστου ΘΕΑΙΤΉΤΟΣ. 119 ϑ aA 4 3 “Ἅ"Ἅ oupavov τε ὕπερ ἀστρονομοῦσα, καὶ v4 5 a 3 Ν al (peas a odov, εἰς τῶν ἐγγὺς οὐδὲν αὑτὴν συγκαθιεῖσα. SEO. [lds τοῦτο λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες; 20. Ὥσπερ καὶ Θαλῆν ἀστρονομοῦντα, ὦ Θεό. B) Vf Lf > 4 δωρε, καὶ ἄνω βλέποντα, πεσόντα εἰς φρέαρ, ΄“ ᾽ὔὕ Oparra 3 \ Ν / \ 3 a ’, Tts ἐμμελὴς καὶ χαρίεσσα θεραπαιιὴς ἁποσκώψαι λέ- \ \ 3 5) ca - / \ γεται, WS τὰ μὲν ἐν ουρανῷ προθυμοῖτο εἰδέναι, τὰ 2, val \ δ᾽ ἔμπροσθεν αὐτοῦ καὶ παρὰ πόδας λανθάνοι αὐτόν. νὰν A ϑ An A B® / “ _TAVTOV δὲ QPKEL σκωμμα €7l TAVTAS OG Ol somewhat abrupt; and.also that the term γεωμετροῦσα 1S more naturally applicable to the sur- face than to the lower parts of the Earth. 2. τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου] Ὃ γὰρ συνοπτικὸς διαλεκτικός, 6 δὲ μή, οὔ. (Rep. γ. 537 ΟΣ) See the humorous illustration of this in the Republic, 5. 474 C: Ὅτι ὃν ἂν φῶμεν φιλεῖν τι, δεῖ φανῆναι αὐτόν, ἐὰν ὀρθῶς λεγῆ- ται, οὐ τὸ μὲν φιλοῦντα ἐκείνου, τὸ δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ πᾶν στέργοντα, k.T.X. ἘΠῚ τὖ 6. 486 A Ἐναντιώτατον σμικρολογία ψυχῇ μελλούσῃ τοῦ ὅλου καὶ παντὸς ἀεὶ ἐπορέξεσθαι θείου τε καὶ ἀνθρωπίνου... 7 οὖν ὑπάρχει διανοίᾳ μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ θεωρία παντὸς μὲν χρόνου, πάσης δὲ οὐσίας, οἷόν τε οἴει τούτῳ μέγα τι δοκεῖν εἶναι τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον; Ibid. 500 B. 3. ὅλου] ‘In its universal aspect.’ εἰς τῶν ἐγγύς] ‘Not lower- ing herself to contemplate any of the things surrounding her,’ 4. Theodorus does not at once understand the contrast between ‘things universal and things near,’ 6. Oparrd τις] “Θρᾷτταν a pa- tria ancillam hance dicit,. ἐμμελής autem h. 1. ad leporem et ve- nustatem in jocando trahendam docuit Rubnken. ad Longin. Ρ. 261. Fabellam hine forte duxit Laért. 1. 34” Heind., Does not ἐμμελής rather refer to the slave's neatness in her own department? Cp. τορῶς καὶ ον 175 EH, 4A trim and dainty Thracian handmaid.’ The opposite is implied in ἀσχημοσύνη... ἀβελτερίας, infr. CO, The same jestoccursin Chaucer, The Millere’s Tale, 3458-60: ‘He walked in the feldes for to prie Upon the starres, what ther should befalle, Til he was in a yfalle.’ ΤΟ. ταὐτὸν δὲ ἀρκεῖ σκῶμμα] ‘The same piece of raillery does not fail to apply,’—‘will serve.’ For the metaphorical use of ἀρκεῖν ἐπί cp. Soph. Ant. 6rr: Τό τ᾽ ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ πρὶν ἐπαρκέσει νόμος ὅδε. For the application of the σκῶμμα in the mouth of an enemy see the speech of Cal- licles in the Gorgias, 484 sqq., which presents many points of similarity to the present pas- sage, marlepit ἐν φιλο-. - traversing the earth and hea- ven, com- passing the whole of everything. e is laughed at by ordinary ‘people, as Thales was by the — Thracian maid-ser- vant. For knowing nothing of his neigh- bour, while he searches into the nature of man, he appears helpless in public and private life, having no topics for scandal, and despis- ing the common subjects of praise and boasting : thinking of a king merely as the shep- herd of a trouble- some flock, who for want of lei- sure must be a clown : looking upon broad acres as a narrow strip of earth: and on high pe- digree as but a single reach in the descent of an end- less river. 120 , ’ a δ 5», XN A e \ : σοφίᾳ διάγουσι. τῷ γὰρ ὄντι τὸν τοιοῦτον ὁ μὲν P. 174: wey ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ , ΝΣ , , » / “ , Β πλησίον καὶ ὁ γειτων λέληθεν, οὐ μόνον ὅ τι πράττει, 9 yy , 5, yay ἀλλ᾽ ὀλίγου καὶ εἰ avOpwros ἐστιν ἤ τι ἄλλο θρέμμα" / / > 5 Ν oS \ / a / ld τί δὲ ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος Kal τί TH τοιαύτῃ φύσει 5 προσήκει διάφορον τῶν ἄλλων ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, ζητεῖ τε καὶ πράγματ᾽ ἔχει διερευνώμενος. μανθάνεις » γάρ που, ὦ Θεόδωρε. ἢ οὖ: ΘΕΟ. Ἔγωγε: καὶ ἀληθῆ λέγεις" ΣΏ. Τοιγάρτοι, ὦ φίλε, ἰδίᾳ τε συγγιγνόμενος ὁ το τοιοῦτος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δημοσίᾳ, ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον, 20 0 ἐν δικα ίῳ ἢ χλλοθι ἀ θῃ ὶ ὅταν ἐν στηρίῳ ἢ που ἄλλοθι avayKacOn περὶ lad \ / a a τῶν παρὰ πόδας Kal τῶν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς διαλέγεσθαι, ’ / > / 4 » \ Ν i γέλωτα παρέχει ov μόνον Θρᾷτταις ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἄλλῳ ὄχλῳ, εἰς φρέατά τε καὶ πᾶ ἱπορίαν ἐμπί- Ὁ Ὄχλῷ, εἰς φρέατὰ τε καὶ πᾶσαν ἀπορίαν ἐμπί ς ἊΝ » 7 Q e 5 / / / 15 TT@OV ὕπο ἀπειρίας, καὶ ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη Sewn, δόξαν > / / »Ἱ \ a / ἀβελτερίας παρεχομένη. ev τε yap ταῖς λοιδορίαις > rar 2Q/ > Oia ts Φπτὶ \ ἰδιον ἔχει οὐδὲν οὐδένα λοιδορεῖν, ar οὐκ εἰδὼς κακὸν 5 ΘΥΝ > \ 3 ra Ν ,ὔ 5 an 3 οὐδὲν οὐδενὸς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ μεμελετηκέναι: ἀπορῶν οὖν “ if yy lo > , ΄σ a γελοῖος φαίνεται" ἐν TE τοῖς ἐπαίνοις Kal ταῖς TOV ἄλλων μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ χλλὰ τῷ ὅ μεγαλαυχίαις, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι lot yf / 7] “-“ε 5 / γελῶν ἐνδηλος γιγνόμενος ληρώδης δοκεῖ εἶναι. τύ- / iN Ἃ ld > ld σ΄ a pavvov Te yap ἢ βασιλέα ἐγκωμιαζόμενον ἕνα τῶν 4. τῇ τοιαύτῃ] Sc. ἀνθρωπίνῃ. 10. ὅπερ ἀρχόμενος ἔλεγον] These words refer only to δη- pooia, and recall 172 C. 14. εἰς φρέατα] ‘Into pitfalls and all manner of perplexity.’ Cp. supr. 165 Bs: Τὸ. λεγόμενον ev φρέατι συνεχόμενος. But the words immediately refer to supr. A: Πεσόντα ἐς φρέαρ. 15. ἡ ἀσχημοσύνη] ‘And the awkwardness of the position is terrible, making him seem no better than. a fool.’ 17. ἴδιον] I. 6. he cannot use personality in invective. 20, οὐ προσποιήτως, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι] Cp. 173 E: Οὐ γὰρ ai- τῶν ἀπέχεται τοῦ εὐδοκιμεῖν χάριν, Kit. 21. τύραννον. . ἐγκωμιαζόμενον] Governed (1) by ἀκούων, im- plied in ἀκούειν below : or (2) more truly, an accusativus pen- dens. τε is answered by δέ in γῆς δέ, «7A. infr, 22. ἕνα τῶν νομέων] Comp. the Politicus, 266 1), where this is regarded as the most universal conception of the D SEAITHTOS. 121 , Ὁ ᾽ὔ ἋἋ , yf 7 p 114: νομέων, οἷον συβώτην, ἢ ποιμένα, ἤ τινα βουκόλον ΄“ \ ἡγεῖται ἀκούειν εὐδαιμονιζόμενον πολὺ βδάλλοντα. A / δυσκολώτερον δὲ ἐκείνων ζῷον καὶ ἐπιβουλότερον / Ν 4 / 3 JA ποιμαίνειν τε καὶ βδάλλειν νομίζει αὐτούς. ἀγροικον δ Ν 3 , ε νΝ > 5ῸΝ @ - δὲ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον ὑπὸ ἀσχολίας οὐδὲν ἧττον τῶν 4 Ν aA ~ ’ \ > νομέων τὸν τοιοῦτον ἀναγκαῖον γίγνεσθαι, σηκὸν ἐν 5, \ a “4 a \ o@ / opel TO τείχος περιβεβλημένον. γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία , Δ» / > / oa 5, 4 πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκουσῇ ὡς τις apa κεκτημένος θ Ν ANG, td 4 ὃ a 5 7 αυμαστα TT. HUEL ΚΕΚΤΉΤΑΙι, TQAVO LK pa OKEL QKOUVELY εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν. τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη e [2 < ant e \ ’ὔ’ὔ 7 ὑμνούντων, ὡς γενναῖός τις ἑπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους kingly office ; contemplating νομευτική AS a whole, the phi- losopher thinks of βασιλική only as a part of it: Ὅτι τῇ τοιᾷδε μεθόδῳ τῶν λόγων οὔτε σεμνοτέρου μᾶλλον ἐμέλησεν ἢ μή, τόν τε σμι- κρότερον οὐδὲν ἠτίμακε πρὸ τοῦ μείζονος, ἀεὶ δὲ Kad? αὑτὴν περαίνει τἀληθέστατον. Soph. 227 A: Τῇ τῶν λόγων μεθόδῳ σπογγιστικῆς ἢ φαρμακοποσίας οὐδὲν ἧττον οὐδέ τι μᾶλλον τυγχάνει μέλον, εἰ τὸ μὲν σμικρὰ τὸ δὲ μεγάλα ὠφελεῖ ἡμᾶς καθαῖρον. τοῦ γὰρ κτήσασθαι ἕνεκα νοῦν πασῶν τεχνῶν τὸ ξυγγενὲς καὶ τὸ μὴ ξυγγενὲς κατανοεῖν πει- βωμένη τιμᾷ πρὸς τοῦτο ἐξ ἴσου πάσας, καὶ θάτερα τῶν ἑτέρων κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιότητα οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται γελοι- ὅτερα, σεμνότερον δέ τι τὸν διὰ στρατηγικῆς ἢ φθειριστικῆς. δη- λοῦντα θηρευτικὴν οὐδὲν νενόμικεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς τὸ πολὺ χαυνότερο»ν.---- The latter passage has also a slight tinge of the irony of the text. The figure may have originated in some saying of Socrates. Compare Xen. Mem. I. 2.. 32: Ὅτι θαυμαστὸν of δοκοίη εἶναι, εἴ τις γενόμενος βοῶν ἀγέλης νομεὺς καὶ τὰς βοῦς ἐλάτ-- τους τε καὶ χείρους ποιῶν μὴ ὁμολο- γοίη κακὸς βουκόλος εἶναι, ΤΡ. § 37: Ὁ δὲ Κριτίας" ᾿Αλλὰ τῶνδέ τοί σε ἀπέχεσθαι δεήσει, τῶν σκυ- τέων καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν χαλκέων... Ναὶ μὰ Al’, ἔφη ὁ Χαρικλῆς, καὶ τῶν βουκόλων γε" εἰ δὲ μή, φυλάττου, ὅπως μὴ καὶ σὺ ἐλάττους τὰς βοῦς ποιήσης. 2. πολὺ βδάλλοντα] ‘As: be- ing rich.in milk,’ i.e. ‘squeezing out much wealth.’ Compare the speeches of Thrasymachus in Rep. 1. 3. ἐκείνων] Masculine. 4. ποιμαίνειν. τε καὶ βδάλλειν] ‘Only he thinks that the crea- ture whom they tend, and out of whom they squeeze their wealth, is of a less tractable and more insidious nature.’ There is here an anticipation of the bitter satire or actual human nature which appears in the Politicus, ἄγροικον δέ.. ἀσχολίας] ‘Rough and uncivilized from stress of work,’ 6. σηκὸν ἐν ὄρει, κιτιλ.] And So cut off from the great world, over which the philosopher freely ranges, supr. 173 E. 10. γένη ὑμνούντων. .| ‘And when they cant of pedigree . ,’ or , 122 ITTAATOQNOZ » 3 A , 3 \ Q δον Ἁ EXOV ἀποφῆναι, πανταπασιν ἀμβλυ καὶ ἐπὶ σμικρον p. 174. e 7 e r Ν 37) e \ ϑ / 3 OP@VT@Y NYELTAL TOV ἐπαινον, ὑπο ἀπαιδευσίας οὐ Pp. 175- Ῥ) “ \ δυναμένων εἰς TO πᾶν ἀεὶ βλέπειν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι 4 / 7 / Chee , OTL πάππων καὶ προγόνων μυριάδες ἑκάστῳ γεγό- > 4 > € / \ ἊΝ \ vac ἀναρίθμητοι, ἐν ais πλούσιοι καὶ πτωχοὶ Kal βασιλεῖς καὶ δοῦλοι βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες πολ- ΄ / , a > 3. OOS 2 Nt Aakis μυρίοι yeyovacw ὁτῳοῦν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ πέντε καὶ 3) 7 7 , Ny ΩΝ εἰκοσι καταλογῷ προγονὼν σεμνυνομεένων και ἀναφε- ἢ > “ ΄ δῶ Τῷ , x es povrav eis Ἡρακλέα τὸν ᾿Αμφιτρύωνος ἄτοπα αὐτῷ I. παντάπασιν ἀμβλὺ... ὁρών- των] ‘Betraying a dull and con- tracted vision.’ In what fol- lows, theapodosis ἡγεῖται is twice resumed (καταφαίνεται, γελᾷ) with variations of the protasis. 4. ὅτι πάππων καὶ προγόνων] Compare the comic fragment ascribed to Menander: Men. Fragm. Inc. 4 (Meineke) :— > r , ᾽ = 3. Ss Απολεῖ pe TO γένος" μὴ λέγ᾽, εἰ φιλεῖς ἐμέ, Μῇ ae ey \ ΄ =, ec KR a , nTEp, ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστῳ TO γένος" ois ἂν TH φύσει ἾἊ θὸ ¢ , 6 \ pee ἐς , γαθὸν ὑπάρχῃ μηθὲν οἰκεῖον προσόν, > “ ’ Ἐκεῖσε καταφεύγουσιν εἰς τὰ μνήματα, \ id > ~ @ Καὶ τὸ γένος, ἀριθμοῦσίν τε τοὺς πάππους ὅσοι. Θ᾽ > »* μὴ “ 2 »>Q> ’ “ iv Οὐδ᾽ ἕνα δ᾽ ἔχοις ἰδεῖν ἄν, οὐδ᾽ εἰπεῖν, ὅτῳ Οὐ 5 ἈΝ , ὰ “-“ A » 4 3. 4» . UK €LOL TATTOO πὼς yap €«yevovT ἂν ΠΟΤΕ; K.T. λ. μυριάδες... ἀναρίθμητοι] This expression recurs frequently in later Greek authors. 6. βάρβαροί τε καὶ Ἕλληνες] These words belong to all the preceding nouns. 7. ἐπὶ πέντε... προγόνων] The order is ἐπὶ καταλόγῳ πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι προγόνων. 8. ἀναφερόντων] Se. τὸ γένος, or τὴν εὐγένειαν. The genitives depend upon σμικρολογίας, or rather, more vaguely, upon the sense of the words ἄτοπα αὐτῷ καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, as δυναμένων upon γελᾷ below, κατα- In καταφαίνεται being perhaps used in its condemnatory sense, as IN καταγιγνώσκειν. 9. ἄτοπα... τῆς σμικρολογίας] The genitive is not quite analogous to ἀμήχανον εὐδαιμονίας, Apol. 41 C, which is rather quantitative : nor is it exactly equivalent to ἄτοπος ἡ σμικρολογία (like ἄσημα . . Bons, . . φώτων ἀθλίων ἱκτήρια, in Sophocles), though, as in these last cases, the adjective is isolated for the sake of em- phasis; but the genitive has the additional meaning, ‘in respect of, as after interjec- tions and epithets. Cf. Pro- tagoras 317 B: Πολλὴ μωρία καὶ τοῦ ἐπιχειρήματος. Rep.1.328 EH: Χαλεπὸν tod βίου (for its way of life?) 7. 531 D: Πάμπολνυ ἔργον λέγεις. τοῦ προοιμίου, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ ; Pheed. 99 B: Πολλὴ ἂν καὶ μακρὰ ῥᾳθυμία ἂν εἴη τοῦ λόγου. The whole sense lies some- where between σεμνυνόμενοι καὶ » 4 + ’ ~ ἀναφέροντες .. ἄτοποι φαίνονται τῆς σμικρολογίας and σεμνυνομένων καὶ , € ἀναφερόντων... ἄτοπος φαίνεται ἡ σμικρολογία. OEAITHTOS. 123 a ο \ 99 175. καταφαίνεται τῆς σμικρολογίας, ὅτι δὲ ὁ Gm Αμφι- / \ » ‘\ a 3 oS Βτρύωνος εἰς TO ἄνω πεντεκαιεικοστὸς τοιοῦτος ἦν, οἵα ’ en ’ὔ συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχη, γελᾷ οὐ δυναμένων λογίζεσθαί τε καὶ \ «© \ 9.9 > rad KQt ὁ TWEVTNKOOTOS QT αὐτου, ΄ XAVVOTHTA 3 ’ a > ΄ 3 c \ ’ ε ἀνοητου Ψυχῆς ἀπαλλάττειν. ἐν ἅπασι δὴ τούτοις 6 “- «ς Ν “A ~ ~ Τοίουτος ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν καταγελᾶται, ’ yf € “ npaves ἔχων, ὡς δοκεῖ, » e 7 3 A ἐν ἑκάστοις ἀπορῶν. ΘΕῸ. Παντάπασι τὰ γιγνόμενα λέγεις, Κρατες. o , ἐς EE 20. Ὅταν δέ γέ τινα αὑτὸς, ἈΝ 3 7 » a 3 n ckat ἐθελήσῃ τις αὐτῷ ἐκβῆναι 9 ὔ ἜΝ 7 N εἰς σκέψιν αὐτῆς δικαιοσύνης τε καὶ > a N Rae 2 ἀδικῶ ἢ σὺ ἐμέ; > / ἀδικίας, > ’ὔ’ ’ὔ ἀλλήλων διαφέρετον ; 2. οἵα συνέβαινεν] The Bodl. reads οἷα συνέβαινεν αὐτῷ τύχῃ. Perhaps rightly. The meaning in both cases is the same. ‘ He was,—what Fortune made him,’ 3. ar αὐτοῦ] Se, (1) τοῦ πεν- Τεκαιεικοστοῦ : ΟΥ̓ (2) τοῦ ᾿Αμφι- τρύωνος. But the latter (2) has less point. 11, Ὅταν δέ ye, κατιλ. | Compare Rep. 7.515 E, 16: Ei δ᾽, ἢν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐντεῦθεν ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ διὰ τραχείας τῆς ἀναβάσεως καὶ ἀνάν- τους, καὶ μὴ ἀνείη πρὶν ἐξελκύσειε πρὸς τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς, ἄρα οὐχὶ ὀδυνᾶσθαί τε ἂν καὶ ἑλκόμενον, καὶ ἐπειδὴ πρὸς τὸ φῶς ἔλθοι, αὐγῆς ἂν ἔχοντα τὰ ὄμματα μεστὰ ὁρᾶν οὐδ᾽ ἂν ἐν δύνασθαι τῶν νῦν λεγομένων ἀληθῶν. τινα. τις] The indefinites are used with an indirect refer- ence to τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον καὶ δριμὺν καὶ δικανικόν below (0). 12. καὶ.. αὐτῷ] ‘ And he finds > r ayavakTety 7] ε ’ὕ > a XQ 7 a Tt TE €KATEPOV QUTOL καὶ TL τῶν \ \ ς Τὰ MEV UTTED~ \ Se 3 \ » a Ν τὰ δ᾽ ἐν ποσὶν ἀγνοῶν τε καὶ ὦ Σώ- Q )ὔ e Ze 5, ὦ φίλε, ἑλκύσῃ ἄνω, ᾽ a / >’ N ‘ εκ τοῦ Τὶ ἐγὼ σὲ , “Ἃ πάντων ἢ ἢ ἐκ τοῦ Ei βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων Some one willing.’ Supr. 154 EK, Rep. 1. 343A, ete. 15. Εἰ βασιλεὺς εὐδαίμων] See the passage of the Gorgias (471), in which Polus con- tends that Archelaus is happy. (Diog. Τὰ mentions a diatribe of Antisthenes, called ᾿Αρχέλαος, ἢ περὶ βασιλείας, in which Gor- gias was assailed.) Buttmann thus defends εἰ, which a few MSS. omit: ‘Quamvis certum exploratum- que haberent vulgares illi ora- tores, regem propter divitias suas unice beatum putandum esse, tamen rem ita in encomiis tractabant, ut, quasi dubia ea videri posset, multis eam exem- plis argumentisque probarent. Quidni igitur v. τς encomii alicujus in Creesum ‘argumen- tum his verbis indicari potu- erit; εἰ Κροῖσος εὐδαίμων ;᾿ Tf εἰ is retained, a certain point may be given to aé (with Cou- Io But when he takes the other up into his own region, from ques- tions of pri- vate wrong, 15 to inquire What jus- tice is, from diatribeson the theme ‘Is a king happy ?’ to contem- plate the idea of the royal office and of hu- man happi- ness, Then that dwarfed shrewd le- gal mind is 124 ITAATONO®S - 9 3 δ ,ὕ / , Ν Κεκτήμενος T αὖ πολὺ χρυσίον, βασιλείας πέρι καὶ 9 7 Ψ >’ , XY 2 / x, A ’ὔὕ ἀνθρωπίνης ὅλως εὐδαιμονίας καὶ ἀθλιότητος ἐπὶ σκέ- / / 3 XN \ / / 3 / Ww, ποίω τέ τινε ἐστὸν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἀνθρώπου / / N \ / > a N δον 8 φύσει προσήκει τὸ μὲν κτήσασθαι αὐτοῖν, τὸ δὲ ἀπο- a Ν , e ΄ “ 3 / / 5 φυγεῖν,----περὶ τούτων ἁπάντων ὅταν αὖ δέῃ λόγον , x \ Son \ \ \ \ διδόναι τὸν σμικρὸν ἐκεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ δριμὺν Q / ’ὔ 5 \ 3 , ΕῚ Md καὶ δικανικόν, πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν" a XN A / ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀπὸ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθεὶς καὶ βλέπων με- if 5, XN an > a Tewpos ἄνωθεν ὑπὸ ἀηθείας, ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν sin, Wagner, H. Schmidt) by supposing βασιλεύς and κεκτη- μένος to be distinct subjects: ‘Is a king, or, again, one pos- sessed of much gold, to be ac- counted happy?’ It may be questioned, however, whether ἦ βασιλεύς might not give a better meaning. In any way of taking the words as they stand, re seems to impede the sense, and αὖ is superfluous. If Plato is really quoting from ἃ rhetorician, this is possibly not a fatal ob- jection, though the conjectures πάνυ πολύ, πάμπολυ, (Heusd. Hirschig. Badh.) would: seem probable. (Schanz reads from Madvig’s conj. βασιλεὺς ἐὐδαίμων κεκτημένος THU χρυσίον) Ῥοϑ- sibly, however, the words βασι- λεὺς, χρυσίον are adapted from Some poet. (Cp. Theogn.: Εὐ- δαίμων εἴην, καὶ θεοῖς φίλος ἀθανά- Toot, Κύρν᾽, ἀρετῆς δ᾽ ἄλλης οὐδεμιᾶς ἔραμαι.) In which case γᾶν πολύ- Χρυσον is perhaps the true reading. For κεκτημένος in such an adaptation, cp. (besides Pro- tag. 340 D quoted above), the quotation of Tyrtzus in the Laws, 62y A: οὔτ᾽ ἂν μνη- σαίμην οὔτ᾽ ἐν. λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθεί- μην, οὔτ᾽ εἰ πλουσιώτατος ἀνθρώ- mov εἴη, φησίν, οὔτ᾽ εἰ πολλὰ ἀγαθὰ κεκτημένος, εἰπὼν σχεδὸν ἅπαντα, k.T.A. (E. g. the lines might run Ei βασιλεὺς εἴην, ἴσχ- οιμι δὲ γᾶν πολύχρυσον.) There is a close parallel between the present passage and 174 B: Τοιγάρτοι, x.7.d. Cp. ri ἐγὼ σὲ ἀδικῶ with ἐν δικαστηρίῳ... ἀναγκασθῇ λέγειν: ἢ σὺ ἐμέ with ἐν ταῖς λοιδορίαις : εἰ (or ἢ) βασιλεύς. with τύ- ραννόν τε yap... 2. ἐπὶ σκέψιν] MSS. ἐπίσκεψιν. Bekker corr. 3. ἀνθρώπου φύσει] Cp. supr. 174 B: Τῇ τοιαύτῃ φύσει. 8. ἰλιγγιῶν τε] ‘He gives the philosopher his revenge ; (for) dizzied by the strange experi- ence of hanging at such a height and looking downwards from mid-air, and being dis- mayed and lost, and broken in his utterance, he is laughed at, not by Thracian handmaids, nor by any other of the un- educated, for they do not per- ceive his plight; but by all whose nurture has been the reverse of servile.’ The sentence probably di- vides after ἀηθείας, and ἀδημονῶν Te... answers to ἰλιγγιῶν τε. (ἰλιγγιῶν τε. γάρ add. Ven, &. This is quite unnecessary.) Ρ. 175. ρ. 175. καὶ ΘΕΑΙΤΉΤΟΣ. ἄλλῳ ἀπαιδεύτῳ οὐδενί, 125 ’ὔ A βαρβαρίζων, γέλωτα Oparrais μὲν οὐ παρέχει οὐδ᾽ » Ἁ 5 an ov yap αἰσθάνονται, τοῖς. δ᾽ > / a ε 3 ΄ - σ“ @ ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς ἀνδραπόδοις τραφεῖσιν ἅπασιν. Οὗτος δ ’ὔ / δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, Ε ἐλευθερίᾳ \ “~ 4 TE καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένου, ® Θεύδωρε. 6 μὲ ao. ? Ope, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ὃν δὴ φιλόσο- qn @ ᾽ ;» 339 σ΄ Q 3 \ pov καλεῖς, @ ἀνεμέσητον εὐήθει δοκεῖν καὶ οὐδενὶ 5 σ > €LVQL, OTaV εἰς στρωματόδεσμον μὴ \ 3 V4 7 - δουλικὰ ἐμπεσῃ διακονήματα, οἷον ᾽ /, , ἐπισταμένου συσκευάσασθαι μηδὲ ὄψον ἡδῦναι ἢ θῶπας λόγους: ὁ δ᾽ αὖ τὰ μὲν A ? , an τοιαυτα TavTa δυναμένου Topas κονεῖν, ἀναβάλλεσθαι δὲ Ts βαρβαρίζων] Lit. ‘Speak- ing a strange dialect: ’"—strange i.e. to the inhabitants of the higher region. Schanz admits into the text Pierson’s con- jecture βατταρίζων (Ἢ stammer- ing’), founded ona passage in Themistius which seems an echo of this ; Themist. 22. 278 b: Ὄψει γὰρ ἰλεγγιῶσαν εὐθέως καὶ λογιζομένην καὶ βατταρίζουσαν. But there is no sufficient reason for rejecting βαρβαρίζων. 6. ᾧ ἀνεμέσητον] * Who may, without our surprise or cen- Sure, appear simple and a mere cipher, when some menial ser- vice is required of him, if he has no skill, for instance, in tying up bedclothes with the proper knot, nor in flavouring a sauce, or a fawning speech :— the other character is that ofthe man who is able to do all such service with smartness and de- spatch, but has not the skill to throw his cloak over his right shoulder with a gentlemanly grace; no, nor to celebrate aright with the music of dis- course, in his turn, that life which is lived in truth by the TE καὶ ὀξέως δια- 5» » , 3 ’ Οὐκ ἐπισταμένου ἐπιδέξια immortals and by heaven-fa- voured men.’ Cobet requiresotdévfor οὐδενί. But the dative, whether mascu- line or neuter, is analogous to Soph. (Βα. Tyr. IOIg: Ἐξ ἴσου τῷ μηδενί, and agrees better with εὐήθει. 8. ἐπισταμένου] So Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π. ἐπιστάμενος cett. 10. τορῶς] ‘Smartly.’ dre δὴ δριμὺς ὦν. II. ἀναβάλλεσθαι, . ἐπιδέξια] Probably, (x) ‘to wear his gar- mentover his rightshoulder in a gentlemanly fashion,’ Aristoph. Av. 1567: Οὗτος, ri δρᾷς ; ἐπ᾽ ἀριστέρ᾽ οὕτως ἀμπέχει ; [ οὐ μετα- βαλεῖς θοἰμάτιον ὧδ᾽ ἐπὶ δεξιά; Or, possibly, ἐπιδέξια may mean ‘cleverly,’ ‘deftly.’ Cp. Hor. Ep. 1.1.96: ‘Si toga dissidet im- par, Rides. Quid, mea cum pug- nat sententia secum?’ (2) A pos- sible rendering at first sight is, ‘to strike up the song in his turn,’ Cp. οὐδέ γ᾽ ἁρμονίαν λό- γῶν λαβόντα, and ep. Rep. 4. 420 ἘΣ: Κατακλίναντες ἐπὶ δεξιὰ πρὸς τὸ πῦρ διαπίνοντας, Symp. 177 Ὁ: Εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιά. But one person could hardly be 5 puzzled in its turn, and be- comes a laughing- stock not to the unedu- cated, but to the wise and free, The philo- sopher may be well con- tent toseem unskilledin servile arts, in compari- son with those who are dumb in the high- est music of the soul, 126 TTAATONOS ἐλευθέρως οὐδέ γ᾽ ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς p. 176 a A a 2 / / es ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. Q a SEO. Ei πάντας, ὦ Σώκρατες, πείθοις ἃ λέγεις io 3 ia 7 Ἃ 9 , ἣν \ 3 4 » ὥσπερ ἐμέ, πλείων ἂν εἰρήνη καὶ κακὰ ἐλάττω κατ » 7 of 5 ἀνθρώπους εἴη. 2Q. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὔτ΄. drrodéabar rd κακὰ δυνατόν, ὦ Θεόδωρε: e 7 4 a 3 a SN 5 ὑπέναντιον γὰρ Tl T@ ἀγαθῷ QEL εἰναι , σι ΑἉ / \ Ἁ Ss ἀνάγκη" οὔτ᾽ ἐν θεοῖς αὐτὰ ἱδρύσθαι, τὴν δὲ θνητὴν / Ν ’, Ν / om τ > / dvow καὶ τόνδε τὸν τόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. said to sing ἐπὶ δεξιά, and the antithesis requires the other rendering. The slave can tuck in and pack up bedclothes, the freeman wearshis garment with a grace. Theslaves’ contribution to the banquet is literally ὄψον ἡδῦναι, figuratively θῶπας λόγους ἡδῦναι. Supr.173 A. (Cp. Gorg. 465D: Τὴν ῥητορικὴν... ἀντίστρο--: ov ὀψοποιΐας ἐν Ψυχῇ ὡς ἐκεῖνο ἐν σώματι) The “ freeman’s’ part is literally the lyre and Song ; in a higher sense, dis- course of philosophy and virtue. This is his proper ἔρανος, Cp. Symp. 174 D, where the minstrel is dismissed, and Eryximachus proposes that they should discourse of the praises of love: Δοκεῖ yap μοι χρῆναι ἕκαστον ἡμῶν λόγον εἰπεῖν ἔπαινον Ἔρωτος ἐπὶ δεξιὰ ὡς ἂν δύνηται κάλλιστον, Prot, 347 There is a further ‘har- mony’ between the discourse and life of the philosopher ; Lach. 188 D: Καὶ κομιδῇ μοι δοκεῖ μουσικὸς ὁ τοιοῦτος εἶναι, ἁρμονίαν καλλίστην ἡρμοσμένος οὐ λύραν οὐδὲ παιδιᾶς ὄργανα, ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντι ζῆν ἡρμοσμένος αὐτὸς αὑ- τοῦ τὸν βίον ξύμφωνον τοῖς λόγοις πρὸς τὰ ἔργα, ἀτεχνῶς δωριστὶ ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἰαστί, οἴυμαι δὲ οὐδὲ φρυγιστὶ οὐδὲ λυδιστί, ἀλλ᾽ ἥπερ μόνη “Ἑλληνική ἐστιν ἁρμονία. There is an allusion to the well-known custom of taking the lyre in turn. θῶπας λόγους is perhaps rightly supposed by Ruhnk. ad Tim. p.146 to be a poetical expression, quoted perhaps from Euripides or Epicharmus, 2. θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαι- μόνων βίον ἀληθὴ] There is a rhythmical cadence in the words, cp. Phedr. 261 A: Πάριτε δή, θρέμματα γενναῖα, καλλίπαιδά τε Φάϊδρον πείθετε. Rep. 617 D: ᾿Ανάγκης θυγατρὸς κόρης Λαχέσεως λόγος, x. τ. Δ, Symp. 197 E, the end of Aga- thon’s speech. This is not improved by deleting ἀληθὴ with Cobet, and go leaving an iambic ending ——VY—U=, 7. ὑπεναντίον yap | Compare the saying of Heraclitus, Fr. 56: Παλίντονος ἁρμονίη κόσμου ὅκωσπερ λύρας καὶ τόξου. The preposi- tion conveys the idea of ‘ bear- ing up against.’ 9. τόνδε τὸν τόπον] Viz. τὸν σωματοειδῇ τε καὶ ὁρατὸν τόπον, Rep. 7. 532. ἢ. The imagery of place in which Plato’s philoso- phy is enfolded appears most prominently in the Phedo, the Pheedrus, and Rep. 6 and ης The notion that evil must SEAITHTOS. , B TAXLOTA. 127 176. διὸ καὶ πειρᾶσθαι χρὴ ἐνθένδε ἐκεῖσε φεύγειν ὅ τι \ \ € / ~ \ \ / φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν. ε / \ / Nye, \ ’ / ὁμοίωσις δὲ δίκαιον καὶ ὅσιον μετὰ φρονήσεως γενέ- exist in everything but the Divine Nature reappears: in a curious mythical form in the Politicus, 270; and is im- plied Tim. 48 A: "EE ἀνάγκης καὶ νοῦ συστάσεως. 86 B: Τὰ δὲ περὶ Ψυχὴν (se. νοσήματα) διὰ σώματος ἕξιν, κτλ. Ib, 69 D: Ξυγκερα- σάμενοί τ᾽ αὐτὰ ἀναγκαίως τὸ Ovn- τὸν γένος ξυνέθεσαν. In the Phedo evil is almost identi- fied with the bodily principle. Our ignorance on the subject is, however, confessed in the Lysis, 220 E, 221: Πότερον, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐὰν τὸ κακὸν ἀπόληται, οὐδὲ πεινῆν ἔτι ἔσται οὐδὲ διψῆν οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν τοιούτων ; , , ἢ γελοῖον τὸ ἐρώτημα, ὅ τί ποτ᾽ ἔσται τότε ἢ μὴ ἔσται ; τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ; 2. φυγὴ δὲ ὁμοίωσις θεῷ] Pheedr. 252 ἘΠῚ: Ἰχρεύοντες δὲ παρ᾽ ἑαυτῶν ἀνευρίσκειν τὴν τοῦ σφετέρου θεοῦ φύσιν, εὐποροῦσι διὰ τὸ συντόνως ἠναγκάσθαι πρὸς τὸν θεὸν βλέπειν, καὶ ἐφαπτόμενοι αὐτοῦ τῇ μνήμῃ, ἐνθουσιῶντες, ἐξ ἐκείνου λαμβάνουσι τὰ ἔθη καὶ τὰ ἐπιτηδεύματα, καθ᾽ ὅσον δυνατὸν θεοῦ ἀνθρώπῳ μετασχεῖν. Rep. το. 613 A: οὐ yap δὴ ὑπό ye θεῶν ποτὲ ἀμελεῖται, ὃς ἂν προθυμεῖσθαι ἐθέλῃ δίκαιος γίγνε-- σθαι καὶ ἐπιτηδεύων ἀρετὴν εἰς ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀνθρώπῳ ὁμοιοῦσθαι θεῷ. Ib. 6. 500 Β: οὐδὲ γάρ που, ὦ ᾿Αδείμαντε, σχολὴ τῷ γε ὡς ἀληθῶς πρὸς τοῖς οὖσι τὴν διάνοιαν ἔχοντι κάτω βλέπειν εἰς ἀνθρώπων πραγματείας καὶ μαχό- μενον αὐτοῖς φθόνου τε καὶ dya- μενείας ἐμπίπλασθαι, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς Τεταγμένα ἅττα καὶ κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα ὁρῶντας καὶ θεωμένους οὔτ᾽ ἀδικοῦντα οὔτ᾽ ἀδικούμενα ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων, κόσμῳ δὲ πάντα καὶ κατὰ λόγον ἔχοντα, ταῦτα μιμεῖ- σθαΐί τε καὶ ὅ τι μάλιστα ἀφομοι- οὔσθαι. Phed. 107 C: Νῦν δὲ ἐπειδὴ ἀθάνατος φαίνεται οὖσα, οὐδεμία ἂν εἴη αὐτῇ ἄλλη ἀποφυγὴ κακῶν οὐδὲ σωτηρία πλὴν τοῦ ὡς βελτίστην τε καὶ Φρονιμωτάτην γενέσθαι. Tim. 90 B: Τῷ δὲ περὶ φιλομάθειαν καὶ περὶ τὰς ἀληθεῖς φρονήσεις ἐσπουδακότι καὶ ταῦτα μάλιστα τῶν αὑτοῦ γεγυμνασμένῳ φρονεῖν μὲν ἀθάνατα καὶ θεῖα, ἄνπερ ἀληθείας ἐφάπτηται, πᾶσα ἀνάγκη που, Kad ὅσον δ᾽ αὖ με- τασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνη φύσις ἀθανα- σίας ἐνδέχεται, τούτου μηδὲν μέρος ἀπολείπειν, διὰ τὸ καταμανθάνειν τὰς τοῦ παντὸς ἁρμονίας τε καὶ περιφοράς, τῷ Κατανοουμένῳ τὸ κατανοοῦν ἐξομοιῶσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀρχαίαν φύσιν. 3. ὁμοίωσις δέ] ‘And to be made like to Him is to be- come righteous and holy, not without wisdom.’ μετὰ φρονήσεως] 15. virtue possible apart from know- ledge? This question is dis- cussed in the Protagoras and the Meno. The answer given is, that practically it would appear so, but that perfect vir- tue must be inseparable from knowledge. And in the Meno the paradox is solved by saying that practical virtue is a Divine gift, θείᾳ μοίρᾳ προσγιγνομένη ἄνευ vod, but that if ever there should be a virtuous man who could teach virtue, he would be like Teiresias amongst the shades ; ὥσπερ παρὰ σκιὰς ἀληθὲς ἂν πρᾶγμα εἴη πρὸς ἀρετήν, In Men will not hear this: for there must be some evil to re- sist the good, and this cannot dwell in heaven, but must wan- der about this lower world. Our wisdom therefore is to escape heaven- wards, by becoming 128 5) \ / Ὅν 3. 3 ’ σθαι. ἀλλὰ yap, ὦ ἀριστε, οὐ πᾶνυ ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 5᾽ 5 χὰ 4 e » a / Ἁ apa οὐχ ὧν ἐνεκᾶ Ob πολλοί φασι δεῖν πονηρίαν μεν / > Ν \ / / 4 Ν \ > φεύγειν, ἀρετὴν δὲ διώκειν, τούτων χάριν TO μὲν ἐπι" , a 7 & \ \ \ “ὦ ᾽ \ τηδευτέον, TO δ᾽ OV, ἵνα δὴ μὴ κακὸς καὶ WO. ἀγαθὸς δοκῇ εἰναι. na , 5 / a ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ὃ λεγόμενος YpawVv ὕθλος, ὡς ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. τὸ δὲ ἀληθὲς ὧδε λέγωμεν. θεὸς οὐδαμῇ οὐδαμῶς ἄδικος, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς οἷόν τε δικαιό- / \ 5 32) =) “ι΄ ε 5. ΧἋ A x TATOS, και OUK €OTLY αὐτῷ ομοιοτέρον οὐδὲν ω) ος αν ε n 5 ,ὔ ᾿ / ἡμῶν αὖ γένηται ὃ TL δικαιότατος. the more dialectical dialogues one side of the -contradiction disappears, and it 15 assumed that philosophy is essential to real virtue. Phed. 69 AB: 70 μακάριε Σιμμία, μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἀλ- λαγή, ἡδονὰς πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας πρὸς λύπας καὶ φόβον πρὸς φόβον καταλλάττεσθαι .. . GAN ἢ ἐκεῖνο τὸ νόμισμα ὀρθόν, «ὦν φρόνησις, «++ καὶ ξυλληβ- δὴν ἀληθὴς ἀρετὴ ἣ μετὰ φρονή- ‘seas, ... χωριζόμενα δὲ φρονήσεως καὶ ἀλλαττόμενα ἀντὶ ἀλλήλων, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή, x.t.d. In the Republic it is again acknowledged that it is possible to partake of virtue without philosophy, but in an imperfect way; 6. δ. in the case of the soul which laments its choice of another life; 10. 619 C: Εἶναι δὲ αὐτὸν τῶν ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ἡκόντων, ἐν τεταγμένῃ πολιτείᾳ ἐν τῷ προτέρῳ βίῳ βε- βιωκότα, ἔθει ἄνευ φιλοσοφίας ἀρετῆς μετειληφότα. And the education of the φύλακες gene- rally (not of the rulers) 1s independent of reason, though in harmony with it. Rep. 3. 401, 402. (In the Philebus also the perfect life contains the knowledge of practical things. The philosopher must / u(t περὶ τούτου Καὶ ἢ know his way home.) Thus the contradiction felt at first is reconciled by acknowledg- ing the existence of different parts of our nature, which, though connected, and indis- pensable to each other’s per- fection, are not identical. There is a slight emphasis on μετὰ φρονήσεως iM opposition to what follows. 4. wa... δοκῇ εἶναι. . ayvo- οὔσι γὰρ ζημίαν ἀδικίας] The whole of this passage is paral- lel to the speeches of Glaucon and Adeimantus in the second book of the Republic, and the same thought is differently worked out in the Gorgias. 5. ὁ λεγόμενος γραῶν ὕθλος] ‘This is what men commonly repeat, an old wives’ fable, as appears to me. The meaning of λεγόμενος here (not=‘ as the saying is’) seems determined by λέγομεν following. 9. περὶ τούτου] ‘ Moreover a man’s real ability, or else his nothingness and want of man- hood, is concerned with this.’ περὶ τοῦτο is read in the quo- tations of Jamblichus and Theodoret. It is approved by Cobet, and has been adopted by Schanz. The genitive is accounted for by the indeter- e? A ῥάδιον πεῖσαι ws Ῥ- 176. SEAITHTOS. 129 e ’ A , > \ \ ’ , \ 9 176. ws ἀληθῶς δεινότης ἀνδρὸς καὶ ovdevia τε καὶ ἄναν- wise and , ε \ ᾿ ΄ A , ee \ just and Opia. ἡ μὲν Yap TovTov γνῶσις σοφία καὶ Q2PETH dure, g0 » 7 ς \ » » ,ὔ \ 7 ᾽ 7 ε becoming ἀληθινή, ἡ δὲ ἄγνοια ἀμαθία καὶ κακία ἐνᾶργηρ' ab προ > Κ , ,ὕ A \ , > \ δ᾽ ἄλλαι δεινότητές τε δοκοῦσαι καὶ σοφίαι ἐν μὲν an / / Υ 3 \ πολιτικαῖς δυναστείαις γίγνομεναι φορτικαί, ἐν δὲ 5 77 , an 5 3 A Q > Ve f iar τέχναις Bavavoot. τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι καὶ ἀνόσια λέ- — Thisiga Ἂ ΄ὕ na » ee κ᾿ A man’s true DYovTt ἢ πράττοντι μακρῷ ἀριστ᾽ ἔχει τὸ μὴ συγχω- ‘cleverneas A Or an , 5 aa and proo ῥεῖν δεινῷ ὑπὸ πανουργίας εἶναι. ἀγάλλονται aD. abate SA we. ν oo» » ΄, Ψ ’ ee ae a And the τῷ ονείδει, καὶ οἴονται ἀκούειν OTL οὐ ληροί εἰσι, γῆς real penalty Bo . ai. - of vice ig ἄλλως ἄχθη, ἀλλ ἄνδρες οἵους δεῖ ἐν πόλει τοὺς το one which , , 5 ; - Ἔ ; cannot be σωθησομένους. λεκτέον οὖν τὰἀληθές, ὅτι TOTOUT@ - escaped by (τὸ / > © » / co 5.) ἃ ” 3 clever μαλλοὸν εἰσιν οἷοι οὐκ οἰονται, OTL οὐχὶ οἴονται" αγνο- shifts. For A \ , > , ἃ na o 9 a = to act Ovot yap ζημίαν ἀδικίας, ὃ δεῖ ἥκιστα θεῖν, δὴν —-Sronsiy τ, ΄ » A a 7 \ , ® to be re- γὰρ ἐστιν ἣν δοκοῦσι, πληγαί τε καὶ Oavaro, ὧν oe? from Cae, ΄, 2Q\ > Ξ ἢ ae ge the Divine ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν ἀδικοῦντες, ἀλλὰ ἣν ἀδύνατον 15 pattern 3 a and to be E ἐκφυγεῖν. brought minateness of the point in Aristoph. Nub. 1203: Πρόβατ᾽ question. ‘On this, one way ἄλλως, Milton, Areopagitica : or other, depends,’ etc, ἀνανδρία “Many a man lives a burden is suggested by ἀνδρός. to the Earth; but a good book 5. Φορτικαὶ.. βάναυσοι] “]- ig the precious life-blood of a gar’—‘ mechanical,’ or ‘mean,’ master spirit,’ The contrast here is not be- λῆροι] Charm. 176 A: Ἐμὲ tween truth and falsehood, μὲν λῆρον ἡγεῖσθαι εἶναι καὶ ddim but, as in the Politicus, be- νατον λόγῳ ὁτιοῦν (ζητεῖν. Pheed, tween the actual and the ideal. 72 Ο: Τελευτῶντα πάντ ‘dy λῆρον τῷ οὖν ἀδικοῦντι, K. τ, λ.] τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα ἀποδείξειε καὶ οὐ- This very favourite thought is δαμοῦ ἂν φαίνοιτο. developed in the Gorgias. See IO. οἵους. τοὺς σωθησομένους] esp. 524-7. ‘Such as all must be in the fe TO μὴ, . ὑπὸ πανουργίας city who are to live securely εἶναι] ‘Not to admit that vil- there’ ‘Such ag those must lany constitutes him a clever be in the state whose lives man, _ are not to be forfeit,’ i.e. en- 9. οὐ λῆροι] ‘That they are dangered by every accusation not mere absurdities, cumber- (Wohlrab). Cp. Soph. Ant, ing the ground — not sole- 189: "HS ἐστὶν ἡ σώζουσα. cisms,’ as Carlyle might Say. 14. ὧν ἐνίοτε πάσχουσιν οὐδὲν γῆς ἄλλως ἄχθη] ἐτώσιον ἄχθος ἀδικοῦντες] ‘Which men often ἀρούρης (Il. 18, 104, quoted escape entirely in doing wrong.’ in Apol. 28), Od. 20. 379, “ὧν pendet ab οὐδέν, Heindorf. 130 ITAATQNO2 nearer to GEO. Tiva δὴ λέγεις ; 176, the likeness 7 Ὲ . ne Ε ἈΠ é 5 ss ἼΤΩ τ ΣΏΩ. Παραδειγμάτων, ὦ φίλε, ἐν τῷ ὄντι ἑστώτων, Θ sou A \ / 7 A \ / oe so τοῦ μέν θείου εὐδαιμονεστάτου, τοῦ δὲ ἀθέου ἀθλιω- Wili ho e ° 7 3 ε a τ Ψ 27 Ἂν 3 J / received at τάτου, OVX ὁρῶντες OTL οὕτως ἔχει, ὑπὸ ἡλιθιότητος | eath into Fea! , , , α΄ ἃ the region 5 ΤῈ καὶ τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀνοίας λανθάνουσι τῷ μὲν ὁμοι- pure from A Jee ; , τ μὰ , evils—-They οὔμενοι διὰ τὰς ἀδίκους πράξεις, τῷ δὲ ἀνομοιούμενοι. Pp. 177. will laugh Su he , Ξ Ν 5. , ence at this, ov δὴ τίνουσι δίκην ζῶντες τὸν εἰκότα βίον ᾧ opot- and call us Ζ a ee o x ἜΣ: zs a simple men, ουνται. EQAV ὃ εἰπῶμεν OTL, αν [LY ἀπαλλαγῶσ. { TS δεινότητος, καὶ τελευτήσαντας αὐτοὺς ἐκεῖνος μὲν ὁ το τῶν κακῶν καθαρὸς τόπος ov δέζεται, ἐνθάδε δὲ τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς διαγωγῆς ἀεὶ ἕξουσι, κακοὶ κα- κοῖς συνόντες, ταῦτα δὴ καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοὶ καὶ a 3 / “ 3 / TAVOUPYOL GVONT@V τινῶν AKOVGOOVTAL. 3“: Παραδειγμάτων] Cp. Rep. 9. 592 B: ᾿Αλλ᾽, ἦν δ᾽ ἐγώ, ἐν οὐρανῷ ἴσως παραδεῖγμα ἀνάκειται [ως 4 ς vas Ν᾿ = a“ τῷ βουλομένῳ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὁρῶντι τ ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν. 3. ἀθέου] ‘From which all that is Divine has fled.’ 8. τῆς δεινότητος ‘From this cleverness which is their boast.’ 10. τῶν κακῶν καθαρός] Viz. ’ AA , Ν , ee) πλάνης καὶ ἀνοίας καὶ φόβων καὶ ay- ρίων ἐρώτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν τῶν ἀνθρωπείων, Pheed. 81 A. καθαρός] Pheed. 83 D: ’Ex yap τοῦ ὁμοδοξεῖν TH σώματι Kal τοῖς αὐτοῖς χαίρειν ἀναγκάζεται, οἶμαι, ὁμότροπος καὶ ὁμότροφος γίγνεσθαι Α μὲ "2 al 77 καὶ ova μηδέποτε καθαρῶς εἰς “Διδου ἀφικέσθαι ἀλλ’ ἀεὶ τοῦ σώματος ἀναπλέα ἐξιέναι, ὥστε ταχὺ πάλιν πίπτειν ἐς ἄλλο σῶμα καὶ ὥσπερ , > , % oS ΄ σπειρομένη ἐμφύεσθαι, καὶ ἐκ τού- των ἄμοιρος εἶναι τῆς τοῦ θείου τε καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ μονοειδοῦς συνουσίας. Ibid. 69 Ο: Καὶ ἡ σωφροσύνη, \ dale Wit 5 , \ K.T.A. καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ φρόνησις μὴ Ka- θαρμός τις ἧ. καὶ κινδυνεύουσι καὶ οἱ τὰς τελετὰς... καταστήσαντες... ΄, 4.Κ Ld 4 x eed πάλαι αἰνίττεσθαι ὅτι ὃς ἂν ἀμύητος καὶ ἀτέλεστος εἰς “Αἰδου ἀφίκηται, ἐν βορβύρῳ κείσεται, ὁ δὲ κεκαθαρ- μένος τε καὶ τετελεσμένος ἐκεῖσε ἀφικόμενος μετὰ θεῶν οἰκήσει. τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοιότητα τῆς δια- γωγῆς] 1. 6. (as H. Schmidt remarks) τὴν αὑτοῖς ὁμοίαν δια- γωγὴν τοῦ Biov. ‘They will always retain their way of life like to themselves — evil as they are, associating with evil things.’ Compare the well- known passage of the Pheedo, 81 C-82 A: ᾿Αλλὰ διειλημμένην γε, οἶμαι, ὑπὸ TOD σωματοειδοῦς .. κατὰ τὰς αὐτῶν ὁμοιότητας τῆς μελέτης (imitated by Milton, Comus, 467-9: ‘The soul grows clotted by contagion, Imbodies, and imbrutes, till she quite lose The divine property of her first being.’) II. κακοὶ κακοῖς συνόντες] κα- κοῖς 18 probably neuter. See H.Schmidt, Exegetischer Com- mentar, p. 139. 12. καὶ παντάπασιν ὡς δεινοί] SEAITHTOS. GEO. Καὶ μάλα δή, 131 3 v4 ὦ Σώκρατες. ἘΠ ΣΟ) Otda τοι, ὦ ἑταῖρε. ἃ ὕ » a εν βέντοι τι αυτοις συμ- βέβηκεν, ὅτι ἂν ἰδίᾳ λόγον δέῃ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξα- Ν ic ’ὔ σθαι περὶ ὧν ψέγουσι, \ i - πολὺν χρόνον ὑπομεῖναι 7 , 3 , τότε ἀτόπως, ὦ δαιμόνιε, Ve sy 4 > a καὶ ἐθελήσωσιν ἀνδρικῶς Ν \ LEN 2 / Kal μὴ ἀνανδρως φεύγειν, ἴω » Zz τελευτῶντες οὐκ ἀρέσκουσιν ϑ Q e a Ὁ Wot αὐτοῖς περὶ ὧν λέγουσι, {τυ ὧν \ Kal ἡ ῥητορικὴ ἐκείνη 3 4 (oA 7 \ “ TOS ἀπομαραίνεται, ὥστε παίδων μηδὲν δοκεῖν δια- φέρειν. Ν \ 5 ΄ Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, 3 Ν Ν 7 ἐπειδὴ καὶ πάρεργα Ve , > a > \ / / 2% τυγχάνει λεγόμενα, ἀποστῶμεν---- εἰ δὲ Hn, πλείω ἀεὶ ᾽ ὔ 7 e “ N a“ / / "4 Q : ἔφαμεν τοὺς τὴν φερομένην οὐσίαν λέγοντας, καὶ Pp. 177. NAATONOZ ἈΝ 3.8 a e / an Q 3 tA - an τὸ ἀεὶ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι τούτῳ ᾧ δοκεῖ, a 9 oe 7 ἐν μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐθέλειν διϊσχυρίζεσθαι, καὶ οὐχ oa SS \ / e Ν a A xX “- ἥκιστα περὶ τὰ δίκαια, ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον, ἃ ἂν θῆται / / en a \ ΤῊΣ / = 5 πόλις δόξαντα αὑτῇ, ταῦτα καὶ ἐστι δίκαια TH θε- ’ὔ ev Ἃ / Ν \ 3 an 10 / » μένῃ, ἐωσπέερ ἂν Κεηται" πέρι δὲ τἀγαθοῦ ovdeva αν- ἃ an SA? of 3 oa a ὃ ’ὔ’ 6 a ρειον ἐθ᾽ οὕτως εἶναι, ὠὡστε τολμᾶν διαμάχεσθαι OTL ἃ ΩΝ V4 as / e a a NY Kal ἃ av ὠφέλιμα οἰηθεῖσα πόλις ἑαυτῇ Onrat, καὶ 3. ἐν μὲν. . περὶ δὲ τάγα- θοῦ] ‘In other cases they would insist strongly on the truth of their principle ;— with respect to justice in par- ticular they would insist that the enactments of any state are just for her, so long as they remain in force ;—but when good is in question— 4. περὶ τὰ δίκαια... περὶ τἀγαθοῦ] ‘In regard to what is just— concerning what is good.’ 5. τῇ θεμένῃ] So Bodl. with Vat. Ven. Π., τιθεμένῃ T cett. 6. ἔωσπερ ἂν κέηται] Supr. 172 B: Ὅσον ἂν δοκῇ χρόνον. περὶ δὲ τἀγαθοῦ] Rep. 6. 505 Ὁ : °O δὴ διώκει μὲν ἅπασα ψυχὴ καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα πάντα πράττει, ἀπομαντευομένη τι εἶναι, ἀποροῦσα δέ, «.7.A. What is good can- not be apparent merely. (Com- pare the saying of Des Cartes and Spinoza: ‘The idea of God implies His existence.) This was not, however, universally admitted. Ar. Eth. N. 1. 3. § 3: Τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην ἔχει καὶ τἀγαθά, κ. τ.λ. τἀγαθοῦ. ὠφέλιμα] Rep. 5.45} B, 458 E: Κάλλιστα γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ λέγεται καὶ λελέξεται, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ὠφέλιμον καλὸν, τὸ δὲ βλα- βεοὸν αἰσχρόν. .. γάμους... ποι- ἤσομεν ἱεροὺς εἰς δύναμιν ὅτι μά- λιστα' εἶεν δ᾽ ἂν ἱεροὶ οἱ ὠφελι- μώτατοι. We have not yet risen to the conception of the ideal good ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας : good is still a relative term, though know- ledge begins to find a resting- place there. In the concrete the good and expedient are identical. See Spinoza, Cog. Met. 1. §§ 6,11: ‘Res sola considerata neque bona dici- tur, neque mala, sed tantum respective ad aliam, cui con- ducit ad id quod amat acqui- rendum, vel contra; ideoque unaqueeque resdiverso respectu eodemque tempore bona et mala potest dici—Deus vero dicitur summe bonus, quia omnibus conducit, nempe uni- uscujusque esse, quo nihil magis amabile, suo concursu conservando. Malum autem absolutum nullum datur, ut per se est manifestum. ‘Porro uti bonum et malum non dicitur nisi respective, sic etiam perfectio, nisi quando perfectionem sumimus pro ipsa rei essentia, quo sensu antea diximus, Deum infinitam per- fectionem habere, hoc est infi- nitam essentiam, seu infinitum esse.’ D ; OEAITHTOS. 133 » A / σ Ὃ VA > / δὰ 177. ἐστι τοσοῦτον χρόνον ὅσον ἂν κέηται ὠφέλιμα, πλὴν 78. 7 \N wy v4 A ᾽ὔ an 9 x o/ εἰ τίς TO ονομὰ λέγοι: τοῦτο δέ που σκωμμ ay εἴη Ν ἃ , 3 IY πρὸς Ὁ λέγομεν. οὐχί; SEO. Πάνυ γε. 2Q. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα 5 a& > / na ὃ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρεῖται. ΘΕΟ. Μὴ γαρ. 2Q. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ, τούτου δή που ΄ VG \ / \ ᾽ στοχάζεται νομοθετουμένη, καὶ πάντας τοὺς νόμους, 3. ὦ 5, / Ν / e > / καθ᾽ ὅσον οἴεταί τε καὶ δύναται, ως ὠφελιμωταάτους a Ἃ N » ἑαυτῇ τίθεται. ἢ πρὸς ἄλλο τι βλέπουσα νομοθε- TELTQL ; ΘΕΟ. Οὐδαμῶς. = Ξ τς 20. Ἢ οὖν καὶ τυγχάνει ἀεί, ἢ πολλὰ καὶ δια- ᾽ ε ’ ΄ μαρτάνει εκαστη ; I. πλὴν εἴ τις... λέγομεν] Rep. 7-533 1): Ἔστι δ᾽, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐ περὶ ὀνόματος ἀμφισβήτησις, οἷς τοσούτων πέρι σκέψις ὅσων ἡμῖν πρόκειτα. The scoffer is supposed to say that the legis- lature may give the name ὠφέλιμον to what it will. Cp. Charm. 163 D. 3- πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν] In respect of that which we mean. 5. Μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τὸ ὄνομα] ‘Let him not intend the name but the thing which is con- templated under it.’ γάρ re- fers to Theodorus’ πάνυ ye. Badham’s conjecture, τὸ πρᾶγμα ὃ ὀνομάζομεν θεωρείτω, has re- ceived a curious apparent con- firmation from the variant which appears on the margin of two MSS. (Ven. 1 and Ces.), ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα τὸ ὀνομαζόμενον θεωρείτω. But it may still be doubted whether this is not a coincidence of conjectures. For λέγειν in Plato is rather ‘to mean’ than ‘to say.’ For the sense cp. Ar. Met. 1. 1006: Τὸ δ᾽ ἀπορούμενον od τοῦτό ἐστιν, εἰ ἐνδέχεται τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον τὸ ὄνομα, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρᾶγμα. 7. Μὴ γάρ! These words were put into Socrates’ mouth in the edd. before Heindorf. Cp. Soph. 257 B: Μὴ τοίνυν λέγωμεν, κιτιλ. Oe. μὴ γάρ. ὃ. ὃ ἂν τοῦτο ὀνομάζῃ] ‘ What- ever name the State gives to this’ (τὸ πρᾶγμα, supr.). ΤΌ. καθ᾽ ὅσον οἴεταί τε καὶ δύ- varat]| ‘To the extent of her opinion and her power.’ I. 6. She prescribes what she thinks beneficial, so far as she is able to enforce it. (She may be blind to her true interests, or a stronger power may prevent her from legislating according to her own views.) Cp. Rep. I. 338 foll. _ Ο principle to what is Be- neficial and good. A. state makes laws for the be- nefit of its members, but they are not al- ways bene- ficial. Or, to put it more generally, (for the laws regard the future benefit of the citi- ZenS, ) The man, you say, is the mea- sure of all things white, heavy, and the like, for he has 134 es . ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ GEO. Οἴμαι ἔγωγε καὶ διαμαρτάνειν. 2Q. Ἔτι τοίνυν ἐνθένδε ἂν μᾶλλον πᾶς τις ὁμο- ld > \ ~ > Ν / “ + λογήσειε ταὐτὰ ταῦτα, εἰ περὶ παντὸς τις τοῦ εἰδους » » 3 Ὁ \ Χ » VA , 3) 5᾽ ᾽ὔ EPOT@ON, ἐν ᾧ καὶ TO ὠφέλιμον τυγχάνει ον. ἐστι δέ XN / , σ x 5 που καὶ περὶ Tov μέλλοντα χρόνον. ὅταν γὰρ νομο- 4 > iA / δ / / θετώμεθα, ὡς ἐσομένους ὠφελίμους τοὺς νόμους τιθέ- 3 Ν ay Ul a \\ δι 3 ian μεθα εἰς Tov ἔπειτα χρόνον. τοῦτα δὲ μέλλον ὀρθῶς ) fe) δ / av λέγοιμεν. OEO. Πάνυ ye. 2Q. "TH δή, οὑτωσὶ ἐρωτῶμεν Πρωταγόραν ἢ Ὁ Ν “ 3 / \ > A / 7 ἄλλον τινα τῶν ἐκείνῳ τὰ αὐτὰ λεγόντων, Πάντων 7 357 θ / 3 e ’ 53 Π / μέτρον avlpwiros ἐστιν, ws ᾧατέ, ὦ Πρωταγόρα, Qn / / Χ fof = λευκῶν, βαρέων, κουῴφων, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐ τῶν τοι- 7 “ἤ Ν x, δ Ν᾿ 7 > Clee - οὐτῶν. EX@V yap QUT@OVY TO Κριτηρίον εν QAUT@, Ola 2. ἐνθένδε] ‘From the fol- lowing point of view,’ 4. ἐν ᾧ kai] For the me- thod cp. Rep. 6. 491 OC: Λαβοῦ τοίνυν ὅλου αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς, mdv- Tos περὶ σπέρματος ἢ φυτοῦ. By analysing the term ‘ beneficial’ into ‘future good’ Socrates is able to extend his proof to sensible things, and thus di- rectly to refute Protagoras. For not only ‘future good,’ but ‘future hot,’ ‘sweet,’ ‘tune- ful,’ ‘ persuasive,’ is known by the ἐπιστήμων, and by him alone. Plato also brings out the signi- ficant principle that ‘ predic- tion is the test of science.’ ἔστι δέ! Cp. τὸ ὠφέλιμον. Whatever is expedient is also referrible to future time. As elsewhere, the connotation of the term is limited by the example given, so that τὸ ὠφέ- λιμὸν here really=ré ἐν νομοθε- τήσει ὠφέλιμον, “ Expediency as a principle of legislation,’ Cp. infr.179 A. And, for the use of kai, supr. 152 B: Οὐκοῦν καὶ φαίνεται οὕτως ἑκατέρῳ ; 7. τοῦτο δέ] Op. τὸ ἐσόμενον εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον. μέλλον] The MSS. vary be- tween μᾶλλον (Bodl. Vat. Ven. Π.), μέλλει μᾶλλον (Coisl.), and μέλλον μᾶλλον (Τ᾽ pr. cett.), But μέλλον is given by the cor- rector of T. 13. λευκῶν, βαρέων, κούφων, οὐ- δενὸς ὅτου ov| Cp. supr. 171 Εἰ: Τὰ μὲν πολλὰ 7 δοκεῖ ταύτῃ καὶ ἔστιν ἑκάστῳ, θερμά, ξηρά, γλυκέα, πάντα ὅσα τοῦ τύπου τούτου. And, for the omission of μελάνων, supr. 159 C, καθεύδοντα, and note. 14. τὸ κριτήριον !͵!] The word is formed from κριτής, on the analogy of δικαστήριον. Op. Legg. 6. 767 B: Δύο δὴ τῶν λοιπῶν ἔστω κριτήρια. The pre- sent is probably one of the earliest instances of its use, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος] p. 178 OEAITHTOS. 135 , A ἢ a 5 eon 178, πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ TE οἴεται αὑτῷ Kal 5, 3 σ΄ OVTA. οὐχ οὕτως; ΘΕΟ. Οὕτως. ΣΏ. Ἦ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι, φήσομεν, ὦ “- > 4 37 Ν 7 » e a \ - x σ Πρωταγόρα, EXEL τὸ KplLTN PLOY ἐν αὐτῳ" καὶ Ola ἂν οἰηθῃ ἐσεσθ ἢ ὶ γῶ ι ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἰηθέντι: ἰηθῃ ἐσεσθαι, ταῦτα καὶ γίγνεται ἐκείνῳ τῷ οἴη : - ἊΣ 5, ὦ 9 κι» 7 Cha \ Olov θερμα, ap οταν τις οἰηθῇ ἰδιώτης QUTOV πυρετον Ue / Χ ’ λήψεσθαι καὶ ἔσεσθαι ταύτην τὴν θερμότητα, καὶ σ 4 Χ ΨΩ a . \ \ VA ’ὔ ἕτερος, ἰατρὸς δέ, ἀντοιηθῇ, κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν φῶμεν τὸ μέλλον ἀποβήσεσθαι; ἢ κατὰ τὴν ἀμφο- 4 ἣν an \ 3 a 3 \ 5ὼλ ’ TEPOV, Καὶ τῷ μεν ἰατρῷ οὐ θερμὸς οὐδὲ πυρέττων , e la) δὲ » / ᾿ γενήσεται, ἑαυτῷ δὲ ἀμφότερα: OEO, Γελοῖον μέν τ᾽ ἂν εἴη. ϑ 3 if ’ : 2Q. ᾿Αλλ᾽, οἶμαι, περὶ οἴνου γλυκύτητος Kai av- Se. αὐτά. Or cusatives are supr. 152 C: νεται, and note. 2. dvra| There is a slight stress on the present tense in opposition to μελλόντων ἔσεσθαι. 4. Ἦ καὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἔσ- εσθαι, φήσομεν] As here know- ledge seems to emerge with the mention of future time, so in the Protagoras, 357, virtue is shown to be know- ledge, because it implies the power of comparing the future with the present. (Cp. the line of Homer, 1]. 1. 343: Οὐδέ τι οἶδε νοῆσαι ἅμα πρόσσω καὶ ὀπίσσω.) 7. οἷον θερμά] The word is placed absolutely, or in a loose construction with φῶμεν infr. Heindorf comp. Crat. 393 E: Οἷον τὸ Bara’ ὁρᾷς ὅτι τοῦ ἢ καὶ TOUT καὶ τοῦ ἃ προστεθέντων οὐ- δὲν ἐλύπησεν, K.T.A. dpa. . κατὰ τὴν ποτέρου δόξαν] rather the ac- cognate. Cp. Oia yap αἰσθά- ‘Surely we must suppose (must we not?) that the result will be according to the opinion of one of them, or shall we say that it will be in accordance with both?’ It is implied in what follows, which opinion is probably right. For the in- definite ποτέρου see above, 145 B, εἰ ποτέρου, and esp. Lach. 181 D. avrév| The accusative (not αὐτός) is used because the man is supposed to consider his own case objectively. 12. ἑαυτῷ δὲἀμφότερα] Viz. καὶ θερμὸς καὶ πυρέττων. The same word is repeated in a different relation. Cp. supr. 147 E, δυνάμενον, and note. Cp. Aristotle, Met. 1. 5. 1010 "Ὁ: Ἔτι δὲ περὶ τοῦ μέλ- λοντος, ὥσπερ καὶ Πλάτων λέγει, οὐ δήπου ὁμοίως κυρία ἡ τοῦ ἰατροῦ δόξα καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντος, οἷον περὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἔσεσθαι ὑγιοῦς ἢ μὴ μέλλοντος, the stand- ard of them in himself. Has he also the stand- ard in him- self of Future things ? If he thinks he is going to have a fever, and the physi- cian tells him No, which opinion will prove true for him in the sequel ? The musi- cian is a better judge of future har- mony than the gym- nast, as the latter will himself confess when he hears the sounds, Surely Pro- tagoras himself professed to be a better pro- phet than those whom he taught, of the proba- ble effect of a rheto- rical argu- ment, 136 στηρότητος κε τὶ ἔσεσθαι ἡ ᾿ τοῦ γεωργοῦ δόξα, Ρ 178. ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ἡ τοῦ ee κυρία. SEO. Τί μήν; ἢ 3 le 2Q. Οὐδ᾽ av ad περὶ ἀναρμόστου τε καὶ evap- ’ xX , he δ μόστου ἐσομένου παιδοτρίβης av βέλτιον Sokacee “ ὰ SS 5 δ ΄ν “ / ΄ μουσικοῦ, O καὶ ETELTa αὐτῷ τῷ παιδοτρίβῃ δόξει BIT A 53 εὐάρμοστον εἰναι. GEO. Οὐδαμώς. a a 4 e , Ἂν 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος ἑστιάσεσθαι μὴ ΄ 3 ’ e το μαγειρικοῦ ὄντος, σκευαζομένης θοίνης, ἀκυροτέρα ἡ 4 nm ~ nn nw ͵ Cal κρίσις τῆς τοῦ ὀψοποιοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐσομένης ἡδονῆς. \ \ a 4 4 ’ x περὶ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἤδὴ ὄντος ἑκάστῳ ἡδέος ἢ γεγονό- ’ὔ’ “ / ro > Ν Q ΄-“ τος μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ διαμαχώμεθα, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ᾽ : Car? \ , Kf ’ὔ μέλλοντος ἑκάστῳ καὶ δόξειν καὶ ἔσεσθαι πότερον By ΓΝ e At> 37. , x ἐφ 15 AUTOS αὐτῷ ἀριστος κριτῆς, ἢ OV, 3 Ἐ ’ ὦ Τ]ρωταγόρα, τὸ ῆς 7 Ν ε ’ ε al » iE > γε περὶ λόγους πιθανὸν ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον εἰς ’ / Ἃ id Ἃ a 9 “ δικαστήριον βέλτιον ἂν προδοξάσαις ἢ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν ὁστισοῦν ; ΘΕΟ. Καὶ μάλα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτό γε σφόδρα ς ΄- I , 3 / 20 ὑπισχνεῖτο πάντων διαφέρειν AUTOS. \ , 5 / Ἂ > , 3 ἃ a Ἢ 2Q. Ny Δία, ὦ μέλε: ἢ οὐδείς γ᾽ ἂν αὐτῷ διε- 4. ἀναρμόστου ἐσομένου] The neuter is used without the article here, because the ques- tion refers to a particular case. g. Here, as in the Gorgias, (463, 4) cookery prepares the way for rhetoric. Cp. supr. 175 D. Even ὀψοποιική, how- ever, is not an dreyvos τριβή if it can foretell consequences, 13. μηδέν πω τῷ λόγῳ δια- μαχώμεθα] The certainty of present impressions is after- wards swept away together with the doctrine of motion, infr. 182. And the relation of present to past impressions is further discussed under the guise of a new inquiry, 191 foll. (See especially the word μνημεῖον. ) 15. τό γε περὶ λόγους πιθανόν] A further homethrust at Pro- tagoras, of a different order from his own ὑηνεῖς supr. 166 C. 16, ἑκάστῳ ἡμῶν ἐσόμενον eis δικαστήριον] ‘That which each of us will find persuasive to be spoken in court.’ ‘ Hach of us’ includes not only those who are to hear, but the man who is to speak the speech in court, 21. ὦ μέλε] This comic ad- OEAITHTOS. 137 -179. λέγετο διδοὺς πολὺ ἀργύριον, εἰ *51) τοὺς συνόντας Ν . 3, ; / ἔπειθεν ὅτι καὶ TO μέλλον ἔσεσθαί τε καὶ δόξειν οὔτε dress, nowhere else used by Plato, marks Socrates’ exqui- site enjoyment of the humour of the situation. I. εἰ δὴ] The MSS. have all εἰ μή. Heindorf corrects this to εἴ my, and gives the following note :—‘ Profecto in ~ futurarum quoque rerum cog- nitione omnibus precellere se Protagoras profitebatur, aut nemo ipsi magnam doctrine mercedem solvisset, si quo modo persuasisset discipulis, etiam de futuris rebus neque vatem neque alium quemquam melius posse judicare, quam ipsum sibi unumquemque. Υ͂. ad Gorg. ὃ 75.47. Platonis autem sententiam restituimus unius litterule mutatione. Quippe vulgo scriptum εἰ μὴ τοὺς ovy., unde contrarius pror- sus et absurdus sensus effi- citur, Quam scripturam nequis tuendam arbitretur verbo αὐτός ad Protagoram trahendo et αὑτῷ mutando in αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ συνόντι), manifesta ἢ. 1. est superiorum verborum πότερον αὐτὸς αὑτῷ ἄριστος κριτής re- petitio, neque tum ferri posset hoe αὐτῷ : adeo id moleste re- dundaret. Idem vitium insedit Phileb. 34 C: Ἵνα μὴ τὴν ψυ- χῆς ἡδονὴν χωρὶς σώματος ὅτι μάλιστα καὶ ἐναργέστατα λάβοιμεν. Corr. ἵνα πη, et Protag. 331 D: Καὶ γὰρ ὁτιοῦν ὁτῳοῦν ἀμηγέπη προσέοικε. τὸ γὰρ λευκὸν τῷ μέ- λανι ἔστιν ὃ μὴ (1. ὅπη) προσ- ἔοικε καὶ τὸ σκληρὸν τὸ μαλακῷ." This reasoning is in the main correct. But δή, which is the received correction of Phil. 1. c., seems more forcible here than πῃ, which has no particular aptness ἴῃ this passage. ‘If it had really been his wont to persuade them of that which has been now suggested.’ Cp. 166C: Ei δὴ ὀνομάτων ye....: 8110. The corruption probably ori- ginated in the slightly obscure reference of αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, or per- haps simply from the neigh- bourhood of Ny (written pn). [Schanz also, it would seem independently, suggests εἰ δή.] Schleiermacher solved the difficulty by omitting αὑτῷ (which, as H. Schmidt ob- serves, might be suggested to an emendator by πότερον αὐτὸς αὑτῷ, supr.178 ΕἸ), and referring αὐτός to Protagoras. But this de- stroys the force of καί, and the question is not between one oracle and another, but be- tween the opinion of the master and of the common in- dividual. For αὑτῷ referring to an indefinite subject cp. Apol. 39 D: Οὐ γάρ ἐσθ᾽ αὑτὴ ἡ ἀπαλλαγὴ οὔτε πάνυ δυνατὴ οὔτε καλή, ἀλλ᾽ ἐκείνη καὶ καλλίστη καὶ ῥάστη, μὴ τοὺς ἄλλους κολούειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἑαυτὸν παρασκευάζειν ὅπως ἔσται ὡς βέλτιστος. For the change from plural to singular, which has been elsewhere illus- trated, cp. esp. Rep. 1. 344 BC. € μάντις is introduced as being ἐπιστήμων of the future generally, just as the physician is of future health or sickness, the musician of future har- mony, etc. tes ἄλλος points distantly at Protagoras him- self, and his position as the prophet of the school is hinted at. Cp. supr. 162 A: Ἐκ τοῦ ἀδύτου τῆς βύβλου ἐφθέγξατο, And it is acknow- ledged that a state must often fail in its legislation, which re- gards the future. Therefore one man is wiser than another, and not every man, but the wise man, is the mea- sure of things. On this ground, then, the theory can- not stand. And there are other 138 , Ν᾽ Ὁ » ! Saree x 8 μάντις οὔτε τις ἄλλος ἄμεινον κρίνειεν ἂν ἢ αὐτὸς Pp. 179: € a αὐτῷ . ΘΕΌ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. MAATOQNOS / 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ at νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλιμον Ν \ Zz 3 / \ a δ ε ΩΝ 5 περὶ TO μέλλον ἐστί, καὶ πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ νομοθετου- 77] ’ , 4 3 a a μένην πόλιν πολλάκις ἀναγκὴν εἶναι τοῦ ὠφελιμωτά- 4 TOU ἀποτυγχάνειν 5 SEO. Mada ye. 2Q. Merpios ἄρα ἡμῖν πρὸς τὸν διδάσκαλόν σου » / [χά » ’ > Xe δα las / / το εἰρήσεται, OTL AVAYKN αὑτῷ ομολογεῖν σοφώτερον TE B 15 2 ο y + sy \ \ \ aA , 3 ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, » Ν ‘ A 5 ‘4 \ e rn 5 A ἐμοὶ δε τῳ αἀνεπιστημονι μηδε οπωστιουν αναγκὴν 53 Ld / e 57 3 ᾿ς e Ὁ \ εἶναι μέτρῳ γίγνεσθαι, ὡς ἄρτι με ἠνάγκαζεν ὃ ὑπὲρ 3 , ἢ .}» , 5᾽ , a Cy ἐκείνου Aoyos, ett ἐβουλομὴν εἴτε μη, τοιοῦτον εἶναι. ΘΕΟ. ‘Exeivyn μοι δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μάλιστα cae fe ε ͵ € / \ / χὰ Ν ἀλίσκεσθαι ὃ λόγος, ἁλισκόμενος καὶ ταύτῃ, ἡ τᾶς ἴω yf / a @ ’ὔ τῶν ἄλλων δόξας κυρίας ποιεῖ, αὗται δὲ ἐφάνησαν οἷ 5 / / 5 ῪἮἝ ee a e / τοὺς ἐκείνου λόγους οὐδαμῇ ἀληθεῖς ἡγούμεναι. ΣΏ. Πολλαχῇ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, καὶ ἄλλῃ ἂν τό γε κι e 7 Ὗ la Ν 3 “ , 53 τοιοῦτον ἁλοίη, μὴ πᾶσαν παντὸς ἀληθὴ δόξαν εἶναι. H. Schmidt remarks that the descriptive imperfects are con- tinued from ὑπισχνεῖτο supr. 4. αἱ νομοθεσίαι καὶ τὸ ὠφέλι- μον] ‘Legislation and expedi- ency’ (which is the principle of legislation). 5. πᾶς ἂν ὁμολογοῖ] An ap- peal to common sense like supr.171D: Ὁμολογεῖν ἂν τοῦτό γε ὁντινοῦν. Thus we return to the chief statement, which has been reinforced with the additional argument beginning with "Ere τοίνυν, supr. 178 A. Arist. Met. 11. 1063 a: Tov- του δ᾽ ὄντος τοιούτου, τοὺς ἑτέρους μὲν ὑποληπτέον μέτρον εἶναι, τοὺς δ᾽ ἑτέρους οὐχ ὑποληπτέον. 12. τῷ ἀνεπιστήμονι] Supr. 150 Ὁ. 13. ὡς ἄρτι) Supr. 167 D. 15. Ἐκείνῃ ... ταύτῃ͵ The position which Theodorus has previously accepted is nearer and more familiar to him than that to which he points as still in the hands of Socrates. Hence the use of the demonstratives. 16. καὶ ταύτῃ] 171 foll. 20. μή] Cp. supr. 166 Ὁ. τὸ τοιοῦτον is either (1) the theory, or (2) (as cognate sub- ject of ἁλοίη) the refutation of the theory. ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 139 Φ i 2S Ἃ Cll 3 3 ia ry Ay 179. περὶ δὲ TO παρὸν exaoT@ Talos, ἐξ ὧν αἱ αἰσθήσεις \ e \ ’ / / καὶ αι KATA TAVTAS δόξαι γιγνονται, χαλεπώτερον “ a ,ὔ \ \ , J ἑλεῖν ὡς οὐκ ἀληθεῖς. ἴσως δὲ οὐδὲν λέγω: ἀνάλωτοι , yf 7 ε / \ 3 a ἄρ. εἰ ἔτυχον. εἰσί. καὶ οἱ φάσκοντες αὐτὰς ἐναργεῖς 9 3 9 53 Ἂς » / z “Ὁ By 4 7 \ TE ELVAL Καὶ ETTLOT ἡμᾶς TAXA QV oVTa λέγοιεν, Και 5 ’ σ » ἜΤ ἊΝ an By 7 Ν Θεαίτητος ὁδὲε οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἰρηκεν αἰσθησιν Kat 3 ’ SHEN / / 5 5 I ETLOTH UNV TAUVTOV θέμενος. προσιτέον οὖν ἐγγυτέρω, ς Se ¢ NS / 7 1 2 Ν / Ὁ ὡς ὁ ὑπερ IIpwrayopov λογος ἐπέταττε, καὶ σκέπτεον I. περὶ δὲ τὸ παρόν, κιτιλ.] This was the point reserved above, 178 D E: Περὶ μὲν yap τοῦ ἤδη ὄντος, κιτιλ. For the change from singular to plural cp. Rep. 2. 373 Εἰ: Πολέμου.... ee δ. ἐξ ὧν] ‘The momentary effect produced on each man, from which arise the sensa- tions, and the beliefs which are in accordance with them.’ Vid. 156 DE; and note the incipient distinction between αἴσθησις and δόξα. Kai. . δόξαι is added because we are now directly engaged with Pro- tagoras, who said τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ εἶναι, or rather with those disciples of his who support his theory on the Heraclitean principle. πάθος in this sense appears to have been a technical term of the Cyrenaic school. Cp. Sext. Emp. adv. Math. 191: Φάσιν οὖν οἱ Κυρηναϊκοὶ κριτήρια εἶναι τὰ πάθη καὶ μόνα καταλαμβά- νεσθαι καὶ ἀδιάψευστα τυγχάνειν, κτλ. But we may observe that Plato here, as elsewhere, distinguishes the physical im- pression from the sensation itself. 5. ὄντα] Ast conjectured τὰ ὄντα, but see above, 178 Β: ᾿Αληθῆ τε οἴεται αὑτῷ καὶ ὄντα. 6. οὐκ ἀπὸ σκοποῦ εἴρηκεν] Hom. Odyss. 11.344: Ὦ φίλοι, οὐ μὰν ἣμιν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ οὐδ᾽ ἀπὸ δόξης | μυθεῖται βασίλεια περί- φρων. 8. ὡς .( ἐπέταττεΠΉ͵ Supr. 166 C, 168 B. In the pre- vious section Socrates was dealing directly with Pro- tagoras. He now goes still more closely to work by grap- pling with the principle on which the theory of Protagoras is grounded by his disciples, especially by those who are also followers of Heraclitus. We have already answered him (supr. A) in his own per- son, but we have not quite done with him (infr. 183 B) until the Heraclitean ‘/lua’ has been finally disposed of. σκεπτέον... διακρούοντα] Soph. 246 Β: Τοιγαροῦν οἱ πρὸς αὐ- τοὺς ἀμφισβητοῦντες μάλα εὐλα- βῶς ἄνωθεν ἐξ ἀοράτου ποθὲν ἀμύνονται, νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώ- ματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι" τὰ δὲ ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ᾽ αὐτῶν ἀλή- θειαν κατὰ σμικρὰ διαθραύοντες ἐν τοῖς λόγοις γένεσιν ἀντ᾽ οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσιν. ἐν. μέσῳ δὲ περὶ ταῦτα ἄπλετος ἀμφοτέρων μάχη τις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀεὶ ξυνέστηκε. This combat is somewhat differently de- points where it is easily as- sailable. But it is more diffi- cult to at- tack the main posi- tion, viz. that the present sensible impression is always true, Perhaps this is im- pregnable, but let us approach, and try whether its foundation in the doc- trine of motion is secure, I. δ. Critz- cism of the principle, All is mo- tion. Final re- jection ὁ. the doctrine of sense. σι Io 140 τὴν εἴτε σαθρὸν φθέγγεται. φαύλη οὐδ᾽ Ἡρακλείτου ἑταῖροι μάλα ἐρρωμένως. 22. Τῷ τοι, ὦ φίλε καὶ εξ ἀρχῆς 9 SEO. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ’ὔ v4 4 φερομένην ταύτην οὐσίαν διακρούοντα, iA σι παμπολυ. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 5) e \ εἰτε ὑγιέες μάχη δ᾽ οὖν περὶ αὐτῆς οὐ ὀλίγοις γέγονεν. GEO. Πολλοῦ καὶ δεῖ μὲν τὴν Ἰωνίαν καὶ ἐπιδίδω / 3 \ φαύλη εἶναι, ἀλλὰ περὶ ε ἃ “ οἱ γὰρ τοῦ A / aA ‘4 χορηγουσι τούτου τοῦ λόγου a he Θεόδωρε, μᾶλλον σκεπτέον" 7 ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται. XN 7 3 V4 Kal yap, ὦ Σώκρατες, \ / A ε ,ἷ \ 9 \ / πέρι TovT@v τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων, ἢ ὥσπερ ov λέγεις scribed in the present pas- sage. I. τὴν φερομένην, . οὐσίαν] ταύτην refers to the conclusion in 160 C and the preceding argument from 4156 Α on- wards. διακρούοντα] (ἀκούοντα Bodl.) Schol.: Ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν δια- κωδωνούντων τὰ κεράμια, εἰ ἀκέ- paid εἰσιν. Cp. Phileb, 55 C: Tevvaiws δέ, εἴ πῃ σαθρὸν ἔχει, πᾶν περικρούωμεν, Compare the English expression, ‘As sound as a bell.’ 5. ἐπιδίδωσι πάμπολυ] ‘Gains in importance,’ ‘ig waged with increasing energy.’ 6. χορηγοῦσι] Cp. Demetr. Byz. ap. Athen. 295. ed. Schw.: Ἐκάλουν δὲ καὶ χορη- γούς, ὥς φησιν ὁ Βυζάντιος Δη- μήτριος, οὐχ ὥσπερ νῦν τοὺς μισθουμένους τοὺς χορούς, ἀλλὰ τοὺς καθηγουμένους τοῦ χοροῦ, καθάπερ τοὔνομα σημαίνει, It would appear from this that the Heracliteangs of Ephe- sus upheld a doctrine akin to that of the Cyrenaics, τούτου τοῦ λόγου] λόγος is here almost equivalent to ‘school of thought.’ Cp. supr. TOUS τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ, κ. τ. r., infr. τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων. 8. Τῷ rox] ‘We are the more bound to consider the question, and that in the light of its first principle, even as they present it to us in the discussion.’ Gorg. 448 E: Ὥσπερ σοι τὰ ἔμπροσθεν ὑπετεί- varo Χαιρεφῶν. (καὶ ἐξ ἀρχῆς is the Bodleian reading, ἐξ ἀρχῆς T. The words ἡ τοιάδε σκέψις... μᾶλλον ἐξ ἀρχῆς εἴη ἄν occur in Lach. 189 ΒΕ. 9. ὥσπερ αὐτοὶ ὑποτείνονται] Viz. in referring everything to a first principle, whether of fire or motion. rk. τῶν Ἡρακλειτείων] Se. δογ- μάτων. περὶ τούτων, κιτ.λ. depends verbally partly on διαλεχθῆναι, partly on ἔμπειροι, but really upon the notion ‘there is no discussion possible.’ Cp. infr. 180 C: Ὅπερ fa ἐρῶν, If the genitives were masculine, and out of construction, the use of ἔμπειροι. without an object would be too abrupt. Com- pare, however, παρὰ μὲν τούτων, below. SEAITHTOS. τὴν Ἔφεσον, 14] e 7 \ »~y ’ὔ 5 a \ ω \ Ρ. 179. Ομηρείων, καὶ ἔτι παλαιοτέρων, αὐτοῖς μὲν τοῖς περὶ oC An y 5 ὅσοι προσποιοῦνται ἔμπειροι [εἰναι], a wi a Γ΄ a οὐδὲν μᾶλλον οἷόν τε διαλεχθῆναι ἢ τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν. as \ \ Z ’, Χ ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ τὰ συγγράμματα φέρονται, τὸ δ᾽ ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις] 152 C, Cp. Cratyl. 439 C: Satvovra yap ἔμοιγε καὶ αὐτοὶ οὕτω διανοηθῆναι. Ι. ὋὉμηρείων] Cp. 1526. ἔτι παλαιοτέρων] “ Orpheum intelligit: conf, Cratyl. § 41. (402 Β.) Heind. αὐτοῖς μέν] μέν points to the opposition which comes out distinctly afterwards (180 C) between the men and_ their doctrine. There is no con- versing with the men 3; we must examine their doctrine on our Own account. 2. [εἶναι] ] Omitted in most MSS. including BT, 3. τοῖς οἰστρῶσιν] ‘With men in frenzy.’ 4. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ] ‘ For, in true accordance with their master’s writings, they are ever in mo- tion ; but as for dwelling upon an argument or question, and quietly asking and answering in turn, they are absolutely without the power of doing So; or rather they possess in a Surpassing degree the most perfect absence of all quiet- ness, even in the minutest re- spect.’ More literally, (1) ‘It ig beyond everything, how ut- terly incapable they are of rest even in the most trifling respect.’ Cp. Ar. Eth. Ν. 4. I. § 39: Ὑπερβολῆς... τοῦ μηδενὶ ἂν διδόναι. Τηΐγ, 1 oe α The doubtful point in this rendering of the last words is πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρόν“ ἴῃ re- Spect of what is less than little.’ For πρός compare Soph. 248 Ὁ: “Ὅταν τῷ παρῇ ἡ τοῦ πάσχειν ἢ δρᾶν καὶ πρὸς τὸ σμικρότατον δύναμι, And for μηδὲ σμικρόν cp. Phileb. 60 Ο: Ppdvnow . , ἡδονῆς μηδὲ τὸ σμικ- ρότατον ἔχουσαν. See also Pheedo, 93 B: “Qore καὶ xara τὸ σμικ- porarov ... ἐπὶ πλέον. . ἢ er €Aarrov . , αὐτὸ τοῦτο εἶναι. Here it is assumed that bya stretch of hyperbole, made pos- sible by the negative sentence, μηδὲ σμικρόν is substituted for σμικρότατον. Op. frrov . . ἢ τὸ μηδέν, supr. There is a similar emphasis, though with less complexity, in Symp. 192 C: Οὐκ ἐθέλοντες, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν, χωρίζεσθαι ἀλλήλων οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον... (where οὐδὲ σμικρὸν χρόνον might be rendered ‘any time at all ἢ. ὑπερβάλλει ig here taken as impersonal, and τό, κιτιλ, as epexegetic. The use of μή (not οὐκ) is occasioned by the hypothetical turn—= οὐδ᾽ εἰ μηδὲ σμικρὸν εἴη. The geni- tive ἡσυχίας is postponed. (2) Mr. Riddell, in his Dj- gest of Idioms, ὃ 246, observes that ‘to τὸ οὐδ᾽ οὐδέν must be supplied eveivar:’ i, 6, he would render ‘the utter absence of it is extraordinary, in regard of the entire absence of rest in the men even in the least particular.’ But this is surely too harsh. (3) H. Schmidt (Fleckeis, Jahrb. 103. 806) suspects the whole sentence (μᾶλλον, ἡσυχίας) as interpolated. Great has been the conflict and many the combatants on either side. The friends of Heraclitus in Ionia defend the doctrine of motion with all theirmight. But we must take their theory into our own hands to test it. For the men are in a flux, and offer us no hold for ar- gument, 142 3 a Ir Xr / \ 3 , mers / 3 Ρ 17 ἐπιμεῖναι ἐπὶ Aoy@ Kal ἐρωτήματι Kal ἡσυχίως ἐν P- 179. i 3 7 ς τὺ e. Ὁ > Co τς x Ν μέρει ἀποκρίνασθαι καὶ ἐρέσθαι ἧττον αὐτοῖς ἔνι ἢ τὸ P. 180. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ μηδέν: μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπερβάλλει τὸ οὐδ᾽ οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸ \ Ν 3 las a 3 , e 7 3 > ΚΝ» μηδε σμικρον EVELVAL TOLS ἀνδράσιν ησυχίιας" ἀλλ ἂν ’ὔ’ ay σ 7 e 5 TWA TL ENN, ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγμα- V4 9 a 3 7 x vA [οὐ TOON AVAOCTTWVYTES ἀποτοξεύουσι, καν. Τουτου ζητῆς 7 nan 5) ce 2 £ “ λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴρηκεν, ἑτέρῳ πεπλήξει καινῶς Uf a \ > if 2Q\ Ν μετωνομασμένῳ, περανεῖς δὲ οὐδέποτε οὐδὲν πρὸς a 4 a SA 3 , οὐδένα αὐτῶν: οὐδέ ye ἐκεῖνοι αὐτοὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους, 3 a lA Ν Ἁ a 5 10 ἀλλ᾽ εὖ πάνυ φυλάττουσι τὸ μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν εἶναι ‘Jee Woe ’ 7 fa Ἐπ a e A a e 4 μὴτ ev Aoy@ pyT ἐν Tals αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς, ἡγούμενοι, ε 3 Q - ΤΟΝ ’ὔ’ 3 ᾽ὔ \ f ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, αὐτὸ στασιμον εἰναι" τουτῷ δὲ πάνυ a ἣν > oe 4 / 3 πολεμοῦσι, καὶ καθ ὅσον δύνανται πανταχόθεν ἐκ- βάλλουσιν. ΣΏ. Ἴσως, ὦ Θεύδωρε, τοὺς ἄνδρας μαχομένους δ εν UA \ 4 ἐκ eMpakas, εἰρηνεύουσι δὲ οὐ συγγέγονας. οὐ γάρ σοι The point in ὑπερβάλλει is, not that οὐδ᾽ οὐδέν is a stronger expression than μη- δέν (it should be compared with ἧττον... ἢ τὸ μηδέν), but (a) the negation is put more strongly by being affirmed ; (ὁ) ὑπερβάλλει assists the cli- max, as being a stronger word than any in the former clause; and, (c) if the first rendering is correct, what was at first spoken of only with reference to argument, is now asserted generally (πρὸς τὸ μηδὲ σμικρόν). Cp. infr. Myr’ ἐν λόγῳ μήτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς. 5. ὥσπερ ἐκ φαρέτρας, κ-τιλ.] Cp. Protag. 342 D (of the Spartans) : Τὰ μὲν πολλὰ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις εὑρήσει αὐτὸν φαῦλόν τινα φαινόμενον, ἔπειτα, ὅπου ἂν τύχῃ τῶν λεγομένων, ἐνέβαλε ῥῆμα βραχὺ καὶ συνεστρὰμμένον, ὥσπερ δεινὸς ἀκοντιστής. pnpatiokia .. . ἀποτοξεύουσι] ‘Plucking up as from a quiver sayings brief and dark, they let them fly at you.’ | 6. ἀνασπῶντες] Cp. Soph. Aj. 302: Adyous ἀνέσπα. τούτου] Sc. red ῥηματισκίου. 7. τί εἴρηκεν] Sc. τὸ ῥηματί- σκιον. καινῶς μετωνομασμένῳ] “Οἱ words new-fangled ill,’ ‘of terms strangely twisted to an unheard-of sense.’ Compare the humorous simile in Protag. 329 A: Ὥσπερ τὰ χαλκεῖα, k.T.d. 10. PeBaov.... στάσιμον ‘Fixed or settled—stationary. εἶναι] γενέσθαι is purposely avoided. 12. αὐτό] Sc. τὸ βέβαιον. 16. οὐ γάρ σοι ἑταῖροί εἰσιν) The dislike of ἃ geometrician to the Heraclitean ‘method’ is not unnatural. And it is unmistakably evident here B OEAITHTOS. 143 e aA 9 3 3 5 Ἃ a A σι 30. ἐταιροι εἰσιν. ἀλλ,, οἶμαι, τὰ τοιαῦτα τοῖς μαθηταῖς nA ’ὔ’ ἃ Ἃ 4 ἐπὶ σχολῆς φράζουσιν, ods ἂν βούλωνται ὁμοίους αὑ- τοῖς ποιῆσαι. ΘΕῸ. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς, ὦ δαιμόνιε ; οὐδὲ γίγνεται la / 4 Cha S 7 ’ > s ἢ CT@V TOLOUTMY ETEPOS ἐτέερου μαθητῆς, ἀλλ QUTOMLATOL 5 > / e / x , Cy ae, x, A 3 ἀναῴύονται, ὁπόθεν ἂν τύχῃ ἕκαστος αὐτῶν ἐνθου- ΄ Ν \ oS εν 5ῸΝ ς a 207 σιασᾶς, Και TOV ετέρον O ετέρος οὐδεν YYELT AL εἰδέναι. \ \ 5 ΄ σ 5 SA » 5, παρὰ μεν οὖν τούτων, ὅπερ Aa ἐρῶν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε , ’ὔ » cor y DIA 41 N \ λάβοις λόγον οὔτε ἑκόντων οὔτε ἀκόντων. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας ὥσπερ πρόβλημα ἐπισκοπεῖσθαι. ρ ρ πρόβλη that Plato has used a ‘ tour de force’ in bringing together the Heracliteans and the “ dis- ciples of Protagoras.’ I. τὰ τοιαῦτα] Se. εἰρηνικά (Heindorf) or, rather, ra βέβαια ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. 4. Ποίοις μαθηταῖς] ‘Disciples forsooth !’ Rep. 1.330 Β: Ποῖ ἐπεκτησάμην, ὦ Σώκρατες ; alib. 5. αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται] ‘They spring up unbidden, wherever each happens to have caught the afflatus.’ 6. ὁπόθεν ἂν riyn.. évOov- gcas| Contrast with this Hegel, G. d. Ph. ed. 1840, p. 55: ‘It is the very spirit of this whole recital, that the more developed Philosophy of a later age, is really the product of the previous labours of the thinking mind: that it is required and determined by these earlier views, and has not sprung of itself independ- ently from the ground.’ (‘Nicht isolirt fiir sich aus dem Boden gewachsen ist.’) For the ex- pression αὐτόματοι ἀναφύονται cp. Rep. 7. 520 B: αὐτόματοι yap ἐμφύονται ἀκούσης τῆς ἐν ἑκάστῃ πολιτείας. As in supr. 172 [0]]. we had a description of the man corresponding to Pro- tagoras’ theory, so here we have the men of Heraclitus. The wildness and the enthu- siasm, at once speculative and irrational, are Oriental rather than Greek, and are probably due rather to the soil than to the germ. Comparatively little of this is to be found in Heraclitus himself, although for their abrupt quaintness his sayings might be called ῥηματίσκια αἰνιγματώδη. 8. οὐκ ἄν ποτε λάβοις λόγον] Ar. Met. 3. 4. 1006 a: Γελοῖον τὸ ζητεῖν λόγον πρὸς τὸν μηθενὸς ἔχοντα λύγον, ἣ μὴ ἔχει; ὅμοιος γὰρ φυτῷ ὁ τοιοῦτος ἧ τοιοῦτος ἤδη. το. τού3 a: Μηθὲν γὰρ τιθέντες ἀναιροῦσι τὸ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ ὅλως λόγον, ὥστε πρὸς μὲν τοὺς τοιούτους οὐκ ἔστι λόγος. 9. αὐτοὺς δὲ δεῖ παραλαβόντας] ‘But we must take the doc- trine out of their hands, and con it over by ourselves like a geometrical theorem.’ Theo- dorus speaks 85. ἃ mathemati- cian. The object of παραλα- βόντας is vague; neither λόγον in the sense just used, nor ἀρχήν ; but τὰ Ἡρακλείτεια ταῦτα, ἤ τι τοιοῦτον. The ques- tion now before us has come down from ancient . times. But wise Men formerly veiled their meaning from the multitude in poetry, not as these now, who make no se- cret of their views, and seek to win universal suffrage for them, and to convert men from the foolish- ness ofcom- mon sense. 5 Io ; 144 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ ao ere a Ν ΣΩ. Καὶ μετρίως γε λέγεις. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα p. 180. 2, (Zs Ν Ν “ 3 Ψ A ἄλλο τι παρειλήφαμεν παρὰ μεν τῶν ἀρχαίων μετὰ XN / , ποιήσεως ἐπικρυπτομένων τοὺς πολλοὺς, ὡς ἡ γένεσις D a 3, \ ε τῶν ἄλλων πάντων ᾿Ωκεανός τε καὶ TnOvs ῥεύματα ’ Ν » ΟΝ σ΄ Ν \ ~ ε 7, fod τυγχάνει καὶ οὐδὲν ἕστηκε, παρὰ δὲ τῶν ὑστέρων, ATE / es Ν » / 4 Ν ε σοφωτέρων, ἀναφανδὸν ἀποδεικνυμένων, Wa καὶ οἱ / Ages \ / ΄ » , σκυτοτόμοι αὐτῶν THY σοφίαν μαθωσιν ἀκούσαντες Ν tA > ’ “ἢ Ν \ e ’ ἈΝ καὶ παύσωνται ἡλιθίως οἰόμενοι TH MEV εἐσταναι, τὰ Ἁ nt a 57 / + ees 4, 5 δὲ κινεῖσθαι τῶν ὄντων, μαθόντες δ᾽ OTL πάντα KLVEL~ a - / xX ἘῸῚ / 3 [2 ται τιμῶσιν αὐτούς ; ὀλίγου δὲ ἐπελαθόμην, ὦ Θεο- “ ” ἘΠῚ τ Υ / > ’ 5 δωρε, ὅτι ἄλλοι αὖ τἀναντία τούτοις ἀπεφήναντο, Οἰον / a / ,ὔ 5ὴ 5 .»Ά» a? ἀκίνητον +rede, τῷ πάντι 7 ὄνομ. εἰναι, καὶ ἄλλα ὅσα » / Ν / > / a , Μέλισσοί τε καὶ ἸΠαρμενίδαι ἐναντιουμενοι πᾶσι του- “ 7 «ε oS / » Ν ἃς 4 TOLS duc χυρίζονται, ως ἐν TE παντα EOTL Και ἐστ ὮΚεν 1. τό γε δὴ πρόβλημα] “ Well, the theorem, as you call it.’ Compare with the repetition of ye the double use of γάρ, ἀλλά, k.T.A. 2. παρειλήφαμεν . . ἀποδεικνυ- μένων] ‘The doctrine comes to us from ancient and from modern sources. The ancients indeed veiled their meaning from the multitude and said, etc.; but the moderns openly declare their meaning.’ See H. Schmidt, Krit. Comment., Ρ. 509. 4. ῥεύματα rvyxdve] Se. ὄντα, which is purposely (or instinctively) omitted. ᾿Ωκεα- vos τε καὶ Τηθύς are in appo- sition with ἡ γένεσις, and pev- para 1s predicate. ὡς, ete. expresses not what the poets said, but what they meant, depending partly on παρειλή- φαμεν. 4. σκυτοτόμοι] I. e. The meanest artificers. Cp. Prot. 324 C; Ὡς pev-... εἰκότως ἀποδέχονται... καὶ χαλκέως καὶ σκυτοτόμου συμβουλεύοντος τὰ πο- λιτικά : 4110. 10. τιμῶσιν αὐτούς] These words merely satirize the φι- λοτιμία of the Sophist. H. Schmidt’s remark that the multitude are predisposed to extol a doctrine which reflects the arbitrariness of their life, introduces a subtlety which is not present in the text. 11. Oiov| MSS. οἷον. But the words of Simplicius in Aristot. Phys. ἢ 7. a are decisive : ᾿Ακίνητον αὐτὸ ἀνυμνεῖ καὶ μόνον ὡς πάντων ἐξηρήμενον. 12. τελέθει, τῷ παντί] So all the MSS. Buttm. conjectured τ᾽ ἔμεναι τῷ πάντ᾽, This is gathered from the quotations of Simpli- cius, and is probably right. Cobet, relying on the same source, changes οἷον to οὖλον, 14. ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὑτῷ] ‘ All Being is One, and stand- eth self-contained, not having any space in which it moves.’ 8 SAND: e “ > 5, UY > OQ nw Pp. 100. AUTO EV αὐτῷ; οὐκ ἐχον χώραν ἐν ἡ κινεῖται. 0.181. ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. > 53 ς a an 7 / 4 οὖν, ὦ εταῖρε, πᾶσι τί χρησόμεθα; κατὰ 145 , Tovrois A σμικρὸν Ἢ τι 7, 3 ΄ὕ 3 \ ,ὕ yap προιοντες λελήθαμεν ἀμφοτέρων εἰς τὸ μέσον / “Ὁ / 3 / / πεπτωκότες, καὶ ἂν μή πῃ ἀμυνόμενοι διαφύγωμεν, " id “ ε » a 7 Α δίκην δώσομεν ὦσπερ οἱ ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις διὰ “ / ad (- > > fe 4 γραμμῆς παίζοντες, ὅταν ὑπ ἀμφοτέρων ληφθέντες 6 / a 5 ἊΝ Ui ἕλκωνται εἰς τἀναντία. δοκεῖ οὖν μοι τοὺς ἑτέρους The nearest approach to this latter assertion in the frag- ments of Parmenides is in the lines— (78-85 Mullach) Οὐδὲ διαιρε- TOV ἐστιν, ἐπεὶ πᾶν ἐστὶν ὅμοιον, | οὐδέ τι τῇ μᾶλλον τό κεν εἴργοι μιν ξυνέχεσθαι, | οὐδέ τι χειρότερον" πᾶν δὲ πλέον ἐστὶν ἔοντος. | τῷ ξυνεχὲς πᾶν ἐστίν, ἐὸν γὰρ ἔοντι πελάζει. [Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν | ἐστιν, ἄναρχον, ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὀλεθρὸς] τῆλε μάλ᾽ ἐπλάγχθησαν, ἄπωσε δὲ πίστις ἀληθής. [ ταὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐν τωὐτῷ τε μένον καθ᾽ ἑαυτό τε κεῖται. He asserts, however, that Being is net without bounda- ries, else it would be imper- fect. Zeno appears to have said, that being was neither with nor without boundaries. Cp. Arist. de Xenoph. Gorg. et Melisso, ¢. 3: ᾿Αἴδιον δὲ ὄντα καὶ ἕνα καὶ σφαιροειδῆ, οὔτ᾽ ἄπειρον, οὔτε πεπερᾶσθαι" ἤΛπειρον γὰρ τὸ μὴ εἶναι... .. τὸ δὲ ἕν οὔτε τῷ οὐκ ὄντι οὔτε τοῖς πόλλοις ὁμοι- οὔσθαι. “Ev γὰρ οὐκ ἔχει πρὸς ὅ τι περανεῖ. ‘Dasz hier Melissus als Ver- treter der Eleatischen Schule genannt wird, hat seine Grund darin, dasz der Beweis ... ἕστηκεν αὐτὸ ἕν αὑτῷ οὐκ ἔχον χώραν ἐν 7 κινεῖται nach der von Heindorf angezogenen Stelle Aristot. Phys. 4. 6, dem Me- lissus angehdort.’ H. Schmidt. The Eleatics did not ab- stract the idea of Being from that of extension, although its fulness destroyed the idea of space. It was here that the Atomists joined issue with them. To Leucippus and De- mocritus the relations of body were not symbolical but real. They felt that they must ac- count for motion. Hence their assertion of the existence of empty space, τὸ κενόν, or, in other words, τὸ μὴ ὄν in the material sense. 3. εἰς τὸ μέσον] Viz. by having partly discarded and partly retained the principle, ἐπιστήμη αἴσθησις, ... τὸν Πρω- ταγόρου λόγον μὴ παντάπασι λέ- γοντές, 5. δίκην δώσομεν] For the humour ep. Rep. 5.474 A: Τῷ ὄντι τωθαζόμενος δώσεις δίκην. διὰ γραμμῆς παίζοντες Α game, like our French and English, was called διελκυστίνδα. 7. δοκεῖ οὖν por] “1 think therefore we ought first to examine the one faction, to whom we first addressed our- selves, these wavering movers of unrest,’ and if we find any truth in them, we will join our efforts with theirs to pull us to them, endeavouring to shake the others off. But if those who stand for the un- σι Their vehe- mence al- most makes us forget the oppo- site faction, who say that the One Being which fills all things doth not move. “We find ourselves on the dan- gerous mid- dle ground between these ar- mies. With which side shall we go? Shall we declare for the inviol- able consti- tution of all things, or for the σι 10 146 (if 7 POTEPOV MAATONOZ Li 279 “ ε ’ j . Ν σκεπτέον, ED οὕσπερ ὡρμήσαμεν, τοὺς Ρ. 181. er Ro SN / ,ὔ yt ΄ ~ peovTas. και ἐὰν μὲν TL φαίνωνται ἐγόντές, DUVEA= 3 5 a ξ ἴω 3 7 Χ ΕἾ 3 = hs ἕξομεν PET αὑτῶν ἡμᾶς AVTOVS, τοὺς ετέεβοὺυς ἐκφυγεῖν 4 IN \ ε ~ ὦ, “ > / πειρώμενοι. ἐὰν δὲ OL τοῦ ὁλου στασιῶται ἀληθεέ- an > > Ν Je ae] 3 στερα λέγειν δοκῶσι, φευξόμεθα Tap αὐτοὺς am αὖ a \ 9) ΤῸ » ’ , δ᾽ xX a TOV τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. ἀμῴοτεροι ὃ ay φανῶσι μηδὲν μέτριον λέγοντες, γελοῖοι ἐσόμεθα ἡγούμενοι e a 7 y+ , \ ἡμᾶς μέν τι λέγειν φαύλους ὄντας, παμπαλαίους δὲ Ν / yf >’ 7 fo 3 καὶ πασσόφους ἄνδρας ἀποδεδοκιμακοτες. Opa οὖν, 3 9 Se! 3 la of 7] ὦ Θεύδωρε, εἰ λυσιτελεῖ εἰς τοσοῦτον προίεναι κιν- δυνον. 5 > δ ΘΕΟ. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν, ὦ Σώκρατες, μὴ οὐ Mf 7 lal an διασκέψασθαι τί λέγουσιν ἑκάτεροι τῶν ἀνδρῶν. broken Whole of Being seem to speak more reasonably, we will desert to these again from the revolutionary violence of the movement party.’ I. τοὺς ῥέοντας] ‘The un- stable philosophers.’ (‘ The river-gods,’ Jowett.) They are humorously identified with their principle. Vid. supr. ἀτεχνῶς γὰρ κατὰ Ta ovyypap- ματα φέροντα. This way of taking péovras—not as causa- tive—is also confirmed by the parallel passage in the Cra- tylus, 439 C: Αὐτοί τε ὥσπερ εἴς τινα δίνην ἐμπεσόντες κυκῶνται καὶ ἡμᾶς ἐφελκόμενοι προσεμ- βάλλουσι. Socrates adopts the jest of Theodorus, supr.180 B: Μηδὲν βέβαιον ἐᾶν... αὑτῶν ψυχαῖς. For a similar reference to a set of persons by an epithet cp. Phileb. 46 A: Ods εἴπομεν δυσχερεῖς. Soph. 248 C: Τὸ νῦν δὴ ῥηθὲν πρὸς τοὺς γηγενεῖς, Rep. 6. 488 A: Τὸ πάθος τῶν ἐπιεικε- στάτων. ἐν ταῖς 5. ἀπ᾿ αὖ τῶν] (ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτούς Bodl. Vat. Ven. II. παρ᾽ αὐτοὺς ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν T cett. Schleierm. corr.: ad ἀπὸ τῶν Bekk. But for the position of αὖ cp. supr. "FOr ay and note). We pass from the image of a game to that of a civil war, in which the Heracli- teans are the ‘movement,’ or revolutionary, party. There is probably a slight play on the word στασιῶται, and certainly also on the phrase τὰ ἀκίνητα κινεῖν. For ‘to move what may not be moved’ was, as_ the scholiast indicates, a prover- bial way of speaking of sacri- legious actions. See esp. Legg. 8.842 [ἢ ; Διὸς ὁρίου μὲν πρῶτος νόμος ὅδε εἰρήσθω: μὴ κινείτω γῆς ὅρια μηδεὶς. .. νομίσας τὸ τἀκίνητα κινεῖν ἀληθῶς τοῦτο εἶναι. Thuc.8.15: Ta τε χίλια τάλαντα oe Κινεῖν. 7. μηδὲν μέτριον] ‘Nothing worthy of our reception.’ 12. Οὐδὲν μὲν οὖν ἀνεκτόν] ‘Nay, Socrates, we can by no p. 181. YY GEAITHTOS. 147 / ἡ 3, A δ , XQ. Σκεπτεον av ein cov ye οὕτω προθυμουμένου. 1 z a 53 N 53 ἴω / ᾽ὔ / Δοκεῖ οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ εἶναι τῆς σκέψεως κινήσεως πέρι, Ar , By ’ Ν x z ἮΝ © ποιὸν TL ποτε apa λέγοντες φασὶ τὰ πάντα κινεῖσθαι. “ / / Ο 5 βούλομαι δὲ λέγειν τὸ τοιόνδε. πότερον ἕν τι εἶδος Sse / \ co » \ 7] 7 y , αὑτῆς λεγουσιν ἢ WOTED εμοι φαίνεται, δυο: μὴ μεν- 5 A 3 \ 4 3 ‘ / Ν io TOL μόνον EOL δοκείτω, ἀλλα συμμετέχε και OV, ινα an 7 yS Q , , / ©) κοινῇ TACTX@MEV, αν TL και δέῃ. καὶ μοι λέγε: apa ω las “ ,ὔ 3 7 , κινεῖσθαι καλεῖς, ὅταν TL χώραν ἐκ χώρας μεταβαλλῃ xX \ » la 3. UA , ᾿ ἢ καὶ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ στρεφηται; SEO. Ἔγωγε. XQ. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἕν ἔστω εἶδος. ὅταν δὲ 7 Ν 5 a 3 a / δέ Ἃ Δ 3 λ nA xX D μεν EV T@ QaUTO, YU PaO KY) €, 1) μέλαν EK E€UKOU 7) σκληρὸν ἐκ μαλακοῦ γίγνηται, ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἀλλοίω- a 5 3 ΄ σιν ἀλλοιῶται, ἀρα οὐκ ἄξιον ἕτερον εἶδος φάναι κι- ’ νήησεως : ΘΕΟ. "Ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, 20. ᾿Αναγκαῖον μὲν οὖν. δύο δὴ λέγω τούτω εἴδη Χ κινήσεως, ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ Τπεριφοραν. “Means endure to stop short of thoroughly examining the meaning of both sets of think- ers.’ ovdevis, ofcourse, adverbial. Madvig’s conjecture, ἀνετέον, had occurred to others. But the humour of the place, where Theodorus, who had been go backward, is now become so eager and ἀτεχνῶς φιλολόγος in the hands of Socrates, is more pointedly expressed by ἀνεκτόν, the MS. reading. I. σοῦ ye] Ie. You, that were so reluctant to enter on the discussion. Cp. supr. 169 C: Οὐ μέντοι περαιτέρω ye ὧν προτίθεσαι οἷός τ' ἔσομαι παρα- σχεῖν ἐμαυτόν σοι. 2. ἀρχή] This is the predi- cate, the subject being con- tained in what follows. Hence no article is required. 5. ἢ ὥσπερ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, δύο] Parm. 138 B: Kwvovpevov γε ἢ φέροιτο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο dv" αὗται γὰρ μόναι κινήσει. No argu- ment can be drawn from this about the comparative dates of the two dialogues. ἀλλοίωσις as yet includes αὔξησις. Aristot. Phys. Ause. 8. 3. § 3: Πρὸς οὕς, καίπερ οὐ διορίζον- τας ποίαν κίνησιν λέγουσιν ἢ πά- σας, οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι. 6. wa κοίνῃ πάσχωμεν] Socrates continues the notion of danger from supr. A B, and with his usual irony professes fear of τῶν τὰ ἀκίνητα κινούντων. 11. ὅταν δὲ ἢ μὲν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ] Cp. supr. 156 CD. 18. ἀλλοίωσιν, τὴν δὲ Ἐπεριφο- ράν] ‘Coisl. τὴν μὲν ἀλλοίωσιν, 12 » « Id movement party? Let us examine the latter first, as we began with them. Motion is their prin- ciple. Do they admit that motion is of two kinds, loco- motion and change? On their granting this,weask, Do you mean that all things move in both these ways? And they must say, Yes; or else it will be as true to say that things stand still, as that they move. 148 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ GEO. Ὀρθῶς γε λέγων. SQ. Τοῦτο τοίνυν οὕτω διελόμενοι διαλεγώμεθα 37) lat ΝΥ & fe na , 3 an ἤδη τοῖς TA πάντα φάσκουσι κινεῖσθαι καὶ ἐρωτῶμεν: , n \ 9 , an 7 , πότερον πᾶν φατε ἀμφοτέρως κινεῖσθαι, φερόμενον « , ETEPOS 5 Q 3 ’ Ἃ x ’ ϑ ’ὔ Ν 9 5τε καὶ ἀλλοιούμενον, ἢ τὸ μέν τι ἀμφοτέρως, τὸ ὃ ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Δί᾽ ἔγωγε οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν: οἶμαι δ᾽ ἂν φάναι ἀμφοτέρως. 7 ys Ss e wn , a, an ΣΟ; Et δέ ye ὦ ἑταῖρε. κινούμενα TE ξαὐτοῖς >] 9 ιο καὶ ἑστῶτα φανεῖται, καὶ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον ὀρθῶς ἕξει > Fab 1, ΄- \ / NX of ὃ εἰπεῖν ὅτι κινεῖται τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἕστηκεν. > ee ’ GEO. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. TQ. Οὐκοῦν ἐπειδὴ κινεῖσθαι αὐτὰ δεῖ, τὸ δὲ μὴ a A Ss Ca , , \ a ΄ κινεῖσθαι μὴ ἐνεῖναι μηδενί, πάντα δὴ πᾶσαν κινησιν So. A lad 15 GEL KLVELTQL. τὴν δὲ mepupopav—quod glos- sema sapit.’ Stallb. Cp. Soph. 221 E,alib. It may be asked why circular motion should be chosen to represent φορά. The answer possibly is, that the revolution of the Heavens is conceived of as embracing all other kinds of motion. Cp. supr. ἕως μὲν ἡ περιφορὰ ἢ κινου- μένη καὶ ὁ ἥλιος. Perbaps also the révolution of the Heavens (or of the Sun) is symbolical of the Heracli- tean cycle of elements. (Las- salle.) For περιφορά inter- changed with φορά cp. Rep. 7.528 A: Ἐν περιφορᾷ ἤδη ὃν στερεὸν λαβόντες... ἀστρονομίαν ἔλεγον, φορὰν οὖσαν βάθους. It must be admitted that φοράν would be more exact. But the compound is more rhythmical, and, as περιφέ- ρεσθαι does not always mean ‘to revolve, it may be used here for locomotion in gene- ral. See Tim. 70 B, Apol. τοῦ, Rep. 3. 402 A-C. 2. διαλεγώμεθα ἤδη] Imagin- ing them, for the sake of our argument, to be less imprac- ticable. ὑποτιθέμενοι vopipwre- pov αὐτοὺς ἢ νῦν ἐθέλοντας ἂν (Soph. 246 D.) τὸ δ᾽] Rep. ἀποκρίνασθαι. B. τὸ μὲν Tee 4. 456 C. 6. ἑτέρως] ‘In one or other of these two ways.’ Cp. Soph. 226 A: Ov τῇ ἑτέρᾳ ληπτέον. 9. κινούμενά te αὐτοῖς καὶ ἑστῶτα φανεῖται] Cp. Rep. 4. 436 D: Ὡς οἵ ye στρόβιλοι ὅλοι ἑστᾶσί τε ἅμα καὶ κινοῦνται, Most MSS. ἑαυτοῖς. For αὐτοῖς, ‘They will find,’ ep. supr. 170 Εἰ; Τί δὲ αὐτῷ Πρωταγόρᾳ, k.T.A. 14. ἐνεῖναι] Almost all the MSS. have ἕν eva, But the correction of the Bodl. MS. to ἐνεῖναι appears to be in an ancient hand, p. 182. SEAITHTOS. GEO. ᾿Αναγκη. 149 / 7 , a “ VA x‘ 2Q. Σκόπει δὴ μοι τόδε αὐτῶν: τῆς θερμότητος ἢ Ne a , 3 ο a5 7 λευκότητος ἢ ὁτουοῦν γένεσιν οὐχ οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν ’ὔ > / / oS / a > , : φαναι αὐτοὺς, φέρεσθαι ἐκαστον τούτων apa aicOnoe \ a a ’ \ if Ν. Ἁ \ μεταξὺ TOU TWOLOUVYTOS TE Και TAC XOVTOS, Και TO μεν > “ πάσχον “αἰσθανόμενον ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αἴσθησιν ἔτι γίγνεσθαι, 2. Σκόπει δή μοι τόδε αὐτῶν] ‘I would have you consider this point in them,’ i.e. in their theory. Cp. 149 D: *Ap’ οὖν ἔτι καὶ τόδε αὐτῶν ἤσθησαι ; 3. οὕτω πως ἐλέγομεν] Supr. 156, 157, 159. 5. τὸ μὲν πάσχον “aicbavope- νον] The MS. reading αἰσθητόν is Inconsistent with the con- text, and with the language used elsewhere in the dialogue. Buttmann conjectured αἰσθητήν, to which Schleiermacher ob- jected that τὸ πάσχον means the sensorium, and not the sentient subject. But the dis- tinction between them is not clearly marked from the Pro- tagorean point of view. Indeed the conception of a ‘senso- rium’ nowhere appears, at least in this part of the dialogue. It is only in speaking of a particular sense that τὸ πάσχον means, for instance, the eye (157): In 159 A it appears doubtful whether τὸ πάσχον means the tongue of Socrates, or more indefinitely the ‘ per- cipient.’ And even if τὸ πάσ- xov is limited to the organ of sense, there is no reason why αἰσθητής should not be used of this. (Cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 4.5: Ἢ γλῶσσα γνώμων τούτων ἐνειρ- γάσθη.) The noun αἰσθητής appears to be suggested in 160 D by the use of ἐπιστήμων just before. In the present place it might recur naturally, as it is in the manner of Plato to recall a train of thought by repeating some remarkable word. (Rep. 488 A: Οἱ émet- kéoraro. Supr. 180 C: Τά ye δὴ πρόβλημα.) To which it may be added, that there is a consciousness of technicality observable in the present pas- sage. (ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἅμα ἀλλόκοτόν τε φαίνεται ὄνομα, κ.τ.λ.) Apart from these considera- tions, the rareness of the word, which would be a strong argu- ment in its favour if it had MS. authority, must be al- lowed to weigh against it as a conjectural reading. And it may also. be urged, that the masculine gender of αἰσθητής would impair the effect of the passage, in which everything seems to be made, as far as possible, neuter and imper- sonal, But Heindorf’s emendation, αἰσθανόμενον, agrees perfectly with the context and with all that precedes (esp. supr. 159 E, 160 A), and it is quite possible that αἰσθητόν may have slipped in instead of it by an unconscious logical inversion on the part of the copyist. This conjecture is therefore adopted in the text. 6. ἔτι] 1.6. when we carry Let us now recall their theory of sensations and quali- ties, which were said to flit be- tween the subject and the object. I 150 x Ἁ A 7 3 9 3 / 9᾽ 3 [2 Ξ τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν ποιὸν τι ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ποιότητα; ἴσως οὖν ἢ p. 182. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ , o 3 , t , By \ 3 ποιοτὴῆς aja ἀλλόκοτον TE φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ ΄, ε ἢ / \ ΄ 3 »᾿ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον: κατὰ μέρη οὖν ἄκουε. ἮΝ \ an ΕΣ / yf / Ν TO γὰρ ποιοῦν οὔτε θερμότης οὔτε λευκοτης, θερμὸν \ Ν Ἂ , Ν 3 oc 4 5. δὲ Kat λευκὸν γίγνεται, καὶ τἄλλα οὕτω. μέμνησαι Oo a a; yap που ἐν Tots , v4 Ὁ; 3, 7 ἃ πρόσθεν ὅτι οὕτως ἐλέγομεν, ἕν δὲ SIN θ᾽ eX 5 δ᾽ 3 Ν a Ἃ μῆοέν AUTO Ka αὐτὸ ELVAL, μῇ αὖ TO ποιοὺυν ἢ πάσχον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων πρὸς ἄλληλα συγγιγνο- ’ὔ \ 3 7 Q \ 9 δ. , A μενων---τὰς αἰσθήσεις Kai Ta αἰσθητὰ ἀποτίκτοντα τὰ \ Sc Ὁ / 6 \ δὲ » θ “ MEV ποιὰ ATTA γίγνεσ Ql, TA CE ALT AVOMLEVA. our analysis beyond the act of sensation to that which under- lies it. ἔτι is omitted in one MS., and Schanz reads dpa instead. I. ποιόν τι] MSS. ποιοῦντι. But the Bodleian margin has ποιόν τι, With marg. F, corr. E. ἡ ited i ΠΕ Ἢ stand in the way of the recep- tion of any new ‘term of art ;’ the strangeness of the word, and the effort required to fol- low the generalization which it presupposes. 2. ἀλλόκοτον] ‘Strange and uncouth,’ ἀλλοκοτώτερον is a ¥. I. 3. ἁθρόον λεγύμενον] ‘The collective (i. 6. general) expres- sion. » This harmonizes with the language adopted above, 157 B: Δεῖ δὲ καὶ κατὰ μέρος οὕτω λέγειν περὶ πολλῶν ἁθροισθέντων, ᾧ δὴ ἁθροίσματι ἄνθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ ἕκαστον ζῷόν τε καὶ εἶδος. The conception of quality is of later growth than that of kind or form ; since the latter is less abstract, and still re- tains a tinge of metaphor. 6. ἐν] καὶ ἐν Bodl. corr. ἢ. μηδ᾽ αὖ τὸ ποιοῦν ἢ πάσχον] \ Kat Supr.157 A. ad distinguishes the active and passive elements from the crude notion of an ob- ject, which is analysed into these. 8. ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων... αἰσθανόμενα] ‘But out of both as they come together—they become, while producing sen- sations and sensible things, the one of a certain kind, the other percipient.’ Attribute and _ perception arise together in the act of sense out of the meeting of agent and patient, neither of which has any independent existence. The text is not grammatical, but neither is it really open to suspicion, and Madvig’sconjecture,dmorexOévra, makes nonsense. The con- struction may be explained by substituting ἐκ τοῦ συγγίγνεσθαι ἀμφότερα for ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων συγ- γιγνομένων, --- or the sentence from ras αἰσθήσεις to the end may be taken as an expansion of γίγνεσθαι τὸ τοιαῦτα φανῆναι. Cp. the construction of infr. 194 CD, where, conversely, τὰ ἰόντα should in strict gram- mar be a genitive governed by τὰ σημεῖα, OEAITHTOS. 151 GEO. Μέμνημαι: πῶς δ᾽ οὔ; 3, 45 > c SO. Ta μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλα χαίρειν ἐάσωμεν, εἴτε β , ey 9 , ἄλλως εἴτε οὕτως λέγουσιν: οὗ δ᾽ ἕνεκα λέγομεν, ). 182. “ ’ ᾽7ὔ 9 “ τοῦτο povoy φυλάττωμεν, ἐρωτωντες" Κινεῖται καὶ en ς , \ Ἅ) Ξ 5 Fi 5 ῥεῖ, ws φατε, τὰ TavTa; ἢ yap ; P ΘΕΟ. Nai. ~ , ἃ , 7 LQ. Οὐκοῦν ἀμφοτέρας as διειλόμεθα κινήσεις, ’ ’ Ν 29 7 φερομενὰ τε καὶ ἀλλοιουμενα ; σι \ , / GEO. Πώς δ᾽ ov; εἴ πέρ ye On τελέως κινήσεται. —_ If the qua- litiesmoved J » a \ LQ. Ei μὲν τοίνυν ἐφέρετο μόνον, ἠλλοιοῦτο δὲ τὸ without ἘΣ » wat. ποτ ΑΙ ΖΕ. changing, μή; εἴχομεν ἀν που εἰπεῖν, οἷα ATTA ρεῖ Ta φερόμενα: πὸ might x n ’ give them Tas λεγωμεν; names. But 7 YOHEY 5 Ἄ now, while CEO. Οὕτως. each of \ \ \ ~ t Q \ en them is OQ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο μένει, TO λευκὸν ῥεῖν moving be- ΝΕ. εὖ 5 \ ΄ o N tae , tween ob- To peov, ἀλλὰ μεταβάλλει, ὠστε καὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου 15 ject and 5 es a , \ \ es subject, εἰναι pony, τῆς λευκότητος, Καὶ μεταβολὴν εἰς AAAHVY τὸ also ΠΛ Φ τ - -α , , 5 2 er , changes, χρόαν, iva μῃ ἁλῷ ταὐυτῇ μένον" ἀρὰ ποτε οἷον TE TL go that a A “ Ὁ ΔΚ , x while you προσειπεῖν χρῶμα, ὥστε καὶ ὀρθῶς προσαγορεύειν ; μέρες. Pp 5 ,ὔ A By / it, it ha SEO. Kai τίς μηχανή, ὦ Σώκρατες; ἢ ἄλλο YE — ireome Ξ ’ 5 ΣΝ ee ε εξέ ἘΣ ἢ “ Eo another TL τῶν τοιούτων, εἴπερ ἀεὶ λέγοντος ὑπεξέρχεται, ATE 20 thing Χ Ces. On ῥέον: 2. εἴτε ἄλλως, . . A€yovow| ‘We need dwell no longer on the details of the theory, since our business now is with its first principle—xivnocs. 7. Οὐκοῦν, K.7.A.] Se. κινεῖται mee Ta πάντα. 12. λέγωμεν] λέγομεν T. 17. ἵνα μὴ ἁλῷ ταύτῃ μένον] Cp. supr. 154 D: Φυλάττων μὴ ἐναντία εἴπω. Infr. 183 A: Ἵνα δὴ ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. And, for the argument, Cratyl. 439 D: ἾΔρ᾽ οὖν οἷόν τε προσει- πεῖν αὐτὸ ὀρθῶς, εἰ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέρ- χεται, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἐκεῖνό ἐστιν, ἔπειτα ὅτι τοιοῦτον, ἢ ἀνάγκη ἅμα ἡμῶν λεγόντων ἄλλο αὐτὸ εὐθὺς γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπεξιέναι καὶ μηκέτι οὕτως ἔχειν; τι προσειπεῖν χρῶμα] To give the name of any colour (to an object)—To use the name of any colour so as to apply it rightly. 20. τῶν τοιούτων] Viz. τῶν αἰσθητῶν, i.e. the remark ap- plies to all sensible attributes and not to colour only. For the step which, for the sake of brevity, Theodorus is here allowed to make by himself, H. Schmidt well compares supr. 158 CE, 189 C, 196 B, And the same argu- ment ap- plies to the sensations, and to Sen- sation, which we said was Know- ledge. Therefore when we said Sensa- tion was Know- ledge, it would have been equal- ly true to say, Not knowledge. The princi- ple of mo- tion has proved a tallacious support, since ac- cording to it every answer, whether Yes or No, is, or rather οι -- σι 152 ,ὔ \ a a [ 2Q. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως ἐροῦμεν ὁποιασοῦν, p. 182. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ @ A nA Coa x 3 / , \ = Va Olov TNS TOU ορᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν ; μένειν ποτε EV αὐτῷ τῷ CEN \ 93 ᾽ὔ ορᾶν ἢ ἀκούειν ; GEO. Οὔκουν δεῖ γε, εἴπερ πάντα κινεῖται. ΣΏ. Οὔτε ἄρα ὁρᾶν προσρητέον τι μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ σι 4 3 9. 37 a ἋΟὈ ὁρᾶν, οὐδέ TW’ ἄλλην αἴσθησιν μᾶλλον ἣ μή; πάντων , / YE πάντως Κινουμενων. ΘΕΟ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. 2Q. Καὶ μὴν αἴσθησίς γε ἐπιστήμη, ὡς ἐφαμεν » ΄ Ν / ἐγὼ TE καὶ Θεαίτητος. GEO. Ἢν ταῦτα. ZQ. Οὐδὲν ἄρα ἐπιστήμην μᾶλλον ἢ μὴ ἐπιστή- > ’; ΕῚ Υ [2 , μὴν ἀπεκριναμεθα ἐρωτώμενοι ὃ τί ἐστιν ἐπιστήμη. ΘΕΟ. ’Eotkare. 2Q. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν συμβαίνοι τὸ ἐπανόρθωμα a > / a » a a ΄ τὴς ἀποκρίσεως, προθυμηθεῖσιν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι πάντα a cd Nee / e 5» / 3 ‘ a Ν > κινεῖται, iva On ἐκείνη ἡ ἀπόκρισις ὀρθὴ φανῇ. too, «ες ὃν 5 vA 9 7 la a 3 ὡς EOLKEV, ἐφάνη, εἰ TQAVTA KLVELTAL, TATA ἀποκρισίς, I. Τί δὲ περὶ αἰσθήσεως] So far of αἰσθητά, now οὗ αἰσθήσεις. 2. μένειν] Sc. τὴν αἴσθησιν. 5. Οὔτε ἄρα, K.T.A. | ‘Then we must not at all predicate seeing in preference to not-seeing, nor any other sensation rather than the absence of it, since all things move in every way.’ Join οὔτε μᾶλλον. 6. Bekker reads οὔτε,, οὔτε, perhaps rightly. 12. Οὐδέν is adverbial. For ἐπιστήμην. . .. ἀπεκρινάμεθα cp. supr. 147 B: Ὅταν ἀποκρίνηται τέχνης τινὸς ὄνομα. We gave ‘sense’ as an equivalent for Knowledge. But ‘sense’= ‘not-sense,’ therefore if ‘ sense’ =‘knowledge,’ ‘sense’ =‘ not- knowledge.’ 15. Καλὸν ἂν ἡμῖν] ‘ Here is a fine result of having corrected (or completed) our first answer in our eagerness to prove that nothing is at rest, and so to make it clear that that first an- swer was right, whereas it would seem to be made clear that if nothing is at rest, every answer upon whatever subject is equally right, both “it is so” and “ it is not so,” or, if you choose, “ be- comes so,” that we may say no- thing that would bring them to a stand-still.’ For the asyn- deton, and for ἄν (‘would seem to’) Heind. well compares Rep. 10. 602 A: Χαρίεις ἂν εἴη, κιτ.λ. Badh. conjectures Καλὸν ἄρ᾽ ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, p. 183 . OEAITHTOS. 153 \ o@ 3) 3 4 e 7 > θὴ 5 oS 183. περὶ OTOU ἂν τις ἀποκρίνηται, ὁμοίως ὀρθὴ εἶναι, οὕτω 7 x \ J / T ἔχειν φάναι καὶ μὴ οὕτω, εἰ δὲ βούλει, γίγνεσθαι, ed A Z > \ a x , Wa μὴ στήσωμεν AUTOVUS T@ OY®. SEO. ᾿Ορθῶς λέγεις. XQ. Πλὴν γε, ὦ Θεύδωρε, ὅτι οὕτω τε εἶπον καὶ 5 la \ \ a Ἂν / x \ οὐχ οὕτω. δεῖ δὲ οὐδὲ τοῦτο “τὸ οὕτω λέγειν: οὐδὲ yap Sy yf la ΕἾ \ ΄ xa 5 \ 4 >O\ Ν ἂν ETL κινοῖτο ἦτο οὕτω: οὐδ᾽ αὖ μὴ οὕτω: οὐδὲ γὰρ An Zz y \ 7 a τοῦτο κίνησις" ἀλλά Tw ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον τοῖς I. οὕτω τ᾽ ἔχειν φάναι] These words are added in explanation of πᾶσα. While you are nam- ing a quality, it is altered and slips away ; and while you are naming a sensation, it has given place to another. While you say the words ‘Sense is knowledge,’ your theory of change compels you to utter in the same breath, Sense is not knowledge. In supporting your answer by the doctrine of motion, you have made this and every other answer alike unstable. 3. ἵνα μὴ στήσωμεν αὐτούς] ‘That we may not arrest them (τοὺς ῥέοντας) in their flow.’ Cp. supr. 181 D E, 182 A. The humour is lost by reading αὐυτους. 5. Πλήν γε, ὦ Θεόδωρε] μή is changed to οὐχ, because the words are taken out of their hy- pothetical connection.—Com- pare the conclusion of the Par- menides. 6, 7. *ré] The articles, which Seem necessary, were added by Schleiermacher. Their ab- sence is defended by Wohlrab, who quotes Soph. 244 A: ‘Ozé- ταν ὃν φθέγγησθε. 7. οὐδὲ γάρ] ‘For when we think of “so,” there is no mo- tion init; nor yet in “not so.””’ 8. ἀλλά τιν’ ἄλλην φωνὴν θετέον] Cp. supr. 157 B, Soph. 252C: Τῷ τε εἶναί που περὶ πάντα ἀναγκάζονται χρῆσθαι καὶ τῷ χωρὶς καὶ τῷ ἄλλων καὶ τῷ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ καὶ μυρίοις ἑτέροις, ὧν ἀκρατεῖς ὄντες εἴργεσθαι καὶ μὴ συνάπτειν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις οὐκ ἄλ- λων δέονται τῶν ἐξελεγξόντων, κιτ.λ. φωνήν] ‘ Dialect.’ Arist. Met. 3. 4. 1008 a: Οὔτε yap οὕτως οὔτ᾽ οὐχ οὕτως λέ- γει, ἀλλ᾽ οὕτως τε καὶ οὐχ οὕτως. καὶ πάλιν γε ταῦτα ἀπόφησιν ἄμφω ὅτι οὔθ᾽ οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως. εἰ γὰρ μή, ἤδη ἂν εἴη τι ὡρισμένον. Aristotle points out (1), that it does not follow, because quantity is wholly relative, that quality need be so also; (2) that it is not the quality, but the subject of it, which changes. Sensations are wholly shift- ing and relative. They could not be the objects of the mind, unless we perceived resemblance and difference in them. In every act of sense, therefore, there is a universal element, and the mind gives to it its own stamp of unity. Arist. Met. 3. 4. 1007 b: Kat γίγνεται δὴ τὸ ᾿Αναξαγόύρου, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα" ὥστε μηθὲν ἀληθῶς ὑπάρχειν. τὸ ἀόριστον οὖν ἐοίκασι λέγειν, καὶ οἰόμενοι τὸ ὃν λέγειν, περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος λέγουσιν" τὸ γὰρ becomes, equally true, except that both Yesand No are falsified while we are utter- ing them. A new dia- lect should be invented to carry out this theory. The only word for it in existing languageis, ‘ No-how.’ Thus we are rid, not only of Protagoras, but also of the theory of sense, so far as it is based cn motion, 5 Io μι οι 154 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ Ν , a 4 e a A \ e Tov λόγον τοῦτον λέγουσιν, ὡς νῦν γε πρὸς τὴν av- a e 3 e 3 \ ay ‘ 3 τῶν ὑπόθεσιν οὐκ ἔχουσι ῥήματα, εἰ μὴ APA TO οὐδ , © x (ας ἐᾷ , ὅπως. μάλιστα δ᾽ οὕτως ἂν αὐτοῖς ἁρμόττοι, ἄπειρον λεγόμενον. » an ? ἴω GEO. Οἰκειοτάτη γοῦν διάλεκτος αὕτη αὐτοῖς. σι 53 an an e ͵ LQ. Οὐκοῦν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου 3 λλ Ψ' θ Ν 27 A 3 “ [4 9 ἀπηλλάγμεθα, καὶ οὔπω συγχωροῦμεν αὐτῷ TAVT 3 ΄ / 3 DY \ ΄ ἄνδρα πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον εἶναι, ἂν μὴ φρονι- > > £ μός τις ἢ" ἐπιστήμην τε αἴσθησιν ov συγχωρησομεθα a lal , κατά ye τὴν τοῦ πάντα κινεῖσθαι μεθοδον. r/ i Tos ἄλλως Θεαίτητος ode λέγει. 7 3, a / , A CEO. "Apior’ εἴρηκας, ὦ Σώκρατες: τούτων yap ὔ Ws SN mn 3 7 3 , περανθέντων καὶ ἐμὲ δεῖ ἀπηλλάχθαι σοι ἀποκρινο- \ Ν / > \ Ν Ν a poe ecm te ot ἐπειδὴ τὸ περὶ Tov IIpw- ταγόρου λόγου τέλος am ΘΕΑΙ. Μὴ πρίν γ᾽ ἄν, ὦ Θεόδωρε, Saxparys TE καὶ σὺ TOUS φάσκοντας αὖ τὸ πᾶν ἑστάναι διέλθητε, ’ IZ ,ὔ €l Ly) TL ad “7 27) ὥσπερ ἄρτι προὔθεσθε. δυνάμει ὃν καὶ μὴ ἐντελεχείᾳ τὸ ἀόριστόν ἐστιν. 2. τὸ οὐδ᾽ ὅπως... ἄπειρον λεγό- μενον] With most of the Greek philosophers the Infinite was a purely negative idea. At this point sensation ap- pears to be annihilated. And yet if we view the dialogue as a whole, the impression we re- ceive from it is rather this :— Sensations are purely relative to the individual, and infinitely diverse : taken alone, therefore, they cannot be the objects of knowledge and thought: but it is not denied that they are the occasions of thought and the conditions of knowledge. (186 1) : Ἔν μὲν dpa τοῖς παθή- μασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπιστήμη, ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλογισμῷ.) 3. otras... λεγόμενον] Viz. οὐδ᾽ ὅπως. 6. τοῦ τε σοῦ ἑταίρου] This τε is answered by ἐπιστήμην Te... καί is epexegetic. Aristotle, Met. 3. 4. 1009 a, expresses the same sense of re- lief: Kat τοῦ λόγου ἀπηλλαγμένοι ἂν εἴημεν τοῦ ἀκράτου καὶ κωλύον- τός τι τῇ διανοίᾳ ὁρίσαι. 10. εἶ μή τί 'πωρ] Theztetus is to follow the argument, but Socrates has no intention of re- linquishing Theodorus, now that he has dragged him in, This gives occasion for the banter which follows. 15. σχοίη) The optative depends on συνθηκάς, ‘As it was agreed I should, when the discussion. of Protagoras’ argument should be completed. Supr. 169 C. Ῥ. 18: D "Ὁ: OEAITHTOS. 155 GEO. Neos ὦν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους a (6 , / \ ἀδικεῖν διδάσκεις ὁμολογίας παραβαίνοντας ; ἀλλὰ 7 σ“ “- 3 ,ὔ , 7 παρασκευάζου ὕπως τῶν ἐπιλοίπων Σωκράτει δώσεις λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἑσνπερ γε βούληται. ἥδιστα μέντ᾽ ἂν, aS ΝΣ Ὁ I nKOvoa περὶ ὧν λέγω. ΘΕΟ. ἽἹππέας εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖ Σωκράτη εἰς ΄ ΄ 3 ΄, λόγους προκαλούμενος: ἐρώτα οὖν καὶ ἀκούσει. 2Q. ᾿Αλλά μοι δοκῶ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, περί γε ὧν κε- / ἉἍὦ » / 2 a 5 Aevet Θεαίτητος, ov πείσεσθαι αὐτῷ. GEO. Τί δὴ οὖν οὐ πείσεσθαι ; 7 \ δὰ δὰ Ν 2Q. Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους, οἱ ἕν ἑστὸς et « Ἂς A UL \ A lad λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν, αἰσχυνόμενος μὴ φορτικῶς σκοπῶ- @ 9 7 Δλοο » / μεν, NTTOV αἰσχυνομαι ἢ eva. ὄντα Ilappevidny. Tlap- μενίδης δέ μοι φαίνεται, τὸ τοῦ Ὃμήρου, αἰδοῖός τέ συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ δὴ τῷ Cy σ ’ὔ, μοι εἶναι apa δεινὸς τε. I. τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους] Viz. Socrates, who, in his character of Sciron (supr. 169 A), is not likely to be over-scrupulous. 3. τῶν ἐπιλοίπων] Viz. the discussion of the Eleatic prin- ciple according to Socrates’ own proposal, supr. 181 A. 7. Ἱππέας εἰς πεδίον] * You challenge cavalry to an encoun- ter in the open plain,’ Schol.: ‘Imméas προκαλεῖσθαι εἰς πεδίον, ἐπὶ τῶν τοὺς ἔν τισι βέλτίους καὶ ἐπιστημονικωτέρους αὑτῶν εἰς ἔριν προκαλουμένων, Πλάτων ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ καὶ Μέναν- δρος ΚΚαταψευδομένῳ. γράφεται δὲ καὶ Ἵππον εἰς πεδίον προκαλεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τῶν εἰς ἃ βούλεταί τις προ- καλούντων. The latter inter- pretation 15 alone suitable here. For the point is, not that The- etetus is provoking defeat, but that Socrates is eager for the fray. 11. Τί δὴ οὖν] Hither ‘in what respect?’ or ‘for what reason?’ The former is pre- ferable. Theodorus is puzzled, as supr. 161 A. ‘How do you mean, Socrates, that you will not comply with his request 1᾽ Rep. 5. 449 C: Τί μάλιστα, ἔφην, ὑμεῖς οὐκ ἀφίετε ; Σέ, ἢ 8 ὅς. Ἔτι ἐγὼ εἶπον, τί μάλιστα ; ᾿Απορρᾳθυ- μεῖν ἡμῖν δοκεῖς, ἔφη... 12. ἑστός] So Bodl. (though rather doubtfully) with Vat. Ven. Π, and other MSS. 15. τὸ τοῦ ‘Ounpov| 1]. 3.172: Αἰδοῖός τέ μοί ἐσσι, φίλε ἑκυρέ, δεινός τε. 16, εἶναι ἅμα] This is theread- ing of the Bodl. MS. and of T. συμπροσέμιξα γὰρ... τῷ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ] In what connection do these words stand with the Parmenides ἢ Do they imply that Plato had already written it, or that he Io I 5 Theztetus desires now to hear the opposite theory (that of rest) dis- cussed. But Socrates declines. ‘ Parmeni- des, whom I once saw in his old age, in- spires me, for his glorious depth, with reverence and awe. I fear, therefore, lest we should mistake his words, and still more his thoughts, and lest the crowd of discussions which would enter in should 156 4 ,» ΄’ / , 3 , , ὺ ἀνδρὶ πάνυ νέος πάνυ πρεσβύτῃ, Kat μοι ἐφάνη βαθος p. 18; 3 Ψ' lay Aa 3 νΝ τι ἔχειν παντάπασι γενναῖον. φοβοῦμαι οὖν μὴ οὔτε p. 18 MNAATOQNOZ \ , a , / 5 \ τὰ λεγόμενα ξυνιῶμεν, τί τε διανοούμενος εἰπε πολὺ , / \ Ν / @ & ε ΄ πλέον λειπώμεθα, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, οὗ EveKa ὁ λογος. a / / , 3 > , ἂν 5 ὥρμηται, ἐπιστήμης πέρι, τί TOT ἐστίν, ἄσκεπτον Zz eax a 3 Υ Ψ' 3) > γένηται VITO TOV ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λογων, εἰ τις av- oe hh / , ἃ a » , / τοῖς πείσεται: ἄλλως TE καί, OV νῦν ἐγείρομεν πληθει had conceived it? or do they refer to a fact or to a supposi- tion which was the germ from which that dialogue sprang, or which was used to ornament it, by Plato or by some one else ? Or did Plato add the present passage after both dialogues had been written? Some light is thrown upon this question by comparing Soph. 217 C: Οἷον (δ᾽ ἐρωτήσεων) καὶ Παρμενίδῃ χρωμένῳ καὶ διεξιόντι λόγους παγ- κάλους παρεγενόμην ἐγὼ νέος ὦν, ἐκείνου μάλα δὴ τότε ὄντος πρεσ- Burov. This passage conveys the impression that the written dialogue is referred to. At all events, the repeated refer- ence helps to mark the Par- menides as belonging to this series of dialogues. (See In- troduction.) The same concep- tion of the time at which Par- menides lived, and the same reverence for him, is implied in the words of the Eleatic stranger (his professed disciple), Soph. 237 A: Παρμενίδης δὲ ὁ μέγας, ὦ παῖ, παισὶν ἡμῖν οὖσιν . . ἀπεμαρτύρατο., ὧδε ἑκάστοτε λέγων. I. βάθος... γενναῖον] ‘A mag- nificent depth of mind.’ Schol.: Φαίνεται kai’ ApiororeAns σεμνύνων τὸν Παρμενίδην. 2. οὔτε τὰ λεγόμενα] It is re- markable to find already in Plato such a distinct perception of the difference between the grammatical sense and the real drift of an author. The ex- pression ὃ διανοούμενος ἠρόμην occurs in Lach. 190 E. 5. ἄσκεπτον... λόγων] ‘Should fail to be considered through the endless intrusion of alien subjects of inquiry.’ 6. τῶν ἐπεισκωμαζόντων λόγων] We pass from the image of a flood (supr. 177 B) to that of a disorderly crowd of discus- sions. Compare Philebus, 62 C: Βούλει δῆτα, ὥσπερ θυρωρὸς ὑπ᾽ ὄχλου τις ὠθούμενος καὶ βια- ζόμενος, ἡττηθεὶς ἀναπετάσας τὰς θύρας ἀφῶ πάσας τὰς ἐπιστήμας εἰσρεῖν καὶ μίγνυσθαι ὁμοῦ καθαρᾷ τὴν ἐνδεεστέραν; See also Shake- speare, Lucrece, 1301, 2: ‘Much like a press of people at a door Throng her inventions, which shall go before.’ For the use of the verb see Rep. 6. 500 B: ᾿Επεισκεκωμακότας . . said of the bad philosophers. εἴ τις . . πείσεται] ‘If we once let them in,—‘give them a hearing.’ 7. ἄλλως τε καί] ‘ Especially as. Jor the paratactic struc- ture cp. Aesch. Pers. 689: ἤλλλως τε πάντως χοὶ κατὰ χθονὸς θεοὶ | λαβεῖν ἀμείνους εἰσὶν ἢ με- θιέναι. OEAITHTOS. 17 3 ΄ Υ, ’ 3 f ‘4 3 , > XN 184. ἀμήχανον, εἰ TE TIS EV παρέργῳ σκέψεται, ἀνάξι ἂν 8 ἀφανιεῖ, δεῖ δὲ οὐδέτερα, ἀλλὰ Θεαίτητον ὧν κυεῖ ’ | ἀπεκρίνω. Q , 5) e a / Ἂ a 3 , πάθοι, εἴτε ἱκανῶς, μηκυνόομεέενος TO τῆς ἐπιστημῆς περὶ ἐπιστήμης πειρᾶσθαι ἡμᾶς τῇ μαιευτικῇ τέχνῃ ἀπολῦσαι. ΘΕΟ. ᾿Αλλὰ χρή, εἰ δοκεῖ, οὕτω ποιεῖν. 2Q. Ἔτι τοίνυν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, τοσόνδε περὶ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπίσκεψαι. αἴσθησιν γὰρ δὴ ἐπιστήμην ἢ γάρ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί ’ 53 , ea » , o N N Ν ΣΩ). Εἰ οὖν τίς σε ὧδ᾽ ἐρωτῴη: τῷ τὰ λευκὰ καὶ al yy ΄- \ μέλανα ὁρᾷ ἄνθρωπος καὶ τῷ τὰ ὀξέα καὶ βαρέα > a 4 5) Μ 5 »“ἤ , NS 7 QKOVEL 5 εἰποις ἂν, οἰμαι, ομμασι τε καὶ MOLY. ΘΕΑΙ. "Eyoye. N \ \ - ’ 2Q. To δὲ εὐχερὲς τῶν ὀνομάτων τε καὶ ῥημάτων Ἁ > 7 καὶ μὴ Ot ἀκριβείας ἐξεταζόμενον τὰ μὲν πολλὰ οὐκ I. εἴτέτις, x.7.A.] The reasons given here for avoiding a criti- cism of Parmenides and the Eleatic doctrine are not such as would prevent its being discussed in another dialogue. It would therefore be a mis- take to argue from them against the genuineness of the Sophist. Compare with the expression Ov νῦν ἐγείρομεν πλήθει ἀμήχανον... Rep. 5. 450 Β: Οὐκ ἴστε ὅσον ἐσμὸν λόγων ἐπεγείρετε. 3. ὧν κυεῖ] Bod]. Vat. Ven. Π. ὅν. Perhaps rightly. Schanz gives κύει, the reading of the Bodleian first hand, and of T. ὧν κυεῖ περὶ ἐπιστήμης] Supr. 149 Β΄. ‘This reference to μαιευτική prepares us for the ‘appeal to experience’ in what follows.—A different method is required for the ontological problem.—Theetetus’ first an- swer has been disposed of, but his second is to be evolved through a final criti- cism of the first. He is now prepared to see the limits of sensation and to pass beyond them. The present criticism was already implied in the lan- guage of 179 C. 5. ἀπολῦσαι] ‘To deliver.’ I5. Τὸ, εὐχερές]. ‘ Facility about words and phrases rather than captious minuteness.’ Cp. Supt. Tyee eolit. 260 (H+ “Av διαφυλάξῃς τὸ μὴ σπουδάζειν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὀνόμασι, πλουσιώτερος εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀναφανήσει φρονήσεως. Cp. Arist. Met. 1.3. 995 a: Τοὺς δὲ λυπεῖ τὸ ἀκριβὲς ἢ διὰ TO μὴ δύ- νασθαι συνείρειν ἢ διὰ τὴν μικρολο- γίαν' ἔχει γάρ τι τὸ ἀκριβὲς τοιοῦ- τον, ὥστε καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν συμβο- λαίων, καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἀνελεύθε- ρον εἶναί τισι δοκεῖ, cause the question about Knowledge to be end- lessly de- ferred. Transition From Sense to Opinion, We there- fore return once more upon our old track, and ask, With what do we see and hear what is white or shrill ? Do we see and hear with our eyes and ears, or through them ? Not with, butthrough. We are not each of us a sort of Trojan- horse full of discon- nected faculties. There is one pre- siding na- ture, in which they all meet. This it is with which we see through our eyes Vl ae 158 MAATONOZ / 3 x a XN 7 3 , ϑ , ἀγεννές, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ τούτου ἐναντίον ἀνελευθε- 327 ‘ 7? 3 lot - Q a , pov, ἔστι δὲ ὅτε ἀναγκαῖον, οἷον καὶ νῦν ἀναγκὴ ἐπι- / la) > , A 5 / χὰ 3 3 / λαβέσθαι τῆς ATOKPLOEWS ἣν ATTOKPLVEL, ἢ οὐκ ορθη. , 7 ‘ds , - a σκόπει γάρ, ἀπόκρισις ποτέρα ὀρθοτέρα, ᾧ ὁρῶμεν, ἴω ῦ i ἡφθαλ ἧς, ἢ OL οὗ δρῶμε © ἀκού 5 τοῦτο εἶναι ὀφθαλμοὺς, ἢ U ὁρῶμεν, καὶ ᾧ ἀκοῦο ΙοΟ 3 x 3 ey 8 / μεν, ὦτα, ἢ OL οὗ ἀκούομεν 5 ΘΈΑΙ. Av ὧν ἔκαστα αἰσθανόμεθα, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ, > = AN Ὁ ὦ Σώκρατες, μᾶλλον ἢ οἷς. 7 S - LQ. Δεινὸν yap που, ὦ παῖ, εἰ πολλαί τινες ἐν eon a 3 , e ’ / 9 , ἡμῖν, ὡσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις, αἰσθήσεις ἐγκαθην- AX \ XN ΟῚ / \ ἰὃ ’ By XN 37 oe ται, ἀλλὰ μὴ εἰς μιαν τινα LOEQY, ELTE ψυχὴν ELTE O TL a a , a , i \ / re δεῖ καλεῖν, πάντα ταῦτα ξυντείνει, ἡ διὰ τούτων οἷον > / > / [4 ΕῚ 7 ὀργάνων αἰσθανόμεθα ὅσα αἰσθητά. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλά μοι δοκεῖ οὕτω μᾶλλον 7 ἐκείνως. p. 18. D LQ. Toddé τοι ἕνεκα αὐτὰ σοι διακριβοῦμαι, εἴ td a 3 a ~ a “~ \ \ ’ a > TLL μων αὐτῶν τῷ αὐτῷ διὰ μὲν ὀφθαλμῶν ἐφι- / ω ’ Ν SN las YA κνούμεθα λευκῶν TE καὶ μελάνων, διὰ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων ©. ἢ 3 an \ ge > ξ΄ é \ ETEPWV av τινῶν" Kal ἕξεις ερωτῶμενος σαντα Τὰ TOl-E 2. ἐπιλαβέσθαι... ἣ οὐκ ὀρθὴ] ‘To check your answer and show where it is erroneous.’ Cp. Rep. 5. 450 A: Οἷον... εἰρ- γάσασθε ἐπιλαβόμενοί pov. 9. Δεινὸν γάρ που] ‘Would it not be strange, if in each of us there were perched, as in a sort of Trojan horse, a number of separate perceptions, and these did not all meet in some one nature, the Mind or what you will, with which, through the medium of these, we perceive the various objects of sense ?’ 10. ὥσπερ ἐν δουρείοις ἵπποις] The plural is caused by ἡμῖν. As if each of us were a sort of wooden machine, like the Tro- jan horse (‘a sort of Noah’s ark,’ as we might say).—Man cannot be regarded as a bundle of separate faculties having no | higher unity: that would be too mechanical a conception of his nature. The term ‘organ of sense’ perhaps originates with this passage. The differ- ence between and δὲ οὗ, di- rect and indirect instrumen- tality, is obvious, but difficult to render exactly. 11. idéaisused in the concrete vernacular sense ; Thue. 2. 51: Τοιοῦτον ἦν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν. 15. Τοῦδέ τοι ἕνεκα] “ΤῸ 15 with a view to this that I am so precise with you, namely, to the inquiry whether,’ etc. τοῦδε (better than rod δέ) has a double reference to eis μίαν τινὰ iséav.. αἰσθητά and to εἴ τινι, k.T.A. 18, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα must mean ‘all attributes,’ preparing 185 OLEAITHTOS., 159 h i ᾿ lad 9 \ “ 3 7 5) x f \ 184. αὑτα εἰς TO σῶμα ἀναφέρειν; ἴσως δὲ βέλτιον σὲ λέ » x 5 LAX “ἋΟὃ » \ e \ ἴω ἐγειν αὑτὰ ἀποκρινόμενον μᾶλλον ἢ ἐμὲ ὑπὲρ σοῦ an 7 , \ \ \ πολυπραγμονεῖν. καί μοι λέγε: θερμὰ καὶ σκληρὰ \ “a Ν / ΩΣ > / 5 » a καὶ κοῦφα καὶ γλυκέα δ ὧν αἰσθάνει, apa ov τοῦ ΄ a , \ + / σώματος ἕκαστα τίθης ; ἢ ἄλλου τινὸς; OEAI. Οὐδενὸς ἄλλου. xO. Ἦ καὶ ἐθελήσεις ὁμολογεῖν, ἃ Ov ἑτέρας 7 7 V4 9S > 77 an δυνάμεως αἰσθάνει, ἀδύνατον εἶναι δ ἄλλης ταῦτ᾽ αἰσθέσθαι, οἷον ἃ δι ἀκοῆς, δ᾽ ὄψεως, ἢ ἃ δι᾽ ὄψεως, > 3 “ δι ἀκοῆς; ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐκ ἐθελήσω ; ΣΏ. Hi re ἄρα περὶ ἀμφοτέρων διανοεῖ, οὐκ ἂν ἣν» an CoS 5) / >a 53 ὃ % a Ce: διὰ γε τοῦ ἐτέρου ὀργάνου, οὐδ᾽ αὖ διὰ τοῦ ETEPOV SS i 9 ἧς 3. Ὁ περὶ ἀμῴοτερων αἰσθανοίι᾿ av. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. LQ. Περὶ δὴ φωνῆς καὶ περὶ χρόας πρῶτον μὲν αὐτὸ A YY ὦ ’ 3 ma Ch » 7 3 , TOUTO πέρι apporepav ἢ διανοεῖ, OTL ἀμῴφοτερω ἐστον: ΘΕΑΙ. "Eyoye. 3 an \ of e ’ ς ’ A “ 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ὅτι ἑκάτερον ἑκατέρου μὲν ἐτερον, e “ \ 5. FZ εαυτῷ δὲ ταὐτὸν ; the way for the suprasensual attributes to be adduced below. For τῷ αὐτῷ cp. Rep. 4. 436 A. In καὶ ἕξεις... ἀναφέρειν ; the question is put more strongly instead of continuing καὶ εἰ δεῖ ἔνιά ye τῶν τοιούτων ἀναφέρειν eis μὴ σωματικόν τι. This passage is differently interpreted by H. Schmidt, who takes εἴ τινι, κατὰ, as hypothetical, and supposes the apodosis to be deferred, where Socrates breaks off at ἴσως δέ, κιτιλ. a. πολυπραγμονεῖν Socrates will not, if he can help it, act beyond his part as questioner and μαιευτής, . ἡ. ἃ δι’ ἑτέρας δυνάμεως] The object of one sense cannot be perceived by another. There- fore if I perceive anything about the objects of two dif- ferent senses, it cannot be through either of them. 12. οὐκ dv..aic@dvoe ἄν] ‘This cannot be ἃ perception of either sense which embraces the ob- jects of both.’ 17. ἦ διανοεῖ) ‘I wonder if you have this notion,’ i.e. ‘Surely you have.’ Cp. supr. 145 A; and for the position of 7, Rep. 2. 396 B, ἵππους, κιτιλ. .. ἢ μιμή- σονται : Io 20 and hear through our ears. But wecan- not see and hear through the same organ, There are somethings which we perceive about the objects of both senses, e.g. that they are both, that they are different from each other, and each the same with itself. That both are two, and each is one. That they are like or anlike. Through what organ do we per- ceive these things? If I had asked, through what do we per- ceive that they are salt, you would have said ‘the tongue.’ Through what, then, do we per- ceive being and not-be- ing, same- ness and 160 ΘΕΑΙ. Ti μήν; ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΣΩ. Καὶ ὅτι ἀμφοτέρω δύο, ἑκάτερον δὲ ἕν ; ΘΕΑΙ͂. Kai τοῦτο. ἴω , 9 / 7 ε / > , SQ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἴτε ἀνομοίω εἴτε ὁμοίω ἀλλήλοιν, 5 δυνατὸς εἶ ἐπισκέψασθαι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ἴσως. DO. Ταῦτα δὴ πάντα διὰ τίνος περὶ αὐτοῖν δια- ane By 4 \ ὃ Come: “ ,ὕ ov v fet Ν νοεῖ; οὔτε γὰρ Ou’ ἀκοῆς οὔτε OL ὄψεως οἷον τε τὸ XN 7. ἣν > a 3, \ \ ,ὔ ’ κοινὸν λαμβάνειν περὶ αὐτῶν. ETL δὲ καὶ TOOE τεκμη- Ν Gee ee > \ ὃ \ 3} > ,ὕ 10 ριον περὶ οὗ λέγομεν" εἰ Yap OUvATOY eli} ἀμφοτέρω 5. ΝᾺ 3 a4 ο σκέψασθαι, ap’ ἐστὸν ἁλμυρὼ ἢ οὔ, οἶσθ᾽ ὅτι ἕξεις > o Ὁ » δ Ν a δ᾽ Ὑ, 57 > Χ ELTTELV ῳ ἐπισκέψει, καὶ TOUTO OUTE ovis OUTE QKO?) 7 ’’ A φαίνεται, ἀλλά τι ἄλλο. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δ᾽ οὐ μέλλει; ἥ γε διὰ τῆς γλώττης 15 δύναμις. TQ. Καλῶς λέγεις. ἡ δὲ δὴ διὰ τίνος δύναμις TO 5 ss. a Ν \ XN IN / a Ὁ Ν > ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις δηλοῖ σοι, ᾧ TO BA > f \ x » Ay x a aA ΧΝ > εστιν ἐπονομάζεις καὶ TO οὐκ εστι και A VUV δὴ npo- TOUEY περὶ αὐτῶν: τούτοις “τσ! ποῖα ἀποδώσεις 3 8. τὸ κοινόν] ‘That which regards them both.’ You can refer any particular sensation to its proper organ. Can you do so in the case of these com- mon perceptions ? Cp. Rep. 7. 522 C: Οἷον τοῦτο τὸ κοινόν, ᾧ πᾶσαι προσχρῶνται .. ἐπιστῆμαι .. τὸ ἕν τε καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ τὰ τρία διαγιγνώσκειν. 10. ἀμφοτέρω] So B: ἀμφο- τέρως ΠΝ. 16. τό τ᾽ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τούτοις] “ Which is common not only to these sensible ob- jects, but to all things.’ H. Schmidt would confine πᾶσι to objects of sense (56. τοῖς αἰσθη- τοῖς), referring τούτοις to φωνή, χρόα, χυμός only. Although this is more strictly logical, 1t seems improbable that the notion of ἐπὶ πᾶσι (and of ἐπὶ πάντων, 186 A) should be thus narrowed. 18. ἃ νῦν δὴ ἠρωτῶμεν] ΥΊΖ. as Theeetetus understands it, ὁμοι- ότητα καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ τὸ ταὐ- τόν τε καὶ τὸ ἕτερον, ἔτι δὲ ἕν τε καὶ τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν, referring to what has just pre- ceded. Ὑπέρευ] This warm praise of Theeetetus for dialectical ap- prehension prepares the way for the wnwonted outburst of admiration which follows. 19. περὶ αὐτῶν] Concerning the objects of sense, Μ΄ 3 a / Ley. a \ 3 Χ +o ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν, πλὴν Ὑ ὅτι μοι δοκεῖ THY ἀρχὴν οὐδ 5) a AN / 37 7 d εἰναι τοιοῦτον οὐδὲν τούτοις ὄργανον ἴδιον ὥσπερ OEAITHTOS. 161 4 > ἊΝ 3 / - a Ν 3 7 Ρ. 185. opyava, Ot ὧν αἰσθάνεται ἡμῶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον difference, o unity and εκαστα 5 plurality, , / δ ΝΞ odd and GEAI. Οὐσίαν λέγεις καὶ τὸ μὴ EVOL, Καὶ ὅὁμοιό- ὀγραὶ 7 Ν \ 3 ΄ X 6 THTA καὶ ἀνομοιότητα, καὶ TO ταὐτόν TE καὶ TO ἕτερον, XY 46 » Ν VA ΕῚ Ν σι an Ὁ ἔτι δὲ ἕν TE Kal τὸν ἄλλον ἀριθμὸν περὶ αὐτῶν. δῆλον ξ δι Se / \ Ν δ “A Ν ΟῚ δὲ ὅτι καὶ ἄρτιόν τε καὶ περιττὸν ἐρωτᾷς, καὶ τἄλλα Ve 7 \ / \ an an / ὅσα τούτοις ἕπεται, διὰ Tivos ποτὲ τῶν TOD σώματος a an 9 / τῇ ψυχῆ αἰσθανόμεθα. € ’ὔ 3. if lant 3, A 20. “Yirepev, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀκολουθεῖς, καὶ ἔστιν ἃ 5 a \ an ἐρωτῶ αὐτὰ ταῦτα. 10 > \ \ , 3 4 ΒΥ Py OEAT. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ ἂν πτρμεαίοευς answers, that these are perceiv- ed through ’ 7 > 3 SUN > econ ε \ \ ᾽ὔ no special Β ἐκείνοις, AAA αὐτὴ Ov αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ τὰ κοινά μοι bodily or- / ae ’ a gan, but by φαίνεται περὶ πάντων ἐπισκοπεῖν. 15. the mind \ \ 5 9 , eee ef | » itself, sur- 20. Καλὸς yap εἶ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγε το ΤΥ what is / > ᾽ e \ at Θεόδωρος, αἰσχρός: ὁ yap καλῶς λέγων καλός τε ’ / N \ ae a oy ESS ,ὔ Υ Ψ καγαθὸς. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ εὖ ἐποίησάς με μάλα 13. ὄργανον ἴδιον] The Bodl. MS. has ὀργανίδιον. 16. Καλὸς γὰρ εἶ] The en- thusiasm with which Socrates accepts Thetetus’ acknowledg- ment of the truth that the mind has its perceptions, independent of sense, belongs to the most interesting aspect of Greek Phi- losophy. ‘Gradually it threw off the garment of sense ; it re- vealed a world of ideas. It is impossible for us to conceive the intensity of these ideas in their first freshness: they were not ideas but gods, penetrating into the soul of the disciple, sinking into the mind of the human race ; objects not of spe- culation only, but of faith and love.’ (Jowett.) Compare, as an- other instance of this religious feeling, Soph. 265 D: Νῦν μὴν βλέπων eis σὲ καὶ ὑπολαμβάνων οἴεσθαί σε κατά γε θεὸν αὐτὰ γίγνε- σθαι, ταύτῃ καὶ αὐτὸς νενόμικα. Καλῶς γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε. καὶ εἰ μέν γέ σε ἡγούμεθα τῶν εἰς τὸν ἔπειτα χρόνον ἄλλως πως δοξαζόντων εἶναι, νῦν ἂν τῷ λόγῳ μετὰ πειθοῦς ἀναγ- καίας ἐπεχειροῦμεν ποιεῖν ὁμολο- γεῖν᾽ ἐπειδὴ δὲ σοῦ καταμανθάνω τὴν φύσιν, ὅτι καὶ ἄνευ τῶν παρ᾽ ἡμῶν λόγων αὐτὴ πρόσεισιν ἐφ᾽ ἅπερ νῦν ἕλκεσθαι φής, ἐάσω" χρό- νος γὰρ ἐκ περιττοῦ γίγνοιτ᾽ ἄν. 17. 6 γὰρ καλῶς λέγων, K.T.A. | Rep. 3. 402 E. 18. πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ] (1) ‘Ad καλῷ ex precedd. mente repe- tendum εἶναι, que notatu dig- num est ellipsis, quum post common to all. Socrates receives his answer with de- light. There are somethings then which the mind itself per- ceives with- out the help of the body. Being is the most universal of these. The Good and Beauti- ful are also ‘thus per- ceived. 162 συχνοῦ λόγου ἀπαλλάξας, MAATONO2 ’ / \ δ - εἰ φαίνεταί σοι τὰ μέν P- 185: » Ν 9 e ao ε x 3 Lal \ \ Ἂς Lal an αὐτὴ δὶ αὑτῆς ἡ ψυχὴ ἐπισκοπειν, τὰ δὲ διὰ τῶν τοῦ ,ὔ , A \ 5. a \ Pane OWUATOS δυναμεων. TOUTO γὰρ ἣν O καὶ αὐτῷ μοι ἐδόκει, ἐβουλόμην δὲ καὶ σοὶ δόξαι. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν φαίνεταί γε. / 5 XN nw TQ. Ποτέρων οὖν τίθης τὴν οὐσίαν ; τοῦτο γὰρ , ᾿ I / ᾿ς μάλιστα επι παντῶν παρέπεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐγὼ μὲν ὧν αὐτὴ ἡ ψυχὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν / ἐπορέγεται. Ν 5 Ν SCZ \ One! Nae SN > SO. Ἦ καὶ τὸ ὅμοιον καὶ TO ἀνόμοιον, Καὶ TO TAV= Ἃ Ν᾿ TOV καὶ ETEPOV 5 GEAI. Ναί SO. Ti δὲ καλὸν καὶ αἰσχρόν, καὶ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ᾽ κακον 3 ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ τούτων μοι δοκεῖ ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα ἣν 3 lay Ν / , πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι τὴν οὐσίαν, ἀναλογιζομένη heee πρὸς δὲ τῷ καλῷ non infera- tur nominativus, verbo εἶ vel addito vel subaudiendo, velut infertur Sympos. 195 C: Νέος μὲν οὖν ἐστι, πρὸς δὲ τῷ νέῳ ἁπαλός... Heind. (2) ‘ Preeter hoe pulchrum, quod in te lau- davi.’ Stallb. The latter (2) is right. ‘ Be- sides this beauty you have shown, you havedonemea kind- ness. Op. Eurip. Hee. 382: Καλῶς μὲν εἶπας, θύγατερ, ἀλλὰ τῷ καλῴ | λύπη πρύσεστιν. Thue. 4. 98. 2. The phrase in Symp. 195 © ought to be similarly construed. 6. τοῦτο yap μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάν- των παρέπεται] 1.6. ἐπὶ πᾶσι κοι- νόν ἐστι (Supr. 185 Ο). It will serve therefore as a sort of crucial instance. 9. ἐπορέγεται ΘΧΡΥΘΒΒΘΒ Plato’s notion of the intuitive action of the mind (νόησις), not as mere contemplation, but as a passion- ate outgoing. Rep. 6. 490 A B. 15. ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα] Inthis and similar phrases the article re- tains its demonstrative force, as is evident where the words are separated; e.g. Euthyd. 303 C: Ἔν δὲ τοῖς καὶ τοῦτο με- γαλοπρεπέστερον. Soph. Cid. Col. 742 : Ἔκ δὲ τῶν μάλιστ᾽ ἐγώ. 16. πρὸς ἄλληλα σκοπεῖσθαι] ‘To consider in relation to each other τ viz. as opposites. Thesetetus is probably think- ing of the recent argument in which ἀγαθόν, ὠφέλιμον, μέλλον, were identified. The ‘idea of good’ is still regarded by him ‘hypothetically,’ and, as it were, from beneath. But he is no longer capable of the fallacious admission into which he fell unwarily, supr. 157 D. The OEAITHTOS. 163 | 86 ’ e a \ , \ \ ΄ Ν \ i Pp. I . EY €QUT@ Ta yEeyovoTa Καὶ Ta TAPOVTA 7 Pos Ta με ἐπὶ Β λοντα. XQ. Ἔχε δή: ἄλλο τι τοῦ μὲν σκληροῦ τὴν σκλη- if Ἁ “ 3 “ » IZ Ν ἴω A pornra διὰ TNS ἐπαφῆς αἰσθήσεται, καὶ του μαλακοῦ \ / I. THY μαλακότητα ὡσαύτως: ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. Ν , ’ f \ \ 20. Τὴν δέ ye οὐσίαν καὶ ὅ τι ἐστὸν καὶ τὴν 3 / Χ 3 / Ν Χ > 7 3 va ἐγαντιοτητα πρὸς ἀλλήλω Kai THY οὐσίαν αὖ τῆς 3 , Bit EN e \ 3 A Q , EVAYTLOTHTOS αὐτὴ ἢ Ψυχὴ ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλ- ‘\ 3 aA ec oan λουσαὰ πρὸς ἀλληλα κρίνειν πειρᾶται ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. σι A \ x Zz 20. Οὐκοῦν τὰ μὲν εὐθὺς γενομένοις πάρεστι / if Chuo αἰσθάνεσθαι ἀνθρώποις τε καὶ θηρίοις, ὅσα A “ ’ὔ / SS \ \ he διὰ τοῦ σώματος παθήματα ἐπὶ THY ψυχὴν τείνει" question pressed by Η. Schmidt, ‘ How past and future enter into the notion of honour,’ is hardly present in the Greek, but may be answered by the familiar example of an act of ordinary courage, in which the fear of future disgrace overcomes that of instant danger. The sense of honour emphatically belongs to acreature of ‘ large discourse, looking before and after,’ ἀναλογιζομένη] ‘Thinking over the past and present with a view to the future.’ 3. Ἔχε δή] ‘Hold there!’ Socrates sees his opportunity of furthering the argument by applying the last expression of Theztetus, and therefore bids him pause over it. 7. Τὴν δέ ye οὐσίαν) Se. τοῦ σκληροῦ καὶ τοῦ μαλακοῦ. ‘The fact that they exist’ (Germ. ‘Dasein’). In this and similar passages Plato may be said to be appealing to the conscious- ness of his reader. Q. ἐπανιοῦσα καὶ συμβάλλουσα] Returning upon (reviewing) the sensations, it perceives the Be- ing of their objects, and com- paring these together, perceives their opposition, and the Being of this again. 12. Οὐκοῦν, κιτιλ.] For the rarity of Reason cp. Rep. 4. 428, Tim. 51 E: Καὶ τοῦ μὲν πάντα ἄνδρα μετέχειν φατέον, νοῦ δὲ θεούς, ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι. 14. ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τείνει] “ Ἐχ- tend to the mind.’ Cp. Tim. 64 B: Τὸ μὲν yap κατὰ φύσιν εὐκί- νητον... καὶ βραχὺ πάθος... διαδίδω- σιν... ἐπὶ τὸ φρόνιμον... τὸ δ᾽ ἐναν- τίον ἑδραῖον ὃν... ἀναίσθητον παρ- έσχε τὸ παθόν. Phileb. 33 Ὁ : Θὲς τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν ἑκάστοτε παθημάτων τὰ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι κατασβεννύμεν. πρὶν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν διεξελθεῖν, ἀπαθῆ ἐκείνην ἐάσαντα, τὰ δὲ δὲ ἀμφοῖν ἰόντα, καί τινα ὥσπερ σει- σμὸν ἐντιθέντα ἴδιόν τε καὶ κοινὸν ἑκατέρῳ. Μ42 Io All such ideas the mind im- mediately contem- plates, sur- veying with a view to the fu- ture the present and the past :— e.g. The quality of hardness is perceived through the touch. But that it ds, that it is opposite to softness, and that this opposi- tion is, the mind itself seeks to de- cide, re- turning over its sensations, and com- paring them. The one power be- longs to all live crea- tures from their birth : the other is slowly at- tained, and only by some men. Sensation does not reach be- ing, there- 5 Io 164 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ Ν \ \ ’ 3 7 , > 7 \ τὰ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἀναλογίσματα πρὸς TE OVTLAY Καὶ » / / ee / Ν a ΄, ὠφέλειαν μογις καὶ ἐν χρονῷ διὰ TOAA@Y πραγμάτων / , - x Ν , καὶ παιδείας TAPAYLYVETAL OLS ἂν καὶ TAPAYLyVITAL. ΘΈΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. SO. Οἷόν τε οὖν ἀληθείας τυχεῖν, ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας : ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αδύνατον. SO. Οὗ δὲ ἀληθείας τις ἀτυχήσει, ποτὲ τούτου 9 ͵ yf ETLOTH UV EDTAL 5 OEAI. Καὶ ras ἄν, ὦ Σώκρατες ; DO. Ἔν μὲν ἄρα τοῖς παθήμασιν οὐκ ἔνι ἐπι- στήμη; 3 NN = ee / as 3 / ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκεινῶν συλλογισμῳ:" ουσίιας ν \ 9 7 ᾽ A ,ὔ ε δ, 5 \ yap καὶ ἀληθείας ἐνταῦθα μέν, ὡς ἐοικε, CUVATOY ἅψασθαι, ἐκεῖ δὲ ἀδύνατον. CEAI. Φαννεται. I. ἀναλογίσματα] ‘But what the mind discovers by reflecting upon these.” The idea of pro- portion (τὸ ἀνάλογον) does not seem to enter into the verb ἀναλογίζομαι and its derivative noun. ἀναλογίζεσθαι is rather εἰς εἶδός τι ἀναφέρειν τῷ λόγῳ. οὐσίαν] German critics raise the doubt whether οὐσία is to be taken in the same sense throughout this passage. Plato had not present to his mind the distinctions between ‘Sein,’ ‘Dasein,’‘ Wesen,’‘Fiirsichsein,’ etc., but if one meaning 1s to be held throughout, it is rather the ‘fact’ (‘Dasein’) than the ‘mode’ (‘Wesen’). If this is emphasized, μηδέ (1. 6) retains the force of ‘not even.’ 5. ᾧ μηδὲ οὐσίας] (1) ‘Ad dat. hune ᾧ repetendum est οἷόν τε (potestne illud verum assequl uod ne οὐσίαν quidem assequi potest 1), ut declarant illa mox, Ξύμπαν ἄρ᾽ αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν; ᾿Ανάγκη. ire, φάμεν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψασθαι, οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐσίας. Heindorf. And so H. Schmidt. But (2) in the present con- nection ᾧ is probably masculine. ‘Is it possible for him to reach truth who missestruth?’ (Wobhl- rab assents to this.) There is a transition in the next question from the subject to the object, from αἰσθανόμενος to αἰσθητόν. ‘But can one have knowledge of that, the truth of which he misses ?’ A third way may be mentioned, but only to be re- jected, viz. (3) making instru- mental dative. ‘Can one reach truth with that,’ etc. Schanz reads οὗ from Heindorf’s conj. 11. ἐν δὲ τῷ περὶ ἐκείνων συλλο- γισμῷ] Something very different from syllogism is meant, and more nearly analogous to ge- neralization. Op. Pheedr.249 B: Aci yap ἄνθρωπον συνιέναι κατ᾽ εἷ- δος λεγόμενον, ἐκ πολλῶν ἰὸν αἰσθή- σεων εἰς ἕν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον. Phil. ατῷὖἍ: Bees eee OEAITHTOS. 165 5 53 3. ΨἷΝ 3 a ἢ Q A a 20. Ἢ οὖν ταὐτὸν ἐκεῖνό τε καὶ τοῦτο καλεῖς, , \ yay τοσαύτας διαφορὰς ἔχοντε ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκουν δὴ δίκαιόν γε. XQ. Τί οὖν δὴ ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα, τῷ ὁρᾶν, εἰκούειν, ὀσφραίνεσθαι, ψύχεσθαι, θερμαίνεσθαι ; ΘΕΑΙ. Αἰσθάνεσθαι ἔγωγε: τί γὰρ ἄλλο; si a 4 2Q. Ξύμπαν ap αὐτὸ καλεῖς αἴσθησιν ; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αναγκη. ΣΏΩ. Ὧι γε, φαμέν, οὐ μέτεστιν ἀληθείας ἅψα- » ἮΝ \ 3 / / σθαι: οὐδὲ yap οὐσίας. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. LQ. Οὐδ᾽ ἀρ’ ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γάρ. ΣΏ. Οὐκ ap ἂν εἴη ποτέ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, αἴσθησίς Va) / ἊΝ TE Και ἐπισ THY TQUTODP. OEAI. Ov φαίνεται, ὦ Σώκρατες. καὶ μάλιστά A 7 7 yf x > / γε νῦν καταφανέστατον γέγονεν ἄλλο ov αἰσθήσεως ἐπιστήμη. 9. Ὧι is neuter here—refer- ring to the fem. αἴσθησιν. 12. OW dp’ ἐπιστήμης] The genitive is governed by μέτεστιν alone. ἀληθείας and οὐσίας are governed partly by μέτεστιν, partly by ἅψασθαι. 16, μάλιστά γενῦν καταφανέστα- τον] For the double superlative cp. Rep. 1. 331 B: ᾿Αλλά ye ἕν ἀνθ᾽ ἑνὸς οὐκ ἐλάχιστον ἔγωγε θείην ἂν εἰς τοῦτο ἀνδρὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλοῦτον χρησιμώτατον εἶναι. 17. καταφανέστατον γέγονεν |The criticism of Sensation is now complete. We see it clearly, as relative, shifting, momentary, inseparable from physical con- ditions: we have placed our- selves above it, and proceed to explore the region next beyond, that of Opinion. To recapitulate the criticism of ἐπιστήμη αἴσθησις. τ. Certain presumptions are raised against the saying ἄνθρωπος μέτρον, as that it makes all beings equally wise, and that it implies that we can at once know and not know the same thing. 2. Protagoras is convicted out of his own mouth, for in confirming , the opinion of other men he con- futes himself. 3. There is at least one sphere of knowledge which is above sense, the fore- sight of consequences, the perception of what is good. 4. And within the sphere of sense, if sensation depend on motion, and motion include change, no quality can be so much as named. 5. The mind IO 5 fore it fails of truth, and is not knowledge. This lies not in our impres- sions, but in that which the mind col- lects from them. Sensation, therefore, has no share in knowledge. They are wholly dis- tinct. We have found what knowledge is not. Our aim was to find what itis. Yet we have gained something. We shall not seek for it any more in sensation, but in whatever that is call- ed, when the mind is by itself engaged with being. Opinion is the name for this. We ven- ture ac- cordingly on a second defini- tion :— 166 SQ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὔ τι μὲν δὴ τούτου γε ἕνεκα ἡρχόμεθα Ρ. 84 ἌΣ ee te MAATOQNOZ Diaheyopevor 2 iva ἜΡΟΝ τί TOT οὐκ ἐστ᾽ ἐπιστήμη, ἀλλὰ τί ἔστιν. ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γε προβεβήκαμεν, is \ las ΩΝ 3 3 / \ »" » 4 ὥστε μὴ Crew αυτὴν εν αἰσθησει τὸ παραπαν, ἀλλ 5 > 7 “-“ 3 / ad / > 3) « 7 Φ δὲν ἐκεινῷ τῷ OVOMATL, OTL ΠΟΤ EXEL Ἢ ψυχη: οταν 3 ΟΝ > CoN ἂν \ AY Ae αὐτὴ καθ᾽ αὐτὴν πραγματευηται πέρι TH OVTA. ΘΒΕΑΙ. ὡς ἐγῴῷμαι, δοξάζειν. > \ Χ Ἄν 6 a 5. 7. Αλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε καλεῖται, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἘΏ); Opee γὰρ οἴει, ὦ φίλε. καὶ ὅρα δὴ νῦν το πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλείψας, εἴ τι μᾶλλον καθορᾷς, ἐπειδὴ ἐνταῦθα προελήλυθας. καὶ , 5 / es ee , λέγε αὖθις τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἐπιστημῆή. ΘΕΑΙ. Δόξαν μὲν πᾶσαν εἰπεῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἀδύνατον, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ψευδής ἐστι δόξα: κινδυνεύει δὲ ε΄ \ , > / 53 , an > 15 ἡ aAnOns δόξα ἐπιστημὴ ELVAL, καὶ μοι TOVTO ἀποκες- / aN Ἁ δὴ “ oA ivf Ν “ κρίσθω. ἐὰν γὰρ μὴ φανῃ προιοῦσιν, ὥσπερ TO νυν, ἄλλο τι πειρασόμεθα λέγειν. receives impressions from with- out through certain bodily or- gans ; but knowledge implies the comparison of the impres- sions received through different organs, and this must be the immediate function of the mind. The whole of this last section should be compared with Rep. Η. 522-. 5. ἐκείνῳ τῷ ὀνόματι] ‘But in that other term, whatever it is, which is applied to the mind whenengaged alone with being.’ The form of expression 18 partly influenced by the words (186 D), Ti οὖν ἐκείνῳ ἀποδίδως ὄνομα; «tA. The distinction between ὄνομα and ῥῆμα is not observed here. 10. πάντα τὰ πρόσθεν ἐξαλεί- yas] As if in a mathematical demonstration. 1153: Δόξαν] δόξα follows natu- rally upon αἴσθησις. Charm. I 58 E,159A: Δῆλον yap ὅτι εἴ σοι πάρ- εστι σωφροσύνη, ἔχεις τι περὶ av- τῆς δοξάζειν. ἀνάγκη γάρ που ἐνοῦ- σαν αὐτήν, εἴπερ ἔνεστιν, αἴσθησίν τινα παρέχειν, ἐξ ἧς δόξα ἄν τίς σοι περὶ αὐτῆς εἴη ὅ τί ἐστι καὶ ὁποῖόν τι ἡ σωφροσύνη. As in finding the mathema- tical δύναμις Thesetetus used a word which had been employed in the previous inquiry, so here. But hitherto δόξα has been bound up with φαντασία and αἴσθησις, and even where So- crates had preserved the dis- tinction between apprehension and judgment (179 C), this had passed unnoticed. 16. ὥσπερ τὸ νῦν] Se. φαίνεται. 17. ἄλλο τι (‘something else’) is not adverbial here. — Q OEAITHTOS. 167 XQ. Οὕτω μέντοι χρή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, λέγειν προθύ- ca Ἃ ς Ν a 37 3 7 μως μᾶλλον ἢ ὡς τὸ πρώτον ὠκνεις ἀποκρίνεσθαι. aN Ν σ΄ a a / “ὉΟ ς 7 3. .5 ἐὰν Yap οὕτω δρῶμεν, δυοῖν θάτερα, ἢ εὑρήσομεν ἐφ ὃ ἐρχόμεθα, ἢ ἧττον οἰησόμεθα εἰδέναι ὃ μηδαμῇ / LZ 3 Ἃ Yj \ \ a ἰσμεν: καί TOL οὐκ ἂν εἴη μεμπτὸς μισθὸς ὃ τοιοῦτος. καὶ δὴ καὶ νῦν τί dys; δυοῖν ὄντοιν *eideow δόξης, τοῦ μὲν ἀληθινοῦ, ψευδοῦς δὲ τοῦ ἑτέρου, τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην ὁρίζει: ΘΕΑΙ. “Eywye: τοῦτο γὰρ αὖ νῦν μοι φαίνεται. ΣΏ. ᾿Αρ᾽ οὖν ἔτ᾽ ἄξιον περὶ δόξης ἀναλαβεῖν ’ παλιν; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δὴ λέγεις ; 2Q. Θράττει μέ πως νῦν τε καὶ ἄλλοτε δὴ πολ- λ ie ivf > 3 3 7 λλ “ Χ 3 Ν A \ QKLS, WOT EV ATT OPlLa 77O 7) T POS ἐμαῦυτον και 7 pos ay if > aS 3 “ , >” 5 Ν A ἄλλον γεγονέναι, οὐκ ἐχοντα εἰπεῖν TL TOT ἐστὶ τοῦτο SS / Ὁ la 7 / > ἐς τὸ πάθος παρ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἐγγιγνόμενον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον δή ; 2Q. Τὸ δοξάζειν τινὰ ψευδῆ. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν 3. ἐὰν... δρῶμεν]ἠ For the first person cp. infr. 210 B. 6. ὅ εἰδέν] MSS. ἰδέαιν. ὁ εἰδέοιν ex emend. apogr. H.’ Schanz. 10. ἀναλαβεῖν πάλιν] ‘To take up a thread of the previous argument.’ Though we have dismissed the saying of Protagoras, so far as it is bound up with sense, τὸ δοκοῦν ἑκάστῳ τοῦτο καὶ εἶναι, (φαντασία being σύμ- μιξις αἰσθήσεως καὶ δόξης, Soph. 264 B), yet the same ques- tion returns upon us in re- gard to opinion considered by itself. This forms a link of connection between the present inquiry and the fore- going. Cp. Cratyl. 429 D: "Ap ὅτι ψευδῆ λέγειν τὸ παράπαν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἄρα τοῦτό σοι δύναται ὁ λόγος; συχνοὶ γάρ τινες οἱ λέγοντες, ὦ φίλε Κρατύλε, καὶ νῦν καὶ πάλαι. See also Euthyd. 284 A, 286 C, where the ἀπορία (ὅτι ψεύδεσθαι, ἀντιλέγειν, οὐκ ἔστιν) is ascribed to the followers of Protagoras amongst others. It has generally, however, been associated with the name of Antisthenes. 15. τοῦτο τὸ πάθος παρ᾽ ἡμῖν] ‘This experience of the human mind.’ Op. supr. 155 A. 18. σκοπῶ δὴ καὶ νῦν ἔτι] Though the past discussion has been ‘ wiped out,’ this still remains ‘to trouble the mind’s eye. Badham would read = mn 5 11. Know- ledge is true opinion. But, still to return upon a for- mer track, Is false opinion possible ? σι 168 Ἂν , ’ 27 + Vas , ; ἔτι διστάζων, πότερον ἐάσωμεν αὐτὸ ἢ ἐπισκεψώμεθα p. 187 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ 2) x 3 / , ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ολίγον προτερον. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἴ πέρ γε καὶ ὁπῃ- A 7 5 “7 Ἁ » an \ Ν οῦν φαίνεται δεῖν ; ἄρτι γὰρ οὐ κακῶς γε σὺ καὶ VA » “ e > o Θεόδωρος ἐλέγετε σχολῆς πέρι, ὡς οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς τοι- CO 4 O10 OE κατεπείγει. TQ. Ὀρθῶς ὑπέμνησας. ἴσως yap οὐκ ἀπὸ και- κ a ’ a of las a ’ὔ pov πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελθεῖν. κρεῖττον yap που a 3 Ἂ Χ Ἂν ἴω an σμικρὸν εὖ ἢ πολὺ μὴ ἱκανῶς περᾶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; SQ. Πῶς οὖν ; τί δὴ καὶ λέγομεν 3 ψευδῆ φαμὲν ἑκάστοτε εἶναι δόξαν, καί τινα ἡμῶν δοξάζειν ψευδῆ, Ν 3 3 la / lA τὸν δ᾽ αὖ ἀληθῆ, as φύσει οὕτως ἐχόντων 5. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαμὲν γὰρ δή. SQ. Οὐκοῦν τόδε γ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ ἡμῖν περὶ πάντα καὶ p. 188 3 “ + > / καθ ἐκαστον, ἤτοι εἰδέναι ὃ θράττει, but the asyndeton is expressive. 67 also has been changed to δέ (Buttmann), but without reason. 2. ἄλλον τρόπον ἢ ὀλίγον πρότερον] 1. 6. not with refer- ence to sensation and motion (supr. 164, τόν, 171, (180), but in a more abstract way. The new ‘manner’ has some- thing in it of the Eleatic spirit. For the expression compare Soph. 245 HE: Τοὺς δὲ ἄλλως λέγοντας αὖ θεατέον. 3. ὁπῃοῦν] The Bodl. has ὁπῃγοῦν. But the second ye is awkward, and ὁπῃοῦν has good authority in 'T. 6. κατεπείγει] Supr. 172 D. 8. πάλιν ὥσπερ ἴχνος μετελ- θεῖν] We seemed to ourselves to be launching into a wholly new inquiry, but we have fallen into the same track by δ Χ ἰδέ = ba ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι; μανθάνειν a different route. Cp. Aristot. Eth. 1. 7. 2: Μεταβαίνων δὴ ὁ λόγος εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀφῖκται. Aesch. Prom. 845: Ταὐτὸν μετελθὼν τῶν πάλαι λόγων ἴχνος. κρεῖττον .... mepava| This is said in order to obviate the discouragement which may be felt αὖ having to return again upon our footsteps. Cp. Soph. 261 AB. 13. ἐχόντων is neuter. For the plural cp. Rep. 2. 375 C: Ταῦτα δὲ ἀδυνάτοις ἔοικε. 16. ἤτοι εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι] Socrates here takes up the thread of reflection introduced above, 165 B: ἾΑρ᾽ οἷόν τε τὸν αὐτὸν εἰδότα τι τοῦτο ὃ οἶδε μὴ εἰ- δέναι; It was one weakness of the sensation doctrine that it led to this contradiction, The same opposition considered in the abstract is now used to OEAITHTOS. 169 7 \ / 7 188. γὰρ καὶ ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι μεταξὺ τούτων ὡς ὄντα χαί- “ / ἴω A ε la \ / _ pew λέγω ἐν τῷ παρόντι: νῦν yap ἡμῖν πρὸς Aoyov 3 ἐγ 3 ie ἐστὶν οὐδέν. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μήν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄλλο γ᾽ οὐδὲν λείπεται περὶ ἕκαστον πλὴν εἰδέναι ἢ μὴ εἰδέναι. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ἤδὴ ἀνάγκη τὸν δοξάζοντα δοξάζειν Ἃ ic 5 Sy N 3 ἢ ὧν TL οἶδεν ἢ μὴ οἶδεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. 2Q. Καὶ μὴν εἰδότα ye μὴ εἰδέναι τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ μὴ 8 εἰδότα εἰδέναι ἀδύνατον. ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς δ᾽ οὔ: ΣΏ, *Ap’ οὖν ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων, ἃ οἶδε, ταῦτα 3) » A 5 » Ne, 4 ὩΣ 3 Ν OleTaL οὐ ταῦτα εἰναι ἀλλὰ ETEPA ATTA ὧν οἶδε, καὶ 3 / 2Q\ > -”~ 3» / ἀμφότερα εἰδὼς ἀγνοεῖ ἀμφότερα ; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀδύνατον, ὦ Σώκρατες. 20. “AAN apa, ἃ μὴ Ψ vy ie NY Ὁ. Ν ἐτερα ATTA ὧν μὴ οἰδε, καὶ prove the impossibility of falsehood in opinion. The discussion which fol- lows probably bears some rela- tion to the notions of Gorgias, and perhaps of Antisthenes. At all events it would seem to be a fragment of Eleaticism ; being exactly analogous to the difficulties raised by Zeno against the possibility of mo- tion. It runs parallel also to the subtleties of the later Me- garians. I. μεταξὺ... λέγω] The construction follows the ana- logy of χαίρειν ἐῶ. Cp. Soph. 258 KH, where the phrase again occurs in a loose construction. 2. viv yap ἡμῖν πρὸς λόγον ἐστὶν οὐδέν] Because we choose to dwell on the absolute al- ternative, knowledge or igno- 3 ε a SON ‘er οἶδεν, ἡγεῖται αὐτὰ εἶναι Ig OP. a , Θ / TOUT ἐστι τῷ pnTE Θεαί rance. Cp. supr. 158 E: Νὴ ὑπολάβωμεν, κι τ. λ., Where a limited: ‘ Standpoint’ is simi- larly emphasized. Plato thus hints at the true solution of the difficulty, viz. the conception of a gradual process, which is afterwards presented under the image of the impressions on wax, ete. The doctrine of ἀνάμνησις which had been developed in the Meno and Phedo, is per- haps also held in reserve. 5. λείπεται] ‘ Remains’ — when learning and forgetting are left out. 6. ἤδη] ‘Since that point is settled.’ 7. ὧν τι οἶδεν] For τὶ thus interposed cp. infr. 192 A. 12. ὁ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζων] The articles refer to supr. 187 E. Io τς one of two altern- atives is true of us, Either we know it, or we do not know it. (The inter- mediate processes of learning and forget- ting may be left out of sight as beside our present ar- gument, ) In think- ing, there- fore, I must think of something which I know, or which I do not know. But I can- not know and be ig- norant of the same thing. Therefore I cannot think falsely, for I cannot think one thing which I know to be another which I know, else T should know it and not know it. Nor can I think what I do not know to be something else which I do not know, for what I know not cannot be present to my mind. Nor can I think what I do not 170 7 ’ “ τητον μήτε Σωκράτη εἰδότι εἰς τὴν διάνοιαν λαβεῖν Ρ. τ8 MAATQNOZ e e / 3 e ὡς ὃ LwKparns Θεαίτητος ἢ ὁ Θεαίτητος Σωκράτης ; ΘΈΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς ἀν; > / ow / Θ ἃ TQ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐ μήν, & γέ τις οἶδεν, οἴεταί που ἃ μὴ 5 ΦΎΝ 5 >a? 3 ἃ Ν Ξ a 3 5 οἶδεν αὐτὰ εἶναι, οὐδ᾽ αὖ ἃ μὴ οἰδεν, ἃ οἶδεν. ΘΕΑΙ. Tépas γὰρ ἔσται. SOQ. Πῶς οὖν ἄν τις ἔτι ψευδῆ δοξάσειεν ; ἐκτὸς \ / 10 , / ὃ 3 7 / “ἃ yap TOUT@Y QOUVATOVY ποὺ οζαζειν, €7TELTTEP TQVT 7) 5 x » 3 » \ / > a / ἴσμεν ἢ οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐν δὲ τούτοις οὐδαμοῦ φαίνεται 10 δυνατὸν ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. > SF 2549) > / / BN a \ >Q. > Ap’ οὖν ov ταύτῃ σκεπτέον Ὁ ζητοῦμεν, κατὰ \ ’ 7 \ \ ’ / aif, > A \ Χ 3 τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι ἰοντας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ το εἰναι Ν / καὶ μὴ: ΘΕΑΙ. Πῶς λέγεις ; \ e a ἊΨ 6 Ἁ ἈΠ wc τε “ SQ. Μὴ ἁπλοῦν ἢ ore ὁ Ta μὴ OVTA περὶ οτουουν δοξάζων οὐκ ἔσθ᾽ ὡς οὐ ψευδῆ δοξάσει, κἂν ὁπωσοῦν ἄλλως τὰ τῆς διανοίας ἔχῃ. 4. "AX οὐ μήν... ἃ οἶδεν] ‘But surely when a man knows anything, he cannot take for that thing one which he does not know, nor for what he does not know can he take what he knows. Cp. intr. 191 A, and note. 5. αὐτά] Cp. Pheed. 99 Β: *O δή μοι φαίνονται. . . ὡς αἴτιον αὐτὸ προσαγορεύειν : and see r55. HE. 6. Tépas] Supr. 163 D, and note: Tépas yap ἂν εἴη ὃ λέγεις. Pheed. ror B, alib. 9. ἐν δὲ rovras| ‘And under this alternative,’ viz. as developed in the above in- stances. 12. ὃ ηχοῦμεν] The Bodl. MS., by an obvious error, has ἐζητοῦμεν. Op. Polit. 276 C: *O λέγομεν, and v. rr. 13. εἶναι]. So the Coislinian MS. and the corrector of T. Most MSS. have εἰδέναι. 16. Μὴ ἁπλοῦν ἢ] ‘May not the case possibly be simply thus? pf expresses suspicion =‘T should not wonder if.’ Op. Pheed. 67 B: Μὴ οὐ θεμιτὸν j. Ibid. 69 A: Μὴ γὰρ οὐχ αὕτη ἢ ἡ ὀρθὴ ἀλλαγή, κ. τ. A, μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ τοιαύτη ἀρετή. Crit. 48 C: My... Tatra... σκέμματα ἢ : and see Ast, Lex. sub v. For ἁπλοῦν in this sense cp. supr. 147 Ὁ : “Am\ovv εἰπεῖν. Symp. 183 ἢ. Polit. 306 : Πότερον οὕτως ἁπλοῦν ἐστι τοῦτο i)... ἔχει διαφοράν ... Aristot. Eth. N. 5. 9. 9 : Ἢ οὐδὲ “~ € ~ τοῦτο ἁπλοῦν. σ D . 188, 189. OEAITHTOS. 171 GEAI. Eikos γ᾽ αὖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. 2Q. [las οὖν; τί ἐροῦμεν, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἐάν τις e an » 7 ᾿ A Si δὲ € aes x , / μας ανακρινΉ UVYATOV O€ οτῴουν O + CVET AL, KQL TLS > 7 Ν NON 4 δ Ἂν las yf ἀνθρώπων τὸ μὴ ov δοξάσει, εἴτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων του 3 SiN > ον Ay, je - 7 e yy Ν εἰτε αὑτὸ καθ αὑτὸ; Kat ἡμεῖς δή, ὡς ἔοικε, πρὸς Ἃ Coal 3 ἴων ἢ πῶς ἐροῦμεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. Β ταῦτα φήσομεν Ὅταν γε μὴ ἀληθῆ οἴηται οἰόμενος. 3 “- \ ρον 2Q. Ἢ οὖν καὶ ἄλλοθί που τὸ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; ΣΩ. Ei τις ὁρᾷ μέν τι, ὁρᾷ δὲ οὐδέν. OEAI. Καὶ πώς: 5 \ Ν > ὦ , « a A 37) ra A 20. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν εἰ ἕν γέ τι ὁρᾷ, τῶν ὄντων τι ὁρᾷ. x Nest gor ee τ 9 a ee 5 ἢ OV OLEL ποτε TO EV EV τοις μῇ OVOLW ELVQAL 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔγωγε. 2Q. ὋὉ apa ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ. OEAI. Φαίνεται. Nee τ ὦν ’ / oS , 3 / ν ἃ Σῷ. Καὶ ὁ apa τι ἀκούων ἕν γέ τι ἀκούει καὶ ὃν 3 7 QKOVEL. OEAI. Nai. ἂς: ὃ Ἰλέγεται] ‘Which is herein asserted. Buttmann and Bekker conjecture λέγετε, which seems probable, but not necessary. Cp. Phed. 77 D: ᾿Αποδέδεικται μὲν οὖν ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ νῦν, where there is a simi- lar doubt. 11. Ei] Interrogative. ‘I mean to ask whether (for ex- ample) a man who sees some- thing, sees no single thing ? 13. εἰ ἔν γέ τι ὁρᾷ] The con- verse argument is used Rep. 5. 478 B (where it is asked, ‘What is opinion concerned with ?’): Ἢ οἷόν re ad δοξάζειν μέν, δοξάζειν δὲ μηδέν ; ᾿Αδύνατον. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἕν γε τι δοξάζει ὁ δοξάζων ; Ναί. τι, ἀλλὰ μηδὲν ὀρθότατ᾽ ἂν προσα- γορεύοιτο. Πάνυ ye. This close relation between the ideas of unity and being, derived from Parmenides, appears frequently. See especially Soph. 237 D: ᾿Ανάγκη τόν τι λέγοντα ἕν γε τι λέγειν. The mind cannot re- cognise Being except where it finds its own impress of Unity. Ar. Met. 3. 4.1006 b: Οὐθὲν κε A Φ“ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν μὴ νοοῦντα ἕν, ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν μὴ ὄν γε οὐχ ἕν 15 20 know to be what I know, nor what I know to be what I do not know. And what other case (under the above al- ternative) is conceiv- able ὃ 2. The path of know- ledge being thus hem- med in, we try the path of being. To think that which is not, is to think falsely. But can I think of what is not, either absolutely or with re- ference to anything ? I cannot see, and yet see nothing. And that which I see, being one thing, must have existence. For unity and being are insepa- rable. The same istrue of hearing and touch, And of thought also. To think what is not is to think nothing, and to think no- thing is not to think, False opin- ion, if it ex- ists, must be some- thing dif- ferent from this. Io 15 172 r , er , “ ' SO. Καὶ ὁ ἁπτόμενος δή Tov, ἑνὸς γέ του ἀπτεται P. 18 Ny, + es Ξ' και οντος, €LTrEp EVOS 9 ΘΈΑΙ. Kai τοῦτο. MAATOQNOZ TO. Ὁ δὲ δὴ δοξάζων οὐχ ἕν τι δοξάζει; OEAI. ᾿Αναγκη. ΣΩ. Ὁ δ᾽ ἕν τι δοξάζων οὐκ ov τι; ΘΕΑΙ. Ξυγχωρώ. TQ. Ὁ ἄρα μὴ ὃν δοξάζων οὐδὲν δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ φαίνεται. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν ὅ γε μηδὲν δοξάζων τὸ παράπαν οὐδὲ δοξάζει. ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον, ὡς ἔοικεν. ~ TQ. Οὐκ ἄρα οἷόν τε τὸ μὴ ὃν δοξάζειν, οὔτε περὶ B ~ 27 BA EN > e / τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ KAO avUTO. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ daivera. TO. "AAAo τι ἄρ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν τοῦ τὰ μὴ ὄντα δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. ἔἤΑλλο ἔοικεν. 3 © 3, / XQ. Οὔ ἔτε γὰρ οὕτως οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον 20 ἐσκοποῦμεν, ψευδής ἐστι δόξα ἐν ἡμῖν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δή. SO. ᾿Αλλ᾽ apa ὧδε γιγνόμενον τοῦτο προσαγο- / ρευομεν 5 OEAI. Has; 13. περὶ τῶν ὄντων͵] Arist. Met. 3. 2. 1004 a: ᾿Απόφασιν δὲ καὶ στέρησιν μιᾶς ἐστι θεωρῆσαι διὰ τὸ ἀμφοτέρως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ ἕν, οὗ ἡ ἀπόφασις ἢ ἡ στέρησις (ἢ γὰρ ἁπλῶς λέγομεν ὅτι οὐχ ὑπάρχει ἐκεῖνο ἤ τινι γένει, κιτ.λ.) 19. Οὔ *re γάρ] MSS. οὐ γάρ. τε seems required (as Van Heusde observed), but γάρ is right. Cp. 190 Εἰ: Οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ, K.TAs οὔτε ὡς ὀλίγον πρότερον] Viz. κατὰ τὸ εἰδέναι καὶ μὴ εἰδέναι, 188 C. 22. ’AAN dpa ὧδε γιγνόμενον] ‘But may it be supposed, then, that what we express by this name arises in the following way? ‘In what way? ‘That what we call false opinion is really a sort of crossing of opinions.’ OEAITHTOS. 173 ΣΟ , oe / lal yf . y 3 a 57) ο δόξαν, ὅταν τίς τι τῶν ὄντων ἄλλο αὖ τῶν οντῶν, ᾿Αλλοδοξίαν τινὰ οὖσαν ψευδῆ φαμὲν εἶναι a a a Ο Ἃ ἀνταλλαξάμενος τῇ διανοίᾳ, φῇ εἶναι. οὕτω γὰρ ὃν \ ΣΝ Soe “ “3 »" δὲ ἡ“ ΝΣ τ μὲν ἀεὶ δοξάζει, ἕτερον δὲ ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρου, καὶ ἁμαρ- τάνων οὗ ἐσκόπει δικαίως ἂν καλοῖτο ψευδὴ δοξά- Cov. al lat ie OEAI. ᾿Ορθότατά μοι νῦν δοκεῖς εἰρηκέναι. ὅταν , ϑ ΟΝ ~ 9 \ Ἃ 3 “~\ 9 A Ν yap τις ἀντὶ καλοῦ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἀντὶ αἰσχροῦ καλὸν δοξάζῃ, τότε ὡς ἀληθῶς δοξάξει ψευδῆ. 2s a 20. Δῆλος εἰ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, καταφρονῶν μου καὶ 3 7 ov δεδιώς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ti μάλιστα; ΣΩ. Οὐκ av, οἶμαι, σοὶ δοκῶ τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους 9 OlMAt, 1) ’ , Sf 3 -7 \ / Ἃ Ὁ ἀντιλαβέσθαι, ἐρόμενος εἰ οἷόν τε Taxv βραδέως ἢ a ’ὔὕ \ »S >’ 7 Ν \ \ ε κοῦφον βαρέως ἢ ἀλλο τι ἐναντίον μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὑ- ΄- / 3 \ \ \ an ’ I , τοῦ φύσιν ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ ἐναντίου γίγνεσθαι a“ nA 53 δ Ν » ἑαυτῷ ἐναντίως. τοῦτο μὲν οὖν, ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρ- ’ 3 Υ͂ Ss. , e / Ν \ ‘a pnons, ἀφίημι. ἀρέσκει δέ, ws φῇς, τὸ τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν ἀλλοδοξεῖν εἶναι : ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοιγε.᾿ I, ᾿Αλλοδοξίαν] This seems to have been a prevalent concep- tion. Vid. Arist. Met. 3. 5. ΙΟΙΟ a: Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν Ὅμηρον ταύτην ἔχοντα φαίνεσθαι τὴν δόξαν, ὅτι ἐποίησε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ὡς ἐξέστη ὑπὸ τῆς πληγῆς, κεῖσθαι ἀλλοφρονέ- οντα, ὡς φρονοῦντας μὲν καὶ τοὺς παραφρονοῦντας, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ ταὐτά. He ascribes this application of Homer to Democritus, de An. Τ. 2. Cp. Herod. 1. 85: ᾿Αλλο- γνώσας τὸν Κροῖσον. φαμέν] In apposition with the preceding verb, introduced by ὧδε. This third case is linked on to the second, but is not, as H. Schmidt supposes, a sub- division of it. The three cases are (1) thinking what we do not know, (2) thinking what is not, (3) thinking cross-wise. 13. τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους] Rep. 2. 382 A: Τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεῦδος, εἰ οἷόν τε τοῦτο εἰπεῖν, Phil. 23 B: *Apa ὅτι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶπον, λυπεῖν ἡδονήν. 17. ἵνα μὴ μάτην θαρρήσῃς] Supr. 163 Ο: Ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ. He refers to the boldness with which Theztetus now wswers, supr. 187 B: Οὕτω. .\iyp7... λέγειν προθύμως. σι Lael ° 20 3. Can it then be a cross-appli- cation or transfer- ence of thought : i.e. When I think one existing thing to be another ? Theetetus believes this must be the true Falsehood. Socrates claims credit for moderation in not pressing this con- tradiction in terms, and passes on, When I take one thing for another, I must have either one or both things in my mind, Either at once or in turn. Now thought is the mind’s self-dia- logue, in on 10 174 TO. "Ἔστιν ἄρα κατὰ τὴν σὴν δόξαν ἕτερόν τι ws p. 18 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ Ψ \ W te SL pet , , ἕτερον Kal μὴ ὡς ἐκεῖνο τῇ διανοίᾳ τίθεσθαι. t é ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι. ΣΩ. Ὅταν οὖν τοῦθ᾽ ἡ διάνοιά του δρᾷ, οὐ καὶ 4 , ὌΠ ἙΝ +f 3 7, x Ἂν σ΄“ AVAYKH αὐτὴν TOL appoTepa ἢ TO ETEPOV διανο- E εἶσθαι ; *OEAI. ᾿Ανάγκη μὲν οὖν: rou ἅμα γε ἢ μέρει. x 3 εν ἜΣΩ, Κάλλιστα. τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ap 6 περ ἐγὼ καλεῖς § ΘΕΑΙ. Τί καλῶν : ΣΩ. Λόγον ὃν αὐτὴ πρὸς αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ διεξέρ- τι Ue “\ a of Ν > ᾽ὔ 3 χέται 7rEpl ον ἂν Ο ΚΟΤΊ). ως γε μὴ εἰδὼς σοι απο 7 an / > / , > φαίνομαι. τοῦτο yap μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη, οὐκ 2. ὡς ἐκεῖνοί Referring to the first ἕτερον. 5. τὸ ἕτερον] ‘The one or the other. ἕτερος here=alteruter. ἡ. ἦτοι ἅμα ye ἢ ἐν μέρει] The bearing of these words is not quite clear. Perhaps they are meant to introduce the analysis of thinking, in which things are present to the mind at first successively, afterwards in one view. Most MSS. ar- range the persons thus: Oc. ᾿Ανάγκη μὲν οὖν. Σω. "“Hrot. . μέρει; Θε. Κάλλιστα. 2. Τὸ δὲ . καλεῖς; (In the Bodl. MS., however, it is not clear that the double colon after οὖν is in the first hand, and ἤτοι x.7.A. is given to Socrates in con- tinuation as in our text.) Hirzel, followed by Schanz, gives ἤτοι... μέρει to Thesetetus, and κάλλιστα to Socrates. Theet. ‘Certainly, either at once or by turns.’ Soc. ‘ Well said; but I wonder if your conception of the thinking- process agrees with mine.’ There is much to recommend this arrangement, which is adopted also by H. Schmidt. He proposes, however, to delete the words ἤτοι... μέρει. Compare with the following account of thinking Phileb. 38 C, 39, where the mind not only talks with itself, but has a writer and a painter within it: "Ap οὖν ἡμᾶς...» κιτιλ, Soph. 263 Εἰ: Οὐκοῦν διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταὐτόν: πλὴν ὁ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς Ψυχῆς πρὸς αὑτὴν διάλογος ἄνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος, K.T.A. 12. Δόγον is here used in the first of the three meanings given below, 206 D. 13. ὥς γε μὴ εἰδώς] ‘As one who does not know,’ ‘who is not to be supposed to know.’ The use of μή assists the ironi- cal tone of Socrates, who avoids categorical statements. ‘ You must not assume that I speak as if I knew.’ 14. τοῦτο γάρ μοι] Plato was B ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 175 Ἃ ἃ | A ἄλλο τι ἢ διαλέγεσθαι, αὐτὴ ἑαυτὴν ἐρωτῶσα καὶ 3 Z \ / \ > , fod αποκρινομεένη, καὶ φασκουσα και OV φασκουσα. οταν 4 7 " δὲ ὁρίσασα, εἴτε βραδύτερον, εἴτε καὶ ὀξύτερον ἐπαΐ- ρ ’ pov, ρ Ν ἐς τ “ Ν Ν ’ / 7 ξασα, τὸ αὐτὸ ἤδη On καὶ μὴ διστάζῃ, δόξαν ταύτην a Nd la N / / a τίθεμεν αὐτῆς. ὥστ᾽ ἔγωγε τὸ δοξάζειν λέγειν καλῷ \ % / , 9 V4 3 ᾽ \ + καὶ τὴν δόξαν λόγον εἰρημένον, OV μέντοι πρὸς ἄλλον Oe a λλ \ a \ Cie! \ δὲ γι: οὐδὲ φωνῇ, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ πρὸς αὑτόν. σὺ δὲ τί ; ΘΕΑΙ. Κἀγώ. 7 Y4 \ ὦ ᾽ ’, 20. Ὅταν ἄρα τις τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον δοξαζῃ, καὶ yf Ney, ὕ 5 \ J φησίν, ws ἔοικε, τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερον εἶναι πρὸς ἑαυτόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; \ 5 LQ. ᾿Αναμιμνήσκου δὴ εἰ πώποτ᾽ εἶπες πρὸς σε- μιμνή ρ ss Ψ Ν a / Ν 9 , > QUTOY OTL παντὸς μᾶλλον TO τοι καλὸν αἰσχρον ἐστιν probably thinking of Odyssey 19. 224: ‘Epéw, ὥς μοι ἰνδάλλεται ἦτορ. Compare the φάσματα in the beginning of the dialogue. ‘The semblance which the mind presents to me, when it thinks, is simply that of conversing, and of being engaged in ques- tion and answer with itself” 2. ὅταν δὲ ὁρίσασα] ‘But when it has come to a deter- mination, whether slowly, or by darting swiftly to its con- clusion, and so is now at one and not divided in judgment, we call this its opinion.’ 13. παντὸς μᾶλλον... παντάπασιν ἄρα... ἀνάγκη] These adverbs give an almost dramatic vivid- ness to the description of the process of thought. Note espe- cially the liveliness of τοι, which some critics have rejected. Cp. Phil. 38C: Αὑτὸν.. ἀνέροιτ᾽ ἂν ade... τί ποτε ἄρα ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν... The Greek language from Homer downwards was pecu- liarly apt to suggest such re- flections as these. διαλεκτική was its proper development. The following remarks of Col. Mure (Lit. of Greece, 2. 14. § I) on the self-dialogue of Homer, apply in some degree to all Greek literature: ‘Ex- clusively proper to Homer is his power of dramatizing, not merely action, but thought; not merely the intercourse be- tween man and man, but be- tween man and himself, be- tween his passions and _ his judgment. The mechanism of which the poet here chiefly avails himself is to exhibit the person under the influence of excited feelings as communing with, or, as Homer defines τὺ, addressing his own mind; dis- cussing the subject of his soli- citude under its various aspects as a question at issue between his judgment and himself. The conflicting feelings are thus, as it were, personified ; while the current of the language, often the very sound of the words, is σι question and answer. When it has agreed with itself upona final answer, we call this its opinion, Opinion is a silent proposi- tion. To think this to be that, is to say, ‘ This is that.’ Now who ever said to himself, ‘Surely fair is foul,’ or ‘wrong is ᾽ right,’ or ‘odd is even’? Or, ‘the cow must be a horse,’ or ‘two is ’ one. Therefore when I mis- take this for that, I cannot have both inmy mind, σι 10 15 176 ΠΛΑΤΩΏΝΟΣ ἊἋ \ 2) , xX , Ν 7 , ” TO ἄδικον δίκαιον, ἢ καὶ, TO TAVTOV κεφάλαιον, , 7 we ee / Ν ‘ e σκόπει εἰ TOT ἐπεχείρησας σεαυτον πείθειν ὡς παν- XN a NS Ὁ oS / ἂν “δ ΄“ > / Tos μᾶλλον TO ETEPOV ETEPOY ἐστίν, ἢ TAY TOVVAVTLOV “Ὁ 3 “ Ψ ἀπ τ 9 a \ \ οὐδ᾽ ἐν ὕπνῳ πώποτε ἐτόλμησας εἰπεῖν πρὸς σεαυτὸν e ᾽ὔ y+ x \ RA 7 > BA ως TAVTATACLY apa Ta TEPLTT a αρτιᾶ €OTLY ἢ Tl 7 a ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις. li 3) , X / DO. "AAAov δέ τινα οἷει ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον C a a Ἂς e Ν ΕῚ ω > / τολμῆσαι σπουδῇ πρὸς EavTOV εἰπειν, ἀναπείθοντα ς i ἐδ > ’ \ na oA 53 Xx A 7 yf αὑτόν, ὡς ἀνάγκη τὸν βοῦν ἵππον εἰναι ἢ τὰ δυο ἐν : ΘΕΑΙ. Μὰ A? οὐκ ἔγωγε. SO. Οὐκοῦν εἰ τὸ λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν δοξάζειν / , ἐστίν, οὐδεὶς ἀμφότερά ye λέγων καὶ δοξάζων καὶ » , > ἴω an o 5, Ἂ Ν , ἐφαπτόμενος ἀμφοῖν τῇ ψυχῇ εἴποι ἂν καὶ δοξάσειεν e \ o& 4 , > 3 iA 3 Ky eX ως TO ετέρον ετέρον εστιν. EATEOV ὃ €OTAL σοι TO so nicely adapted to the turns of the self-dialogue, that the breast of the man seems to be laid open before us, and in the literal sense of the term, we read his thoughts as they flit through his bosom.’ 4. ἐν imv@.. . ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον] Note the liveliness with which fresh touches are thrown in. It must be remem- bered here that sensible per- ception is excluded from con- sideration for the present, as well as learning and forgetting. Everything is either known or unknown: present to the mind, or not present. 8. ὑγιαίνοντα ἢ μαινόμενον] These words have been un- reasonably questioned, on the ground that no limit can be set to the illusions of madness. Not to dwell on the general weakness of such minute phi- losophy,—the critics forget that τὸν βοῦν is the ox, thought of as such. Op. the words ἀμ- φότερά ye.. τῇ ψυχῇ just below. This reference to the extreme case of madness which has been already cited (supr. 157 E) is quite in Plato’s manner. 15. ἐατέον δ᾽ *éora| These words are intended to meet the difficulty which may have been felt about the general state- ment (τὸ πάντων κεφάλαιον) ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, in supr. Β. Several of the MSS., including Bodl. and Coisl., have ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ῥῆμα ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ κατὰ ῥῆμα ταὐτόν ἐστι περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, Where ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει evidently refers to 189 Εἰ: Ἤτοι ἅμα γε ἢ ἐν μέρει. This cannot be adopted without rejecting περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου as con- fusing the sentence. The drift would then be, ‘You must not dwell upon the words as regards p- 19 ΝΣ... ee = | eee \— > - SEAITHTOS. BGG ’ ea ἈΝ te) Ἐς ἢ Le Ν ΕΝ δὰ a” , 79° PIMA περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου. λέγω yap αὐτὸ τῇδε, μηδένα ’ ε Ν > NS nN \ »y A Ὁ δοξάζειν ὡς τὸ αἰσχρὸν Kadov ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοι- οὕτων. SEAT. ᾿Αλλ’, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐῶ τε καί μοι δοκεῖ ὡς λέγεις. 5 20. “Auda μὲν ἄρα δοξάζοντα ἀδύνατον τὸ ere- ρον ἕτερον δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. 2Q. ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν τὸ ἕτερόν γε μόνον δοξάζων, τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μηδαμῇ, εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ λέγεις: πτεσθαι καὶ οὗ μὴ δοξάξι. things alternately presented to the mind, seeing that the word ἕτερον, as far as the word goes, is the same as applied to both.’ This would be an imperfect way of developing the distinc- tion thrown out above, and un- like Socrates, who, especially in this dialogue, always waits for Thextetus to follow him. nd it is equally necessary to ‘let the word alone,’ whether the objects are conceived alter- nately or both at once. The words ἐπὶ τῶν ἐν μέρει may therefore confidently be re- jected as a mistaken gloss. If the words ἐπειδὴ . . ταὐτόν ἐστι are genuine, περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου must either be omitted or trans- posed. But it is possible that ἐπειδή, k.7.0., has also crept in from the margin, and this sus- picion is so far confirmed by the fact that the Bodl. p.m. wrote ἐστιν. We thus revert to the reading of T and several MSS. ἐατέον δὲ καὶ σοὶ τὸ ῥῆμα περὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου, περί is often used rather N > , , \ oS ἤ οὐδέποτε δοξάσει ΤΟ ετέρον ετέρον To 3 la Ἁ xX 3 ἐφ ἀναγκάζοιτο γὰρ ἂν ἐφα- vaguely, 6. g. Rep.7.538E: Καὶ περὶ δικαίου ὡσαύτως καὶ ἀγαθοῦ. If δὲ καὶ σοί is retained, καί may be understood with reference to supr. 189 D, where Socrates takes credit for not pressing the words ἀληθὲς ψεῦδος, ‘ You, too (as I did in the former case), must let the word alone in regard to the Other” But this is rather strained. The version of Ficinus led some critics to conjecture εἰ καὶ σοὶ δοκεῖ, But this, as Buttmann observes, would not harmonize with Theztetus’ reply. I have ventured to change δὲ καὶ σοί to δ᾽ ἔσται σοι, an emendation which has often occurred to me in reading the passage, For the A, where the word js dwelt upon: Τίνα τρόπον, ἔφη, ἑτέρου ἑτέρῳ παραγενομένου τὸ ἕτερον τερον ἂν ein; ἾΑρα τοῦτο, ἔφην ἐγώ, ἀπορεῖς :,, ἀλλ᾽ ἔγωγε οὐδ᾽ ἂν παῖδα ᾧμην τοῦτο ἀπορῆσαι ὡς οὐ τὸ ἕτερον ἕτερόν ἐστιν, 12. ἀναγκάζοιτο... δοξάζει] sense cp. Euthyd. 301- But if I think only of the one, IT cannot think the one to be the other, for I can- not have in my mind that of which I am not thinkins. This trans- ference, therefore, is also in- concelv- able. We are in great straits. But we dare not face the conse- quences of failure un- til we have turned every stone. 178 ΣΩ. Οὔτ᾽ ἄρ᾽ ἀμφότερα οὔτε τὸ ἕτερον δοξάζοντι ν. 190 ἐγχωρεῖ ἀλλοδοξεῖν. ὥστ᾽ εἴ τις ὁριεῖται δόξαν εἶναι = ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ a Aes a > Q\ aN , of \ / ψευδὴ TO ἑτεροδοξεῖν, οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι" οὔτε γὰρ THVT) 2) \ \ / / Ν 3 ΠΑΡ 53 οὔτε κατὰ τὰ πρότερα φαίνεται ψευδὴς ἐν ἡμῖν οὖσα 5 δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. ΣΩ. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι, ὦ Θεαίτητε, εἰ τοῦτο μὴ φα- ’ yy A 9 ε va Ν νήσεται ὃν, πολλα ἀναγκασθησόμεθα ὁμολογεῖν καὶ » aATOTTa. ΘΕΑΙ. Ta ποῖα δή ; TQ. Οὐκ ἐρῶ σοι πρὶν ἂν πανταχῇ πειραθώ σκο- ἴω ’ 7 Ν Ἂ ε Ν id a ϑ e a TOV. αἰσχυνοίμην γὰρ αν UTEP ἡμῶν, ἐν ᾧ ἀποροῦ- ’ ,ὔ la - / Ν μεν, ἀναγκαζομένων ὁμολογεῖν οἷα λέγω. ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν fod Q 3 ’ὔ 4 59 ¥ Q “ εὐρωμεν και ἐλευθεροι γενώμεθα, TOT ἤδη περι τῶν “ 9 a e % 3 ς [ἢ ἣν a ἄλλων ἐροῦμεν ὡς πασχόντων, “αὐτοὶ EKTOS TOV γε- / ε an Ν ‘ 7 5 id λοίου ἑστῶτες" ἐὰν δὲ πάντῃ ἀπορήησωμεν, TATTELVO- These words are clearly given to Theetetus in the Cesena MS., as well as in Heindorf’s edition. 3. οὔτε γὰρ ταύτῃ] ‘The truth is, that the existence of false opinion in our minds does not appear on this any more than on the (two) former, grounds.’ The clauses, though connected outwardly by γάρ, are rather parallel than con- sequent, as in 152 Ο. Cp. also supr. 182 B. In all these places some would change ydp to dpa. 8. πολλὰ .. καὶ ἄτοπα] HE. δ. that it is impossible to dis- tinguish the sophist from the true philosopher ; and the other difficulties brought out in the Sophistes. 11. πειραθῶ σκοπῶν] For the participial construction (in fa- miliar use with πειράομαι) cp. supr. 187 A: Ἠρχόμεθα διαλεγό- μενοι. 12. αἰσχυνοίμην . . λέγω] “1 should feel ashamed on our behalf, if, while we were still in doubt, the strange conse- quences I refer to were pressed upon us.’ 15. “adrot ἐκτὸς τοῦ γελοίου ἑστῶτες] ‘ When we are our- selves free from the absurdity,’ ‘exempt from the ridicule.’ This point is not attained in the Theetetus ; and this whole passage may be regarded as an anticipation of the So- phistes.—The MSS. have πά- σχοντες αὐτά (80. τὸ ἀναγκάζεσθαι ὁμολογεῖν τοιαῦτα, Wohlrab). But Ast’s correction, αὐτοί, 18. ex- tremely probable. Heind. con- jectures πάσχοντας αὐτό, αὐτοί, κιτιὰλ, p. 19 wi. * ee ae σι; οἷν ; ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. ͵ [σὺ θέντες, οἶμαι, 179 “ i / ¢e “ τῷ λόγῳ παρέξομεν ὡς ναυτιῶντες a \ a σ΄ Ἂ , en ἐπ. y πάτειν TE καὶ ypnaOat ὁ τι ἂν βουληται. ῃ οὖν. ETL 7 A ε 7 “σ᾿ 7 e ἴω 3) πορον Τινα €UPLO KW TOU ζγτήματος Ὦμιν, ακουε. I. παρέξομεν.. πατεῖν] Gorg. 475 D: Τενναίως τῷ λόγῳ ὥσπερ ἰατρῷ παρέχων ἀποκρίνου, alib. There is an allusion to the proverbial situation described in Soph. Aj. 1142 foll. : Ἤδη mot εἶδον ἄνδρ᾽ ἐγὼ γλώσσῃ θρα- σὺν] ναυτὰς ἐφορμήσαντα χειμῶνος τὸ πλεῖν" | ᾧ φθέγμ᾽ ἂν οὐκ ἂν εὗρες ἡνίκ᾽ ἐν κακῷ | χειμῶνος εἴχετ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ὑφ᾽ εἵματος κρυβεὶς͵ πατεῖν παρεῖχε τῷ θέλοντι ναυτίλων. The posi- tion imagined is something like that reached at the end of the Parmenides. The point is of course the despair of a bad sailor in a storm. Naber’s con- Jecture, vavayodvres, is unneces- sary, and his alternative, ὡς vav- τίλῳ ἀξιοῦντες, is clumsy as well. The argument from 187 to 1ΟῚ may be thus condensed :-— € no longer search for knowledge in sensation, which is neither true nor false, but in opinion, where the mind is en- gaged with its own objects by itself. But here an old difficulty meets us in another form. It seemed that sensation could not be false, because it was re- lative to the subject. It now Seems as though opinion can- not be false, because a think- ing subject is necessarily re- lated to knowledge and being. What I do not know cannot be present in thought. Neither cau I lay hold in thought on that which is not. But can I take one thing which is for an- other which also ἐς 1 Thought being silent speech, if I lay hold of both, (i.e. if both are present to the mind,) I cannot mistake them; e. g. No one ever said to himself, Good is evil, And if only one is pre- sent to me, I cannot discourse about them, e.g. if I am think- ing only of the good, I cannot say, Good is evil. We are in great straits. For the result at which we seem in danger of arriving is contradictory to most important facts. We must not appeal to these, however, until we have extri- cated our minds, if possible, from this metaphysical tangle. For logical and metaphysical difficulties are not to be solved ‘ambulando,’ but by a higher criticism ofthe forms of thought which have occasioned them. In what follows, we are brought gradually back from the simple to the complex, from the more abstract to the more concrete. We are com- pelled to image to ourselves, what was discarded at a former stage of the inquiry (supr. 188 A), a process between the re- lativeness of sense and the ab- soluteness of knowledge, which, like every process, admits of degrees. Thus, it may be said, the idea of Motion returns upon us in a higher form. The mind is a storehouse of old impressions, in which we are continually looking for the types of new ones. But the old impressions fade and get confused, and we fail to bring them with precision and clear- ness into contact with the new. Hence we sometimes think falsely, N 2 We said it was impos- sible that T should think what T do not know to be what I know, else I should be ignorant of what I know. But per- haps it is possible in a certain way; e.g. Theetetus knows So- crates, and yet may 5 Io 180 ΘΕΑΙ. Λέγε μόνον. MAATQNO2 ΣΩ. Οὐ φήσω ἡμᾶς ὀρθῶς ὁμολογῆσαι, ἡνίκα ε Ψ “ 5, 5. 7 ’ ἃ N ὡμολογήσαμεν, & τις οἰδεν, ἀδύνατον δοξάσαι ἃ μὴ 3 3 , a ’ Ψ / οἶδεν εἶναι αὐτά, καὶ ψευσθῆναι: adda πῇ δυνατον. 8 ΘΕΑΙ. ἾΑρα λέγεις ὃ καὶ ἐγὼ τότε ὑπώπτευσα ς-π Δ τας By A 3 Ὡ Sie 3 ΩΝ NVLK αὐτὸ ἐφαμεν, τοιοῦτον εἰναι, OTL EVLOT ἐγὼ γι- / \ a Yj ἃ γνώσκων LwoKpaTn, πόρρωθεν δὲ ὁρῶν ἄλλον ὃν οὐ “- , ἃ - 7; γιγνώσκω, φήθην εἶναι Σωκράτη ὃν οἰδα ; γίγνεται Ν by ’ o ͵ - λέ γὰρ 71) εν T@ TOLOUT® OLOV eyels. > - ay, > a of ἃ 5») > , SQ. Οὐκοῦν ἀπέστημεν αὑτοῦ, OTL ἃ ἰσμεν, ἐποίει ε a »Ὸ 7 Χ "5. 7 ἡμᾶς εἰδότας μὴ εἰδέναι : ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. TO. Μὴ γὰρ οὕτω τιθῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ὧδε: ἴσως πῇ ew / 3) \ 3 “- > \ \ > ἡμῖν TVYXOPYNTETAL, LOWS δὲ ἀντιτενεῖ: ἀλλὰ yap ev © 2. ἡνίκα, κιτιλ Supr. 188 Cx "ANN οὐ μήν, «TA. This pas- sage proves that the phrase nearest to εἶναι in all these expressions is the subject, and the more remote phrase, gene- rally preceding it, contains the predicate. 5. τότε ὑπώπτευσα) This sur- mise was naturally suggested by the impossible case, which had been just stated, of Thestetus being mistaken for Socrates by one who knew neither of them. 6. τοιοῦτον εἶναι] Se. αὐτό, τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι. τοιοῦτον supplies the antecedent to 6. Others (Stephanus, H. Schmidt) omit the comma after ἔφαμεν, and take τοιοῦτον a8==aduvaror. 13. οὕτω] So as to imply knowledge of what we do not know. ὧδε" ἴσως] This is the punc- tuation of the Bodleian MS. καὶ ἴσως, the reading of T and other MSS., is unnecessary. A qualifying clause is sometimes thus introduced before ἀλλά--- without any particle of con- nection with what precedes. Compare Soph. El. 450: Σμικρὰ μὲν τάδ᾽, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως | ἅχω, δὸς αὐτῷ. Cid. Col. 1615: Σκληρὰν μέν, οἶδα, παῖδες" ἀλλ᾽ ἕν γὰρ μόνον | τὰ πάντα λύει ταῦτ᾽ ἔπος μοχθήματα. Eur. Alc. 353: Yu- χρὰν μέν, οἶμαι, τέρψιν" ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως βάρος | ψυχῆς ἀπαντλοίην ἄν. Supr. 171 Ο: Εἰκός γε ἄρα... ἀλλ᾽ ἡμῖν ἀναγκή, κιτιλ. Compare also the frequent asyndeton with πάντως. For ἴσως . . ἴσως δέ cp. Apol. 18 A: Ἴσως μὲν γὰρ χείρων, ἴσως δὲ βελτίων ἂν cin... ‘Perhaps the difficulty will not resist our treatment, or perhaps it will.’ 14. συγχωρήσεται.. , ἀντιτενεῖ Cp. Soph. 254 Ὁ : ᾿Εὰν ἄρα ἡμῖν πῃ παρεικάθῃ τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγουσιν ὡς ἔστιν ὄντως μὴ ὃν ἀθῴοις ἀπαλ- λάττειν. Rep. 1. 348 HE; Τοῦτ᾽ ἤδη στερεώτερον, and, for a simi- lar forlorn hope, Rep. 5. 453 D. ἀλλὰ γάρ] ‘But we must "—— vy * 5 toed oad >. «, _ eee Avy ~~ ες Δ : ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 181 / St, uh > OA / Uf . IQ. τοιούτῳ ἐχόμεθα, ἐν ᾧ ἀναγκὴ πᾶντὰ μεταστρέφοντα / 3 7 , 9 » λόγον βασανίζειν. σκόπει οὖν εἴ τι λέγω. apa ἔστι lA [ν᾿ an μὴ εἰδότα τι πρότερον ὕστερον μαθεῖν ; ΘΈΑΙ. Ἔστι μέντοι. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ αὖθις ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον ; OEAI. Τί δ᾽ οὔ; 2Q. Ges δή μοι λόγου ἕνεκα ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν a [4 » an “-“ \ “ “ > WS. €VOV KNPLVOV ἐκμαγειον, τῷ μὲν μεῖζον, τῷ δ᾽ ἔλαττον, \ a \ 4 an a \ / καὶ τῷ μεν καθαρωτέρου κηροῦ, τῷ δὲ κοπρωδεστέρου, \ / ἌΡ Np ce / »» - D Kat σκληροτέρου, ἐνίοις δὲ ὑγροτέρου, ἐστι δ᾽ οἷς με- τρίως ἔχοντος. ΘΒΑΙ. Τίθημι. ΣΏ. Δῶρον τοίνυν αὐτὸ φῶμεν εἶναι τῆς τῶν risk the chance of failure, for,’ etc. .3. μαθεῖν] The tense is no- ticeable. Whatever difficulty may attend the conception of the process of learning and for- getting (μανθάνειν, ἐπιλανθάνε- σθαι), it is certain that things are learnt and forgotten (μαθεῖν, ἐπιλελῆσθαι.) In what follows the process itself is imagined rather than analysed. 7. Θέ] Cp. Phileb. 33D: Ges τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα ἡμῶν... πα- θημάτων τὰ μέν, 4110. The image (which was repeated in later Greek philosophy) is not unlike Locke’s illustration of the different kinds of memory. Hum. Und. 2. το. δὲ 4, 5: ‘The brain in some retains the characters drawn on it like marble, in others like freestone, and in others little better than sand.’ Ib. 29. ὃ 3: ‘If the organs or faculties of percep- tion, like wax overhardened with cold, will not receive the impression of the seal from the usual impress wont to im- print it, or like wax of a temper too soft, will not hold it when well imprinted ; or else, sup- posing the wax of a temper fit, but the seal not applied with sufficient force to make a clear impression—in any of these cases the print left by the seal will be obscure.’ 8. κήρινον ἐκμαγεῖον] Plato’s image is not the common one of a waxen tablet, but of a ‘block of wax,’ such as was used for sealing. The word ἐκμαγεῖον is used first of the whole mass, afterwards of those parts of it which have received the particular impressions, ‘Hance notionem Plato a Py- thagora videtur mutuatus esse. Cp. Hemsterhusius ad Poll. 9. 130.’ Wobhlrab. 10. σκληροτέρου] Sc. τοῖς μέν. Cp. supr. 159 B, note on κα- θεύδοντα δή. 13. τῆς τῶν Μουσῶν μητρός] Hes. Theog. 54, Aesch. Prom. 461: Μνήμην θ᾽ ἁπάντων μοισο- ἰ «ἢ [9 mistake another whom he sees but does not know, for Socrates whom he knows. IT. a. Hy- pothesis of the waxen block. We return therefore in part to the concep- tion of a process, which may be de- seribed by means of the follow- ing image. Each of us has in his mind a block of wax, on which he receives the stamp of those sensations and percep- ttions which che wishes to remem- ber. That which he succeeds in stamping there is remember- ed and known so long as the impression lasts, but that of which the impression 182 a Ν Μιὰν a [χά x 3 Μουσῶν μητρὸς Μνημοσύνης, καὶ ἐς τοῦτο, 0 TL ἂν Pp. 191 ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ a a κὰ Ἃ 3) x 3 / βουληθῶμεν μνημονευσαι ὧν ἂν ἰδωμεν ἢ ἀκουσωμεν x > a 7 e / SN a 9 4 7) QUTOL εννοησωμενς UTTEXOVTAS αὐτο Tals αἰσθησεσι Ἦν 9 ,ὔ 3 A lof , a καὶ ἐννοίαις, ἀποτυποῦσθαι, ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα 7 ὰ Ν Ἃ > “ , 5 ἐνσημαινομένους. καὶ ὃ μὲν ἂν ἐκμαγῃ μνημονεύειν A ee eR ὦ oS ΕΝ Ss ΧΝ δ » “- σ τε καὶ ἐπίστασθαι, Ews ἂν EVN TO εἴδωλον αὐτοῦ" OTAV δ᾽ ἐξαλειφθῇ ἢ μὴ οἷόν τε γένηται ἐκμαγῆναι, ἐπιλε- E a XN λῆσθαί τε καὶ μὴ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω οὕτως. ε / 3 he Ἁ > ’ a δέ ΣΩ, Ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιστάμενος μεν AVTA, σκοπῶν OLE τῳ ον ΟΝ ρίποςς , 5᾽ Φ. ἊΨ ca , a TL ὧν ορᾷ ἢ ἀκούει, ἀθρει εἰ apa τοιῷδε τροπῷ ψευδὴ av δοξάσαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποίῳ δή τινι; ¢ 53 53 ἃ S A Ἁ SQ. “A οἶδεν. οἰηθεὶς εἶναι τοτὲ ἐν ἃ οἶδε. τοτὲ δὲ 9 Οἰἢ μ δ a / σ \ > a , > a ε ἃ μή. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ov καλῶς ὡμολο- / € a 5 , γήσαμεν ὁμολογοῦντες ἀδυνατα. μήτορ᾽ ἐργάτι.. Plat. Euthyd. 275 D: Καθάπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ δέομαι ἀρχόμενος τῆς διηγήσεως Μούσας τε καὶ Μνημοσύνην ἐπικαλεῖσθαι. 1. ἐς τοῦτο... ἀποτυποῦσθαι] ‘To stamp them upon this, as if we were taking on it the impressions of seal-rings.’ 2. ἀκούσωμεν) ἀκούωμεν BT. 3. ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν] ‘This addition is occasioned by the account of δόξα given above in 184-187, and prepares the way for the case which fol- lows, infr. 195 HE. But, al- though stated here, it is not immediately applied. ὑπέχοντας αὐτό] ‘ Holding it’ (the wax) ‘to receive our per- ceptions and thoughts.’ 4. ἀποτυποῦσθαι) Sec. ἡμᾶς. ὥσπερ δακτυλίων σημεῖα ἐνση- μαινομένους] For the image of the seal cp. Pheed. 75 D, where it is used of the mind impress- ing its own idea of Being upon things. 6. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐξαλειφθῇ] ‘ Ven. I. corr. ὃ δ᾽ ἄν. Bodl. et Vat. δέ omittunt” Schanz. The Bodl., however, has & in the margin by a later hand. The common reading is sufficiently probable : the regularity of the sentence is broken by the introduction of ἕως ἄν, so that instead of ὃ δ᾽ ἄν we have ὅταν δέ. Op. supr. 158 ἘΠ: ὋὋ ἂν... ὅταν, and notes. το. αὐτά] Viz. ἃ ἂν ἴδῃ καὶ ἀκούσῃ ἢ αὐτὸς ἐννοήσῃ (supr.) Although I know what is present to me in sensation, 1.€. though I may have in me a previous impression of the same thing, yet I may mistake it, i.e. fail to identify it, when present, as the original of that previous impression, ». 101. 102. ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 188 ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν δὲ πῶς λέγεις ; 2Q. Δεῖ ὧδε λέγεσθαι περὶ αὐτῶν, ἐξ ἀρχῆς διο- 4 Υ & / 3 \ 3 A ; r ριζομένους, ὅτι ὃ μέν τις οἶδε σχὼν αὐτοῦ μνημεῖον 3 a “ 9 , \ SIN 7 val 9 a ἐν TH ψυχῇ, αἰσθάνεται δὲ αὐτὸ μή, τοῦτο οἰηθῆναι / ὯΝ 9S 5, \ 9 ,ὔ V4 9 ἐτερὸν τι ὧν οἶδεν, ἐχοντὰα καὶ ἐκείνου τύπον, αἰσθα- , \ Loar .o 5 5 ’ A νόμενον δὲ μή, ἀδύνατον. καὶ ὅ ye οἶδεν αὖ, οἰηθῆναι 5 ὰ \ 5 5 » 3 a a CAN \ εἰναι Ὁ μὴ οἶδε μηδ᾽ ἔχει αὐτοῦ σφραγίδα- καὶ ὃ μὴ 5 & \ 5 5 Nore ‘\ Q a 5 XN ἃ οἶδεν, ὃ μὴ οἶδεν αὖ καὶ ὃ μὴ οἶδεν, ὃ olde καὶ ὃ 3 / / [χά / a 5 / » a 2 αἰσθάνεταί ye, ἕτερόν τι ὧν αἰσθάνεται οἰηθῆναι εἰναι" XV ἃ > / Ὁ Χ > / Ν ἃ \ καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν τι μὴ αἰσθάνεται: καὶ ὃ μὴ 3 ’ ς Ν 9 7 w-A ᾿, 3 V4 αἰσθάνεται, ὧν μὴ αἰσθανεται: καὶ ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται, © 9 Y \ 39) 3 Ὁ 5 Ν > / Bay αἰσθάνεται. καὶ ἔτι γε αὐ ὧν οἰδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται "ἡ \ = \ ‘ 53 3 n 5 Kal ἔχει TO σημεῖον κατὰ THY αἴσθησιν, οἰηθῆναι ad σ / @ 53 \ » ’, V7 3 NSCS / ETEPOV TL ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται καὶ EXEL αὖ καὶ ἐκει- XN an \ \ / 3 / + νοῦ TO σήημειον κατὰ THY αἰσθησιν, ἀδυνατώτερον ἔτι 3 ’ 9 el νὰ 5 Ν A 3 / 5 ἐκείνων, εἰ OLOV τε. καὶ ὃ OLOE καὶ Τὸ αἰσθάνεται EX@V 2. ἐξ ἀρχῆς διοριζομένους] ‘Laying down the following preliminary aphorisms.’ These are in fact a restatement of the points already agreed upon. There is a change of subject= δεῖ ἡμᾶς λέγειν. 6. ὅ γε οἶδεν] Se. μὴ αἰσθανό- μενος. I.e. not supposing him to have a sensible perception of either object. 8. καὶ ὃ αἰσθάνεταί γε] Sc. μὴ εἰδώς, 1.6. not supposing him to know it. Both the above cases are distinguished from ‘that in which the predicate is something both known and per- ceived, 13. καὶ ἔχει τὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν] He holds the stamp left by the former sensation in a line with the present sensa- tion, so that the two impres- sions coincide. Cp. inf. 194 B: Καταντικρὺ μὲν καὶ κατὰ τὸ εὐθύ. This is added so as to bear upon the case below,C D: Ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, κιτιλ. 16. The second ὅ is justly questioned by Bonitz. ἔχων TO μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς] Cp. such expressions as ὀρθοῖς ὄμ- μασιν, ἐξ ὀρθῆς φρενός. The above statement may be put shortly thus: Mistake is impossible—r1, Between things not perceived by sense, when we know both or one or neither of them. 2. Between things not known, when we have a sensible impression of one or both or neither of them. Ἂς Still more impossible, if that may be, between things, (a) both of which are known, both perceived by sense, and the knowledge of each of which is identified with its proper sen- sation: (6) One of which we know and also perceive sensi- is rubbed out, or is imperfectly made, is forgotten and not known. For what I know in this way I may mis- take, some- times what I know, sometimes what I do not know. Mistake ig impossible between things both of which are thus known but not present to sense ; © nor indeed is error possible in any case Se εν χ ν ψν without sensation. Still less when two things are known and present to sense, and when the sensation and the old impression coincide: or when neither is present to the mind at all. But when something, either known or unknown, is present to sense, and the mind brings to meet the Ῥυ -— es — a. ΟΝ le lhe -.- 184 ITAATONOZ Q rn ϑ a ἃ 5 3 “ 5ᾺᾺ 7 λὰ τὸ μνημεῖον ὀρθῶς, ὃ οἶδεν οἰηθῆναι ἀδυνατον" καὶ ὃ 53 \ 9 Le 32 \ > , A 9 la . οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται ἔχων κατὰ ταῦτά, ὃ αἰσθάνεται" Ν ἃ 5 ἣν 5 \ 9 », ἃ ᾿ 53 Ν᾿ καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε μηδὲ 5 / νὰ \ 53 \ 3 , ἃ \ 2 αἰσθάνεται: καὶ ὃ μὴ olde μηδὲ αἰσθάνεται, ὃ μὴ οἶδε. Νὰ \ 5 \ > , ἃ \ 3 ν 5 καὶ ὃ μὴ olde μηδὲ αἰσθανεται, ὃ μὴ αἰσθάνεται. , a e ’ >’ 7 nw > 3 lad πάντα ταῦτα ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ Tov ἐν αὐτοῖς ψευδῆ τινὰ δοξάσαι. λείπεται δὴ ἐν τοῖς τοιοῖσδε, εἴ ’ὔ Ya \ a , πέρ που ἄλλοθι, τὸ τοιοῦτον γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔν τίσι δή ; ἐὰν ἄρα ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον / A \ N a 10 μάθω: νῦν μὲν yap οὐχ ἕπομαι. QO. Ἔν οἷς οἶδεν. οἰηθῆναι αὐτὰ ἕτερ᾽ ἄττα εἶναι 4 θιησῃ ρ “Ὁ 5 Ἂς 5 ’ xX Se N 3 9 , ὧν olde καὶ αἰσθάνεται: ἢ ὧν μὴ οἶδεν, αἰσθάνεται / SY gh 53 Ν 3 / ςἷ 3 3 AN 5) / δέ: ἢ ὧν οἶδε καὶ αἰσθάνεται, ὧν οἶδεν αὖ καὶ αἰσθα- VETQL. ΘΕΑΙ. Νῦν πολὺ πλεῖον ἀπελείφθην ἢ τότε. bly, and identify the know- ledge of it with the sensation : (c) Both or either of which we neither know nor perceive sensibly, The only cases left, in which mistake is possible, are (1) when one thing is known and another perceived sensibly ; or (2) when two things are known and also present to sense, but we fail to connect knowledge and sensation rightly. 3. καὶ ὃ αὖ μὴ οἶδε... ὃ μὴ αἰ- σθάνεται] In order to exhaust every conceivable case, the con- verse or negative of each of the foregoing cases, in which . knowledge and sense were com- bined, must be fully stated. 6. ὑπερβάλλει ἀδυναμίᾳ] Cp. supr. B: ᾿Αδυνατώτερον ἔτι ἐκείνων εἰ οἷόν τε. The genitive is go- verned by ἀδυναμίᾳ. ‘ All these cases are beyond everything in regard to the impossibility of any man’s thinking wrongly in any of them.’ Cp. supr. 180 A. 9. ἐὰν dpa ἐξ αὐτῶν τι μᾶλλον μάθω] “ For perhaps if you state them, I may better perceive your meaning. ΟἹ. supr. 156C: ’Eav πως ἀποτελεσθῇ. The question here = λέγε. II-14. Ἐν οἷς... αὖ καὶ ai- σθάνεται] Error arises amongst things already known, when we mistake for these either (1) other things already known and now perceived through sense, or (2) something now perceived by sense but not pre- viously known, or (3) when for something known and perceived we mistake something else which is also perceived and known. Cp.supr.1g1A: Ἡνίκα, κιτιλ., and note. 15. ἀπελείφθην] “1 am lost.’ For this use of the aorist of the immediate past, where a per- son reflects on his own state, p. 192. Q i OEAITHTOS. 185 Ὁ Ἃ 3 Ν \ / 92. 20, “Ode dn ἀνάπαλιν ἄκουε. ἐγὼ εἰδὼς Θεό- - “eae » Can) 7 «el 3 Ν 7 δωρον καὶ ἐν ἐμαυτῷ μεμνημένος οἷός ἐστι, καὶ Θεαί- \ Sam, y Sins \ ε fas > / THTOV κατὰ ταῦτα, ἀλλο τι ἐνίοτε μὲν ὁρῶ αὐτούς, ae \ yy ΜΕΝ , > Sieh NS) 4 Ν ἐνίοτε δὲ OV, καὶ ἄπτομαί TOT αὐτῶν, τοτὲ δ᾽ οὔ, καὶ > 4 yf y 5 > ’ \ 5 ἀκούω ἢ τινὰ ἄλλην αἰσθησιν αἰσθάνομαι, τοτὲ ὃ 3 \ > / y \ e “ » 5, αἰσθησιν μὲν οὐδεμίαν ἔχω περὶ ὑμῶν, μέμνημαι δὲ A Ἁ iy) \ an ὑμᾶς οὐδὲν ἧττον Kal ἐπίσταμαι αὐτὸς ἐν ἐμαυτῷ ; ΄ \ 5 ΒΒ OEAT. [lavu μὲν οὖν. a ἴω \ Ὁ 4 20. Tovro τοίνυν πρῶτον μαθὲ ὧν βούλομαι δη- a e y Ἂ ἃ 5 \ 9 ie 3, \ λωσαι, ὡς ἐστι μὲν a οἶδε μὴ αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἔστι δὲ 4 - αἰσθάνεσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῇ. a a Ἁ 3) \ y 2Q. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἃ μὴ οἶδε, πολλάκις μὲν ἔστι \ 7 i 3 ’ / μηδὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι, πολλάκις δὲ αἰσθάνεσθαι μόνον : ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστι καὶ τοῦτο. OQ. ᾿1Ιδὲ δή, ἐάν τι μᾶλλον νῦν ἐπίσπῃ. Σωκράτης 3 Zz ς r 93. ἐπιγιγνώσκει Θεόδωρον καὶ Qeairnrov, ὁρᾷ δὲ μηδέ- δ δ 6 3) Daca , Ν SEES ae τερον, μηδὲ ἄλλη αἴσθησις αὐτῷ πάρεστι περὶ αὐτῶν > y “ e e 3 οὐκ av ποτε ἐν ἑαυτῷ δοζάσειεν ὡς ὁ Θεαίτητος ἐστὶ ’ 3 +O? ΓΞ Θεόδωρος. λέγω τι ἢ οὐδέν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai, ἀληθῆ γε. A \ A 53 © 20. Τοῦτο μὲν τοίνυν ἐκείνων πρῶτον ἦν av ἔλεγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἦν yap. 2Q. Δεύτερον τοίνυν, ὅτι τὸν μὲν γιγνώσκων e “ \ \ \ , > / \ , ὑμῶν, τὸν δὲ μὴ γιγνώσκων, αἰσθανόμενος δὲ μηδέ- τερον, οὐκ ἄν ποτε αὖ οἰηθείην, ὃν οἶδα, εἶναι ὃν μὴ οἶδα. ep. Soph. Α]. 693 : Ἔφριξ᾽ ἔρωτι 16. Σωκράτης, κ. τ. λ.] This περιχαρὴς δ᾽ ἀνεπτόμαν, 8110. ἀπο- putting of the case is equiva- λειφθῆναι is the opposite of ἐφέ- lent to an hypothetical clause : πεσθαι. hence the use of μηδέτερον and I. Ὧδε δὴ... ἄκουε] Cp.supr. the apparent asyndeton in οὐκ 182 AB. ἄν ποτε, K.TA. 5 | Ό 15 20 sensation her old impression of a dif- ferent thing— then the mind mis- takes, False opin- ion is the wrong putting together of sensa- tion and thought. 186 ΘΕΑΙ. Ὀρθῶς. “2 ’ 4 \ TQ. Τρίτον δέ, μηδέτερον γιγνώσκων μηδὲ αἰσθα- ΄ > x‘ 9 , a \ 5 Ὡ 4 9 53 νόμενος οὐκ ἂν οἰηθείην, ὃν μὴ οἶδα, ἐτερὸν τιν εἶναι a X - n> \ / 4 > A [2 ὧν μὴ οἶδα. καὶ τἄλλα τὰ πρότερα πάνθ᾽ ἑξῆς νόμιζε 7 5) f 3 - 3 7 ᾽ ΕἾΝ ν an \ 5 πάλιν ἀκηκοέναι, ἐν οἷς οὐδέποτ᾽ ἐγὼ περὶ σοῦ καὶ lA \ a ? ͵ Θεοδώρου τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσω, οὔτε γιγνώσκων οὔτε 3 a By δ᾽ ἊΝ , Ν 9 > / ἀγνοών ἄμφω, οὔτε TOV μέν, TOPO οὐ γιγνώσκων. \ Ν 3 Δ \ 3 4 > 4 σ΄ Και πέρι αἰσθησεων KATA TAUTA, ει apa E€7TEL. ΘΕΑΙ. ἕπομαι. 4 Ν a , a TQ. Λείπεται τοίνυν τὰ ψευδῆ δοξάσαι ev τῷδε, ic , \ Ν / Nee 5 ee ἢ ὅταν γιγνώσκων oe καὶ Θεόδωρον, καὶ ἐχων ἐν ἐκείνῳ an 7 fof ὃ δι a Ἂ na x a τῷ κηρίνῳ ὥσπερ δακτυλίων opev ἀμφοῖν τὰ σημεῖα, Ἂ a Χ a “- 5, a \ διὰ μακροῦ Kal μὴ ἱκανῶς ὁρῶν ἄμφω προθυμηθῶ, τὸ ἴω / οι \ Ἐν Yj οἰκεῖον ἑκατέρου σημεῖον ἀποδοὺς TH οἰκείᾳ ὄψει, ἐμ- ’ / Ν ε a 4 ec / 13 βιβάσας προσαρμόσαι εἰς TO εαυτῆς ἴχνος, Wa γένη- ’ 3 / \ 7 TOL ἀναγνώρισις, εἶτα τούτων ἀποτυχὼν καὶ ὥσπερ ἘΦ ε / / / Ἂ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας προσβάλω τὴν ς , By Ν Ν, 3 / n δ \ - ἑκατέρου ὄψιν πρὸς τὸ ἀλλότριον σημεῖον, ἢ καὶ οἷα Ae is / es + ΄ \ 3 > τὰ ἐν τοῖς κατόπτροις τῆς ὄψεως πάθη, δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρι- 13. διὰ μακροῦ, κιτιλ.] ‘ See- ing both of you imperfectly far off, 1 endeavour to assign the right impression of me- mory to the right visual im- pression, and to make the latter stand in its own foot-print, so as to fit, that recognition may take place; and then failing to do so, and bringing the new and old stamps cross- wise like men who put their sandals on the wrong feet,. . .’ 14. ἐμβιβάσας mpocappdcat | Sc. τὴν ὄψιν. These words and the following (iva γένηται ava- yopios) suggest an allusion to Aesch. Choeph. 205-211: Καὶ μὴν στίβοι ye, k.T.A. 17. παραλλάξας] Cp. for the ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ metaphorical use of this word (which here retains something of its literal sense) Tim. 71 E: Οὐδεὶς yap ἔννους ἐφάπτεται pay- τικῆς, GAN’ ἢ καθ᾽ ὕπνον... πεδη- θείς... ἢ διὰ νόσον ἢ διά τινα ἐνθουσιασμὸν παραλλάξας. 18. ἢ καὶ οἷα] ‘ Or my mind errs being affected in the same way as the sight is affected in looking at a mirror, when it shifts so that right becomes left.’ Vision is conceived of as flowing from the eye to its © object. Cp. Tim. 43. 19. δεξιὰ εἰς ἀριστερὰ perappe- οὐσης] ‘Shifting, right-side to left. The words have given some trouble. Buttmann con- jectured perapepovons, Hein- OEAITHTOS. 167 \ be \ \ Lf / )3. OTEPA μεταρρεούσης, ταὐτὸν παθὼν διαμάρτω" τότε ” δὴ συμβαίνει ἡ ἑτεροδοξία καὶ τὸ ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔοικε γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες: θαυμασίως ὡς ἴω / v4 λέγεις TO τῆς δόξης πάθος. ΣΏ. "Ἔτι τοίνυν καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρους γιγνώσκων : Ν Ν δ “ UA 3 Ψ x \ / TOV MEV προς τῷ γιγνώσκειν αἰσθάνωμαι, τὸν δὲ μή, \ \ nan rove ee A x \ \ 5) BA THY δὲ γνῶσιν τοῦ ἑτέρου μὴ κατὰ THY αἴσθησιν ἔχω, A ϑ la L “ 32, Vb / > ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν οὕτως ἔλεγον Kai μου τότε οὐκ 3 ’ὔ’ ἐμανθανες. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν. a Χ 2) [χά ’ Χ ΄ ΣΩ, Tovro μὴν ἐλεγον, ὅτι γιγνώσκων τὸν ἕτερον Ν 5» / \ \ a \ \ / Β καὶ αἰσθανόμενος, καὶ THY γνῶσιν κατὰ THY αἴσθησιν > A y 3 oe 97 5 ἌΝ ΄ / αὐτου €X@V, οὐδέποτε OLNOETAL ELVAL AVUTOV ETEPOV ὰ ΄ \ > / \ \ Qn TWA ὃν γιγνώσκει TE καὶ αἰσθάνεται Kal THY γνῶ- dorf says ‘medelam a libris expecto.’ Stallb. conjectures δεξιᾶς εἰς ἀριστεράν. But (1) may not δεξιὰ eis ἀριστερά be an adverbial expression, originat- ing in apposition? Thus: Ἢ ὄψις perappet δεξιὰ εἰς ἀρισ- τερά (1. 6. τὰ δεξιὰ αὐτῆς εἰς τὰ ἀριστεράλ ---- when the case of ὄψις changes, δεξιά remains unchanged. Compare ἄνω κάτω στρέφων, Phedr. 278 D; and especially Soph. Ant. 340: Ἰλλομένων ἀρότρων ἔτος εἷς ἔτος, where some MSS. have ἔτους eis ἔτος metro repugnante, showing that a similar diff- culty had been experienced there. (2) Riddell (Digest of Idioms, ὃ 2) explains δεξιά as in agreement with an un- expressed cognate accusative. (3) It is better to adopt Butt- mann’s conjecture than to take perappeovons causatively. 1. The phrase ταὐτὸν παθών contains the antecedent to old. 3. ὡς] So Bodl. and other MSS., but some have ᾧ. ‘Your description tallies won- derfully with one’s experience of what Opinion is.’ The other reading (which is_ possibly right) requires a comma at Σώκρατες, ‘One's experience of opinion tallies wonderfully with your description.’ (Ces. ὦ. Schanz is silent about the reading of T.) 7. τοῦ ἑτέρου] Viz. of the former, which is present to sense. 8. ὃ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] This refers to the expression τὴν γνῶσιν κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἔχειν. Cp. supr. 192 BC. 11. Heind. would insert ὁ before γιγνώσκων : but for the transition from the 1st to the 3rd person when the nomi- native is indefinite cp. infr. 195 DE: Οἰηθείημεν ... oin- Gein. 14. ὃν γιγνώσκει] This is the Bodleian reading, which seems σι 10 188 σιν av τοῦτο 5 } ΘΕΑΙ. Nau. ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ , / ad , LQ. Παρελείπετο δέ γέ που τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον, ἐν 5. ᾧ δὴ φαμὲν τὴν ψευδῆ δόξαν γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἄμφω γι- 7 ay a 7 γνώσκοντα καὶ ἄμφω ὁρῶντα ἤ τινα ἄλλην αἴσθησιν yf 3 a Ν , \ \ A » σ᾿ 3) ἔχοντα ἀμφοῖν, To σημείω μὴ κατὰ τὴν αὐτοῦ αἰσθη- e , 7 3 - / “ ? σιν ἑκάτερον ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον ἱέντα / A aA na aA δ an παραλλάξαι τοῦ σκοποῦ Kal ἁμαρτεῖν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ψεῦ- yf 3 ’ 10 δὸς APA ὠνόμασται. ΘΈΑΙ. Ἑϊκότως γε. NX ὦ / “ \ a f a ΣΏ. Kai ὅταν τοίνυν τῷ μὲν παρῇ αἰσθησις τῶν / a“ \ / \ \ a > / 3 / »- σημείων, τῷ δὲ μή, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθήσεως τῇ / J , / 4 ὃ « ὃ ᾽ὔ παρουσῃ προσαρμοσῃ, παντῃ ταυτῇ ψεύδεται ἡ δια- Sey eas ΄ NTRS: \ \ So / Nig Seon AF 15 νοια. καὶ ἑνὶ λόγῳ, περὶ ὧν μὲν μὴ OLDE τις μηδὲ ἐπη- ᾿ Ὁ ἢ y \ Χ 3 3 A και εκεινου EXEL κατα THY αἰσθησιν. nV yap p- 19 Ρ. 19 7 3 yf e yf +S / σθετο πώποτε, οὐκ ἔστιν, ὡς ἔοικεν, οὔτε. ψεύδεσθαι B 3 x / 3 a e an e οὔτε ψευδὴς δόξα, εἴ τι viv ἡμεῖς ὑγιὲς λέγομεν. περὶ δὲ 2 3) \ 3 / > 5 a / δὲ ὧν ἴσμεν τε Kal αἰσθανόμεθα, ἐν αὑτοῖς τούτοις preferable to ὧν, the reading of ΤΠ. The reference of ἐκείνου 18 thus made more distinct. I. ἦν yap τοῦτο:] agreed to this?’ 6. ἤτινα... ἔχειν] ‘Or having some other sensible perception of them, to fail in holding the previous impressions of both, each over against the sensation which belongs to it.’ This reading of Van Heusde is sup- ported by T and other MSS., which read τῷ σημείῳ. The Bodl. has τὸ σημεῖον. Stallb. reads τὸ σημεῖον... ἑκατέρου, Heindorf, τῶν σημείων. τερον. 8. ἀλλ᾽ οἷον τοξότην φαῦλον] I. 6. we try, sometimes in vain, to make our memory coincide ‘We (ew e » EKa- with present facts. We are beginning to have a livelier conception of the movement of the mind and of the remoteness of sensible things from our notions of them. 12. Kat ὅταν τοίνυν] ‘So like- wise when,’ etc. In the former case both objects were known, and both present in sensation : in this, while both are known, one only is present to sense. 13. τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀπούσης αἰσθή- σεως] Se. σημεῖον. 14. προσαρμόσῃ] Sc. ἡ διάνοια. 15. ἐπήσθετοί Sc. αὐτῶν, Most MSS. read μηδὲ ἤσθετο, but the correction of the Bodl. is in the ancient hand. 18, ἐν αὐτοῖς... ἡ δόξα] ‘ Here, and here alone, opinion twists OEAITHTOS. 189 4. στρέφεται καὶ ἑλίττεται ἡ δόξα ψευδὴς καὶ ἀληθὴς C / \ \ Ν x NS +n \ rn γιγνομένη, καταντικρὺ μεν καὶ κατὰ TO εὐθὺ τὰ οἰκεῖα ΄ὕ 3 / \ / = 9 / > συνάγουσα ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους ἀληθὴς, εἰς πλαγια δὲ καὶ σκολιὰ ψευδής. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν καλῶς, ὦ Σώκρατες, λέγεται ; J ‘ys 4 , a SN LQ. “Ere τοίνυν καὶ rade ἀκούσας μᾶλλον αὐτὸ qn 3 7 ἐρεῖς. TO μὲν yap τἀληθὲς δοξάζειν καλόν, τὸ δὲ ψεύδεσθαι αἰσχρόν. ΘΕΑΙ. Tas δ᾽ ov; ΣΏΩ. Ταῦτα τοίνυν φασὶν ἐνθένδε γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν \ e / 3 a a B θύ Ἂς λὺ \ μεν O Κηρος TOU EV TH ψυχῇ aGus τε Kal πολὺς καὶ an \ 7 ΕἿΣ > M4 53 δ: A ὃ \ a λεῖος και HET PLoS ὠργασμεέενος 7)9 Τὰ tlovVvrTa Ola τῶν ͵ 3 lA an Ν an qa αἰσθήσεων, ἐνσημαινόμενα εἰς τοῦτο τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς / ἃ 5, ἕῳ 9 / \ A a KEap, O epn Ὅμηρος αἰνιττόμενος τὴν τοῦ Kn pou / 4 \ Ν / \ \ o D ὁμοιότητα, τότε μὲν καὶ τούτοις καθαρὰ τὰ σημεῖα > / \e A A , yf / 4 ἐγγιγνομενα καὶ LKaVYa@S TOU βάθους ExovTa πολυχρονιὰ and twirls about, becoming true and false alternately.’ Cp. the language of Rep. 5.479 D: Ὅτι τὰ τῶν πολλῶν πολλὰ νόμιμα... μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται, κιτ.λ. 3. ἀποτυπώματα καὶ τύπους] (1) τύπος is here the present im- pression, which we endeavour to fit into the mark left by the former one (ἀποτύπωμα). τύπος can scarcely be (2) ‘the form of the object.’ This would be inconsistent with the previous use of the word, 192 A. 6. μᾶλλον αὐτὸ ἐρεῖς] Plato is satirizing the fallacy of sup- posing that physical illustra- tions can serve to explain the operations of the mind. 10. φασίν͵] This may or may not imply a reference to some contemporary doctrine. It indicates the half mythical tone which Socrates has as- sumed. He knows nothing of himself, but only repeats what he has heard. 12. *dpyacpévos | ‘Tempered.’ This word has been restored from Timeus to Suidas, the latter of whom quotes this passage. MSS. εἰργασμένος. τὰ ἰόντα διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων. . . ἐνσημαινόμενα.. .. καθαρὰ τὰ ση- μεῖα ἐγγιγνόμενα] The thread of the sentence is resumed in an altered form. Cp. Polit. 205 D: Πᾶν τοιοῦτον... ξύμ- Bawov ... γέλως av... γίγνοιτο τῶν τοιούτων... Phed.69BC: Χωριζόμενα δέ, κιτ.λ. 14. κέαρ] The Homeric form is κῆρ. But κέαρ, although still a poetical form, might be felt to harmonize better with Attic Greek. See above, 173 E, and note. 16. ἱκανῶς . . ἔχοντα] ‘ Being adequate in respect of thei depth,’ : The cause of this lies in the na- ture of the waxen block, which may be either too shallow, or too hard, or too soft, or too nar- row, or impure, whence the impres- sions are either im- perfect or faint, or short-lived, or crowded, or coarse and dim, so that it is difficult for the mind to make each sensa- tion corre- spond to its proper foot- print. 190 [4 \ 2748 € a a A ~ TE γιγνεται Και εἰσιν οἱ TOLOUTOL τρρῶτον μεν εὐμαθεῖς, Ρ.19 ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ yy ,ὔ 5 23 ΄ a ᾽ Υ ἔπειτα μνήμονες, εἶτα οὐ παραλλάττουσι τῶν αἰσθη- σεων τὰ σημεῖα ἀλλὰ δοξάζουσιν ἀληθῆ. σαφῆ γὰρ ~ 5 3 7 BY Ἁ ’Ψ 3 ὦ, \ e an και ἐν ευρυχωρίᾳ οΟονΡΤα TAXU διανέμουσ ἐν ἔστι TA αὐτῶν “ » a a WEES a ἣν Ν \ 5 EKAOTA ἐκμαγεῖα, ἃ On ὄντα καλεῖται. Kal σοφοὶ δὴ @ a xX 3 “ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἢ οὐ δοκεῖ σοι; ΘΕΑΙ. ὝὙπερφυώῶς μὲν οὖν. 7 / , , \ 53 ἣν ΣΏΩ. Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ ἢ, ὃ δὴ 5 ’ e ’ὔ Ν ἔπηνεσεν O πάντα coos 2. τῶν αἰσθήσεων] ‘ Do not fail in identifying the new im- pressions with the old.” The genitive depends on παραλλάτ- τουσι, like τοῦ σκοποῦ above. 3. σαφῆ γὰρ καὶ ἐν εὐρυχωρίᾳ ὑντα καλεῖται] (1) There is here a similar irregularity to that noticed above. The sen- tence begins as though it were to be σαφῆ γὰρ... ὄντα (sc. τὰ σημεῖα) ταχὺ εὑρίσκουσιν, ΟΥ̓ something of the kind: but the thought grows as we pro- ceed: and σαφῆ... ὄντα is left as an accusativus pendens. What follows is to be con- strued thus: ταχὺ διανέμουσιν (οἱ τοιοῦτοι ταῦτα) ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, ἕκαστα ἐπὶ τὰ αὑτῶν ἐκμαγεῖα. ‘Such persons quickly distribute things (as we term them) each to the place of its own former impress upon the block.’ Or (2) ἐκμαγεῖα may possibly here, as in Legg. 7. 800, 801, mean the mould or form of the seal which gives the im- pression. Cp. supra, note on ἀποτυπώματα kal τύπους,(2). This gives a simpler construction anda good meaning, but ἐκμαγεῖα is used in the other sense infr, E. ‘For they quickly assign ποιητής, ἢ ὅταν κοπρῶδες them (τὰ σημεῖα) as being dis- tinct, and having room enough, each to its proper (sensible) original, or so-called reality.’ 5. ἃ δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται] Supr. 152 Ὁ : *A δή φαμεν εἶναι, 153 EK. The latter part of the dialogue does not forget the earlier part. σοφοί] Supr. 161 D, 167 B. 8. λάσιον. . . κέαρ] Il. 2, 851: πΠυλαιμένεος λάσιον κῆρ. 16.554: Πατροκλῆος λάσιον κῆρ. In Homer the epithet ‘shaggy’ is transferred from στῆθος to knp,—but is here understood of a rugged surface that will not take clear impressions. The wisdom of Homer con- sists in his knowing of the κηρός, rather than in his praise, which is, of course, mistaken. But Plato is satirizing the allegorical method of inter- pretation, which may have been often not less absurdly applied. ὁ πάντα σοφὸς ποιητής] To appreciate the irony here, it is well to compare Soph, 233 DE, where the parallel is drawn between the man who ‘creates’ everything and the man who knows everything ; as well as Rep. το. 596, sqq. EK SEAITHTOS. 191 94. καὶ μὴ καθαροῦ τοῦ κηροῦ, ἢ ὑγρὸν σφόδρα ἢ σκλη- 98. ρόν, ὧν μὲν ὑγρόν, εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες δὲ γί- χὰ \ / , \ Χ ΄ γνονται, ὧν δὲ σκληρὸν, τἀναντία. οἱ δὲ δὴ λάσιον καὶ τραχύ, λιθῶδές τι ἢ γῆς ἢ κόπρου συμμιγείσης ay 5, 5) a x3 eee, A 3 an ἐμπλεων, ἔχοντες, ἀσαφῆ τὰ ἐκμαγεῖα ἰσχουσιν. ἀσαφῆ 5 e 3, “ \ δὲ Kal οἱ τὰ σκληρά: βάθος γὰρ οὐκ ὧι. ἀσαφῆ δὲ Ν ε Ἐς: V4 e Ν A A qn \ 7 Kat οἱ τὰ υγρα" U7TO yap TOU συγχεῖσθαι Ταχυ γίγνε- 3 , ΠῚ \ x a , 59) 5 7, ται. ἀμυδρά. ἐὰν δὲ προς πασι τοῦτοις ἐπ΄ ἀλλήλων , 93 e \ 7) 52 ‘ OULTETTT@KOTA ῇ U7TO OTEVOXKWPLAS, εαν Του σμικρον eh eaes , ao 3 / Se, , 3 Ὦ TO ψυχάριον, €TL ἀσαφέστερα EKELV@V, TWAVTES οὖν οὗτοι γίγνονται οἷοι δοξάζειν ψευδῆ. ὅταν γάρ τι e lay XN 3 4 XN 3 a ΄. 3 ’,ὔ ορῶσιν ἢ AKOV@OLY ἢ ἐπινοῶσιν, εκαστα αἥτονέμειν 3. tavarria] IT. 6, δυσμαθεῖς μέν, μνήμονες δέ, Plato is again thinking of the rare combina- tion of brilliancy with solidity, which is present in Theztetus, supr. 144 A. λάσιον] ‘Shaggy.’ Here, as in the case of βλοσυρός, we experience what is a frequent difficulty in Plato, that of de- termining the precise ethical meaning with which he adapts an Epic word. 4. λιθῶδές τι) ‘Those in whom it is shaggy and rugged, a gritty substance, or one filled with an admixture of earth or dung. The correction λιθῶϑές te (icin. Heusd.) avoids the inconsistency of putting as a single case what are spoken of above as two (Adowv.. ἢ .. komp@des): ‘In whom it is shaggy and rugged and stony, or full of the admixture of earth or dung.’ 10. Ψψυχάριον͵] Cp. Rep.7. 519 A: ‘Os δριμὺ βλέπει τὸ ψυχά- ριον, 12. ἢ érwodow] Cp. supr, 101 D; Ἢ αὐτοὶ ἐννοήσωμεν. It may be asked, whether these expressions do not pro- vide for the difficulty that is raised afterwards about 11 and 12% The answer prob- ably is, that the difficulty which is brought into full light afterwards, is here silently anticipated. (Compare the in- troduction of ἀγαθόν and καλόν in 157 D, and the deliberate slurring over, in 188 CO, of the case which is afterwards to be recognized, t91 A. The in- consistency must be admitted, but it is not necessary, with H. Schmidt, to condemn the words, The case supposed, though not distinctly stated, may be that in which an impression of sense calls up an alien asso- ciation: i.e. the second of the two cases given above, 194 A. As we dwell upon the image we have raised, we find that it is too simple to express more than the relations of sense and memory, and in- stead of multiplying κήρινα πλάσματα, a fresh image is in- 5 Io 15 192 Ve: τς > , rn » 5» ae. ἢ : Ταχὺυ εκαστοις οὐ δυνάμενοι βραδεῖς ΤΕ εἰσὶ Και ἀλ- Pp: 198 ITTAATQNO2 λοτριονομοῦντες παρορῶσί TE καὶ παρακούουσι καὶ μ an “ ἐν na 3 - 3 παρανοοῦσι πλεῖστα, καὶ καλοῦνται αὖ οὗτοι ἐψευ- 4 N aA +S AS la σμένοι τε δὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀμαθεῖς. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθότατα ἀνθρώπων λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες. 85. TQ. Φῶμεν ἄρα ἐν ἡμῖν ψευδεῖς δόξας εἶναι ; ΘΕΑΙ. Σφόδρα γε. ΣΏ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς δή: ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ἀληθεῖς. DQ. Ἤδη οὖν οἰόμεθα ἱκανῶς ὡμολογῆσθαι ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἐστὸν ἀμφοτέρα τούτω τὼ δόξα: ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπερφυῶς μὲν οὖν. TQ. Δεινόν τε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὡς ἀληθῶς κινδυνεύει NGS \ 5 Ἄς ON > is Kal andes εἶναι ἀνὴρ ἀδολέσχης. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δέ; πρὸς τί τοῦτ᾽ εἶπες ; ΣΏ. Τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ δυσμαθίαν δυσχεράνας καὶ ὡς c troduced in Plato’s usual man- ner. The touches of humour have led some critics to sup- pose that Plato is alluding to contemporary opinions (supr. 191 C, note on 1.8). But may he not be laughing at himself ? The description of the act of recollecting in the Philebus, 34 B, should be compared with the present passage: Ὅταν ἃ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπασχε πάθη ἡ ψυχῆ, ταῦτ᾽ ἄνευ τοῦ σώ- ματος αὐτὴ ἐν ἑαυτῇ ὃ τι μάλιστα ἀναλαμβάνῃ, τότε ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί που λέγομεν. 7) yap; Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. Καὶ μὴν καὶ ὅταν ἀπολέσασα μνή- μην εἴτε αἰσθήσεως εἴτ᾽ αὖ μαθή- ματος αὖθις ταύτην ἀναπολήσῃ ἐν ἑαυτῇ, καὶ ταῦτα ξύμπαντα ἀναμνή-- σεις καὶ μνήμας που λέγομεν. The former and simpler process corresponds to the search for the impression upon the wax ; the latter to the hunt in the aviary for a missing bird. ἕκαστα .. ἑκάστοις (1) τὰ ὄντα τοῖς ἐκμαγείοις, OY (2). τὰ σημεῖα τοῖς οὖσιν. See above, note on σαφῆ γάρ, κιτιὰλ. (194 D, 1. 3). I. ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες] “ Mis- appropriating,’ i. 6. ‘ Assigning wrongly.’ 3. καλοῦνται av οὗτοι] αὖ re- fers to supr. 194 : Καὶ σοφοὶ δὴ οὗτοι καλοῦνται. ἀμαθεῖς is the opposite of σοφοί, the words ἐψευσμένοι te δὲ τῶν ὄντων being inserted by way of explanation. 13. Δεινόν τε] The old edi- tions had ye. The abruptness of the reading in the text is better than such a meaning- less connection. Socrates breaks out, after a pause, with an expression, the relevancy of which does not at once ap- pear, OEAITHTOS. 193 195. ἀληθῶς ἀδολεσχίαν. τί γὰρ av τις ἄλλο θεῖτο ὄνομα, “ yf / \ , oS CON , ᾽ oTay ἄνῶ κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἕλκῃ τις ὑπὸ νωθείας οὐ 7 a 3 , δυνάμενος πεισθῆναι, καὶ ἢ δυσαπάλλακτος ἀφ᾽ ἑκά- ι 7 στου λογου: Ν \ Χ ΘΕΑΙ. Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί δυσχεραίνεις ; \ : δ 20. Οὐ δυσχεραίνω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δέδοικα ὅ τι 3 a 2, yf 7 Ai > / “ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ἂν τις ἔρηταί με: OKPATES, εὕρηκας Νὴ lal £ 3 lal 3 > δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι Ν / 3, a a Ὁ πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ᾽ ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῇ συν- Zz > θ 7 Ν ὃ ΄ ε Φ 7 δὲ ᾽ / S ἁψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν ; NOW δὲ ἐγώ, οἶμαι, / “ ες ’ «ς A / καλλωπιζόμενος ὧς τι EUPNKOT@Y ἡμῶν καλον. Yj a“ Ω » ᾽ ΠΕ Eporye δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες. οὐκ aio ὃν ᾿ ρ ’ εἰναι TO νῦν ἀποδεδειγμένον. a / © 53 3 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἃ ’ / ¢€ - ΟῚ y eo 3 52) ov διανοούμεθα μόνον, ὁρῶμεν ὃ οὔ, ἵππον οὐκ ἂν ὰ 5 A 53 3, ε ca 2, ε , ποτε οἰηθείημεν εἶναι, ὃν αὖ οὔτε ορῶμεν οὗτε ἀἁπτό- if \ , 3, 9 , μεθα, διανοούμεθα δὲ μόνον καὶ ἄλλ᾽ οὐδὲν αἰσθανέό- \ » A A 3 , , μεθα περὶ αὐτοῦ; Ταῦτα, οἶμαι, φήσω λέγειν. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ὀρθῶς γε. 5 / XY Ψ A \ 1 “Δ 202. Τί οὖν, ἐφήσει, τὰ ἐνδεκα, ἃ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἢ a 7 3 > / a , > 37 διανοεῖταί τις, ἄλλο τι ἐκ τούτου τοῦ λογου οὐκ ἂν ry , ΄ὕ 5 ἃ ’ 3 a 5 ποτε οἰηθείη δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μόνον αὖ διανοεῖται : ἴθι 5 Uf \\ οὖν On, σὺ ἀποκρίνου. OEAI. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀποκρινοῦμαι, ὅτι ὁρῶν μὲν ay τις ἢ 2. ἄνω κάτω τοὺς λόγους ἕλκῃ τις] Compare the still livelier image supr. 191 C: Ἔν J ἀνάγκη πάντα μεταστρέφοντα λό- γον βασανίζειν. 14. Οὐκοῦν, φήσει, λέγεις ὅτι αὖ] ‘Ts it not then part of your hypothesis, he will say, that on the other hand...’ If mis- take arises upon the wrong union of sensation and thought, thought cannot be mistaken when unaccompanied by sen- sation. (Cp. supr. 190 C.) The opposition between these two cases 1s expressed by αὖ, Most MSS. have φησί, But φήσει is in Par, 1812. 16. ὃν αὖ] ‘Which again,’ 1, e, as well as the man, 20. φήσει] Bodl. φηίς with Vat. Ven. Π. φησί Τ', Stephanus corr. _ ο But, when we consider it, the hy- pothesis is not ade- quate to the pheno- mena, EK.g. The numbers eleven and twelve are not objects of sensa- tion, but of thought, i.e. they are im- pressions on the waxen block, and yet in add- ing 7 and 5 people sometimes take eleven instead of twelve. 194 / , ΟΣ ΄ 53 ἃ , 3 ἐφαπτόμενος οἰηθείη τὰ ἕνδεκα δώδεκα εἶναι, ἃ μέντοι P. 198 MAATOQNO2 “- , yf 3 3, Ν 3 a an ἐν ΤΉ διανοίᾳ ἔχει, οὐκ ἂν ποτε πέρι αὐτῶν ταῦτα δοξάσειεν οὕτως. , 53 4 \ la SEN 3 ε a SQ. Ti οὖν; ole τινὰ πώποτε αὑτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ 7 \ e (2 / N ΝΥ 3 ’ «ε \ \ 5 7evTe Kal emTa, λέγω δὲ μὴ ἀνθρωπους επτὰ και a li a ΕῚ 3 πέντε προθέμενον σκοπεῖν μηδ᾽ ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, ἀλλ “ἊΝ / Ν ε 7 “ ἐ a €L yy an αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ETTA, A φαμεν EKEL PYNMELA EV τῷ > 7 5 Ἂν ψ > » lal 3 53 , ἐκμαγείῳ εἶναι καὶ ψευδῆ ἐν αὑτοῖς οὐκ εἰναι δοξάσαι, a ΟΝ 3) 5 / +f / 3 / ταῦτα αὐτὰ εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων ἤδη πώποτε ἐσκέψατο 7 Ν CN Q 3 a , Se / MAKE i fe) λέγων 7 pos QUTOV Και EPOT@V TOOQ TOT ἐστι. Kal ὁ 93 oS 5. Ne e \ / μέν τις εἶπεν οἰηθεὶς ἕνδεκα αὐτὰ εἶναι, ὁ δὲ δώδεκα, ἢ x / / ἢ)» XQ 5) / eS. 53 πάντες λέγουσί τε καὶ οἴονται δώδεκα αὑτα εἰναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δία, ἀλλὰ πολλοὶ δὴ καὶ a >\ ’ὔ > / > a a ἕνδεκα: ἐὰν δέ ye ἐν πλείονι ἀριθμῷ τις σκοπήηται, B 15 μᾶλλον σφάλλεται. οἶμαι γάρ σε περὶ παντὸς μᾶλ- λον ἀριθμοῦ λέγειν. ἡ. αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά] The insertion of the article after αὐτά does not seem necessary, though it may possibly be right. ἐκεῖ... ἐν τῷ ἐκμαγείῳ] ‘In that block of which we spoke.’ μνημεῖα] ‘ Records.’ At this stage of psychological inquiry, Memory is made to do the work of Abstraction. 9. εἴ τις ἀνθρώπων] The ques- tion is resumed with εἰ, depend- ing on λέγω, which has broken the regularity of the sentence. ‘I mean to ask if... If the sentence had proceeded regu- larly, it would be followed by σκεψάμενον .. .. But εἴ τις, κιτιλ., follows λέγω ΞΞ ἐρωτῶ. 10.. λέγων πρὸς αὑτόν] Socrates refers to his own description of the process of thinking, supr. 189, 190. 5» al ELTTELV, 14. ἐὰν δέ γε] Theetetus is permitted to enlarge a little upon the subject of calculation, with which he is familiar (supr. | 145 D). We seek to identify the sum of 7 and 5, of which we have thought (ἐπενοήσαμεν) with the corresponding number in our minds: and by mistake we identify it with 11 instead οὗ 12. The statement of this case shows the inadequacy of the figure we have adopted. For where are the 7 and 5 and the sum of them of which we think ? They are not in sensation: must they not then be in the waxen block? The former difficulty returns—we have taken one thing which we know for another thing which we know. p. 196 ). 196. D OEAITHTOS. ΣΩ. ᾿Ορθῶς yap οἴει. 195 δον 9 a / Υ See 8 καὶ ἐνθυμοῦ μή τί *rore 7 4 XN 3 | \ , \ 3 ὌΝ 3 7 ἰγνεται aAAo αὐτὰ Ta δώδεκα Τα εν Τῷ εκμαγείῳ γιγ ἢ Ὁ ἐΚβαγεις ἕνδεκα οἰηθῆναι. OEAI. "Ἐοικέ γε. > ἴω 9 \ ’ Υ͂ 3 ’ 4 2Q. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους πάλιν ἀνήκει λό- 5 * € \ “- θ / ὰ ἰδ oS ALN 5) Yous; 0 γὰρ τοῦτο παθῶν, ὃ οἶδεν, ἕτερον αὐτὸ οἴεται 5 © OS a » 5Ὰ 7 Ν / x A εἰναι ὧν αὖ οἶδεν, ὃ ἔφαμεν ἀδύνατον, καὶ τούτῳ αὐτῷ » ’ὔ δ 5 a / “ \ \ 2a. Nie. δ ο ηναγκάζομεν μὴ εἶναι ψευδῆ δόξαν, ἵνα μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ ὁ A ΑΝ, 3 Ψ 7Q\ δ 5... vA αὑτὸς ἀναγκάζοιτο εἰδὼς μὴ εἰδέναι ἅμα. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν ἄλλ᾽ ὁτιοῦν δεῖ ἀποφαίνειν τὸ τὰ Wevdn δοξάζειν ἢ διανοίας πρὸς αἴσθησιν παραλλα- γήν. εἰ γὰρ τοῦτ᾽ ἦν, οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐν αὐτοῖς τοῖς δια- νοήμασιν ἐψευδόμεθα. νῦν δὲ ἤτοι οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς ΄ \ Ὁ 5 od \ >Q7 AN , δόξα, ἢ a τις οἶδεν, οἷόν τε μὴ εἰδέναι. καὶ τούτων 15 ’ an πότερα αἱρεῖ: Yj δ 5 OEAI. Απορον αἵρεσιν προτίθης, ὦ Σώκρατες. ε ’ 20. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι ἀμφότερά γε κινδυνεύει ὁ λόγος 3 a7 σ Me ΄ \ / hg AT. οὐκ ἐάσειν. ὅμως δέ, πάντα yap τολμητέον, τί εἰ ἐπι- χειρήσαιμεν ἀναισχυντεῖν ; ig *rére| MSS. πότε. Heind. corr. οἰηθῆναι, sc. τὸν σκοποῦντα. 5. Οὐκοῦν εἰς τοὺς πρώτους] ‘The discussion has reverted to its first stage.’ Supr. 188 B. Comparing Phil. 43 C, one is tempted to read ἂν ἥκοι. 8. ἠναγκάζομεν.. ἀναγκάζοιτο] ‘It was by this very argument we tried to make the non- existence of false opinion in- evitable, because otherwise it would be inevitable that the Same person should know and be ignorant at once.’ II. GAN ὁτιοῦν] ; Anything but this.’ So Bodl. Most MSS. give ἄλλο τι οὖν. 18. ἀμφότερα] Viz. τὸ εἶναι ψευδὴ δόξαν and ἃ τις οἶδεν οὐχ οἷόν τε εἶναι μὴ εἰδέναι. Το Ths: ἀναισχυντεῖν] ‘How, if we were for once to venture on a shameless course? The distinction between potential and actual now to be made re- quires a definition of the act of knowing. The difference meant is analogous to that observed by Aristotle between ἐπίστασθαι and θεωρεῖν ; which is his fa- vourite example of the differ- ence between ἕξις and ἐνέργεια, Cp, ΠΝ: ὃ: Διαφέρει δ᾽ οὐ μικρὸν ἐν κτήσει ἢ ἐν χρήσει τὸ ἄριστον ὑπολαμβάνειν. The ten- Ο2 Io 20 To meet this diffi- culty, we venture to say what it is to know, —(adaring step, as we are still to seek for the definition of Know- ledge.) 1 5 ο 196 CEAI. [las ; MAATQNO2 ΄- al \ TO. ᾿Εθελήσαντες εἰπεῖν ποῖόν τί ποτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ΕῚ / ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Kal τί τοῦτο ἀναίσχυντον : ΄ . “-“ ε “ ϑ ΄ TO. ἜἜοικας οὐκ ἐννοεῖν, ὅτι πᾶς ἡμῖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ὁ ’ / / > / e > > / , λόγος ζήτησις γέγονεν ETLOTHMNS, ὡς οὐκ εἰδοσι τί DS aka TOT ἐστιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἐννοῶ μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Ἔπειτ᾽ οὐκ ἀναιδὲς δοκεῖ, μὴ εἰδότας ἐπιστή- , Ν > Ss el Σ A μην ἀποφαίνεσθαι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι οἷον ἐστιν ; ἀλλὰ , ὍΣ 7 / 3 Ἁ ϑ if na ἈΝ γάρ, ὦ Θεαίτητε, πάλαι ἐσμεν ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθα- ρῶς διαλέγεσθαι. μυριάκις γὰρ εἰρήκαμεν τὸ γιγνώ- dency to this distinction ap- pears in Sophocles, Ant. 1278: 70 δεσπόθ᾽, ὡς, ἔχων TE Kal κεκτη- μένος, K.T.A. 9. μὴ εἰδότας, κιτλῇ So- crates’ ideal requirement of a perfect definition as the first step in discussion is perpetually mocking us in Plato. Protag. 361, Rep. 1. 354: 11. ἀνάπλεῳ τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς δια- λέγεσθαι] ‘Infected with logical imperfection.’ Cp. Charm. 175 BOC: Καίτοι πολλά ye ξυγκεχω- ρήκαμεν οὐ ξυμβαίνονθ᾽ ἡμῖν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ. καὶ γὰρ ἐπιστήμην ἐπιστή- μης εἶναι ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐκ ἐῶν- τος τοῦ λόγου οὐδὲ φάσκοντος εἶναι" καὶ ταύτῃ αὖ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπιστημῶν ἔργα γιγνώσκειν ξυνεχωρήσαμεν, οὐδὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐῶντος τοῦ λόγου... τοῦτο μὲν δὴ καὶ παν- τάπασι μεγαλοπρεπῶς ξυνεχωρήσα- μεν, οὐδ᾽ ἐπισκεψάμενοι τὸ ἀδύνατον εἶναι, ἅ τις μὴ οἶδε μηδαμῶς, ταῦτα εἰδέναι ἁμῶς γέ πως .. Καΐτοι, ὡς ἐγὼ οἶμαι, οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχὶ ἀλογώτερον τοῦτ᾽ ἂν φανείῃ. τοῦ μὴ καθαρῶς διαλέγεσθαι] In other words, we have felt our way hitherto, not by ab- stract definition and inference, but (as it is expressed in Rep. ἡ. 533 ΟἹ τὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀναι- ροῦντες ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. We first ventured the hypothesis ai- σθησις ἐπιστήμη. ‘This was re- jected, but the difficulties we met with pointed to a further hypothesis, ὅτι ἡ ἀληθὴς δόξα ἐπιστήμη ἐστίν. Here again we are met by fresh difficulties, but the discussion of them leads to a fresh hypothesis, viz. that we may know, with- out having knowledge in hand. 12. μυριάκις yap εἰρήκαμεν] We are haunted throughout by a difficulty respecting the search for knowledge akin to that re- specting its definition. Can we know it, and yet not know it? To inquire about it implies ignorance of its nature, and yet how can we use the name even in inquiry without knowing the meaning of the name? 147 B: Ἢ οἴει ris τι συνίησί τινος ὄνομα, ὃ μὴ οἶδε τί ἐστι; 210A: Καὶ παντάπασί γε εὔηθες ζητούντων ἡμῶν ἐπιστήμην δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι μετ᾽ ἐπιστήμης. Ρ. 196 1 ', 196. ‘197, ΩΣ ΘΕΑΙΤΉΤΟΣ. 107 , tA σκομεν καὶ οὐ γιγνώσκομεν, καὶ ἐπιστάμεθα καὶ οὐκ > , Ω͂ Zz ’ 4 3 © wf 3 ἐπιστάμεθα, ὡς τι συνιέντες ἀλλήλων ἐν ᾧ ἐτι ἐπι- lA » a 9 δὲ B ΤᾺ Ων A 3 “ 2 στημὴν ἀγνοοῦμεν. εἰ ovr, καὶ νῦν ἐν τῷ παρ ’ , > > lal an , ¢€ ovTt Kexpnued αὖ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν τε καὶ συνιέναι, ὡς A an A "5 προσῆκον αὐτοῖς χρῆσθαι, εἴπερ στερομεθα ἐπι- ’ στήμης. \ ’ VA 53 4 OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες, V4 / τούτων ἀπεχόμενος : 7 VA aA Zz 3 YO. Οὐδένα ov γε ὃς εἰμί: εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλο- iP. - A an Qn 7 > Ο yf γικος" οἷος ἀνὴρ εἰ καὶ νῦν παρῆν, τούτων τ᾽ ἂν ἔφη > 7 ᾿ς δ΄ “κι J > ἃ aA » ἊΝ , 3 ᾽ ἀπέχεσθαι καὶ ἡμῖν σφόδρ᾽ ἂν ἃ ἐγὼ λέγω ἐπέπλητ- Ἁ 5S A , / a τεν. ἐπειδὴ οὖν ἐσμὲν φαῦλοι, βούλει τολμήσω εἰπεῖν el 5 SV ge ae A , ’ yf olov ἐστι TO ἐπίστασθαι ; φαίνεται yap μοι προύργου “Δ ὔ τι ἂν γενέσθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τόλμα τοίνυν νὴ Δία. τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπε- χομένῳ σοι ἔσται πολλὴ συγγνώμη. 7. ᾿Αλλὰ τίνα τρόπον διαλέξει, ὦ Σώκρατες] Compare what was said of being, 157 B: Τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον, οὐχ ὅτι καὶ ἡμεῖς πολλὰ καὶ ἄρτι ἠναγκάσμεθα ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνης χρῆσθαι αὐτῷ. That there is such a thing as absolute knowledge and abso- lute being is the postulate of Plato’s mind. That he himself or any man can wholly grasp either is more than he will dare to say. The sacredness of this belief, which it would be impious to relinquish, ap- pears also in Theetetus’ an- Swer: Τούτων δὲ μὴ ἀπεχομένῳ ἔσται σοι πολλὴ συγγνώμη. Cp. Parm. 135 C: Τί οὖν ποιήσεις φιλοσοφίας πέρι ; ποῖ τρέψει ἀγνο- ουμένων τούτων ; 9. ὧν γε ὃς εἰμί] Cp. Pheedr. 243 HE: Ἕωσπερ ἂν ἧς ὃς εἶ, εἰ μέντοι ἦν ἀντιλογικός] The apodosis (διελεγόμην ἂν ὡς τούτων ἀπεχόμενος) is omitted, and the construction changed, because, from supposing himself ἀντιλο- γικός, Socrates proceeds to ima- gine the effect of the presence of such a man upon the discussion. 10. τούτων τ᾽ ἂν ἔφη ἀπέχεσθαι Notexactlywith Heind., Stallb., ‘abstinere nos jubeatur,’ but (1) (sub. δεῖν) ‘would have dwelt on the necessity of ab- staining, or, possibly, (2) (throwing an emphasis on ἡμῖν), ‘Would have professed to ab- stain.’ The kind of sophistry intended is illustrated supr. 157 BC, 165-7. τούτων ἀπε- χόμενος 18 not, as some inter- preters would have it, ‘ with- out definition, but ‘without assuming the reality of know- ledge.’ σι To know is not to have, but to pos- sess, know- ledge. This dis- tinction is illustrated by a new image. II. B. Hy- pothesis of the cagefull of birds. 5 10 15 20 198 / 3 ἃ na / Ny eee TQ. ᾿Ακήκοας οὖν ὃ νῦν λέγουσι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ; Pp. το! ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ 3, 2 / 5, a , OEAI. Ἴσως: ov μέντοι ἐν ye τῷ TapovTL μνη- / μονενω. TQ. ᾿Ἐπιστήμης που ἕξιν φασὶν αὐτὸ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. val 3) ΣΩ. Ἡμεῖς τοίνυν σμικρὸν μεταθώμεθα καὶ εἴς- > , na TOPE ETLOTHUNS κτησιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί οὖν δὴ φήσεις τοῦτο ἐκείνου διαφέρειν ; ΣΏ. Ἴσως μὲν οὐδέν: συνδοκίμαζε. OEFAI. ἃ 3 3 “ > / Ὁ δ᾽ οὖν δοκεῖ, ἀκούσας 3 , 4 er eee Eav πέρ γε οἷος τ᾽ ὠ. LQ. Οὐ τοίνυν μοι ταὐτὸν φαίνεται τῷ κεκτῆσθαι A ee, - * ae » Ψ / Van Ν ΤΟ εχέν. OLOV “εἰ LUATLOV πριάμενος TLS Και ἐγκρατὴς x \ “ y \ > “Ὁ pS 3 / a“ @V μὴ opot: EXELY μεν οὐκ AV AUTOV AUTO, κεκτῆσθαι δέ γε φαῖμεν. OEAI. Ὀρθῶς γε. ΣΏΩ. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμην εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κε- ᾽ὔ Ἁ Ψ > Pts Ὡ“ 7 32) θ 3 / κτημένον μὴ ἐχειν, GAA ὠσπερ εἰ τις ορνιθας ἀγρίας, \ + y ΄ 5 Μ περιστερὰς ἢ τι ἄλλο, Onpevoas οἰκοι κατασκευασα- μενος περιστερεῶνα τρέφοι. ῇ Ν \ aS , T po7rov μεν γὰρ αν ποὺ = SUN 1 Ἃ 5ν 5») “ \ / τινα φαῖμεν αὐτὸν αὐτὰς αει εχέιψν, OTL δὴ ΚΕΚΤΉΤΑΙ. 5 ΄ὕ ἦ γάρ; OEAI. Ναί. 4. Ἐπιστήμης... ἕξιν] Euthyd. 277 B: Τὸ δ᾽ ἐπίστασθαι .. ἄλλο τι ἢ ἔχειν ἐπιστήμην ἤδη ἐστίν ; Pheed. 76 Β. 13. “ei ἱμάτιον] Stallb. at- tempts to defend the optative without «i (which has only slight authority), from Rep. 549 A, ἄγριος εἴη, which is not quite parallel, (and there is MS. authority for inserting ἄν.) The comparison of 193 A: Σω- κράτης ἐπιγιγνώσκει, κιτιλ,, SUS- gests the conjecture φορεῖ as an alternative reading. The Bodl. has φορῶν as an early correc- tion. 18. μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽] This oppo- sition between minute parts of a sentence is characteristic of the Greek idiom. Cp. infr. 199A B. ὥσπερ] The apodosis (se. οὕτω τὴν ἐπιστήμην κεκτῆσθαι) I 18 suppressed,—the main thread being resumed in πάλιν δή, k.7.A. Cp. Rep. 3. 402 A-C. Join οἴκοι τρέφοι. . 107. ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 199 , iy , ,ὔ \ 2Q. Tporov δέ γ᾽ ἄλλον οὐδεμίαν ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ Ψ \ a \ / \ δύναμιν μὲν αὐτῷ περὶ αὐτὰς παραγεγονέναι, ἐπειδὴ 3 3 / Boa e εἰ ‘0 5 οι 7 r Bet: εν οἰκείῳ περιβόλῳ ὑποχειρίους ἐποιήσατο, λαβεῖν \ a 3 \ 7] ͵ Ὰ “Ὁ 5ιὰΝ Ὁ καὶ σχεῖν, ἐπειδὰν βούληται, θηρευσαμένῳ ἣν ἂν ἀεὶ » ᾽’ὔ \ 7 3 , \ ΄“- 5 lat qn εθέλῃ, καὶ πάλιν ἀφιέναι: καὶ τοῦτο ἐξεῖναι ποιεῖν, e ha YY a ΕῚ na ὁποσάκις ἂν δοκῇ αὐτῷ. GOEAI. Ἔστι ταῦτα. ’ὔ V4 7 a ’ ἐφ 2Q. Τ]άλιν on, ὡσπερ ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν κήρινόν τι 3 ἴω nr » ᾽ 5.9.9 ὦ ’ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς κατεσκευάζομεν οὐκ οἶδ᾽ ὅ τι πλάσμα, an 3 3s e fA ἴω 7 lo ἊΨ νῦν αὖ ἐν ἐκαστῃ Ψυχῇ ποιήσωμεν περιστερεῶνά τινα “ dé δὴ \ > > Ζ By παντοδαπῶν ὀρνίθων, τὰς μὲν Kar ἀγέλας οὔσας ἴω ϑ \ \ 3 > \ 7 χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, τὰς δὲ κατ᾽ ὀλίγας, ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας. ΘΕΑΙ. Πεποιήσθω δή. ἀλλὰ τί τοὐντεῦθεν : 20. Παιδίων μὲν ὄντων, φάναι χρή, εἶναι τοῦτο Ἂν 5 ἴω ’ >’ \ Ν a“ 3 / 5 , TO ἀγγεῖον κενὸν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῶν ὀρνίθων ἐπιστῆμας a ἃ > ἃ 3 / 7 i 5 νοῆσαι" ἣν δ᾽ ἂν ἐπιστήμην κτησάμενος καθείρξῃ εἰς 2. δύναμιν μέν] Heind. well compares infr. 201 B: Πεῖσαι μέν. 3. λαβεῖν... ἐθέλῃ] ‘To take and to hold, when he desires to do so, any one of them which he chooses to catch.’ 8. κήρινόν tu] ‘We sought to establish in the mind a sort of moulding-block of wax.’ Io. ποιήσωμεν] ‘ Let us frame.’ Cp. Rep. 9. 588 D. 11. τὰς μὲν κατ᾽ ἀγέλας, k.7.d. | The distinction indicated is probably that between, (1) indi- viduals in the aggregate (πολλὰ ἀθροισθέντα, 1547 B) ; (2) inter- mediate abstractions, as the virtues, numbers, ete.; (3) the highest abstractions, as Being, Goodness, resemblance, differ- ence, etc. Little is thought, however, of any distinction between memory and abstrac- tion, as appears from the in- terchange of the terms μνημεῖον and διανόημα in what precedes. 12. κατ᾽ ὀλίγας] E. g. the vir- tues, arts, ete. ἐνίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν] E. 9. τὴν οὐσίαν... τοῦτο γὰρ μάλιστα ἐπὶ πάντων παρέπεται, 186 A, The supremacy of certain uni- versal forms, or categories, is a conception which belongs to the maturity of Plato’s thought. (See Introduction.) 15. φάναι χρή, εἶναι] Although φάναι χρή 18 parenthetical, the Sentence receives an indirect turn from it. νοῆσαι, sc. χρή. 16. ἀγγεῖον] ‘ Receptacle.’ Ry κτησάμενος] De. tess, | Cp, ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ supr. D. σι — 5 The mindis like a cave, empty at birth, which we fill by degrees with what we learn. Whatever knowledge then is caught by us, is known so long as it remains in this cage, And yet before we have it in hand, there is a further chase re- quired. 200 ᾿ς TIAATONOS τὸν περίβολον, sei αὐτὸν ates ἢ εὑρηκέναι Pp. gi TO et οὗ ἦν αὕτη ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἐπίστασθαι τοῦτ᾽ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔστω. 5. ΣΏ. Τὸ τοίνυν πάλιν ἣν ἂν βούληται τῶν ἐπιστη- μῶν θηρεύειν καὶ λαβόντα ἴσχειν καὶ αὖθις ἀφιέναι, σκόπει τίνων δεῖται ὀνομάτων, εἴτε τῶν αὐτῶν ὧν τὸ a σ“ 3 a 7 ἔν , δ᾽ > / ὃ TPWTOV, OTE EKTATO, εἰτε ἐτέρων. μαθησει evOevoe M4 / / » \ \ Ν / To apply σαφέστερον τί λέγω. ἀριθμητικὴν μὲν yap λέγεις this to the ; case of 10 ΤΕΧΡΉΨΡ 5 number : SEAT. Nai. 2Q. Ταύτην δὴ ὑπόλαβε θήραν ἐπιστημῶν ἀρτίου τε καὶ περιττοῦ παντός. ΘΕΑΙ. Ὑπολαμβάνω. 15 2Q. Ταύτῃ δή, οἶμαι, τῇ τέχνῃ αὐτός τε ὑποχει- ρίους τὰς ἐπιστήμας τῶν ἀριθμῶν ἔχει καὶ ἄλλῳ πα- ραδίδωσιν ὁ παραδιδούς. ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 20. Καὶ καλοῦμέν γε παραδιδόντα μὲν διδάσκειν, 20 παραλαμβάνοντα δὲ μανθάνειν, ἔχοντα δὲ δὴ TO κε- “- » a a 7 > ir κτῆσθαι ἐν τῷ περιστερεῶνι ἐκείνῳ ἐπίστασθαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. . “- σι 3, Ν a The arith- 2Q. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν ἤδὴ πρόσσχες τὸν νοῦν. metician ; eres ΕΣ a , 9 \ has know- ἀριθμητικὸς yap ὧν τελέως ἄλλο TL πᾶντας ἀριθμοὺς 8. ἐνθένδε] The Bodl. MS. 23. Τῷ δὴ ἐντεῦθεν] δὲ δή, the has ἐντεῦθεν, which might mean, reading of the Bodl. and its two ‘If you will come and look companions, has probably slip- from where I stand.’ ped in from ἔχοντα δὲ δή above. 15. ὑποχειρίους] ‘Under (in ‘The example is not merely in- the power of) his hand.’ (Supr. tended to illustrate the dis- 197 0.) But not necessarily tinction between having and προχείρους, ‘in hand.’ holding, but more immediately 16. ἔχει] The omission of to show how we are to con- the subject (rs, ὁ ἔχων) is sup- ceive of the process of realiz- plied in the next clause by the ing knowledge. addition of ὁ παραδιδούς, Ρ. 19 OEAITHTOS. ψυχῇ ἐπιστῆμαι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν ; 201 * ’ Ἁ a 9." 3 ΩΝ ae J ᾽- .198. ἐπίσταται; πάντων γαρ ἀριθμῶν εἰσιν αὐτῷ EV TH > “- “" n Wy VA Ἃ 20. Ἢ οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἀριθμοῖ ἄν ποτέ τι ἢ αὐ- +S Ν €N ae NN? Sh 5) a ", σ“ yf τὸς πρὸς αὐτὸν αὑτὰ ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ἔξω ὅσα EXEL ἀριθμόν ; OEAI. Πῶς yap οὔ; XQ. To δὲ ἀριθμεῖν ye οὐκ ἄλλο τι θήσομεν τοῦ a , 3 Ν / 37 σκοπείσθαι πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὦν. ΘΈΑΙ. Οὕτως. a 5, > / / / e 20. “Ὃ apa ἐπίσταται, σκοπούμενος φαίνεται ὡς 3 > LN ε , a » Ν ».ν ἡ ουκ εἰδως, ον ὡμολογήκαμεν ἀπαντα ἀριθμὸν εἰδέναι. 3 / 4 Ἁ 7 » ls akovels yap Tov Tas ToLavTas ἀμφισβητήσεις. OEAI. Ἔγωγε. 3 A € a 3 ’ὔ ΄-“ aA 202. Οὐκοῦν ἡμεῖς ἀπεικάζοντες τῇ τῶν περιστε- 4. ἢ αὐτὸς πρὸς αὑτὸν αὐτά] This is the reading of the MSS. with the exception of Vat. A, which omits αὐτά ; the reading ἐντός 18 a conjecture of Corna- rius. The common reading is defensible. If αὐτά is omitted, the antithesis is imperfect ; and if grammatical symmetry were desired, it could be restored by substituting αὐτό for αὐτά. But there is no real flaw, for τι is cognate accusative, and ἀριθμοῖ m=castupasum. The second accusative in the plural, of the things which constitutethe sum, is therefore perfectly admis- sible; and it is also pointed, re- ferring to αὐτὰ πέντε καὶ ἑπτά in supr. τοῦ Α. ‘Might he not cast up a sum, either of abstract numbers in his head, or of things about him that happen to be numerable ?’ As in the Parmenides, where unity is provisionally negatived, so here, where it has not been fully reached, the objects of Knowledge (or rather Know- ledges themselves) appear in loose bundles which fiy as we approach them. 9. πόσος τις ἀριθμὸς τυγχάνει ὦν] ‘What such-and-such a sum amounts to.’ (ἀριθμητική here seems to include λογιστική.) 11. The question here is not of error, but of inquiry. The pursuit of knowledge implies ignorance even where the pro- cess 15 correct. 13. ἀκούεις... ἀμφισβητήσεις] Cp. supr. 158 B and esp. Meno, 80 DE: Kai τίνα τρόπον ζητή-- σεις, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοῦτο, ὃ μὴ οἷ- σθα τὸ παράπαν 6 τι ἔστι; . . Sa. μανθάνω οἷον βούλει λέγειν, ὦ Μένων. ὁρᾷς τοῦτον ὡς ἐριστι- κὸν λόγον κατάγεις - ὡς οὐκ ἄρα, Kitt wm Io ledge of every num- ber in his mind. Yet in cal- culating he searches for what he knows, put- ting his hand as it were into the cage. 202 ITAATONOZ aA 7 Q 7 3 A σ VS) e ’ pov κτήσει τε καὶ θηρᾳ ἐροῦμεν, ὅτι διττὴ HY ἡ θήρα, Pp. 19 ς ΑΥ̓͂ an an Qn \ ἡ μὲν πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι τοῦ κεκτῆσθαι ἕνεκα: ἡ δὲ κε- tA a ty B las \ » 3 an QM ἃ aX κτημένῳ τοῦ λαβεῖν καὶ ἔχειν EV ταῖς χερσὶν ἃ πάλαι ᾿ς oa \ @ ᾽ n > an ἐκέκτητο. οὕτω δε καὶ ὧν πάλαι ἐπιστῆμαι ἦσαν αὐτῷ / ee / 9 / 4 » ig 5 μαθόντι Kal ἠπίστατο αὐτὰ, πάλιν ἐστι καταμανθάνειν A A / x t 4 7 ταὐτὰ ταῦτα ἀναλαμβάνοντα THY ἐπιστήμην ἑκάστου 7 aA / \ 7 / καὶ ἴσχοντα, ἣν ἐκέκτητο μὲν πάλαι, πρόχειρον δ᾽ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ ; OEAT. ᾿Αληθῆ. “ν᾿ \ 7 9 , ce A “ ’ 10 2Q. Τοῦτο δὴ ἄρτι ἡρώτων, ὅπως χρὴ τοῖς ὀνο- E / / a 7 / μασι χρώμενον λέγειν περὶ αὐτῶν, ὅταν ἀριθμήσων Yj « Ν 7 / / ἴῃ ὃ ἀριθμητικὸς ἢ TL ἀναγνωσόμενος ὁ γραμματικὸς, ε 5 / y ’ a J 4 ¢ yay ὡς ἐπιστάμενος APA EV τῷ TOLOVT@ πάλιν EPYETAaL μα- / id ov By / Onoopevos Tap ἑαυτοῦ ἃ ἐπίσταται: yf 5 / 13 OEAI. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἄτοπον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ἃ a Ν ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἃ οὐκ ἐπίσταται φῶμεν αὐτὸν ἀναγνώ- ἐν > 7 / » a ᾽ὔ σεσθαι καὶ ἀριθμήσειν, δεδωκότες αὐτῷ πάντα μὲν ’ a Xe ὡς 3 / γράμματα, πάντα δὲ ἀριθμον ἐπίστασθαι ; ΘΈΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ καὶ τοῦτ᾽ ἄλογον. p.1 / 3 -. χὰ ἴω \ ᾽ὔ Weshal 20 ΣΏ,. Βούλει οὖν λέγωμεν ὅτι τῶν μὲν ὀνομάτων say then δια τ ως 7 Ψ , “ M4 δ that it is οὐδὲν ἡμῖν μέλει, ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἐλκων TO ἐπίστασθαι μὰ 1. ἦν] The past tense im- plies ‘We have found it to bes...) Supe A. 2. πρὶν ἐκτῆσθαι] So the MSS. And it is unsafe to change to κεκτῆσθαι, as such variations may have depended on some law of euphony. Cp. Sophocl. O. C. 5: Σμικρὸν μὲν ἐξαιτοῦντα, τοῦ μικροῦ δ᾽ ἔτι, K.T.A, 7. πρόχειρον] As we say, ‘at his fingers’ ends,’ 10. Τοῦτο] Accusative in apposition with the action of the verb, as ταῦτα is very fre- quently used. ‘This was my drift in asking,’ ete. Cp. Rep. ἃ. 5}, Be 20. ὅτι, κιτιλ.] The question asked above, 198 A, was τὸ... θηρεύειν, K.T.A., τίνων δεῖται dvo- μάτων. But the illustration has thrown so clear a light upon the subject that in giving our answer we may dispense with nominal definitions, 21. ὅπῃ τις χαίρει ἕλκων] ‘Whatever confusion may he wilfully made with the verbs to learn and to know,’ i.e. in the ἀμφισβητήσεις above referred to, that a man cannot learn ean pee Ψ = ἔχου Ἷ < n + / Ρ ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 203 N 3 \ \ e ? oe x 199 Kat pavOavev, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ὡρισάμεθα ἕτερον μεν τι τὸ td 7. \ > ’ od \ \ 77 A , κεκτῆσθαι τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἕτερον δὲ τὸ ἔχειν, ὃ μέν v4 Χ A » 7 ͵ 5: τίς KEKTNTAL μὴ κεκτῆσθαι ἀδυνατόν φαμεν εἶναι, ὥστε οὐδέποτε συμβαίνει ὅ τις οἶδε μὴ εἰδέναι, ψευδῆ (2 Og. el 9 5 Q » σι r ὌΠ A \ μέντοι ὁξαν οἰον T εἰναὶ περί αὐτοῦ λαβεῖν ; μὴ yap 322) Ἂν 3. J 7] π΄’ 3 δ δ΄ og 3 > EXELY THY ἐπιστήμην TOVTOV οἱον τε, ἀλλ ετέραν ἀντ » ’ Ψ 7 \ S29 5 iy ae) iA ἐκείνης, ὁταν θηρεύων τινὰ ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμην δια- what he knows nor what he does not know. For the lan- guage cp. Soph. 259 C: Χαίρει τότε μὲν ἐπὶ θάτερα τότε δ᾽ ἐπὶ θάτερα τοὺς λόγους ἕλκων. 4. ὥστε οὐδέποτε] ‘So that ἴῃ no case does it come to pass that a man is ignorant of what he knows, but still he may get hold of a wrong notion in re- gard to it; for he may not have in hand the knowledge of the particular thing in ques- tion, but another instead, when in hunting up some particular knowledge from his stock (rod ὃ κέκτηται) he gets hold of the wrong one by mistake as they flit across him: that is to say, when he thought eleven to be twelve, he got hold of the knowledge of eleven instead of that of twelve,—in other words, the rock-pigeon that was caged within him instead of the dove.’ 5: μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν] These words are put emphatically forward in antithesis to μὴ κεκτῆσθαι. When hunting for some parti- cular knowledge amongst what he possesses and knows, he catches one for another as they fly about: e.g. the arithmeti- cian makes a mistake in regard to number when he seeks in the flock of numbers for that which=7 +5, and takes hold of 11 instead of r2. The germ of the present me- taphor appears in the Euthyde- mus, 290 C, 291 B: Θηρευτικοὶ yap εἰσι καὶ οὗτοι (oi λογιστικοῖ) κιτιλ, αὐτοὶ yap (οἱ στρατηγοὶ) οὐκ ἐπίστανται χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἃ ἐθή- ρευσαν, ὥσπερ, οἶμαι, οἱ ὀρτυγοθῆ- pat τοῖς ὀρτυγοτρόφοις παραδιδόα- σιν... ἀλλ᾽ ἦμεν πάνυ γελοῖοι, ὥσπερ τὰ παιδία τὰ τοὺς κορύδους διώκοντα, ἀεὶ φόμεθα ἑκάστην τῶν ἐπιστημῶν αὐτίκα λήψεσθαι αἱ δ᾽ ἀεὶ ὑπεξέφυγον. Compare also Arist, Met. 1. 5. 1009 Ὁ: Τὸ γὰρ Ta πετόμενα διώκειν τὸ ζητεῖν ἂν εἴη τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 7. ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ] The difficulty of the sentence lies in these words. They probably refer to ὃ κέκτη- ται... ὁ οἶδε above. For it is dif- ficult to imagine that dw αὐτοῦ and περὶ αὐτοῦ above do not re- fer to the same thing. If this be so, the meaning is, that he makes a mistake concerning some general subject, e.g. con- cerning number in general, when he takes one particular thing contained in it for an- other. τούτου therefore has a narrower reference, and means, ‘of this particular thing,’ viz. which he is in search of. For a similar use of τούτου, without anything to which it immedi- ately refers, ep. supr. 180A: Κἂν τούτου ζητῇς λόγον λαβεῖν, τί εἴ- ρηκε. Infr. 202 C: Τὸν μὴ δυνά- μενον δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον σι impossible for him not to know what he knows, i.e. not to possess what he possesses, but yet he may mis- take one thing that he knows for another that he knows, when, fail- ing in this after- search, he takes the wrong knowledge in hand. 5 10 204 7 3 Cas OR e \ ? Ψ ΕΣ πετομένων ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν AaByn,— ὅτε apa ν».1 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ NG / > / 3 XN fas “ > / τὰ ἕνδεκα OWOEKA @NON εἶναι, THY TOV ἕνδεκα ETLOTN- > \ a a ὃ SOE λ β / ὴν > ε n - μὴν ἀντι TNS τῶν OWOEKA Λλαβῶν, τὴν EV EAUT@ OLOV / a array ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔχει γὰρ οὖν λόγον. ΣΏ. Ὅταν δέ γε ἣν ἐπιχειρεῖ λαβεῖν λάβῃ, ἀψευ- va AN \ 9 ΄ / ἈΝ “ ἢ ἀξίου δεῖν τε καὶ τὰ ὄντα δοξαζειν τοτε, καὶ οὕτω δὴ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ δόξαν, καὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν ο » / 2Q\ > \ / 3) S ἐδυσχεραίνομεν οὐδὲν ἐμποδὼν γίγνεσθαι; ἴσως οὖν x qn μοι συμφήσεις. ἢ πῶς ποιήσεις ; OEAI. Οὕτως. Ν a \ Cer SS ἐς \ / YQ. Kai yap τοῦ μὲν ἃ ἐπίστανται μὴ ἐπίστασθαι ἀπηλλάγμεθα: ἃ γὰρ κεκτήμεθα μὴ κεκτῆσθαι οὐ- ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι περὶ τούτου (SC. οὗ ἂν μὴ δύνηται, κιτ.λ.). διαπετο- μένων iS genitive absolute, in partial construction with ἑτέραν. The words ἀπ᾽ αὐτοῦ have been questioned by many critics. Ast’s τῶν ἀφ᾽ αὑτοῦ is the most plausible of the conjectural emendations. I, ὅτε dpa... φήθη civat,... λαβών] We pass from ὅταν to ὅτε ἄρα, because reference is now made to the case actually in question, The participle λαβών is epexegetic to the verb understood in what precedes. ‘He has hold of something else: that is (in the case above adduced) taking the knowledge of eleven for that of twelve,’ As if ἔχειν... οἷόν re were τάχ᾽ ἂν ἔχοι. The change to the nominative is partly occasioned by ὅταν λάβῃ coming in between. dpa=‘ as in our illustration,’ For a similar epexegesis ep. Legg. 3. 690 E: ᾿Αγνοήσαντες τὸν «Ησίοδον ὀρθότατα λέγοντα ws τὸ ἥμισυ τοῦ παντὸς πολλάκις ἐστι πλέον' ὁπόταν 7 τὸ μὲν ὅλον λαμ- βάνειν ζημιῶδες, τὸ δ᾽ ἥμισυ μέ- τριον, τότε τὸ μέτριον τοῦ ἀμέτρου πλέον ἡγήσατο, ἄμεινον ὃν χεί- βονος, 6. ἀψευδεῖν] In construction with φαμέν, supr. 12. Καὶ γὰρ τοῦ μὲν... μέντοι] ‘For indeed we have got rid of the trouble of men not knowing what they know ..: notwith- standing there is a still worse danger which now looks in upon us.’ ἐπίστανται] So the Bodleian with all the other MSS. except pr. Ven. 0. This is hardly suf- ficient authority for the change ἰο ἐπίσταται. The transition from singular to plural is not more remarkable than that from the 3rd person to the rst in κεκτή- μεθα, infr. It may be accounted for by the fact that Socrates is speaking generally, and no longer with reference to the individual case supposed above. Compare especially Rep. 7. 537 H and v. rr. SEAITHTOS. 205 ὌΝ ΝΆ [4 + κι A 5, / 199. δαμοῦ ἔτι συμβαίνει, οὔτε ψευσθεῖσί τινος οὔτε μή. / / 3 δεινότερον μέντοι πάθος ἄλλο παραφαίνεσθαί μοι δοκεῖ, ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον ; 2Q. Εἰ ἡ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μεταλλαγὴ ψευδὴς ye- : σι But, if it is Knowledge that he has in hand, how can he mistake it? νήσεταί ποτε δόξα. ΘΕΑΙ. Πώς δή: an A ’ yf 3 4 lal pd 2Q. Πρῶτον μὲν τό τινος ἔχοντα ἐπιστήμην τοῦτο How can ΠΑ 39 a 3 ΄, » νι Gide 8 Ἃ 3 Knowledge αὐτὸ AYVOELY, μὴ ἀγνωμοσυνῃ ἀλλὰ TH εαυτοῦ ἐπι- po thence i 2) oa 3 a le \ se, casion of στημῃ" ἐπειτὰ ETEpov αὖ τοῦτο δοξάζειν, τὸ δ᾽ ἕτερον το “I” “ a“ ᾽ \ 3 / 5 le τοῦτο, πὼς ov πολλῃ ἀλογία, ἐπιστήμης παραγενο- ’ὔ “A \ ‘ XN 14 > a \ Mens yvover μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν μηδέν, ἀγνοῆσαι δὲ ἊΨ 3 \ te a / 7 3 A Q πάντα ; ἐκ γὰρ τούτου τοῦ λόγου κωλύει οὐδὲν Kal yf - A / ΄ \ / ayvolay παραγενομένην γνῶναί τι ποιῆσαι καὶ τυφλό- “ 7 Ἂς 3 / » es ! ’ τητα ἰδεῖν, εἴπερ καὶ ἐπιστήμη ἀγνοῆσαί ποτέ τινα ι: / ποιήσει. 47 ᾽ s » 3 ~ \ GEAI. ᾿Ισως yap, ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ καλῶς τὰς Perhaps ” > 7 ’ , , , y \ there were opvilas ἐτίθεμεν ἐπιστήμας μόνον τιθέντες, ἔδει δὲ ignorances flyin : ,ὔ ,ὕ π ,ὕ ying Kal ἀνεπιστημοσύνας τιθέναι ὁμοῦ συνδιαπετομέναρξρ — ahont amongst 3 “ ΄“- Ν Ν θ 7 3 A 3 7 εν ΤΊ) ψυχῇ. Και TOV 1) PEVOVTA TOTE μεν ETLO TH μην 2. παραφαίνεσθαι] As it were, ‘looking in at the window.’ The reading παρεμφαίνεσθαι (Ven. 2 etc.) deserves mention. 5. Εἰ... γενήσεταιϊ͵ εἰ with the fut. ind., as usual after δει- νόν, expresses alarm or indig- nation, ‘to think of such a possibility !’ 8. τό τινος] These words de- pend immediately on δεινότερον, in common with εἰ ἡ τῶν... δόξα: but πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία also has reference to them. 9. ἀγνωμοσύνῃ! Used here in its most literal 56:86, Ξε τῷ μὴ γιγνώσκειν, ‘from being un- acquainted.’ τῇ ἑαυτοῦ ἐπιστήμῃ] Viz. which he possesses, ὅ τι δὴ ἔχει τε καὶ κέκτηται, referring to ἔχοντα. II. πῶς οὐ πολλὴ ἀλογία] The clause which follows this is a more particular statement or explanation of that which pre- cedes. Compare the structure οὗ Rep. 4. 445 B: Τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττο- ’ A 7 \ μένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης βιωτὸν ἄρα ἔσται, ἐάν πέρ τις ποιῇ ὃ ἂν βουληθῇ ἄλλο πλὴν τοῦτο ὁπόθεν , δὶ 4 > , 3 Ud κακίας μὲν καὶ ἀδικίας ἀπαλλαγή- σεται, Κιτιὰ., Supr. 144 A. > ie 10. ἀνεπιστημοσύνας] Cp. the Charmides, 166 E, ete. 20 the know- 206 ITAATONOZ 4 \ a , a 3 a 4 Ἰοᾶβοα, and ME Seree TOTE O AVETLOT) OTUs ae a Θ fias taken one δ... μὲν δοξάζειν τῇ ἀνεπιστημοσύνῃ, ἀληθῆ δὲ τῇ of them. ἐπιστήμῃ. ΣΩ. Ov ῥᾷδιόν γε, ὦ Θεαίτητε, μὴ ΕΟ σε. 5. ὃ μέντοι εἶπες, πάλιν ἐπίσκεψαι. ἔστω μὲν γὰρ ὡς λέγεις: ὁ δὲ δὴ τὴν ἀνεπιστημοσύνην λαβὼν ψευδῆ P. 2: μέν, φῇς, δοξάσει. ἢ yap; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί, ΣΏ. Οὐ dn που καὶ ἡγήσεταί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζειν. ιο OEAT. Πῶς yap; ΣΏ. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ἀληθῆ γε, καὶ ὡς εἰδὼς διακείσεται περὶ ὧν ἔψευσται. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; ' ΣΏ. ᾿Ἐπιστήμην apa οἰήσεται τεθηρευκὼς ἔχειν, 15 ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην. OEAI. Δῆλον. . 3 ΩΝ Χ But if he ΣΏ. Οὐκοῦν μακρὰν περιελθόντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὴν has the ig- norance in / / 7 ΝΥ Ν a porence πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν. ὃ yap EAEYKTLKOS ἐκεῖνος hand, how ° ΄ὔ / ἢ 5 3 ΄ can he mis γελάσας φήσει: Ἰίοτερον, ὦ βέλτιστοι, ἀμφοτέρας 5 take it for ᾿ ἃ , , ἃ : knowledge? 20 Tes ELOWS, ἐπιστήμην TE καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσύνην, ἣν After mak- a τοῦ ass 9 , 5 © 5 Ἢ ing a long οἶδεν, ἑτέραν αὐτὴν οἴεταί τινα εἶναι ὧν οἶδεν ; ἢ οὐ- circuit, we , μενοι eg a OS , He Ὁ are again δετέραν αὐτοῖν εἰδώς, ἣν μὴ οἶδε, δοξάζει ἑτέραν ὧν at fault. ᾽ 3 x \ \ 207 \ «ΩΝ 53. Ὰ SN Unless we Οὐκ οἶδεν ; ἢ τὴν μὲν εἰδώς, THY δ᾽ OU, ἣν οἶδεν, HY μὴ have re- 5 Ais κ᾿ 5 A 5 ε a xX / 3 course to οἶδεν ; ἢ ἣν μὴ οἶδεν, ἣν οἶδεν ἡγεῖται ; ἢ πάλιν αὖ again confronted with the same difficulty which encountered us at first.”. Cp, Phil. 13 C: Md- 4. Οὐ ῥάδιόν ye, x... | Socrates is again charmed by the dialec- tical readiness of Thestetus, and yet is compelled to refuse λιν εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν φερόμεθα λόγον, his suggestion, Cp. supr.184 ὦ Πρώταρχε. C, infr. 204 Τὰ: ᾿Ανδρικῶς γε, 18. ὁ. ἐλεγκτικὸς ἐκεῖνος] κιιλ, Phedo, 62 E: Ἡσθῆνας Supr. 165, 195 C, 197 A. τέ μοι ἔδοξε τῇ τοῦ Κέβητος mpay- ματείᾳ, K.T.A, 17. ἐπὶ τὴν πρώτην πάρεσμεν ἀπορίαν͵] ‘We find ourselves 20. ἣν οἶδεν, κιτιλ.} Supr. 188 B, 192. δίας αὐτῶι Most MSS. have αὐτήν, from. the preceding line, 200. D SOEAITHTOS. 207 3 lant 14 A ϑ an Q 3 an μοι ἐρεῖτε OTL τῶν ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἀνεπιστημοσυνῶν > “ ἃ ¢e , 3 εχ) ἃς ὅς εἰσὶν αὖ ἐπιστῆμαι, ἃς ὁ κεκτημένος ἐν ετέροις τισὶ na Δ , γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν ἢ κηρίνοις πλάσμασι καθείρ- aS XN a Bian ἢ eS ΓΝ \ c Eas, ews TEP ἂν κέκτηται, ἐπίσταται, καὶ ἐὰν μὴ προ- » yf 3 a a Q Co δὴ 3 VA χείρους ἐχῃ ev TH ψυχῇ ; καὶ οὕτω δὴ ἀναγκασθή- Ψ \ σεσθε εἰς ταὐτὸν περιτρέχειν μυριάκις οὐδὲν πλέον ἴω Ν an ἊΣ 7 ποιοῦντες ; Τί πρὸς ταῦτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ἀποκρινού- μεθα: “» ΕΣ ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλὰ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἔγωγε οὐκ 3, 7 \ / ἔχω TL χρὴ λέγειν. ic) 3 A 53 an a 7 ΣΩ. ᾿Αρ᾽ οὖν ἡμῖν, ὦ παῖ, καλῶς ὁ λόγος ἐπι- © “ a / πλήττει, καὶ ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι οὐκ ὀρθῶς ψευδῆ δόξαν ᾽ὔ ἮΝ , 3 7, ’ , Ν προτέραν ζητοῦμεν ἐπιστήμης, εκειν ν ἀφέντες ; ΤΟ 3 Ay 3 / a Q y 3 7 δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἀδύνατον γνῶναι, πριν av τις ἐπιστημην a ? / / ἱκανῶς λάβῃ τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν. OEAI. ᾿Ανάγκη, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὡς 4 “ λέγεις ote bau. 20. Τί οὖν τις ἐρεῖ πάλιν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐπιστήμην ; 3 ’ a ’, 4 οὐ γὰρ που ἀπεροῦμέν γέ πω. 3. γελοίοις περιστερεῶσιν] It would be rash to infer from this ridicule that the image is not Plato’s own. Is Socrates never made to accuse himself of ab- surdity? Rep. 1.354 A: Οὐ μέν- τοι καλῶς ye εἱστίαμαι δι’ ἐμαυτὸν ἀλλ᾽ οὐ διὰ σέ. Prot. 340°E: Εἰμί τις γελοῖος ἰατρός. He is here speaking dramatically in the person of the ἐριστικὸς avnp, who is bent on exposing their weak points. Cp. supr. 162 D, 166 A. 5. kat οὕτω δή, κιτιλ.] Op. esp. Charm. 167 foll., and, for the ‘ad infinitum’ argument, Parm. 132 E foll. 11. ὁ λόγος] Hither this par- ticular argument, or rather the discussion generally, in the form of an imaginary disputant. Supr. 195 D. 13. ἐκείνην] ψευδὴς δόξα is the subject immediately in hand, hence ἐκείνη stands for ἐπιστήμη as the more remote. τὸ δέ] Se. ψευδὴς δόξα τί ποτ᾽ ἐστίν. 15. ἱκανῶς λάβῃ] Supr. 145 E. Ig. mov is the reading of Ven. Π., and is probably right. (Cett. πω.) Schanz reads οὔ ye mo ἀπεροῦμεν. This is partly confirmed by the scribe of the Bodl. MS. having begun to punctuate after ἀπεροῦμεν, and in then adding γέ πω, having forgotten to accentuate the last syllable of ἀπεροῦμεν. Io Ἂς the image of another cage or waxen block, con- taining the Know- ledges of the know- ledges and ignorances, and go on thus to infinity, ‘in wandering mazes lost.’ The truth is, we have no right to be search- ing for false opinion un- til we have found Know- ledge. And, though we can attempt nothing © better than our last an- swer, per- haps if we return and examine it, the object of our search may show itself. 208 TTAATOQNO2 ΘΕΑΙ. ἭΚκιστα, ἐάνπερ μὴ σύ ye ἀπαγορεύσῃς. P- » / 4, x aN , 3 / σ > >Q. Λέγε δη, Ti ἂν αὐτὸ μάλιστα εἰπόντες NKLOT x e a > na 5) n ἂν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς ἐναντιωθεῖμεν ; oy > a 3 VA > “~ GEAI. Ὅπερ ἐπεχειροῦμεν, ὦ LoKpares, EV THE 5 πρόσθεν: ov yap ἔχω ἔγωγε ἄλλο οὐδέν. Io >Q. To ποιὸν: ΘΕΑΙ. Τὴν ἀληθὴ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι. ava- μάρτητόν γέ πού ἐστι τὸ δοξάζειν ἀληθῆ, καὶ τὰ ὑπ᾽ 3 ἴω / ‘A \ ee) ‘ , αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ γιγνεται. ΣΩ. Ὁ τὸν ποταμὸν καθηγούμενος, ὦ Θεαίτητε, yf +S / wa, ἊΝ a dA 77 3 a epn Apa δείξειν αὐτο" Καιίιτουτο EAY LOVTES ερευνῶμεν, LIT Aa 3 , ΘΝ , δ / τάχ ἂν ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον αὑτὸ φήνειε TO ζητούμε- Ρ. νον, μένουσι δὴ δῆλον οὐδέν. I. ἀπαγορεύσῃς] So T pr. Vat. Coisl. Zitt. The Bodl. has dmrayopevns With an _ erasure. Schanz reads ἀπαγορεύῃς. The usual aorist form is ἀπείπῃς. 8. καὶ τὰ ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενα πάντα] True opinion guides to right action, but it is a blind guide. See esp. Rep. 6. 506 C: Οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστήμης δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραΐί, κιτιλ. 10. Ὁ τὸν ποταμόν] ‘The man who had to show where the river was fordable is reported (dpa) to have said, Go on, and you will find.” For the expressions αὐτὸ δείξει, τάχ᾽ ἂν αὐτὸ φήνειε cp. Phileb. 20C: Προιὸν δ᾽ ἔτι σαφέστερον δείξει. Protag. 324 A: Αὐτό σε διδάξει. Cratyl. 402 C: Τοῦτό γε ὀλίγου αὐτὸ λέγει ὅτι πηγῆς ὄνομα ἐπικε- κρυμμένον ἐστί, Hipp. Maj. 288 B: Ei δ᾽ ἐπιχειρήσας ἔσται κατα- γέλαστος, αὐτὸ δείξει. The Scho- liast says: Δείξειν αὐτός. ἐπὶ τῶν ἐκ πείρας γιγνωσκομένων. κα- τιόντων γάρ τινων εἰς ποταμὸν πρὸς τὸ διαπερᾶσαι ἤρετό τις τὸν προηγούμενον εἰ βάθος ἔχει τὸ ὕδωρ. ὁ δὲ ἔφη, αὐτὸ δείξει. The explanation is probable, though the authority is uncer- tain. See above, πλείω del ἐπιρρέ- ovra.. τὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς λόγον ; and cp. Rep. 5. 453 D: Edy τὲ tus eis κολυμβήθραν μικρὰν ἐμπέσῃ ἐάν τε εἰς τὸ μέγιστον πέλαγος μέσον, ὅμως γε νεῖ οὐδὲν ἧττον. 12. τάχ᾽ ἂν. «ζητούμενον Hither (1) (Heindorf), ‘Perhaps by giving us trouble, it may of itself bring to light that of which we are in search, or (2) ‘Perhaps the very thing we are in search of may come in our way and show itself,’ or (3) taking ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον with τοῦτο and αὐτὸ φήνειε τὸ ζητούμενον aS ἃ New sentence. ‘If we proceed with this inquiry, perhaps, through its giving us trouble,—the very object of our search may show itself.’ In (2) ἐμπόδιον is used with a forcing of the derivation, like πρόχειρον supr., ‘amongst . 201, OEAITHTOS. 209 OEAI. Ὀρθῶς λέγεις: ἀλλ᾽ ἰωμέν γε καὶ σκο- πώμεν. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε βραχείας σκέψεως: τέχνη ο 5 5 25.7 yap σοι ὅλη σημαίνει μὴ εἶναι ἐπιστήμην αὐτό. ΘΕΑΙ. Ids δή ; καὶ τίς αὕτη ; 20. Ἡ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν, ovs δὴ καλοῦσι e if lA φ ’ὔ ὯΝ al ῥήτοράς τε καὶ δικανικούς, οὗτοι γὰρ που τῇ ἑαυτῶν τέχνῃ πείθουσιν οὐ διδάσκοντες, ἀλλὰ δοξάζειν ποι- a A ἃ / x‘ \ o / od ουντες ἃ av βούλωνται. ἢ σὺ οἴει δεινούς τινας οὕτω , 5 σ - Χ , 7 Β διδασκάλους εἰγαί, ὥστε οἱς μὴ παρεγένοντο τινες" 3 ’ 7 57 y VA ἀποστερουμένοις χρηματὰα ἢ TL ἄλλο βιαζομένοις, τούτοις δύνασθαι πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρὸν διδάξαι ἱκανῶς aA VA Ἂς 3 [4 τῶν γενομένων τὴν ἀλήθειαν ; our feet.’ Both in (2) and (3) the idiomatic use of δείκνυμι is extended to φαίνω. ἐμπόδιον γενόμενον ‘Coming in our way,’ ice. giving us trouble. Those fording the river were feeling the bottom with their fee¢. Compare the way in which justice ‘turns up’ in the Republic, 4. 4 32D: Πάλαι, ὦ μακάριε, φαίνεται πρὸ ποδῶν ἡμῖν κυλινδούμενον. Prof. Jowett translates, ‘We may stumble upon the thing which we are looking for.’ 3. βραχείας σκέψεω:)] Se, εὑρεῖν. Cp, Rep. 3. 414 OC: πεῖ- σαι δὲ συχνῆς πειθοῦς. 4. αὐτό] Se. τὸ εἰρημένον, 1.6. δόξα ἀληθής. 6. Ἢ τῶν μεγίστων εἰς σοφίαν] The irony is almost as transpa- rent as in Polit. 266 C: Τένει ~ “ li τῷ τῶν ὄντων γενναιοτάτῳ καὶ ἅμα εὐχερεστάτῳ. Cp. Pheedr. 2600 8qq., Gorg. 462 CO, 8110. με- γίστων is masc. antec. to οὕς. (7 om. Bodl.) In what follows the Bodleian MS. gives τούτοις with Vat. A. Ven. 0. This is better than τούτους, which can be defended only by supposing the plaintiff to plead his own cause. Trans. ‘Or do you suppose there are such clever teachers in the world, as to be able to convey to others the reality of what happened to men, of whose be- ing robbed or otherwise as- saulted the hearers were not eyewitnesses ?’ Schanz reads, from Naber’s conjecture, εἰ μὴ « . TOUTOUS ... 12. πρὸς ὕδωρ σμικρόν] κατεπεί- yet γὰρ ὕδωρ ῥέον. Supr.172 D, The ῥήτωρ professed to instruct the court. Cp. Hyperid. Euxen. 25: Τοὺς δικαστὰς ὑπὲρ τοῦ πράγ- ματος τὰ δίκαια διδάξαι. Failing to conceive of false opinion, we return to examine the theory of Knowledge which identifies it with true opinion, We have not to search far; for in the familiar case of Judicial evidence, a true opinion may be A brief ex- amination is sufficient here. The rhetoric of the law-courts proves that true opin- ion is not knowledge. For in cases where the evidence of the senses is alone sufficient, the court may be brought to give a true ver- dict. The judges, then, in such a case have true opinion without knowledge. σι Io 210 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμῶς ἔγωγε οἶμαι, ἀλλὰ πεῖσαι μέν. Pp. 50, TIAATQNOZ SQ. Td πεῖσαι δ᾽ οὐχὶ δοξάσαι λέγεις ποιῆσαι: Xx n 3 ΘΕΑΙ. Ti μήν ; SQ. Οὐκοῦν ὅταν δικαίως πεισθῶσι δικασταὶ Ὁ ΄ yy / 5, \ ’ περὶ ὧν ἰδόντι μόνον ἔστιν εἰδέναι, ἄλλως δὲ μη; “ “ “ / ταῦτα τότε ἐξ ἀκοῆς κρίνοντες, ἀληθὴ δόξαν λαβον- ¢ yy > / yay > ba θέ By, TES, QVEV ETT LOTH RNS εκρινᾶν, οοὔα TELOUEVTES, €L7TEP > 3 , εὖ ἐδίκασαν § ΘΕΑΙ. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ΣΩ. Οὐκ ἄν, ὦ φίλε, εἴ γε ταὐτὸν ἦν δόξα τε ἀληθὴς καὶ δικαστήριατ καὶ ἐπιστήμη, ὀρθά ποτ᾽ ἂν formed by the judges without the possibility of knowledge ; since in questions of fact no- thing short of personal obser- vation ensures certainty. The definition ‘ Knowledge is true opinion, is therefore inade- quate. And the example given is calculated to suggest the next definition—Odéa ἀληθὴς μετὰ λόγου. The question returns, Are the above conceptions and images Plato’s own, or is he repeating in them some contemporary theories? The comparison of other dialogues and the close examination of the passage it- self tend to the conclusion that although they may have been suggested to him from without, they may be fairly regarded as his own creation. See especially the passage in Phil. 44 C foll., in which, after certain men have been brought forward as ‘soothsayers’ or ‘ allies,’ there follows the analysis of the plea- sure derived from Comedy, which is one of the most origi- nal and ‘modern’ passages in Plato. The image of the ‘im- pressions’ on the wax has not only been revived in specula- tion, but perpetuated in com- mon language. And that of the aviary has probably been less fortunate only from its greater boldness and subtlety. 1. πεῖσαι μέν] The implied antithesis is διδάξαι δ᾽ οὔ. Cp. Rep. 5. 475 ἘΠ: Οὐδαμῶς, εἶπον, ἀλλ᾽ ὁμοίους μὲν φιλοσόφοις. Τοὺς δ᾽ ἀληθινούς, ἔφη, τίνας λέγεις ; Soph. 240 Β: Οὐδαμῶς ἀληθι- νὄν γε, ἀλλ᾽ ἐοικὸς μέν. : 11. tkat δικαστήρια" | Several MSS. read δικαστήριον, ‘These words were rejected by the older critics, except Buttmann, who conjectured καὶ δικαστική, very aptly for the sense, if the word can be made to signify ‘worthy of a good judge.’ See the words εἴπερ εὖ ἐδίκασαν. . ὀρθά mor ἂν δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδό- ἕαζεν. It is in Plato’s manner thus ostensibly to restrict him- self to the case in point. Cp. 152 Ο: Ἔν re θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοι. 204 D: Ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστιν, Possibly (1) καὶ δικαστοῦ ἀξία may be the true reading, Op. » “Ὑ Ἐ Peay eee | | al ! ΘΕΑΙΤΗΤΟΣ. 211 Ἂ 5᾽ δι ἢ 2, 3 , a δὲ 3201, δικαστὴς ἄκρος ἐδοξαζεν ἄνευ ἐπιστημὴς" νῦν δε : » y κατ 3 εοίκεν ἄλλο τι ἑκάτερον εἶναι. OEAI. "O ye ἐγώ, ὦ Σώκρατες, εἰπόντος Tov Apol. 18 A: Δικαστοῦ yap avrn ἀρετή. And see Phileb. 1 3C, where the Bodl. has πειρόμεθα for πειρασόμεθα. Ib, 36 E, where παραφρυσύναις in the same MS. is a correction for πάσαις ἀφροσύ- vats, which the first hand wrote. Or (2) κατὰ δικαστήρια, a con- jecture adopted by Prof. Jowett (or κατὰ Oukaornpiov)—‘ in the judicial sphere,’ cp. supr. 1 53 : Kara τὰ ὄμματα πρῶτον (“ In the sphere of vision’), Tim. 19 C: Κατὰ τε ras ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις πράξεις καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ’ \ δι “ἢ a διερμηνεύσεις πρὸς ekagtas τῶν πόλεων, The mode of expression in this case approaches still more nearly to that of infr. 204 {ΕΠ 152 0,—the passages quoted above. But (3) it is after all conceivable that δικαστηρία may be the feminine of an adjec- tive not found elsewhere, ex- cept in the neuter substantive δικαστήριον. (This suggestion is also made by Madvig, Adv. 1. 377, and adopted by Schanz.) Or (4) as Wohlrab suggests, καὶ δικαστήριον should be transposed to after δικαστὴς ἄκρος, ‘A good judge or court-full of judges.’ The second of the above conjec- tures (2) seems, on the whole, the most probable. To resume the argument from 195. eins the mind as a recep- tacle of impressions (or ideas), we said that to think falsely was to fail in identifying pre- sent impressions with the ideas already existing in the mind. And thus it seemed impossible to be mistaken about these ideas themselves apart from impressions from without. But in fact we do mistake in things independent of sensation. Eg. a scientific calculator, who pos- sesses the knowledge both of 11 and 12, will sometimes say that the sum of 7 and g istr. We resort therefore to a less simple conception of knowing, and to a more complex image. To know is to possess knowledge. We may possess it without having itin hand. We therefore linage to ourselves false opinion thus, We have caught, as it were (in learning), various. Species of knowledge, some gregarious, some domestic, some noble and solitary, (i.e. highly abstract), and have caged them in the mind, like birds. We try to take in hand one of these birds which we possess, and as they flutter about, we take hold of another instead of it. But then, if we have this one in hand, how can we mistake it for the other? How can Knowledge be the means of error? Perhaps (The- etetus suggests) there were ig- horances flying about amongst the knowledges, and we have taken one of them. But if T have an Ignorance in hand, how can I take it for a Know- ledge? Must we imagine an- other cage or waxen block to contain the Knowledge of the knowledges and ignorances 4 This would be endless. 3. "O ye.. ἐπελελήσμη»] .Α distinction, Socrates, which I Pe2 III. Thez- tetus now remembers to have heard that true opin- ion, unless accompa- nied with an account of its ob- ject, is not knowledge. Socrates identifies the saying thus quoted with what he himself has heard from cer- tain ‘as in a dream ;’ viz. that 5 Io Q12 NAATONOZ an 5) a \ N ἀκούσας ἐπελελήσμην, νῦν δ᾽ ἐννοῶ. ἔφη δὲ τὴν μὲν Ρ. μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲν 57 3 XN 3 ὔ x "Ὁ \ 7, 2.» , ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ETLOTHMNS* Καὶ WY μὲν My COTE Aoyos, 3 3 Ν > e \ Ke AS le ἃ δ᾽ ΕΝ οὐκ επιστήτα εἰναι, ΟὐΤ ὥῶσι Και ὀνομάζων, α EXEL, > 7 ἐπιστητα. DQ. Ἦ καλῶς λέγεις. \ \ ee XN a τὰ δὲ On ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα Q \ a ὃ , Ἶ 7 9 5᾽ Ν ay IN / ε καὶ μὴ πῇ Omper, λέγε, εἰ Apa κατὰ ταῦυτὰ σὺ T \ 3 , κἀγὼ ἀκηκοαμεν. OEAI. ᾿Αλλ᾽ οὐκ οἶδα εἰ ἐξευρήσω: λέγοντος μέν- x Cash: e 3 5 3 / ταν ETEPOV, WS εἐγῷμαι, ἀκολουθησαιμι. 5 \ \ 3 TQ. ἴΑκουε δὴ ὄναρ ἀντὶ ὀνείρατος. ἐγὼ yap av once heard expressed in a way which until this moment I had forgotten.’ I. τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δό- ξαν] Cp. Meno, 97 E, 98: Καὶ yap ai δόξαι ai ἀληθεῖς, ὅσον μὲν χρό- νον παραμένωσι, καλὸν τὸ χρῆμα, καὶ πάντα τἀγαθὰ ἐργάζονται. πολὺν δὲ χρόνον οὐκ ἐθέλουσι παραμένειν, ἀλλὰ δραπετεύουσιν ἐκ τῆς Ψυχῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὥστε οὐ πολλοῦ ἀξιαί εἰσιν, ἕως ἄν τις αὐτὰς Shon ἐπειδὰν δὲ δε- θῶσι, πρῶτον μὲν ἐπιστῆμαι γί- γνονται, ἔπειτα μόνιμοι: καὶ διὰ ταῦτα δὴ τιμιώτερον ἐπιστήμη Op- Ons δόξης ἐστί, καὶ διαφέρει δεσμῷ ἐπιστήμη ὀρθῆς δόξης. See the whole passage. Also Polit. 309 C: Τὴν... ὄντως οὖσαν ἀληθῆ δόξαν μετὰ βεβαιώσεως. Symp. 202 A: ye lod αἰτίας λογισμῷ. .. > Ed ¢ > , \ H οὐκ joOnoa ὅτι ἐστί τι μεταξὺ. , iG. ad , , aA 4 σοφίας καὶ ἀμαθίας ; τί τοῦτο ; TO > A , < of ~ ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν καὶ ἄνευ τοῦ ἔχειν λόγον δοῦναι οὐκ οἶσθ᾽, ἔφη, ὅτι we > .9 ¢ ἀπ} ay \ οὔτ᾽ ἐπίστασθαί ἐστιν ἄλογον γὰρ πρᾶγμα πῶς ἂν εἴη ἐπιστήμη ; οὔτε ἀμαθία' τὸ γὰρ τοῦ ὄντος τυγχάνον ΄ ” a , ala ‘ ’ πῶς ἂν εἴη ἀμαθία ; ἔστι δὲ δή που τοιοῦτον ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα, μεταξὺ φρο- νήσεως καὶ ἀμαθίας. Rep. 6. 506 > A \ > > , C: οὐκ ἤσθησαι τὰς ἄνευ ἐπιστη- pns δόξας, ὡς πᾶσαι αἰσχραί; ὧν αἱ βέλτισται τυφλαί" ἢ δοκοῦσί σοί τι τυφλῶν διαφέρειν ὁδὸν ὀρθῶς πορευομένων οἱ ἄνευ νοῦ ἀληθές τι δοξάζοντες 5 4. οὑτωσὶ καὶ ὀνομάζων] 1. 8. using this strange term ἐπι- στητά. Infr. τὰ δὲ δὴ ἐπιστητὰ ταῦτα. (For the participle cp. Gorg. 493 B: To ἀειδὲς δὴ λέγων, Sophocl. Phil. 64.) ἐπιστητός, like αἰσθητῆς and ποιότης, supra, 160 D, 182 A, is a novel word, and is formed on the analogy of αἰσθητός. 6. Ἦ... λέγεις] ‘Truly, that is fortunate.’ ‘A timely recol- lection, indeed !’ Gorg. 447 C. 7. εἰ ἄρα] ‘That I may know whether.’ Cp. supr. 192 C: ᾿Ἐὰν ἄρα... μάθω. εἰ ἄρα κατὰ ταὐτὰ σύ τε κἀγὼ ἀκηκόαμεν] Had they both heard from the same source? Or is Plato here, as in the beginning of the dialogue, weaving toge- ther two distinct theories? If infr. 206 Οὐ is to be construed — strictly, the latter is true. (See — Introduction.) 11, ὄναρ] Op. Phileb. 20 B: Λόγων ποτέ τινων πάλαι ἀκούσας OEAITHTOS. 213 5Ὰ7 3 [4 “ 7 Ν \ “- ε 201. ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν τινῶν ὅτι τὰ μὲν πρῶτα οἱονπερεὶ 202. E ~ 3 Ὁ ἘΠ ΠΑ , Ν 5 στοιχεῖα, ἐξ ὧν ἡμεῖς τε συγκείμεθα καὶ τάλλα, / V4 XN \ > ἊΝ oS Aoyov οὐκ ἔχοι: αὐτὸ yap Ka αὑτὸ ἕκαστον ὀνο- , / BY o \ 3.NN A Χ μασαι μονον εἴη, προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυνατὸν yn? ες BY 4 2.9) e > 32) By \ ΩΝ » / Ἃ οὔθ᾽ ὡς ἐστιν, οὐθ᾽ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν: ἤδη γὰρ ἂν οὐσίαν ἢ an la \ \ μὴ οὐσίαν αὐτῷ προστίθεσθαι, Ἐδεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν προσ- th 5) “ΟΝ » al Z 3 ca » Ν Ial\ \ φέρειν, €l7TEP QUTO EKELVYO μόνον τις εῤέι. ΕἼΤΕΙ, οὐδε TO Stax 5 Ny ἊΝ 3 a 3 x AUTO οὐδὲ TO ἐκεῖνο οὐδὲ IAN “ / οὐδὲ τοῦτο προσοιστέον, ὄναρ... νῦν ἐννοῶ... Pheed. 61 D: ᾿Αλλὰ μὴν κἀγὼ ἐξ ἀκοῆς... λέγω. It suits Plato’s humour to speak in this distant fashion of a school towards which he felt an ‘imperfect sympathy.’ What Socrates has heard care- lessly, as well as that which The- zetetus once heard but had for- gotten, is compared to a dream. I, ἐδόκουν ἀκούειν] ‘I heard in my dream.’ Ta πρῶτα oiovmepet στοιχεῖα] ‘The first rudiments, so to speak, of things. In what follows it is vain to distinguish between different senses of στοι- χεῖον. The word is here regarded by Plato as a generic term, of which the denotation of the letters of the alphabet is only the most familiar use. ‘ Every- one will acknowledge that mu- sical notes are also στοιχεῖα᾽ (206 B). In fact the unit of apprehension in every subject is the στοιχεῖον of that particular subject-matter. The word συλ- λαβή 18 similarly generalized, so that in passing from language to other things there is no change in the meaning of the word. Op. infr.202 E: Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖά τε καὶ συλλα- βάς, ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν εἰπόντα ἃ λέγομεν. Qe, »xQ\ \ / TO EKAOTOV οὐδὲ TO μόνον Va A aA οὐδ᾽ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα. For such figurative generaliza- tion, which is different from poetic metaphor, cp. esp. Legg. 7.823 B: Θήρα yap πάμπολύ τι πρᾶγμά ἐστι, κιτιλ. See some valuable remarks οἵ Prof. Jebb’s on the use of metaphor in Pindar, Journal of Hellenic Studies, 3. 1. 167. 3. αὐτὸ γὰρ... ein] ‘For that each element in its proper self- existence can only be named.’ Cp. especially Soph. 251 B: Χαίρουσιν οὐκ ἐῶντες ἀγαθὸν λέ- γειν ἄνθρωπον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἀγα- Gov ἀγαθόν, τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον ἄν-- θρωπον. 4. προσειπεῖν δὲ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δυ- νατόν] ‘ But it is impossible to go on to predicate anything of it (the element), either affirma- tively or negatively. For in so doing there is added the idea of existence or non-existence : but nothing must be added, seeing that you can only speak of the element by itself.’ 5. ἤδη γάρ] Sc. ἐὰν ἄλλο τι προσείπῃ τις. 9. οὐδὲ τοῦτο] This has given needless trouble. Heindorf ‘thought the article was re- quired as with the other words, and inserted it. Buttmann ob- jected to τοῦτο being so far se- parated from ἐκεῖνο, and ingeni- the ele- ments of all things can- not be ex- pressed in a proposi- tion, but can only be named. You can- not give them any attribute, since even such com- mon pre- dicables as ‘this’ and ‘that’ are separ- able from the things to which they are applied. As the ele- ments are combined in Nature, so defini- tion is a combina- tion of names. That which is named is 214 A \ A , a Z ταῦτα μὲν γὰρ περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι, p. 202 ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ σ ay Da gor - , - PRIS 3. ETEPA OVTA ἐκείνων οἷς προστίθεται, δεῖν δέ, εἴπερ HV Ν ἌΝ , S a a / δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι καὶ εἶχεν οἰκεῖον αὑτοῦ λόγον, “ὔ Ξ. Ε ἘΝ ,ὔ a \ Ve ©, QVEV TOV ἄλλων ATTAVT@V λέγεσθαι. νυν δε ἀδύνατον 53 e A a , e a , ΝΥ Ly 5 εἶναι ὁτιοῦν τῶν πρώτων ῥηθῆναι oy@: οὐ yap εἰναι 5 fe) 5 a AD’ x > 1¢ 6 , ἣ 5᾽ \ 7 αὐτῷ a ἢ OVOMACED UAL μόνον ονομα γὰρ μόνον v x Ἄ ὧν / yy , oA SN ἐχείν: τὰ δὲ EK τούτων ἤδη συγκείμενα, ὥσπερ αὐτὰ , “ \ Nos for Ste , πέπλεκται, OUT@ Και τὰ ονοματα αὐτῶν σ υμπλακέντα y v ’ \ \ icy Aoyov γεγονέναι: ὀνομάτων yap συμπλοκὴν εἶναι ᾽ » 7 4 \ \ \ lal A \ λόγου οὐσίαν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ μὲν στοιχειὰ ἄλογα καὶ ously conjectured οὐδὲ τὸ τό, Both objections are obviated by observing that αὐτὸ, ἐκεῖνο, ἕκαστον, μόνον, occur in the pre- ceding lines. For this reason they are put first, and with the article, and οὐδὲ τοῦτο. οὐδ᾽ ἄλλα πολλὰ τοιαῦτα is added after- wards. Cp. supr.157 B: Τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι πανταχόθεν ἐξαιρετέον. . . οὐ δεῖ... οὔτε τι ξυγχωρεῖν οὔτε Tou οὔτ᾽ ἐμοῦ οὔτε τόδε οὔτ᾽ ἐκεῖνο οὔτε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὄνομα ὃ τι ἂν ἱστῇ. Accordingly in the reference to this passage, 205 C (which Buttmann must have over- looked), the article is intro- duced—ov6de τὸ τοῦτο. I. περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέ- ρεσθαι] Op. supr. 197 D: ᾿Ενίας δὲ μόνας διὰ πασῶν ὅπῃ ἂν τύχωσι πετομένας. Rep. 3. 402 A: Ta στοιχεῖα. ἐν ἅπασι... περιφε- ρόμενα, Polit. 278 D; Phil. 15 19. 2. εἴπερ nv δυνατὸν αὐτὸ λέγε- σθαι] αὐτό 15 ποῦ emphatic. ‘If it could be spoken of,’ λέγεσθαι is the emphatic word. λόγος is here equivalent to ‘ predica- tion.’ 6. αὐτῷ] Bonitz conjectures αὐτό. But the dative suits better with ἔχειν following. 7. ἤδη) 1.6. ‘when we come to them.’ 9. ὀνομάτων yap συμπλοκὴν εἶναι λόγου οὐσίαν] Cp. Sophist, 262D: where it is described more ac- curately as συμπλέκων τὰ ῥήματα τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. See the whole passage. A passage of Aristot. Metaph. 7.3. 1043 b, is closely parallel to this. He has just shown that sensible reality (αἰσθητὴ οὐσία) consists of matter or potentiality (ὕλη, δύναμις), and form or actuality, (μορφή, ἐνέρ- yeta): Ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἣν οἱ ᾿Αν- τισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευ- τοι ἠπόρουν, ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὁρί- σασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποιὸν μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυ- pov τί μὲν ἔστιν, οὔ, ὅτι δ᾽ οἷον καττίτερος. ὥστ᾽ οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν js ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ἢ" ἐξ ὧν δ᾽ αὕτη πρώ- των, οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ τι κατά τινος σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὁριστικός, καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι, τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφήν. (See Introduction.) Locke’s ‘simple ideas’ are not very different from the meaning of στοιχεῖον here, OEAITHTOS. 215 5 Ν Lee A \ Ν .302. ἄγνωστα εἶναι, αἰσθητὰ δέ: τὰς δὲ συλλαβὰς γνω- D στάς τε καὶ ῥητὰς καὶ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ δοξαστάς. ὅταν 53 3 ἈΝ οὐ 15 A , μὲν οὖν ἄνευ λόγου τὴν ἀληθῆ δόξαν τινός τις λάβῃ, 3 ’ \ ’ an \ δὴ \ 3 ’ ve ο ἀληθεύειν μὲν αὐτοῦ Τὴν ψυχὴν πέρι AUTO, γιγνω- +) yf Χ \ \ ’ ὃ fal / Ν σκειν δ᾽ οὔ: τὸν γὰρ μὴ δυνάμενον δοῦναί τε καὶ 7 ’ 3 / 5 ἣν / δέξασθαι λογον ἀνεπιστήμονα εἶναι πέρι τουτου" ’ UZ aA ’ὔ’ προσλαβόντα δὲ λόγον δυνατόν τε ταῦτα πάντα , LY / \ 3 4 32 Ov: yeyovevat καὶ τελείως πρὸς ἐπιστήημὴν εχειν. UT@S \ Ἀ 3. eS δ + 3. αν συ τὸ ἐνύπνιον ἢ ἄλλως ἀκήκοας ; OEAI. Οὕτω μὲν οὖν παντάπασιν. ΣΏ. ᾿Αρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτῃ, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι ; ΘΕΑΙ. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. ΣΏ. ᾿᾽Αρ᾽, ὦ Θεαίτητε, νῦν οὕτω τῇδε τῇ ἡμέρᾳ I. was .. συλλαβάς] This word, like στοιχεῖα supr., is of course to be taken in the figur- ative sense, for the ‘combina- tions of simple objects or ideas.’ 2. καὶ pytds| There is possibly an allusion, as in ἄλογον supr., to the mathematical use of the word. Cp. Rep. 8. 546C: Πάντα mpoonyopa καὶ ῥητὰ πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀπέφηναν. Ib.7.534D: Ἀλόγους ὥσπερ γραμμάς. But the immediate reference is to ῥηθῆναι λόγῳ, ‘Capable of ex- pression.’ 4. ἀληθεύειν... περὶ αὐτό] ‘Is exercised truly with regard to it.’ 6. περὶ τούτου] Sc. οὗ ἂν μὴ δύνηται δοῦναι λόγον. Cp. supr. 199 A. 7. δυνατὸν. ,. ταῦτα πάντα] Se. ἀληθεύειν καὶ γιγνώσκειν καὶ δοῦναί τε καὶ δέξασθαι λόγον. On this kind of pronominal expression see Riddell’s Di- gest, ὃ 55 and δὲ 17 foll. Contrast with this Arist. Phys. Ausc. 1.1 (who points out that the elements, or simple ideas, are known not by sensation, but by analysis; and that definition distin- guishes, while the name sig- nifies an undivided whole) : Ἔστι δ᾽ ἡμῖν τὸ πρῶτον δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον" ὕστερον δὲ ἐκ τούτων γίνεται γνώ- ρίμα τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, διαιροῦσι ταῦτα... Τὸ γὰρ ὅλον κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν, γνωριμώτερον. Τὸ δὲ καθόλου, ὅλον τί ἐστι. Πολλὰ γὰρ περιλαμβάνει ὡς μέρη τὸ καθόλουυ Πέπονθε δὲ ταὐτὸ τοῦτο τρόπον τινα καὶ τὰ ὀνόματα πρὸς τὸν λόγον. Ὅλον γάρ τι καὶ ἀδιορίστως σημαίνει, οἷον ὁ κύκλος" ὁ δὲ ὁρισμὸς αὐτοῦ διαιρεῖ εἰς τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα. II. ᾿Αρέσκει... σε] Supr. 172. 1) 14. νῦν οὕτω] Ι. 6. “ἴῃ ἃ casual conyersation.’ Supr. 142 ἢ, the object of Sensa- tion; the combina- tion of these ele- ments is alone the object of Know- ledge. For that im- pression deserves not to be called knowledge, which can- not be ex- pressed in a proposi- tion. Knowledge then is true opinion giving an account of itself. Let this be our third answer. Can we prove it true? 1. The an- swer may be a true one, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. This there- fore is examined first. 216 [4 ἃ ’ a A aA ͵ εἰληφαμεν ὃ. πάλαι καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν ζητοῦντες Pp. 20: ΄- Ψ : πρὶν εὑρεῖν KATEYNPAT AY ; ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔμοὶ γοῦν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, καλῶς λέ- γεσθαι τὸ νῦν ῥηθέν. ye Ὁ 35S A ΄ yy , ἃ 2Q. Kat εἰκὸς γε αὐτὸ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχειν: τίς γὰρ A ἈΠ ΟΣ 3 7 53 ν A / NES A ἂν καὶ ETL ἐπιστημὴ εἴη χωρὶς τοῦ λόγου TE καὶ ὀρθῆς / A ip 7 a e », 3 ’ δόξης ; ἕν μέντοι τί με τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀπαρέσκει. ΘΕΑΙ. Τὸ ποῖον dn; ΣΩ. Ὃ καὶ δοκεῖ λέγεσθαι κομψότατα' ὡς τὰ ’ γνωστον. OEAI. Οὐκοῦν ὀρθῶς ; Α ad 5, N \ a a / 10 μὲν στοιχεῖα ἄγνωστα, TO Oe THY συλλαβῶν γένος ΣΏ. Ἰστέον δή: ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁμήρους ἔχομεν τοῦ δ Ν i. ᾿ ΠΥ Ψ λόγου τὰ παραδείγματα, οἷς χρώμενος εἰπὲ TAVTA 15 Ταῦτα. I. καὶ πολλοὶ τῶν σοφῶν] ‘Many ἃ philosopher.’ καὶ πολύς, like καὶ μάλα, is an in- tensive form. Rep. 8. 562 C. 5. αὐτὸ τοῦτο] ‘The defi- nition itself,’ whatever may be said of the theory that has been stated as a ground for it. Heindorf’s conjecture, εἰκός γ᾽ αὖ τοῦτο, would give a differ- ent turn to the sense. ‘ It is natural to suppose that we have said well.’ 9. λέγεσθαι κομψότατα] ‘To be the cream of the whole theory.’ 7 10. τὸ δὲ τῶν συλλαβῶν γένος] The ‘complex mode’ is a natural class or genus, which these philosophers suppose themselves to have discovered. Cp. infr. 206 B: Τὸ τῶν στοι- χείων γένος. 13. Ἰστέον] Symp. 217% Ο. Cp. τάχ᾽ εἰσόμεθα, Kuthyphro, 9 E. ὥσπερ... dunpous| So that if we put them to the torture, we may bring him (τὸν λόγον) to terms. 14. τὰ παραδείγματα] Op Polit. 277 E, 278 D, where the same example, that of let- ters, is introduced to illustrate the nature of Example: Ὅτι τῶν στοιχείων ἕκαστον ἐν ταῖς βραχυτάταις καὶ ῥᾷσταις τῶν συλ- λαβῶν ἱκανῶς διαισθάνονται.... μετατιθέμενα δ᾽ εἰς τὰς τῶν πραγ- μάτων μακρὰς καὶ μὴ ῥᾳδίας συλ- λαβὰς ταὐτὰ ταῦτα πάλιν ἀγνοεῖ. H. Schmidt observes that παραδείγματα here are rather archetypes (Vorbilder) than examples (Beispiele). And it is true that the argument from letters is not so much an illustration as the very foun- dation of the theory. εἶπε] Sc. the person from whom Socrates and Theetetus are supposed to have heard nes OEAITHTOS. ΘΕΑΙ. Ποῖα δή. 2Q. Τὰ τῶν γραμμάτων στοιχεῖα τε ΙΝ καὶ συλ- Ἃ / 7 al a \ AaBas. ἢ οἴει ἄλλοσέ ποι βλέποντα ταῦτα εἰπεῖν τὸν Ἀν ἃ / εἰπονταὰ a λέγομεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὔκ, ἀλλ᾽ εἰς ταῦτα. 20. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτὰ ἀναλαμβάνοντες, μᾶλ- \ (ee 3 7 4 Ἃ 3 oid ᾿ λον δὲ ἡμὰς αὐτοὺς, οὕτως ἢ οὐχ οὕτως γραμματα ἐμάθομεν. φέρε πρῶτον" ap αἱ μὲν συλλαβαὶ λόγον yay \ \ -“ 2) ἐχουσι, τὰ δὲ στοιχεῖα ἄλογα: ΘΈΑΙ. Ἴσως. 2Q. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν καὶ ἐμοὶ φαίνεται. Σωκράτους a 5) δ΄ Χ ΄ ἈΝ e he'd YOuv εἰ Tis Eporro THY πρώτην συλλαβὴν ουτωσι, Q Θεαίτητε, λέγε τί ἐστι TO, τί ἀποκρινεῖ- meGy EY ) Pret ΘΕΑΙ. Ὅτι σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. 20. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχεις λόγον τῆς συλλαβῆς: ΘΕΑΙ. *Eywye. ΣΩ, “16 δή, οὕτως εἰπὲ καὶ τὸν τοῦ σίγμα λόγον. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ πῶς τοῦ στοιχείου τις ἐρεῖ στοιχεῖα : \ xX ’ 3 7 , an A 3 / καὶ yap On, ὦ Σώκρατες, τό τε σίγμα τῶν ἀφώνων 3 V4 , ’ © “ ἴω , ἐστί, ψοῴος τις μόνον, οἷον συριττουσης τῆς γλώτ- the theory ‘in a dream.’ Cp. ΕἸ 2en "CO: Bixdvros του ἀκούσας. Infr. 206 EB. 6. Βασανίζωμεν δὴ αὐτά] ‘ Let us take and examine them, or rather let us put the question to ourselves.’ The image of _ hostages, whom we may treat as we please, is kept up. μᾶλλον δὲ ἡμᾶς αὐτούς] This is done more fully by and by, 206 A; cp. supr. 155 A. 7. οὕτως ἢ ody οὕτως] For εἴτε omitted cp. supr. τόρ D. 15. λόγον 15 predicative. ‘ You have this for an account.’ 18. Καὶ πῶς... ;, στοιχεῖα] ‘How is one to spell each single letter 2’ 19. τό τε σῖγμα... τοῦ δ᾽ αὖ ira] For τε followed by δέ ep. Rep: 3:7304/0. Thezetetus extemporizes the theory of phonetics, which is given more fully in Phil. 18 B foll. Sigma is a semivowel. 20. οἷον συριττούσης τῆς γλώτ- τὴς] This mode of definition reminds us of the Antisthe- hean saying quoted by Aris- totle—mouv μέν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέ- χεται καὶ διδάξαι, κιτ.λ. ; and also of Kuclides’ objection to defi- nition by comparison, It soon ap- pears that we were right in saying the element cannot be defined. 10 2. But is it therefore unknown 2 First, How is the com- plex related to it? E.g. is the syllable the same with the letters of which it is com- posed? If so, they must be equally known with it. ~ Ὁ 10 15 218 της" τοῦ δ᾽ αὖ βῆτα οὔτε φωνὴ οὔτε ψόφος, οὐδὲ τῶν p. 20; ΠΛΑΤΩ͂ΝΟΣ ’ ,ὔ “ , 3 yy - ? πλείστων στοιχείων. ὥστε πάνυ εὖ ἐχει TO λέγεσθαι SAT ΟΝ © Nas / ἕως Re \ αὐτὰ ἄλογα, ων γέ Τὰ εναργεστατα αὐτὰ Τὰ €7TA Χ 7 5, / \ xa ¢ “ φωνὴν μόνον EXEL, λογον δὲ οὐδ᾽ ὁντινοῦν. A ae : TQ. Τουτὶ μὲν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, κατωρθώκαμεν περὶ ἐπιστήμης. ΘΕΑΙ. Φαινόμεθα. TQ. Τί δὲ δή ; τὸ μὴ γνωστὸν εἶναι τὸ στοιχεῖον, © ἀλλὰ τὴν συλλαβήν, ap ὀρθῶς ἀποδεδείγμεθα ; ΘΕΑΙ. Eixos γε. ΣΏ. Φέρε δή, τὴν συλλαβὴν πότερον λέγομεν τὰ > / a NOON / “ xX ᾽ὔ ἈΝ / ἀμφοτερα OTOLXELA, KAL εαν πλείω ἢ ἢ δυο, τὰ πάντα, x / \ , lal ’ > na ἢ μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν γεγονυῖαν συντεθέντων αὐτῶν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τὰ ἅπαντα ἔμοιγε δοκοῦμεν. TQ. “Opa δὴ ἐπὶ δυοῖν, σῖγμα καὶ ὦ. ἀμφότερά « / Χ at al , ͵ἷ ἐστιν ἡ πρώτη συλλαβὴ τοῦ ἐμοῦ ὀνόματος. ἄλλο τι f Cie \\ / 7 ὁ γιγνώσκων αὐτὴν τὰ ἀμφοτερα γιγνώσκει ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί μήν; Ν “σι 53 V4 7 ΣΏ. Τὸ σῖγμα καὶ τὸ ὠ apa γιγνώσκει. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. ΣΩ. Τί δέ; ἑκάτερον ἄρ᾽ ἀγνοεῖ, καὶ οὐδέτερον 5. Χ » / / εἰδὼς ἀμῴφοτερα γιγνώσκει 5 3. ἐναργέστατα] Bodl. ἐνεργέ- στατα, sed ex em., the second ε being in rasura. 9. ἀποδεδείγμεθα] Heindorf conjectured ἀποδεδέγμεθα, for which MS. authority (Coisl. et Par. Εἰ. ex corr.) has since been found; and it has been re- ceived by Bekker. But Stall- baum rightly defends ἀποδε- δείγμεθα in the sense ‘we have declared our opinion;’ in which meaning the pf. pass. is used by Xenophon and Lysias. Cp. supr, 180 1) ; ᾿Αποδεικνυ- μένων, 195 D: Τὸ νῦν ἀποδεδειγ- Cp. however infr, 205 C: ᾿Απεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέ- γεσθαι. But this refers to a part of the theory which has been accepted in the words τοῦτο μὲν . . κατωρθώκαμεν. 11. τὴν συλλαβήν] Arist. Met. 7.3. 1043 b: Οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοι- χείων οὖσα καὶ συνθέσεως. The word συλλαβή is used probably not without the con- sciousness of its etymology. μένον. - Ἢ me04. OEAITHTOS. 219 | pee BEAT. ᾿Αλλὰ δεινὸν καὶ ἄλογον, ὦ Σώκρατες. ’ὔ , 4 LQ. ᾿Αλλὰ μέντοι εἴ γε ἀνάγκη ἑκάτερον γιγνώ- iL ’ 7’ fe σκειν, εἴπερ ἀμφότερα τις γνώσεται, προγιγνώσκειν Ἁ a σ > i. “ / , / τὰ OTOLXELA AaTTATAa avayKn τῷ μέλλοντι ποτε γνω- δ CaN ε Χ / σεσθαι συλλαβήν, καὶ οὕτως ἡμῖν ὁ καλὸς λόγος > \ 55 Ἢ ἀποδεδρακὼς οἰχήσεται. ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ μάλα γε ἐξαίφνης. ΣΏ. Ov γὰρ καλῶς αὐτὸν φυλάττομεν. χρῆν γὰρ ἴσως τὴν συλλαβὴν τίθεσθαι μὴ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ 3 / Ψ Ν 53 3 ’, 7 bam ε A EKELV@V EV TL YEYOVOS εἰδος, ἰδέαν μιὰν AUTO αυτου av Ψ \ “- Εεχον, E€TEPOV δὲ TOV στοίχειων. ΘΈΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν: καὶ τάχα γ᾽ ἂν μᾶλλον oe ee , yf οὕτως ἢ EKELVMS EXOL. 2Q. Σκεπτέον, καὶ ov mpodoréov οὕτως ἀνάνδρως ᾽ Ν Χ , μέγαν TE καὶ σεμνὸν Aoyov. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν." 2Q. Ἐχέτω δὴ ὡς νῦν φαμέν, μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκά- 5. ὁ καλὸς λόγος ἀποδεδρακὼς oixnoera] The image is that of the disappearance of a favourite slave (Prot. sub init.). Compare with the humorous pathos with which this is spoken Pheed. 89 Β: Τήμερον, ἔφη, κἀγὼ τὰς ἐμὰς καὶ σὺ ταύτας, ἐάνπερ ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος τελευτήσῃ καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα αὐτὸν ἀναβιώσασθαι. καὶ ἔγωγ᾽ ἄν, εἰ σὺ εἴην καί με διαφύγοι ὁ λόγος, ἔνορκον ἂν ποιη- σαίμην ὥσπερ ᾿Αργεῖοι, μὴ πρό- τερον κομήσειν πρὶν ἂν νικήσω ἀναμαχόμενος τὸν Σιμμίου τε καὶ Κέβητος λόγον. ΤΟ. εἶδος, ἰδέαν] εἶδος is here rather more concrete, ἰδέα more abstract; but ἰδέα is used for εἶδος a few lines be- low. Generally, εἶδος is more logical, implying distinction ; ἰδέα more metaphysical, imply- ing unity. (See Appendix D.) 15.. μέγαν τε καὶ σεμνὸν λόγον] In these words, as in the figure of the dream, and in κομψότατα supr. 202 D, the Socratic irony is manifest. For μέγαν cp. Pheedo, 62 B. 17. ᾿Εχέτω δὴ ὡς viv φαμέν, μία ἰδέα]! There is no occasion to suspect the reading, or to conjecture μίαν ἰδέαν. ἐχέτω ὡς Ξξέστω ὃ..., and the whole clause pia... συλλαβή is in apposition to os ... φαμέν. Op: Rep..7. 517, B: Ta δ᾽ ἐβοὶ φαινόμενα οὕτω φαίνεται, ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ τελευταία ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἰδέα καὶ μόγις ὁρᾶσθαι. ‘Let the case be then as we have now put it, that the syl- lable or complex (whether of letters or of anything else in the world) is a simple form σι Or is it something by itself resulting Io from them? 15 In that case it cannot have parts: unless we regard every whole in the same way as something different from all its parts, although resulting from them. With a view to this we venture to assert that the Whole is different from the All. 220 A lA , / ε : στων τῶν TUVAPLOTTOVT@Y στοιχείων γιγνομένη Ἢ P. 20: ΠΛΑΤΩΝΟΣ συλλαβή, ὁμοίως ἔν τε γράμμασι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις “ ατασιν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. LQ. Οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς οὐ δεῖ εἶναι. ΘΕΑΙ. Τί δή; ΣΌ Ὅ © KN Sy "2 Ν ὅλ » le ἊΝ 7 . Ore οὗ av ἢ μέρη; To ὁλον avayKn τὰ παντα Ld 9 A \ Ne > a a 7 μέρη εἶναι. ἢ καὶ TO ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν λέγεις γε- Ν oS 9S Φ an , n yovos ἐν TL εἰδος ETEPOY τῶν παντων MEPWY ; ΘΕΑΙ. "Eywye. >Q. To δὲ δὴ πᾶν καὶ τὸ ὅλον πότερον ταὐτὸν a ἂν eh. Ae καλεῖς ἢ ETEPOV EKATEPOD 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Ἔχω μὲν οὐδὲν σαφές, ὅτι δὲ κελεύεις / > if, / / v4 προθύμως ἀποκρίνασθαι, παρακινδυνεύων λέγω OTL oe Εετέρον. SQ. Ἡ μὲν προθυμία, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὀρθή" εἰ δὲ καὶ ε 3 / / 7) ATTOK PLO ls, OKETITEOV. OEAI. Δεῖ δέ ye δή. SO. Οὐκοῦν διαφέροι ἂν τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντός. ὡς ρ ’ « lal , o νῦν Xoyos 5 arising out of each combina- tion of harmonious elements.’ The words ᾿Εχέτω δὴ ὡς take up the thread of ray’ ἂν μᾶλλον οὕτως ἢ ἐκείνως ἔχοι. In the conjectural reading the words ... μίαν ἰδέαν would of course refer to ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔχον. Schanz reads ἔστω. But the anacoluthon is ποῦ more harsh than in supr. 173 1): Σπουδαὶ δὲ ἑταιρειῶν en’ ἀρχάς, κιτιλ. Soph. 218 EH: Τί δῆτα προ- ταξαίμεθ᾽ ἂν εὔγνωστον, . .. οἷον ἀσπαλιευτής; Apol. 21 C: Διαλε- γόμενος αὐτῷ, . .. ἔδοξέ μοι. See Riddell’s Digest, §§ 270, 271. For μία ἰδέα: εἶδος ἰδέαν μίαν ἐχέτω ἔχον cp. Euthyphr. 6 D: Τὸ εἶδος ᾧ πάντα τὰ ὅσια ὅσιά ἐστιν ; a , a 207 , ἔφησθα γάρ mov μιᾷ ἰδέᾳ τά τε δα uk 37 > \ acd ἀνόσια ἀνόσια εἶναι καὶ τὰ ὅσια ὅσια. Infr. 205 ΟἹ Μία τὶς ἰδέα... συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. 18. Δεῖ δέ ye δή] Se. καὶ τὴν ἀπόκρισιν ὀρθὴν εἶναι. 1g. τὸ ὅλον τοῦ παντὸς ... τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν] Op. Ar. Met. ¢, ‘ ‘ 4. 26.1024 a: Ὕδωρ yap kat ὅσα ὑγρὰ καὶ ἀριθμὸς πᾶν μὲν λέγεται, ὅλος δ᾽ ἀριθμὸς καὶ ὅλον ὕδωρ οὐ λέγεται, ἂν μὴ μεταφορᾷ. πάντα δὲ λέγεται, ἐφ᾽ οἷς τὸ πᾶν ὡς ἐφ᾽ ἑνί, ἐπὶ τούτοις πάντα ὡς διῃρημένοις' πῶς οὗτος ὁ ἀριθμός, πᾶσαι αὗται αἱ μονάδες. Β ϊ D. 204. OEAITHTOS. OEAI. Nai. ed | SQ. Ti δὲ δή; τὰ πάντα καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἐσθ᾽ 6 τι ie - > \ / a 4 / / διαφέρει; οἷον ἐπειδὰν λέγωμεν ἕν, δύο, τρία, τέτ- fd χά ΝΥ ΤΠ δ Ν / Ἃ \ / Ἃ / 7 c Tapa, πέντε, EE, καὶ ἐὰν δὶς τρία ἢ τρὶς δύο ἢ τέτταρά Ν Brno , Ν / ΝΜ , > A τε Kal δύο ἢ τρία καὶ δύο Kal ἔν, πότερον ἐν πᾶσι / \ SEN. SN ΘΛ 4 τούτοις TO AUTO ἢ ἐτερον λέγομεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ταὐτόν. DQ. ᾽ἾΑρ᾽ ἄλλο τι ἢ ἕξ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ το ’ὔ εἰρηκαμεν 5 5. ἢ τρία καὶ δύο καὶ ἕν] The words ἢ πέντε καὶ ἕν, which were introduced by Cornarius, are anticipated in the simple enumeration ἕν, δύο, etc. They do not occur in the Bodleian or any other MS. 10. Οὐκοῦν ἐφ᾽ ἑκάστης λέξεως πάντα τὰ ἕξ εἰρήκαμεν;)] So far the MSS. give a meaning per- fectly clear and natural. The words which follow are not so clear. The only way in which it seems possible to construe them as they stand in the MSS., viz. πάλιν δ᾽ οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, is by laying an unnatural stress on ἕν in οὐδέν. “ Again, while we speak of all (in the plural), is there no one thing of which we speak?’ This is brought out more distinctly by C. F. Her- mann’s conjecture, οὐχ ἕν. In my former edition I pro- posed to substitute πᾶν for πάλιν. But πάλιν is probably to be retained. Cp. Symp. 183D: Eis δὲ ταῦτά τις αὖ βλέψας ἡγή- gar ἂν πάλιν, κιτιλ, Phil. 14 D: Πολλοὺς εἶναι πάλιν. And I now think the most probable solution is to suppose πᾶν to have dropped out from its simi- larity to πάλιν. H. Schmidt justly observes that this line of conjecture is more logical than that followed by Heindorf and others, who substitute the awkward expression πᾶν τὰ ἕξ for πάντα τὰ ἕξ in the previous line. ‘ Do we not repeat some- thing when we say τὰ πάντα᾽ is not a satisfactory sense. The present passage is one in which a reader of Plato will expect extreme clearness and minuteness of logical sequence. And to put πᾶν ra ἕξ in the beginning of the argument would be to assume bluntly that which it is intended to prove, viz. that an aggregate may be regarded as one thing. With this object it is neces- sary to reason from the plural to the singular, and to do so gradually. The above argu- ment might lead to the sub- stitution of τὸ πᾶν for τὰ πάντα (a suggestion adopted by Schanz, and in part by Wohl- rab, who reads τὸ πᾶν αὐτά). ‘In counting six, we said “all σι But can we go so far as to distin- guish All, in the sin- gular, from All, in the plural ? It is evi- dent that ‘all of six’ is the same as ‘all six.’ 10 ~ must be.’ 222 ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. MAATOQNOZ LQ. Πάλιν δέ, *wav οὐδὲν λέγομεν τὰ πάντα λέγοντες : ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΩ; 7H ἄλλο τί ἢ Ta ἐς: ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν. 3, a [2 a > / SQ. Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν ye τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, a ἈΠΟ TO TE πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα; ΘΕΑΙ. Φαίνεται. TQ. “Ade δὴ περὶ αὐτῶν λέγωμεν. ὃ τοῦ πλέθρου ’ ἊΝ Ν \ re 3 / 3 7 ἀριθμὸς καὶ τὸ πλέθρον ταυτον: ἢ yap; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. ΣΏΩ. Καὶ ὁ τοῦ σταδίου δὴ ὡσαύτως. ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί six” (in the plural). Again, in speaking of all, in the singular, is there nothing which we express?’ ‘ There ‘And is not this six ?’ ‘Yes,’ But there is need- less obscurity in the logical in- version by which, after reason- ing from the number, we should then reason to it. The required sequence is restored by read- ing as in the text. The pas- sage may then be rendered, ‘Have we not,- then, in each expression, spoken of all the six?’ ‘Yes, “(Bab sagen while speaking of them all, is there no one thing all of which we express?’ ‘ There must be. ‘And is that any- thing but the six?’ ‘ No- thing. This gives much greater force to the inference here and in E. Compare with the resumption of the previous admission in τὰ πάντα λέγοντες, Soph. 238 EH: Οὐκοῦν τό γε εἶναι προσάπτειν πειρώμενος ἐναν- tia τοῖς πρόσθεν ἔλεγον; Paivet. Τί δέ; τοῦτο προσάπτων οὐχ ὡς ἑνὶ διελεγόμην; After ἀνάγκη, we must understand πᾶν τι λέγειν. Compare Symp. 192 E: Οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἷς eEapvnbein... ἀλλ᾽ οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν (se. mas τις), K.T.A. alib. The reasoning of Parm. 144 C may be advantageously compared. See also Aristot. Poet. 1451 a. And for the abrupt form of the question with οὐδέν ep. Gorg. 474 Ὁ: Τί δὲ τόδε; τὰ καλὰ πάντα... εἰς οὐδὲν ἀποβλέπων καλεῖς ἑκάσ- τοτε καλά; 7. Ῥαὐτὸν.. «᾿. προσαγορεύομεν] “ΕἾ give the names πᾶν and πάντα to the same thing.’ 10. λέγωμεν] Several MSS. have λέγομεν. If λέγωμεν is right, it refers, not to the present sentence, but to the argument which it introduces about the relation of parts to a whole. OEAITHTOS. 223 \ ΤᾺ xt “ fd Ν. Χ 2Q. Kat μὴν καὶ 0 τοῦ στρατοπέδου γε καὶ τὸ 7 , Ἁ an e ie \ στρατόπεδον, καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ὁμοίως ; ὃ γὰρ 5 Ν aA XN na oS > “ 5 / ἀριθμὸς τὰς TO OV TQAV EKAOCTOV αὐτῶν ἐστιν. OEAI. Nai. XQ. Ὁ de ἑκάστων ἀριθμὸς μῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ μέρη ; 3 / E€OTLY 5 OEAI. Οὐδέν. 2Q. Ὅσα dpa ἔχει μέρη, ἐκ μερῶν ἂν εἴη ; CEAI. Paivera. / 7 σ΄ 53 ΄σ 2Q. Ta δέ γε πάντα μέρη τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ὁμολογεῖ- yS Ν ὦ a 3 \ ἐν a 32) Ταῖς. ELTTED Καὶ O τας ἀριθμὸς TO σῖαν εσται. ΘΈΑΙ. Οὕτως. x Ὁ x la a A 2Q. To ὅλον ap’ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐκ μερῶν. πᾶν yap Ἃ 5», Ἁ ’ x , αν Ε(ἢ9 Τα TAVTA OV ξερῆ.- ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκ ἐοικεν. 2Q. Μέρος δ᾽ ἐσθ᾽ ὅτου ἄλλου ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστὶν x 0 OA ᾿ ἢ TOV OAOD 9 ΘΕΑΙ. Τοῦ παντός γε. “ὯΝ ΣΏ. ᾿Ανδρικῶς γε, ὦ ῥ Ν ἴω A Θεαίτητε, μάχει. τὸ πᾶν δὲ ᾽ “ N 3 5 sn =X a A 3 7 ουχ οΤαν μηδεν a7), αὐτὸ TOUTO παν ἐστιν 9 2. ὁ γὰρ ἀριθμός] 1.6. ὁ ἀριθμὸς πᾶς ἑκάστου ἐστὶ τὸ ὃν πᾶν ἕκαστον. ‘The number of each taken altogether is each real thing taken altogether,’ or ‘each taken altogether so far as it exists.’ Stallbaum’s conjecture, ἑκάστου, would be more con- venient, but we cannot venture " to say that ἕκαστον is wrong. TO OV... ἕκαστον ΞΞ- ἕκαστον, ὃ ἔστιν. Cp. Rep. 6. 400 Β: Αὐτοῦ ὃ ἔστιν ἑκάστου τῆς φύσεως. It must be admitted, however, that the text becomes more uncertain in the last few pages of the dialogue. 5. Ὁ δὲ ἑκάστων ἀριθμός] The word ἀριθμός implies plurality. Hence ἑκάστων, unless it is cor- rupt. We are now reasoning from singular to plural, as be- fore from plural to singular. ΤΟ. ὁμολογεῖται] ὡμολόγηται, the reading of T, is of nearly equal authority. 16. Μέρος δ᾽ ἔσθ᾽ ὅτου... ὅλου] Cp. Parm. 147 C, Soph. 245 A. 10. ᾿Ανδρικῶς μάχει] Viz. for the θέσις he has chivalrously taken up, 204 B: Παρακινδυνεύων λέγω ὅτι ἕτερον. 20. αὐτὸ τοῦτο πᾶν ἐστί] Is this very thing all, just as above, ἐστὶν ὅπερ ἐστίν. πᾶν, being pre- dicate, does not need the article. 15 20 But all (plural) im- plies num- ber, and numberim- plies parts. Therefore all (singu- lar) alsoim- plies parts. Therefore if all (sin- gular) and the whole are differ- ent, the whole is without parts, But this is absurd. We cannot therefore view the whole as _ different from the all. But, if the whole is all the parts, the complex, if distinct from its elements, is not the whole of which they are the parts. 5 Io 9224. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αναγκη. ΠΛΑΤΏΝΟΣ / \ Ν a @ Δ DQ. Ὅλον δὲ ov ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ἔσται, οὗ ἂν μη- a ic 5 a ee nae. ed δαμῇ μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ ; ov 0 ἂν ἀποστατῃ; οὔτε OAOV ΕΥ “ oA U 3 lo 3 n Ν LA OUTE TQAV, AULA YEVOMEVOV EK TOV αὐτοῦ TO QUTO 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Δοκεῖ μοι νῦν οὐδὲν διαφέρειν πᾶν τε καὶ ὅλον. ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐλέγομεν ὦ ὅτι οὗ ἂν μέρη ἢ, τὸ ὅλον TE Kal πᾶν τὰ πάντα μέρη ἐσ. ται» ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ γε. ’ / LQ. Πάλιν δή, ὅπερ ἄρτι ἐπεχείρουν, οὐκ, εἴπερ ἡ »\ \ \ af 3 > 7 a EN \ « συλλαβὴ μὴ τα στοιχειὰ ἐστιν, ἀναγκὴ αὐτὴν μὴ ὡς / y+ «ε ἴω \ lal > a, IN 3 > ἴω μέρη ἔχειν EAUTNS τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἢ ταῦτον οὖσαν αὑτοις B e / > , Ν 53 ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι 5 ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. Ὅλον] To be taken pre- dicatively, like πᾶν immediately above. 3. οὔτε ὅλον οὔτε πᾶν] Se. ἔσται γενόμενον. “Ὗ11] have be- come at once not-whole and not-all.’ 4. ἅμα γενόμενον, κιτ.λ.] * Be- ing changed in the same in- stant from forms which are identical to other forms which are likewise identical. ἐκ TOU αὐτοῦ] Viz. ὅλον Ξε οὗ ἂν μηδὲν ἀποστατῇ Ξε πᾶν. τὸ αὐτό] Viz, οὐχ ὅλον-ε οὐ πᾶν. ‘Both equally lose their en- tirety of nature.’ (Jowett.) 7. ἐλέγομεν] The argument is resumed from 204 A: Ὅτι οὗ ἂν ἦ μέρη, τὸ ὅλον ἀνάγκη τὰ πάντα μέρη εἶναι. 10. Πάλιν δὴ .. ἀνάγκη] ‘Then I may repeat, what I was try- ing to suggest a little while ago, that if the syllable is dis- tinct from the letters, they are not its parts; else, if they are, it must be indistinguishable from them, and no more know- able than they are.’ In fact it was shown that the know- ledge of the letters was a con- dition of syllables being known. Supr. 203 D, 204 A: Προγιγνώ- σκειν τὰ στοιχεῖα ἅπασα ἀνάγκη TO μέλλοντί ποτε γνώσεσθαι συλλα- βήν, : εἶναι. 12. ἢ ταὐτὸν οὖσαν αὐτοῖς ὁμοίως ἐκείνοις γνωστὴν εἶναι] For the turn of the sentence compare Rep. 6.490 A: ‘“Hyeiro δ᾽ αὐτῷ, εἰ νῷ ἔχεις, πρῶτον μὲν ἀλήθεια, ἣν διώκειν αὐτὸν πάντως καὶ πάντῃ ἔδει ἢ ἀλάζονι ὄντι μηδαμῇ μετεῖναι φιλοσοφίας ἀληθινῆς. Ib. 503 A: ᾿Ἐλέγομεν δ᾽, εἰ μνημονεύεις, δεῖν .. τὸ δόγμα τοῦτο μήτ᾽ ἐν πόνοις μήτ᾽ ἐν φόβοις .. φαίνεσθαι ἐκβάλλον- τας ἢ τὸν ἀδυνατοῦντα ἀποκριτέον. ΤΌ... 525 B: Διὰ τὸ τῆς οὐσίας ἁπτέον εἶναι γενέσεως ἐξαναδύντι ἢ μηδέποτε λογιστικῷ γενέσθαι, > “A , ᾿ heehee) > a . οὐκοῦν μέρη αὐτῆς ov δεῖ OEAITHTOS. 225 A A 4 \ 7 a 2Q. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτο ἵνα μὴ γενηται, ἕτερον αὐτῶν Ὅτ Ν 5,7 > αὐτὴν ἐθέμεθα ; ΘΕΑΙ. Ναί. / 3 A a a 20. Τί δ᾽; εἰ μὴ τὰ στοιχεία συλλαβῆς μέρη 3 {2 y 5᾽ὕ > w+ 9 a ἃ Ψ ’ > ἐστίν, exels GAA arra εἰπεῖν, ἃ μέρη μέν ἐστι συλ- ΄“ ’ὔὕ as λαβῆς, ov μέντοι στοιχεῖά γ᾽ ἐκείνης ; an , 5 Ἥ ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδαμώς. εἰ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, μόρια ταύ- : al \ an > TNS συγχωροίην, γελοῖόν που τὰ στοιχεῖα ἀφέντα ἐπὶ y a2 ἄλλα ἰέναι. by 5 Ἁ ἈΝ A e¢ 20. Παντάπασι δή, ὦ Θεαίτητε, κατὰ τὸν νῦν 4 v2 VN oN 7 λόγον μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλλαβὴ ἂν εἴη. 7 ΟΘΒΕΑΙ. Ἔοικεν. ’ 5 3 an 20. Μᾷῴᾷνησαι οὖν, ὦ φίλε, ὅτι ὀλίγον ἐν τῷ ’ ’ ’ ε 7 5 ὔ Ψ aA πρόσθεν ἀπεδεχόμεθα ἡγούμενοι εὖ λέγεσθαι ὅτι τῶν / 3 of ,ὔ 3 e \ 5, , πρώτων οὐκ én λόγος, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα σύγκειται, διότι αὐτὸ Kal? αὑτὸ ἕκαστον εἴη ἀσύνθετον, καὶ οὐδὲ ἈΝ 3 A “ἅ" 3, ’ an TO εἶναι περὶ αὐτοῦ ὀρθῶς ἔχοι προσφέροντα εἰπεῖν, 3 \ \ ΄σι e lod Q 3 / ’ὔ Ν οὐδὲ τὸ τοῦτο, ὡς eTEepa καὶ ἀλλοτρια λεγόμενα, καὶ 4 ἈΠ Ὁ of δ, ,ὔ ,. » > N a αὕτη On ἡ αἰτία ἄλογόν τε καὶ ἄγνωστον αὐτὸ ποιοῖ: / OEAI. Μέμνημαι. ΤΥ 5 lA XN , A p 20. Ἢ οὖν ἄλλη τις ἢ αὕτη ἡ αἰτία τοῦ μονο- / Wie ee 4 SEN 5 ΣΝ \ \ 3 εἰδὲς τι καὶ ἀμέριστον αὐτὸ εἶναι: EY® μὲν yap οὐχ ΠΝ, ν᾿ OS op® adAnv. The same cause makes it to be unknowable and without parts. Therefore if the ‘syl- 11, συλλαβή] The absence of the article marks our familiarity with the word, and also gives it a certain indefiniteness: as in the expression πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος. Cp. Rep. 2. 369 Β: Τίγνεται τοίνυν . . πόλις... ἐπειδή, Κι τ᾿ A, 21. Ἦ οὖν ἄλλη τις] ‘And ig not this same thing (viz. that it is uncompounded) the cause of its having a simple form Without parts 1᾽ lable’ or complex is without parts, it must be unknowable. Bonitz objects to the logic of this and reads τό for τοῦ. This is tautological, and Bonitz’ reasoning is rightly rejected by H. Schmidt. See below, E. For illogical conversionin Plato cp. supr. 152 BC, 159 A. 20 And it can have no other parts. Therefore it can have no parts. But that which has no parts is uncom- pounded, i.e. an ele- ment, and therefore (by our hy- pothesis) unknown. 226 ΠΛΑΤΏΩΏΝΟΣ ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐ γὰρ οὖν δὴ φαίνεται. a ’ ὃ Ἁ LQ. Οὐκοῦν εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ ἰὃ 3 ’ 5) 4 \ 4 Ν. / 3 Ἂς εἶδος ἐκείνῳ, εἴπερ μέρη TE μὴ EXEL καὶ μία ἐστὶν , LOEa ; 5 OEAT. Παντάπασι μεν οὖν. \ Μ΄ x a "3 ᾿ 5.5 If then the LQ. Ei μὲν apa πολλὰ στοιχεῖα ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐστι complex is x ae ἢ Στ τς A hs Ψ an aggre- καὶ ὅλον TL, μερη δ᾽ αὐτῆς ταῦτα, ὁμοίως αἱ TE συλ- gate of sim- i ee < < tee eo . ple parts, AaBai γνωσταὶ καὶ ῥηταὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα, ἐπείπερ TA it and they , ἢ no s.N wae areequally πάντα μέρη τῷ OAM ταῦτον ehavy. known and ΄ describ) 10 OEAT. Kai pada. able. If it ΄ o , , \ Blane aud LQ. Ei δέ ye ἕν τε καὶ ἀμερές, ὁμοίως μὲν συλ- without / e 7 A a yf , , + aris, tt λαβη, ὡσαύτως δὲ στοιχεῖον ἄλογον TE καὶ ἀγνωστον" and the ΕἾ eS 5. Ὁ , , »Χ a ah cits ῃ γὰρ αὑτὴ αἰτία ποιήσει αὐτὰ τοιαῦτα. ll yf an aged OEAI. Οὐκ ἔχω ἄλλως εἰπεῖν. i 1 A \ / \ U4 a oN / mina’ 6}. SQ. Τοῦτο μὲν ἄρα μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς av λέγῃ known. \ \ \ Ee a \ ’ Thecfore συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστὸν καὶ ῥητόν, στοιχεῖον δὲ TOV ἊΣ ᾿ ante γαγτίον. δ. οὗ Z 4 “ 7 , . Ba OEAI. Mn yap, εἴπερ τῷ λόγῳ πειθομεθα. td 53 7 5 3 A Bee nt SQ. Τί δ᾽ ad; τοὐναντίον λέγοντος ap ov μᾶλ- mown. 20 λον ἂν ἀποδέζαιο ἐξ ὧν αὐτὸς σύνοισθα σαυτῷ ἐν τῇ And we ; : ΐ b have expe- in ° ee τῶν γράμ τον μαθησει 5 Ee: ie OEAI. To ποῖον ; ἢ ε \ Y , / a we learnt YQ. “As οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας ἢ τὰ our letters before we ~ x» “~ Sf , , . στοιχεῖα EV TE TH OWEL διαγιγνώσκειν πειρώμενος καὶ could read, χε ΤῈ Τῇ Ψ γιγ πειρώμενος 3. εἶδος] Used here without reference to the sense in which it occurs above. Op. 148 D: ‘Evi εἴδει περιλαβεῖν. ἐκείνῳ] ‘Sc. τῷ τῶν πρώτων εἴδει, Heindorf. Rather ἑκά- Soph. Ant. 35: ᾿Αλλ᾽ ὃς ἂν rov- τῶν τι dpa, | φόνον προκεῖσθαι δη- μόλευστον ἐν πόλει. 16. γνωστόν] ἄγνωστον Bodl. pr. sed ἃ erasum. 23. ‘Qs οὐδὲν ἄλλο] ‘That in aT» τῶν πρώτων, Cp. περὶ αὐτοῦ, supr. C. 15, μὴ ἀποδεχώμεθα, ὃς dv λέγῃ] For this common use of ὃς ἄν without antecedent cp. esp. learning you continued doing nothing else but endeavouring to distinguish, etc.’ Cp. Men, 80 A: Ὅτι οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ αὐτός TE ἀπορεῖς, OEAITHTOS. 227 p. 6 > ~ 9» LA 1) OM a € x. ¢ Ψ \ e θέ Ῥ' 200. ἐν Τῇ AKON αὐτὸ KAY αὐτὸ ἐκαστον, ἵνα Mn ἢ δέεσις Me, / ‘ σε ταράττοι λεγομένων τε καὶ γραφομένων. ’ ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα λέγεις. \ ~ / A 20. “Ev δὲ κιθαριστοῦ τελέως μεμαθηκέναι μῶν 3 5 xX Ν a / 7 Β ἄλλο τι ἣν ἢ τὸ τῷ φθόγγῳ ἑκάστῳ δύνασθαι ἐπακο- λ 6 la [2 δῆ 5) Υ ἃ 67, las a x ε ουθειν, ποίας χορόης εἴη: ἃ δὴ στοιχεῖα πᾶς ἂν ὃμο- “ ’ὔ λογήσειε μουσικῆς λέγεσθαι ; \ 3, ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδὲν ἄλλο. χὰ \ y > > Δ 55» lie Ὡς / 20. “Ὧν μὲν ἄρ᾽ αὐτοὶ ἔμπειροί ἐσμεν στοιχείων Q vat 9 aah ΟΝ. 7 / Ν καὶ συλλαβών, εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ 3 Ν LAA λὺ Ν va ie ΄ > εἰς Ta ἄλλα, πολὺ τὸ τῶν στοιχείων γένος ἐναργε- ’ Ἁ an στέραν TE THY γνῶσιν ἔχειν φήσομεν καὶ κυριωτέραν “ lay Ἁ Ἂς la 9 τῆς συλλαβῆς πρὸς τὸ λαβεῖν τελέως ἕκαστον μά- θ Ἂν “ ΧᾺ βὴ \ ’ ay NMA, καὶ ἐαν τις Py συλλαβὴν μὲν γνωστόν, ἄγνω- \ ”~ Ἂ στον δὲ πεφυκέναι στοιχεῖον, ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν e / > » / ηγησομεθ αὐτὸν. 15. ἑκόντα ἢ ἄκοντα παίζειν] ‘That he is either playing with us, or talking nonsense.’ The tendency of the present passage is to rise from the con- ception of elementary objects of sense (simple ideas of sensa- tion) to that of abstract ideas, (universals, predicables), as the true elements of Knowledge. Cp. Ar. Met. 1 a, 998 Db: Πότερον ai ἀρχαὶ καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τὰ γένη ἐστιν ἢ εἰς ἃ διαιρεῖται ἐνυπάρχοντα ἕκαστον. This may be illustrated from the frequent use by Plato of the example of letters, elemen- tary sounds, etc., to represent the Ideas and the mode of be- coming acquainted with them. The following passage,— Rep. 3. 402,—is an instance of this :— Ὥσπερ ἄρα... γραμμάτων πέρι τότε ἱκανῶς εἴχομεν, ὅτε τὰ στοι- “σὲ \ “A , χεία μὴ λανθάνοι ἡμᾶς ὀλίγα ὄντα > [ῳ iS , ἐν ἅπασιν ois ἐστὶ περιφερόμενα, \ δ ee “ ΤΣ ὁ δ᾿ - Kal OUT ἐν σμικρῷ οὔτ᾽ ἐν μεγαλῷ > , , ie! a 2 , 3 , ἡτιμάζομεν αὐτά, ὡς ov δέοι αἰσθά- > \ ~ > fe νεσθαι, ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ προὐθυμού- μεθα διαγιγνώσκειν, ὡς οὐ πρότερον σ ἐσόμενοι γραμματικοὶ πρὶν οὕτως ἔχοιμεν. ᾿Αληθῆ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ εἰκό- a \ A vas γραμμάτων, εἴ που ἢ ἐν ὕδασιν ἢ ἐν κατόπτροις ἐμφαίνοιντο, οὐ a πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, πρὶν ἂν αὐτὰ - > A -“ a γνῶμεν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι τῆς αὐτῆς τέχνης A = τε καὶ μελέτης; παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. “- ~ ἃ a »" “Ap οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως 3 \ A , > a 6 οὐδὲ μουσικοὶ πρότερον ἐσόμεθα, + > , y+ ἃ A Cw οὔτε αὕτοι, οὔτε Os φαμὲν ἡμῖν ’ 53 A a A παιδευτέον εἶναι τοὺς φύλακας, πρὶν A \ “ », + Ni 9, ἂν Ta τῆς σωφροσύνης εἴδη Kai ἀν- δρείας καὶ ἐλευθεριότητος καὶ μεγα- a ΔΕ , > A λοπρεπείας καὶ ὅσα τούτων ἀδελφὰ ’ 3 “- καὶ τὰ τούτων αὖ ἐναντία πανταχοῦ περιφερόμενα γνωρίζωμεν καὶ ἐνόντα > ὃ, » 5 , ‘ 5. κ ἐν οἷς ἔνεστιν αἰσθανώμεθα καὶ αὐτὰ ἮΝ 2 καὶ εἰκόνας αὐτῶν, καὶ μήτε ἐν σμι- ΄“΄ , > - lal 3 , Kpols pyre ἐν μεγαλοῖς ἀτιμάζωμεν, Q 2 σι and our notes be- fore we could play the lyre, From this it appears that the element is more known than the syllable, the simple than the complex. This need not, how- ever, affect the truth of our third answer. 228 TIAATONOZ OEAI. Κομιδῇ μὲν οὖν. DQ. ᾿Αλλὰ δὴ τούτου μὲν ere κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν © > ῇ e > Ν la) Ν \ Δ RE ἀποδείξεις, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ: TO δὲ προκείμενον μὴ ἐπι- / Ἂν: Ὁ la “ Ν λαθώμεθα δὲ αὐτὰ ἰδεῖν, 6 τι δή ποτε καὶ λέγεται τὸ ἀλλὰ τῆς αὐτῆς οἰώμεθα τέχνης εἷ- ναι καὶ μελέτης ; At the same time it is hinted that the sensible elements, sofar as each of them can be regarded as one individual thing, are also objects of Knowledge. Cp. Ar. Met. 1 a, 994 Ὁ: Ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες (V1Z. τὸ ἄπειρον λ.) οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἰδέναι πρὶν ἢ εἰς τὰ ἄτομα ἐλθεῖν. To resume the argument from 201. Theetetus has heard it said that true opinion with a reason was knowledge : and that nothing which had not a reason could be known. This reminds Socrates of a theory which said that of the elements (or alphabet) of things no account could be given— they could only be named. But of their combinations an account could be given, and these could be known. Know- ledge according to this consists in being able to give an account of anything. This, however, may be true, and yet the theory on which we have based it may be unsound. ‘Testing this by the example of letters, we find that of the syllable Go an ac- count can be given (it can be analysed), but not of its con- stituents o and ὦ. But is the syllable known, the letter un- known ? If so, in what way are we to conceive of the syllable ? As all the letters? How then can I know them all, and yet none singly? Or is it a simple unity formed out of them? It cannot then be related to them as a whole to its parts,—unless we can establish a distinction between whole and all. But all (singular) cannot be distin- guished from all (plural); and this, containing all the parts, can scarcely be distinguished from the whole. Hence whole and all are indistinguishable. Therefore either the syllable has parts, and, consisting of things unknown, must be itself un- known; or, not having parts, it is uncompounded, and therefore itself, according to the theory, unknown. But our own me- mory ought to teach us that we first learnt to know the letters, and then the syllables and combinations of them. Though thetheoryis rejected, we gain through criticising it the notion of a complex whole. 2. κἂν ἄλλαι φανεῖεν ἀποδείξ- es| The train of thought here broken off is resumed in the Sophist, where the ἀσώματα εἴδη are treatedaselements, and com- binations of them are shown to be possible; also in the ad- mission of θάτερον. Cp. Phileb. 4. ὅ τι δὴ . . γεγονέναι] There is here a beginning of the formal or pedantic rhythm which is more common in the Sophist, Politicus, and Philebus. Indeed the manner of Socrates in this part of the Theetetus bears a close resemblance to that of the Eleatic Stranger, OEAITHTOS. 229 z Ἀν 3 A , , ‘ p. 206. μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελε- ’ / ’ὔ ὠτάτην ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. “ ἄν. τ lal GEAI. Οὐκοῦν χρὴ ὁρᾶν. fe , 4 x An OQ. Φέρε dyn, τί ποτε βούλεται τὸν λόγον ἡμῖν a \ σ΄ / a / σημαίνειν ; τριῶν yap Ev TL μοι δοκεῖ λέγειν. / ΘΕΑΙ. Τίνων 67; Ν \ a 7 ἋΟ N Χ A ’ pd ΣΏ, To pev πρῶτον εἴη ἂν τὸ τὴν αὑτοῦ διάνοιαν 3 a ἴω Ἁ A >" e 2 ΝΆ, ἐμφανῆ ποιεῖν διὰ φωνῆς μετὰ ῥημάτων τε καὶ ὀνο- ’ io 9 7 Ἂ “ Χ , μάτων, ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον ἢ ὕδωρ τὴν δόξαν , Ν \ a i CTA x > ἐκτυπούμενον εἰς THY διὰ TOU στόματος ῥοὴν. ἢ οὐ aA Ν A y 9S δοκεῖ σοι TO τοιοῦτον λογος εἶναι ; OEAI. "Ἔμοιγε. φαμέν. LQ. Οὐκοῦν τοῦτό γε πᾶς ποιεῖν δυνατὸς θᾶττον x ἴω SN A , τὸν γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν ἢ σχολαίτερον, τὸ ἐνδείξασθαι τί δοκεῖ περὶ ἑκάστου αὐτῷ, ὁ μὴ ἐνεὸς ἢ κωφὸς am ἀρχῆς" καὶ οὕτως ὅσοι ETL ὀρθὸν δοξάζουσι, πάντες αὐτὸ μετὰ λόγου φανοῦν- ται ἔχοντες, καὶ οὐδαμοῦ ἔτι ὀρθὴ δόξα χωρὶς ἐπι- στήμης γενήσεται. OEAI. ᾿Αληθῆ. ΣΏ. Μὴ τοίνυν ῥᾳδίως ’ Ν καταγιγνώσκωμεν TO μη- 4. τί ποτε βούλεται] The sub- ject is either ὁ ταῦτα λέγων (cp. infr. E: Tov ἀποφηνάμενον ém- στήμην ὃ νῦν σκοποῦμεν), or 6 λόγος, VIZ. τὸ μετὰ δόξης ἀληθοῦς λόγον προσγενόμενον τὴν τελεωτά- τὴν ἐπιστήμην γεγονέναι. τὸν λόγον... σημαίνειν] Id. qu. τὸν λόγον εἰπὼν σημαίνειν. “ What are we to understand by the term Adyos?’ Three meanings are put forward as possible : (1) Expression in words. (2) Analysis. (3) Definition. 9. ὥσπερ εἰς κάτοπτρον] Cp. Phileb. 38 D: Κἄν τίς γ᾽ αὐτῷ παρῇ; τά τε πρὸς αὑτὸν ῥηθέντα ἐντείνας εἰς φωνὴν πρὸς τὸν πα- ’ ἅτε ἃ a BAY 4 , ρόντα αὐτὰ ταῦτα ἂν πάλιν φθέγ- ξαιτο, καὶ λόγος δὴ γέγονεν οὕτως ἃ ΄ , 2 a ὃ τότε δόξαν ἐκαλοῦμεν ; 10. ἐκτυπούμενον] ‘Imaging.’ Cp. the saying of Democritus, λόγος ἔργου σκιή. For τὴν διὰ τοῦ στόματος pony cp. Tim. 75 Εἰ ; Τὸ δὲ λόγων νᾶμα ἔξω ῥέον καὶ ὑπηρετοῦν φρονήσει κάλλιστον καὶ ἄριστον πάντων να- μάτων. Soph. 263 E. 14. Οὐκοῦν] Ven. Π. and an- other MS. give οὐκοῦν αὖ. 21. καταγιγνώσκωμεν͵ ‘Accuse in our minds.’ τὸ μηδέν] ‘Nothing at all,’ 20 What is meant in it by ‘giving an account 2’ One of three things. Either, 111. a. The reflexion of thought in speech. But this is not peculiar to those who know. Or 111.-:. The enu- meration of the elemen- tary parts of the com- plex whole. 230 \ 9 , Ἀν ἀν , 3 , ἃ A ; dev εἰρηκέναι τὸν ἀποφηνάμενον ἐπιστήμην ὃ νῦν p. 206. ITAATQNOS a ByA \ ε le > a 2, 3 \ σκοπουμεν. Lows yap o λέγων ov τοῦτο ἔλεγεν, ἀλλὰ Ng id δ Χ 3 Ν » ’ τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα τί ἕκαστον δυνατὸν εἶναι τὴν ἀποκρι- Ἁ an / A » ὦ 4 σιν δια τῶν στοιχείων ἀποδοῦναι τῷ ἐρομένῳ. OEAI. Οἷον τί λέγεις, ὦ Σώκρατες : τ ΣΩ. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος περὶ ἁμάξης λέγει τὸ. ε Χ / , > e / AMF aN A > Ἂ ἐκατὸν δέ τε Oovpal’ ἁμάξης. ἃ ἐγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν , 3 - Q \ > Q\ U4 3 > Ss a δυναίμην εἰπεῖν, οἶμαι δὲ οὐδὲ σύ: GAA ἀγαπῷμεν “δ 3 ’ (of "ΑΝ Ge “ 9 5᾿ » tal av ἐρωτηθέντες ὃ Ti ἐστιν ἅμαξα, εἰ ἐχοίμεν εἰπειν 7 δ ΕΙΣ ε ͵ὕὔ 5᾽ 4 το TPOXOL, ἄξων, UTTEPTEPLA, ἀντυγες, Cuyov. SEAI. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. ε , 9 SN a σ x Ν 2Q. Ὃ δέ γε ἴσως οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμᾶς, ὥσπερ ἂν τὸ Ν Ε 3 , ’ \ gov ὄνομα ἐρωτήθεντας καὶ ἀποκρινομένους κατὰ συλλαβήν, γελοίους εἶναι, ὀρθῶς μὲν δοξάζοντας καὶ 5 ἃ ’ > \ 5. 15 λέγοντας ἃ λέγομεν, οἰομένους δὲ γραμματικοὺς εἶναι Noe. Ν , a Ν “ καὶ ἐχειν TE καὶ λέγειν γραμματικῶς τὸν τοῦ Θεαι- lA 3 / 7 X 3 3 > 3 ’ THTOV ὀνόματος λόγον. τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι ἐπιστημόνως i. 6. ‘utter nonsense.’ Cp. supr. 180 A: *“Hrrov...% τὸ μηδέν. Tim. 77 Β: ᾧ... νοῦ μέτεστι τὸ μηδέν. This is better than to take the article with the infini- tive, because the sense passes on more smoothly from καταγι- γνώσκωμεν, than if this word were used quite absolutely, Otherwise expressed, μὴ... καταγιγνώσκωμεν τοῦ. ἀποφηνα- μένου, ὡς τὸ μηδὲν εἴρηκεν. 3. τὸ ἐρωτηθέντα, «r.A.] This is suggested (μαιευτικῶς) by the preceding argument (206 A B). 6. Οἷον καὶ Ἡσίοδος] Op. et D. 454: Φησὶ δ᾽ ἀνὴρ φρένας ἀφνειὸς πήξασθαι ἅμαξαν, | νήπιος, οὐδὲ τὸ οἶδ᾽, ἔκατον δέ τε δούραθ' ἁμάξης. Cp. Arist. Met. 2. 3. g998b: Ἕτερος δ᾽ ἔσται ὁ διὰ τῶν γενῶν ὁρισμὸς καὶ ὁ λέγων ἐξ ὧν ἔστιν ἐνυπαρχόντων, 10. *imeprepia] The MSS. have ὑπερτηρία, or ὑπερτήρια. 12. Ὁ δέ γ᾽ ἴσως οἴοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡμᾶς] ὁ δέ, sc. ὁ λέγων, supr. The apodosis is deferred, as is often the case when an illustration has been introduced with éc- περ. Itis resumed with Οὕτω τοίνυν. Op. Rep. 3. 402 A: Ὥσπερ ἄρα... γραμμάτων πέρι... ἦἾΔρ᾽ οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως οὐδὲ μουσικοί, κιτιλ. 14. γελοίους εἶναι(θο. οἴοιτο) be- longs equally to the protasis and to the suppressed apodosis. Cp., for a similar interweaving of the illustration with the case illustrated, supr. 144 A C. 17. τὸ δ᾽ οὐκ εἶναι] ‘ Whereas, he would say, it is impossible.’ Cp. 157 B: Τὸ δ᾽ οὐ δεῖ, and note, OEAITHTOS. 231 y re Oe \ Ἂ ὃ \ a é \ A ΡῬ. 207. OUOEV EVELV, πριν AV OLA τῶν OTOLV ELV μέτα TNS > a / a / Ψ \ 93 ~ ἀληθοῦς δόξης ἕκαστον περαίνῃ Tis, ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ld Τὰ πρόσθεν που ἐρρήθη. / ’ ΘΕΑΙ. ἜἘρρηθη yap. ’ al LQ. Οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ περὶ ἁμάξης ἡμᾶς μὲν op- ἣν yay , Ἂ \ x “- ε x 3 / / . Onv ἔχειν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ dia τῶν ἑκατὸν ἐκείνων δυνά- a Ss ὧς \ 3 7 / A ο μενον διελθεῖν αὐτῆς THY οὐσίαν, προσλαβόντα τοῦτο, ͵ ’ a 4 λόγον τε προσειληφέναι τῇ ἀληθεῖ δόξῃ καὶ ἀντὶ al / , δοξαστικοῦ τεχνικόν τε Kal ἐπιστήμονα περὶ ἁμάξης , \ ri οὐσίας γεγονέναι, διὰ στοιχείων TO ὅλον περάναντα. το ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐκοῦν εὖ δοκεῖ σοι, ὦ Σώκρατες ; 5 a - ’ Ν 2Q. Ei σοί, ὦ ἑταῖρε, δοκεῖ, καὶ ἀποδέχει τὴν διὰ ,ὔ ὃ ’ ὃ Ἀν. 6 7 λό 5 \ δὲ στοιχείου διέξοδον περὶ ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ XN \ xX \ 4 vad y Ε] 7 we κατὰ συλλαβὰς ἢ καὶ κατὰ μεῖζον ert ἀλογίαν, τοῦτό σι / Φ“ 5" Ss ON >’ A Ὁ μοι λέγε, ἵν αὐτὸ ἐπισκοπῶμεν. 15 > \ , , OEAI. ᾿Αλλὰ πάνυ ἀποδέχομαι. / e 4 ’ 5 A 2Q. Llorepov ἡγούμενος ἐπιστήμονα εἶναι ὁντινοῦν a 7 Ν \ \ \ a A A A ὁτουοῦν, ὅταν TO AUTO OTE μὲν TOU αὐτοῦ δοκῇ αὐτῷ 3 \ \ o& Ἂ σ A aA \ \ εἶναι, τοτὲ δὲ ETEPOV, ἢ καὶ ὅταν τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μὲν oS \ Ne. / ἕτερον, τοτὲ δὲ ἕτερον δοξάζῃ; 20 Ν y OEAI. Ma Δί οὐκ ἔγωγε. 9 3 ἴω ΕῚ A A , 2Q.. Eira ἀμνημονεῖς ἐν τῇ τῶν γραμμάτων μα- , . 5» ᾿ , N Se oy -- θησει κατ᾽ ἀρχὰς σαυτὸν τε καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους δρῶντας ’ αὐτα: ΘΕΑΙ. ἾΑρα λέγεις τῆς αὐτῆς συλλαβῆς τοτὲ μὲν 25 2. ἐν τοῖς πρόσθεν] 206 A: 18. τὸ αὐτὸ ὁτὲ μὲν. .] Eug. Ὡς οὐδὲν ἄλλο μανθάνων διετέλεσας, thinking τ to be the first letter KT] As. * both of re and θεὲ. For the 11. εὖ] Sc. οἴεσθαι, from oto’ construction cp. Phed. 59 A, ἄν, supr. A. supr. 192 Ὁ 12. Εἰ σοί] εἰ is interrogative, IQ. τοῦ αὐτοῦ τοτὲ μέν] E.g depending on τοῦτό μοι λέγε. thinking the first letter of θε 16. αὐτό] ‘Your answer.’ at one time 6, at another τ. 17. Πότερον, x.r.d.] Cp. Soph. 24. αὐτά] ‘ What I have de- 228A. scribed.’ But I may perform this rightly in the case of Theetetus’ name, and yet mistake in the first syllable of Theodorus’, though it is the same in both. This is not to know the syllable. 15 232 IAATONOS ΄ Ν δὲ Y e Va f. Q Ν i τερον, ΤΟΤΕ OE ETEPOY ἡγουμένους γράμμα, καὶ TO p. 207 3 \ \ 9 \ lf \ \ AUTO TOTE μεν εἰς THY προσηκουσαν, ToTE δὲ εἰς ἄλλην ἢ τιθέντας συλλαβήν ; ΣΏ. Ταῦτα λέγω. 5. GOEAI. Ma A? οὐ τοίνυν ἀμνημονῶ, οὐδέ γέ πω e an Ε] , Ἁ γουμαι ET ιστασ. θαι TOUS οὕτως ἔχοντας. , tats 7 > “ / a 2Q. Τίοὖν ; ὅταν ev τῷ τοιουτῳ καιρῷ Θεαίτητον ’ὔ’ lal 3 RA “ γράφων τις θῆτα καὶ εἶ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ ΄ὕ \ > Θ , ὃ 3 A ΄ὕ A \ γράψῃ, καὶ αὖ Θεόδωρον ἐπιχειρῶν γράφειν ταῦ καὶ Si ἢ / - ͵7 ͵΄ > 10 εἰ οἴηταί τε δεῖν γράφειν καὶ γράψῃ, ap’ ἐπίστασθαι ’ 3. AN Ν Hp A , φήσομεν αὐτὸν τὴν πρώτην τῶν ὑμετέρων ὀνομάτων συλλαβήν ; ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αλλ’ ἄρτι ὡμολογήσαμεν τὸν οὕτως yx 4 5.7 ἐχοντὰ μήπω εἰδεναι. 7 53 , 202. Κωλύει οὖν τι καὶ περὶ τὴν δευτέραν συλλα- \ Ν / \ / “ yf \ , Bnv και TPLTHV Kal TETAPTHV OUTWS EXELV TOV αὐτὸν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Οὐδέν γε. ΣΏ. *Ap’ οὖν τότε τὴν διὰ στοιχείου διέξοδον ἔχων γράψει Θεαίτητον μετὰ ὀρθῆς δόξης, ὅταν ἑξῆς 20 γράφῃ ; ΘΕΑΙ. Δῆλον δή. 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ἔτι ἀνεπιστήμων ὦν, ὀρθὰ δὲ δοξά- 5 Cov, ὡς φαμέν; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. 7. ἐν... καιρῷ] Se. κατ' ἀρχὰς τῆς τῶν γραμμάτων μαθήσεως, 17. Οὐδέν γε] Se. κωλύει. ‘Certainly not.’ γε assents to the meaning of the question, Cp. Phil. 38 A: Οὐδέν γε. ἀλλ᾽ ἅπερ ἀκούω λέγω. 18. ἾΔρ᾽ οὖν, κιτιλ. | “Soc. Then in writing out correctly the word Thectetus, he will do so not only with right opinion, but with command of the enu- meration of elements; will he not? Zh. Clearly he will. Soc. Andthat while still without knowledge, though with right opinion. Is not that what we say? Zh. Yes. Soc. And yet with definition added to right opinion, For he wrote with command of the way through the elements; and this we ad- mitted to be knowledge.’ Ρ. 20% i ), 208. D OEAITHTO2. 233 TQ. Λόγον ye ἔχων pera ὀρθῆς δόξης. τὴν yap διὰ τοῦ στοιχείου ὁδὸν ἔχων ἔγραφεν, ἣν δὴ λόγον ὡμολογήσαμεν. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθῆ. DQ. Ἔστιν ἄρα, ὦ ἑταῖρε, μετὰ λόγου ὀρθὴ δόξα, ἃ 2, ra) 7 a nV οὕπω δεῖ ἐπιστήμην καλεῖν. ΘΕΑΛΙ. Κινδυνεύει. ͵ / e , 3 / 9 / SQ. Ὄναρ δή, ὡς ἔοικεν, ἐπλουτήσαμεν οἰηθέντες a N > / > / / x iy ἔχειν Tov ἀληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. ἢ μήπω aA A > qn J 3 ει e ἴω κατηγορῶμεν ; ἴσως γὰρ οὐ τοῦτο τις aUTOY οριεῖται, %S rt 4 ©e Co 7 a ο ἀλλὰ τὸ λοιπὸν εἶδος τῶν τριῶν, ὧν ἐν γέ TL ἐεφαμεν Ν Ν᾿ / , / 5 λόγον θήσεσθαι τὸν ἐπιστήμην ὁριζόμενον δόξαν εἶναι ὀρθὴν μετὰ λόγου. an e 3 A , Ἁ ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Ορθῶς ὑπέμνησας" ἔτι γὰρ ἕν λοιπόν. τὸ \ \ 53 ΕΣ ΤΣ “ι " \ » μὲν yap ἦν διανοίας ἐν φωνῇ ὥσπερ εἰδωλον, τὸ ὃ Ν \ ἃ ἄρτι λεχθὲν διὰ στοιχείου ὁδὸς ἐπὶ τὸ ὅλον" τὸ δὲ δὴ ’ 7 τρίτον τί λέγεις ; SQ. Ὅπερ ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ εἴποιεν, τὸ ἔχειν τι ση- μεῖον εἰπεῖν ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. ΘΕΑΙ. Οἷον τίνα τίνος ἔχεις μοι λόγον εἰπεῖν ; LQ. Οἷον, εἰ βούλει, ἡλίου πέρι ἱκανὸν οἶμαί σοι 8. Ὄναρ... ἐπλουτήσαμεν͵] Cp. Polit. 277 D: Κινδυνεύει γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστος οἷον ὄναρ εἰδὼς ἅπαντα, πάντ᾽ αὖ πάλιν ὥσπερ ὕπαρ ἀγνο- ew. 278E: Ἵνα ὕπαρ ἀντ᾽ ὀνεί- patos ἡμῖν γίγνηται. Lys. 218 C. The expression is proverbial, and there is no distinct refer- ence to the ‘dream’ of Socrates. supr. zor D. 9. ἐπιστήμης λόγον͵] λόγος is used here in a double sense. (1) ‘ Definition of Knowledge.’ Cp. 148 Ὁ: ‘Evi λόγῳ προσειπεῖν. (2) That ‘account’ of a thing which (with right opinion) con- stitutes Knowledge. The play of words may be preserved: ‘when we thought we had found the most indubitable “account” concerning Know- ledge.’ 10. τις] Viz. the nameless author of our theory. 18. Ὅπερ ἂν of πολλοὶ εἴποιεν] The two former were inferences from different meanings of λέ- yew ;—‘to express’ and ‘to enu- merate. See 206 D: Tov γοῦν αὐτὸ δρῶντα λέγειν φαμέν. 20. ἱκανὸν. ἀποδέξασθαι] ‘Suf- ficient to obtain your assent.’ ἀποδέξασθαι is an epexegetic infinitive. σι μι 5 20 Or, lastly, III, y. The power of adding a mark which distin- guishes it from all other things. 1.6, Definition by the cha- racteristic difference, or by the 234 ITAATONOS ‘ aoe ae εἶναι ἀποδέξασθαι, 6 ὅτι τὸ λαμπρότατόν ἐ ἐστι τῶν κατὰ Ρ. 208 istinctive | elements, TOV οὐρανὸν ἰόντων περὶ γῆν. ΘΕΑΙ. Πάνυ μὲν οὖν. 2Q. Λαβὲ τ οὗ χάριν εἴρηται. ἐστι δὲ ὅπερ ἄρτι δ ἐλέγομεν, ὡς ἄρα τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου ἂν λαμβάνῃς : τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει, λόγον, ὡς Reds TES Ἄγε ἕως δ᾽ ἂν κοινοῦ τινὸς ἐφάπτῃ, ἐ ἐκείνων πέρι σοι ἔσται ὁ λόγος ὧν ἂν ἡ κοινότης ἢ. SEAT. Mavéave: καί μοι δοκεῖ καλῶς ἴ ἔχειν λόγον = ιο τὸ τοιοῦτον καλεῖν. XQ. Ὃς δ᾽ ἂν μετ᾽ ὀρθῆς δόξης περὶ ὁτουοῦν τῶν ὄντων τὴν Sapopay τῶν ἄλλων προσλάβῃ αὐτοῦ, ἐπιστήμων γεγονὼς ἔσται οὗ πρότερον ἦν δοξα- στής. 1 OEAI. Φαμέν γε μὴν οὕτως. Even this ποτόν ΣΩ. Nov δῆτα, ὦ Θεαίτητε, παντάπασιν ἔγωγε us on a nearer ἐπειδὴ ἐγγὺς ὥσπερ σκιαγβαφημητ γέγονα τοῦ Aghia λεγομένου, ξυνίημι οὐδὲ σμικρόν" ἕως δὲ ἀφεστήκη πόρρωθεν, epawen τί μοι λέγεσθαι. 9 ΘΕᾺΑΙ. Iles τί τοῦτο; - Ν 4 3 2Q. Φράσω, ἐὰν οἷός τε γένωμαι. ὀρθὴν ἔγωγε p. 20 y / Ἂς “ aN \ ¢ ‘N 5 ἐχων δόξαν περὶ σοῦ, ἐὰν μὲν προσλάβω τὸν 4. Λαβέ] 1. e. μάθε, ‘Let me ᾿Επιστήμων ἂν εἴην, ὧνπερ ai- explain to you,’ σθητής. 6, ὥς φασί τινες] The τινες 17. σκιαγραφήματος] Cp. Pheed. are certainly Socratics, and 69 B: Μὴ σκιαγραφία τις ἢ ἡ probably the Megarians are τοιαύτη ἀρετῆ. Rep. 2. 365 O, meant. (See Introduction.) Ἴ. 523 B, 40, δ Soph. 12. αὐτοῦ,] This punctuation 235 EH, Parm. 165 α The appears preferable when it is illusion of σκιαγραφία depended observed that there has been a on. distance, and the picture tendency in the last few pages would seem unmeaning from to accumulate genitives, τὴν close at hand. Soph. Fr. 773 διαφορὰν αὐτοῦ τῶν ἄλλων, “ Its (N.): Πόρρω δὲ λεύσσων, ἐγγύθεν distinction from other things.’ δὲ πᾶς τυφλός. Others join αὐτοῦ ἐπιστήμων. 20. Πῶς τί τοῦτο] ‘ What do 13. δοξαστής] Cp. 160 D; you mean? and why is it 80%” =. are tna bt SEAITHTOS. ψ μόνον. OEAI. Nai. 235 . 200. σὸν λόγον, γιγνώσκω δή σε, εἰ δὲ μή, δοξάζω ΣΩ. Λόγος δέ γε ἦν ἡ τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος ἑρμηνεία. ΘΕΑΙ. Οὕτως. ΣΏ. “Hvik’ οὖν ἐδόξαζον μόνον, ἄλλο τι ᾧ τῶν 3 / na ἄλλων διαφέρεις, τούτων οὐδενὸς ἡπτόμην τῇ δια- , VOLE 3 é GEAI. Οὐκ ἔοικεν. 2Q. Τῶν κοινῶν τι ἄρα διενοούμην, ὧν οὐδὲν σὺ μᾶλλον 7 τις ἄλλος ἔχει. OEAL. ᾿Ανάγκη. ΣΏ. Φέρε δὴ πρὸς Διός: πῶς ποτὲ ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ σὲ μᾶλλον ἐδόξαζον ἢ ἄλλον ὁντινοῦν ; θὲς γάρ με γι maak yy Ὁ / ἃ a 53 διανοούμενον ὡς ἔστιν οὗτος Θεαίτητος, ὃς ἂν ἢ τε δ, ae en eee \ \ / N ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔχῃ ῥῖνα καὶ ὀφθαλμοὺς καὶ στόμα καὶ 2 NN Φ, A an oe 5 ¢e 7 οὕτω δὴ EV ἕκαστον τῶν μελῶν. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διάνοια ,, » Ὁ “ / Τὸ ΕΝ J ἐσθ᾽ ὅ τι μᾶλλον ποιήσει με Θεαίτητον ἢ Θεόδωρον a x‘ A 7 a Ἁ 59 διανοεῖσθαι, ἢ τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν τὸν ἐσχατον ; ΘΕΑΙ. Τί γάρ; 1. δή] According to the hypothesis, 4. ἦν] ‘Is,’ according to the hypothesis. τῆς σῆς διαφορότητος] ‘Of your differentia.’ Plato affects this abstract termination. Cp. esp. δικαιότης, Prot. 331 B, Gorg. 508 A. 7. @ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρεις, Tov- tov οὐδενός] It occurs to_So- crates while speaking that the ‘ Difference’ of one person from another is not one but many. Hence the inexact correlation. 12. ἤτις ἄλλος ἔχει] The verb (ἔχεις) is attracted by τις ἄλλος, 20. τῶν λεγομένων Μυσῶν The phrase Μυσῶν ἔσχατος is strengthened by the insertion of the article. The earlier editors (under protest from Buttmann) read τὸ λεγόμενον. There is no reason for this. Cp. supr. 173 D: Οἱ τῆς θαλάττης λεγόμενοι xdes, Arist. Eth. N. 8, 3: Δεῖ yap τοὺς λεγομένους ἅλας συναναλῶσαι. In the examples quoted by the Scholiast the proverb is used to express con- tempt. Here it rather conveys the notion of indifference, 5 Io μι 5 20 For unless I can dis- tinguish Theztetus from Socra- tes and every one else, how can I be said to have a right opinion of him? If then by the compre- hension of a true account is meant ‘right opinion of the distinc- tive differ- ence,’ this is a neces- sary part of right opinion. 236 ΣΏΩ. *AAN ἐὰν σ a ὁσοι τοιοῦτοι : 5 ΘΒΑΙ. Ovdd. 3 , 5 i , 2Q, ᾿Αλλ’ ov πρότερόν ye, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν > \ / Ἂς x e / 4 a 57 ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλ- / < \ 7’ Me “ λων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διαάφορόν τι μνημεῖον > Ν => , a 3 παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται,---καὶ τᾶλλα οὕτως ἕξ το 53 / ἃ Sto \ aN + > / roe€ ὧν εἰ ov,—[n] ἐμε, καὶ ἐὰν αὔριον ἀπαντήσω, 3 / \ , > A is Q a ἀναμνήσει καὶ ποιήσει ὀρθὰ δοξάζειν περὶ σοῦ. ΘΕΑΙ. ᾿Αληθέστατα. ΣΏ. Περὶ τὴν διαφορότητα ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὀρθὴ δόξα νυ ἂν εἴη ἑκάστου πέρι. 2. τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξόφθαλ- μον] Supr. 143 E. In Xen. Cyr. 1.9 ἐξόφθαλμος is opposed to κοιλόφθαλμος. But in Ar. H. A. 1. 8. ὃ 5 the words ἐκτός and ἐντός seem rather to refer to the position of the eyes. 8. μνημεῖον. . . ἐνσημηναμένη] Cp. 191 D, 192 A, 194 C, 196 A. The theory which has been rejected is still permitted and intended by Plato to leave an impression on the mind. 10. εἶ σύ,---- [ἢ] ἐμέ, καί] Bod]. εἶ σὺ ἐμὲ kai: Ven. Ξ. et pr. I. .. ἥμε εἶ σὺ ἣ ἐμὲ καί : Ces, elon ἐμὲ καὶ: Ven. Ξ. yp. οἴση eye: cett. elon ἐμὲ καί. The reading is uncertain. That adopted in the text is the most plausible which can be said to rest on MS. authority. ἢ refers back to αὕτη ἡ σιμότης, passing over τἄλλα οὕτως ἐξ ὧν εἶ σύ, which is added διὰ μέσου and answers to ἐξόφθαλμον in the previous sentence, Heindorf’s conjecture, 6, re- ITAATOQNOZ NN \ , Νὴ y+ en Q all On μὴ μόνον τὸν ἔχοντα ῥῖνα καὶ Ρ. 20 3 Χ a \ \ ah 4 οφθαλμοὺς διανοηθῶ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν σιμόν τε καὶ ἐξ- © / "t \ 3 a 7 Δ NN xX οῴθαλμον, μὴ τι σὲ αὖ μᾶλλον δοξάσω ἣ ἐμαυτὸν 7) ferring to μνημεῖον, is unsatis- factory, because it is rather the object of sense, which, by fitting — the μνημεῖον, would be said to remind. Hence ἃ ἐμὲ καί (ad- opted by Wagner) would seem a fair emendation. But a still simpler line of conjecture is to suppose, asin my former edition (1861), ἐμὲ καί in the Bodleian reading to have been trans- posed from kat ἐμέ. This gives the same meaning (the sentence as usual passing out of the re- lative construction), and ac- counts naturally for the corrup- tion. If this emendation is right, the sentence must be supposed to revert by a con- versational licence to the indi- cative mood. Op. supr. 149 D: Ποιεῖν καὶ, ἀμβλίσκουσιν, and note. Schleiermacher’s conjec- ture, 7 ἐμέ, κιτιλ., leaves the subject of ἁ ἀναμνήσει doubtful. That of the Zurich editors, εἴσει σὺ ἐμέ, καὶ ἐμέ, introduces an abrupt and awkward inversion, OEAI. Φαίνεταί ye. OEAITHTOS. 237 ΣΩ. Td οὖν Bafa ici λόγον τῇ ὀρθῇ δόξῃ τί ἂν ἔτι εἴη ; εἰ μὲν γὰρ προσδοξάσαι λέγει 7 ἢ διαφέρει aA 7 , Vg , £) 35 of TL τῶν ἄλλων, πάνυ γελοία γίγνεται ἡ ἐπίταξις. ΘΗΑΙ. [as : XQ. “Ov ὀρθὴν δόξαν ἔχομεν ἣ τῶν ἄλλων δια- φέρει, τούτων προσλαβεῖν κελεύει ἡμᾶς ὀρθὴν δόξαν © ~ δ, , e , Ἂ ἢ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει. καὶ οὕτως ἡ μὲν σκυτάλης ἢ e 7 \ of \ vf ἃ \ 4 Χ ὑπέρου ἢ ὅτου δὴ λέγεται περιτροπὴ πρὸς ταύτην τὴν 3 5ῸΝ Ἂ a \ / Ων ἐπίταξιν οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι, τυφλοῦ δὲ παρακέλευσις ἂν Qn , x μὰ a “A καλοῖτο δικαιότερον: TO yap, ἃ ἔχομεν, ταῦτα προσ- “ 4 ’ ε “λαβεῖν κελεύειν, ἵνα μάθωμεν ἃ δοξάζομεν, πάνυ γεν- ’ yf 5 J VQALMS EOLKEV EO KOT@LEVO. OEAI. ἘΞ εἴ γε δή τι viv δὴ ὡς ἐρῶν ἐπύθου ; And the use of οἶδα in this sense is questionable. 9. ὑπέρου... περιτροπή] ἐπὶ τῶν τὰ αὐτὰ ποιούντων πολλάκις καὶ μηδὲν ἀνυόντων, ἢ ἐπὶ τῶν ταχέως τι πραττόντων. μέμνηται δὲ αὐτῆς Φιλήμων ἐν Ἥρωσι καὶ ἐνταῦθα Πλάτων. (Schol. ) Io. οὐδὲν ἂν λέγοι] 1.6. λῆρος ἂν εἴ. Cp. Phedo, 72 B, Legg. 3. 698 A: Aéyovres ae ὅτι λῆρος πρὸς χρυσόν τε καὶ dp- γυρόν ἐστιν ἑκάστοτε τὰ λεγόμενα τίμια καὶ καλὰ κατὰ πόλιν. 12. πάνυ γενναίως. ἐσκοτω- μένῳ] Cp. esp. Rep. 8. 558C: Ἢ δὲ συγγνώμη . . adris'—Tldvv, ἔφη, γενναία. 14. ***+tei ye dn] Sothe Bod- leian MS. (but with no accents by the first hand.) Ven. T. has εἶπέ, with the rest, except Vat. A, which has εἰ δέ. The Bod- ᾿ leian continues without punc- tuation from ἐσκοτωμένῳ, and accents as above. But the ac- cents appear to have been added by a later hand. Is it possible some words may have slipped out? such as Ti οὖν δή ; εἴ ye δή Te —‘ Well, what then? If, as I presume, your question just now’ (supr. D) ‘prepared the way for some announcement.’ The reading of Vat. A (εἰ δὲ δή .. Ti, «7.A.) admits of being rendered, however: ‘ Well, but if— what were you just now going to say, when you asked the question?’ Most of the editors give Εἰπέ. The ques- tion referred to is τὸ οὖν προσ- λαβεῖν... τί ἂν ἔτι ein; ~=This is a little difficult; «nd Badham, reading Ei δέ, most ingeniously conjectures τί viv δὴ ὡς ἕτερον ὑπέθου, 1. 6. ‘what was the sup- pressed alternative implied by your use of pev?’ But ὑποτίθε- σθαι elsewhere refers to a dis- tinctly expressed postulate or condition (Rep. 1. 346 B), and if it could be used of something merely implied, the imperfect tense would be, required in such a reference. πυθέσθαι and μὲ oO But if it means, ‘ Know- ledge of the distino- tive differ- ence,’ the term Knowledge remains still un- analysed. Though Theztetus has brought forth more than he knew was in him, the art of So- crates has hitherto re- jected all, 238 ITTAATOQNOS \ 5 A A A 20. Ei τὸ λόγον, ὦ παῖ, προσλαβεῖν γνῶναι κε- λεύει, ἀλλὰ μὴ δοξάσαι τὴν διαφορότητα, ἡδὺ χρῆμ᾽ xX 5 an 7 a Ἄν , 7 X av en Tov καλλίστου τῶν περὶ erlaTnpns λόγου. τὸ \ an 3 i an 3 7 53 7 γὰρ γνῶναι ἐπιστήμην που λαβεῖν ἐστίν. ἢ yap; ΘΕΑΙ. Nai. a »y “ 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ἐρωτηθείς, ὡς ἔοικε, τί ἐστιν ἐπι- Vd 3 ΄“ Φ δό 3 θὴ Ν ’ / Oo TRY, απ OKPLVELTQL OTL ὀξα op Ὦ μέτα ἐπισ ΤΉ μη Ὁ διαφορότητος. λόγου γὰρ πρόσληψις τοῦτ᾽ ἂν εἴη 23> a ΚΑΤ €KELVOV. OEAI. Ἔοικεν. 20. Καὶ παντάπασί ye εὔηθες, ζητούντων ἡμῶν 3 / l , 3 \ 5 at) ἢ ἐπιστημην, δόξαν φάναι ὀρθὴν εἶναι per ἐπιστημὴς 5) ὃ , Ry, ε A 3) yf 5 εἰτε διαφορότητος εἴτε ὁτουοῦν. οὔτε apa αἰσθησις, ὦ Θεαίτητε, οὔτε δόξα ἀληθὴς οὔτε μετ᾽ ἀληθοῦς OEAI. Οὐκ ἔρικεν. 15 δόξης λόγος προσγιγνόμενος ἐπιστήμη ἂν εἴη. SQ. Ἦ οὖν ἔτι κυοῦμέν τι καὶ ὠδίνομεν, ὦ φίλε, Nye ged , Ἃ ie 3 , πέρι ἐπιστημῆς, ἢ TAVTA ἐκτετοκαμεν ; ΘΕΑΙ. Καὶ ναὶ μὰ A’ ἔγωγε πλείω ἢ ὅσα εἶχον 3 > a \ Nor, 20 ἐν ἐμαυτῷ δια σὲ εἴρηκα. » σ΄ A Ἁ ’ὕ e Ἁ ΕἸ νας 2Q. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μὲν πάντα ἡ μαιευτικὴ ἡμῖν ἢ 5 as ΄. Q 3 3᾽ τέχνη ἀνεμιαία φησι γεγενῆσθαι καὶ οὐκ ἄξια Tpo- φῆς; SEAI. Παντάπασι μὲν οὖν. ἐρέσθαι are nearly synonymous in Plato. Thestetus very pro- perly recals Socrates from his unwonted discursiveness, Mr. Paley reads εἶα δή, τί νῦν δή, κιτιλ. 2. ἡδὺ χρῆμ᾽ ἂν εἴη τοῦ] The genitive is due to a sort of at- tractive ethical force in ἡδύ, ep. ἄτοπα τῆς σμικρολογίας above. Soph. Phil. 81 : ᾿Αλλ’ ἡδὺ γάρ τοι κτῆμα τῆς νίκης λαβεῖν. ‘An amusing sort of creature does our fairest of the accownts of knowledge prove !’ 7. ἀποκρινεῖται] Sc. ὁ λόγος, 12. φάναι] ἐκεῖνον sc. The absurdity is in fact the same as in Thesetetus’ first attempt, supr. 147 Β, 17. For the rst pers. plural cp. supr. 154D. It may be called the good physician’s figure,—oyipa ἰατρικόν. 19. Kai ναὶ μὰ Δί᾽ ἔγωγε πλείω] , 210. OEAITHTOS. 239 9 \ , y Ν A ’ , 3 2Q. ᾽Εὰν τοίνυν ἄλλων μετὰ ταῦτα ἐγκύμων ἐπι- © χειρῆς γίγνεσθαι. ὦ Θεαί --- ἐάν τε γί βελτιό- χειρῃς γίγνεσθαι, ὦ Θεαίτητε,---ἐάν τε γίγνῃ, βελτιό »» Ν [Z ὃ Ν \ a 55“, 5. \ νῶν evel TANpHS διὰ THY νῦν ἐξέτασιν, ἐάν τε κενὸς 5 @ 3) Χ a “ ἢ , NS, ἧττον ἔσει βαρὺς τοῖς συνοῦσι καὶ ἡμερώτερος, , 3 Sule RAZ ἃ \ 5 A σωφρονως οὐκ οἰόμενος εἰδέναι ἃ μὴ οἶσθα. τοσοῦτον \ /, ΕΝ / / 7 \ >Q?7 IQ? γὰρ μόνον ἢ ἐμὴ τέχνη δύναται, πλέον δὲ οὐδέν, οὐδέ 5 © € 5.) Ψ 7 Ν , 3 TL οἶδα ὧν οἱ ἄλλοι, ὅσοι μεγάλοι καὶ θαυμάσιοι av- / Ν , Χ \ / / Opes εἰσί τε καὶ γεγόνασι. τὴν δὲ μαιείαν ταύτην ϑ ’ὔ’ Q e 4 3 A 3 » ς A “ ἐγὼ TE Καὶ ἢ μητηρ ἐκ θεοῦ ἐλάχομεν, ἡ μὲν τῶν 7 A \ 53 καλοὶ. νῦν μὲν οὖν ’ὔ Ἁ Sah βασιλέως στοὰἂν ἐπὶ A Sa 8 \ a , Ν [4 Ν᾿ Ὁ Ὁ γυναικῶν, ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν νέων τε καὶ γενναίων καὶ ὅσοι 3 τ Ἁ a ἁπαντητέον μοι εἰς THY TOD τὴν Μελήτου γραφήν, ἣν με Ss 4 A γέγραπται: ἕωθεν δέ, ὦ Θεόδωρε, δεῦρο πάλιν ἀπαν- τῶμεν. καὶ πλείω, ‘even more:’—val μὰ Δί᾽ ἔγωγε is interposed. I, “Eay.. ἐάν τε... ἐάν τε] For this hypothesis within hypo- thesis cp. supr.147 A, and note. ἐάν Te... ἐάν τε are correlatives. ‘Then, Theetetus, should you go about hereafter to con- ceive afresh,—whether you do conceive, your state will be the more promising for what you have now gone through, or whether you remain barren, you will be gentler and less offensive to those about you, for you will be too modest to think that you know what you do not know.’ 9. ἐκ θεοῦ] θεός is here ge- neralised. Cp. supr. 149 B, 150 Ο, 10. ὅσοι καλοί] Supr. 185 ἘΠ: Ὃ γὰρ καλῶς λέγων καλός τε κἀ- γαθός. The word accentuates Socrates’ satisfaction with The- etetus. Cp. supr. 142 C: Πάνυ ἀγασθῆναι αὐτοῦ τὴν φύσιν. 11. τὴν τοῦ βασιλέως στοάν] Τη- dictments for impiety were laid before the ἄρχων βασιλεύς, who was the representative of the ancient kings in their capacity of High-Priest, as the Rex Sa- crificulus was at Rome. (Smith’s Dict. of Ant.) It is at thig point that the Euthyphro is supposed to open. 13. ἕωθεν δέ, K.T.A. | These words may have originally be- longed to the dialogue without implying the promise of a con- tinuation. Cp. Lach. sub fin, 5 But the youth is cured of thinking that he knows what he does not know. Beer ENDIX A, Heraclitus and Parmenides. As after-ages saw amongst Plato’s contemporaries distinctions which were only partially developed in his time, so in a less degree, and with the difference which his genius implies, Plato viewed the past through a generalization and an antithesis. Heraclitus and Empedocles, and from another point of view Pro- tagoras, were the representatives of one tendency, Parmenides and his followers, of the contrary one. The opposition between them is that between rest and motion, unity and diversity, absolute _ and relative, universal and particular, finite and infinite, positive and negative, between knowledge and opinion, ideas or concep- tions and impressions. : In endeavouring to conceive what Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Protagoras really were, it is necessary to divest our minds of this contrasted form under which we are led to think of them in reading Plato. It would only be an approximation towards a true estimate to Earlier say that Parmenides represents the idea of unity, being, or rest, Heraclitus that of dualism, of a process, or motion, and Pythagoras that of harmony and order, or definite proportions, as intermediate between the other two. Philosophy was yet too near its origin for its streams to have diverged very far. As we come nearer to those early thinkers, we find that they had more in common than we supposed. They have a common mythological element, the atmosphere in which __ their thoughts move, and which they strive to pierce, although it veils their meaning partly from themselves ; inhaled by some in | _ the Greek and Sicilian valleys, by some, perhaps in earlier purity, on the Eastern plains, but in all finding its highest sensuous em- bodiment in the Sun or Fire. The notion of Δίκη is common to Heraclitus and Parmenides, the εἱμαρμένη of the one is paralleled by the ἀνάγκη of the other, R 242 APPENDIX A ἃ The endeavour to pierce this veil of language’ is accompanied in all of them by a melancholy scepticism and contempt for the com- mon opinions of men. The words of Plato in the Phzedo, οἱ πολλοὶ ψηλαφῶντες ὥσπερ ἐν σκότῳ, might have been applied by any of the earlier philosophers to the condition of men, who believe the testi- mony of their senses before that of reason, and cling to their own narrow thoughts instead of being conformed to the law of Nature or Being. 7 With this scepticism is combined in all of them what may be termed an ideal Pantheism: the speculative and religious intellect filling the void of observation with the intensity of its own early thought*. All that is particular owes its being to Wrong, in the universal alone is harmony and righteousness and peace. The world of opinion is a world of ‘nought and night;’ the ful- ness of being is absolute, and commensurate with thought. The nature of things, says Philolaus, belongs to divine, and not to human knowledge. Such being the ground colours more or less discernible throughout the philosophy of the sixth century B.c., what were the distinguish- ing features by which they were relieved? It is now proposed to consider this in the case of Heraclitus and (more briefly) of Par- menides; aid it may be remarked in passing, that, historically speaking, it does not seem very probable that either of these phi- losophers pursued his reflections with direct reference to the other. The idea of the History of Philosophy is a little apt to intercept our view of the History itself. As a Platonist sees in the Ionian and Eleatic two opposite poles, so the Hegelian is tempted to trace the progress of thought from Parmenides to Heraclitus, while a Kantian may view the Eleatic transcendentalism as the higher. Such thoughts may supply a valuable theory, but they are not strictly historical. Parmenides and Heraclitus were nearly contemporary, Heraclitus being the earlier of the two: they lived far apart, and were subject to different influences. Heraclitus. 1, Heraclitus of Ephesus was an Eastern Greek, and it is ποῦ merely fanciful to find an analogy between his thoughts and — the more dreamy speculations of the remoter East. But they have a greater interest for the student of philosophy, not only as having contributed primarily to the speculative impulse of the Greek mind, but as permanently valuable in themselves, and anti- cipating some of the most fruitful of modern ideas. Bacon drew τ Op. Parmen, : ‘Naodpeva κροτάφων ἄπο χερσὶ καλύπτρας. 2 Τὸ γὰρ mAcov ἐστὶ νόημα, Parmen, hae 2 ee Ree SRT ARASE TS LO e Ne PelY Νς ζει “μὰ Nasa a na > ae bie i τ = een bi ΒΥ Ἷ , . / APPENDIX A. 243 from them some of his happiest expressions ; and Hegel professed to have embodied in his own Logic every principle which they contained. ‘The voice of the Sibyl,’ says Heraclitus, ‘although its notes be harsh and rude, yet penetrates to a thousand years.’ This pregnant saying may be well applied to the obscure utterances of Heraclitus himself. Half understood even by his own followers, imperfectly appreciated by Plato and Aristotle, he exercised a wide-spread influence, second only to that of Parmenides in its intensity. Caught up afresh by the Stoics and N eo-platonists, and by the Fathers of the Christian Church, and read by them in the light of deeper wants, his words received a new interest from their sublime spirit of awe and sadness. And thus many of them have been preserved to us; and reveal in dim and broken outline the proportions of a most noble and far-seeing intellect. It is the common fate of great thinkers in an early time, that for the most part only the negative side of their teaching ‘lives after them.’ One reason is, that it is the most distinct and intelligible to themselves and their contemporaries. Deep intuitions, but unsubstantial, though clothed in palpable imagery; anticipations, vague and unsupported by proof, of the human mind, dreaming on thoughts to come, partly become engulfed by time, partly remain dead and fruitless and unknown, until their meaning is revealed by the development of cognate thoughts in distant ages, and a late sympathy detects what is hidden there in germ. So the doctrine of Heraclitus, which undoubtedly contained an element of order and unity, if not of rest, and had been as ideal as any, was degraded to be the support of the doctrine of sense, although it again enters to restore the balance of philosophy when in danger of being bound fast in the Eleatic One}. Heraclitus himself had followed in the wake of previous thinkers. As the emigrant Xenophanes had ‘looked up to the vault of heaven and said that the Oue was God,’ so Thales had looked forth on the expanse of the Algean and said that Water was the All, with a vague sense that Nature must be simple and all-pervading. The tendency of his successors had been towards the idea of an homo- geneous Infinite. Heraclitus rose to the conception of Nature as a universal ever-acting Law. He felt deeply the falseness and contradictoriness of sensation and opinion, not because he contrasted their objects with that of knowledge, but because he felt that these are presented as being * Thus the dialectic of Plat. Rep. 6 is a sort of ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω pia, See also the Sophist and Parmenides. : R 2 e 244 APPENDISCV SS something in themselves,—‘ not fluctuating but fixed,’-—and not as moments in the Universal Process. This is itself unseen, but is symbolised in several ways. ‘The Order that embraces all things is an everliving Fire, Eternal, Uncreated, kindling itself by mea- sures and extinguishing itself by measures;’ i.e. The Idea of the universe implies at once absolute activity and perfect law. This Idea is also represented as ‘the invisible harmony’ which is ‘ better than the visible,’ as the ‘Thought which guides all through all,’ as the ‘Universal Word’ or ‘Reason,’ as the ‘One Wisdom,’ as ‘Time,’ as ‘ Righteousness,’ as ‘Fate,’ as the ‘Name of Zeus.’ This Eternal process, which is at the same time a law or harmony, is inseparable in the mind of Heraclitus from the notion of dualism. The process is from This to That and back again, the harmony is between opposites, which do not cease to be opposites, although the one passes into the other. This was not lost upon Plato. ‘The universe is ever drawn asunder and together at once, says the muse of firmer tone,’ viz. the Ionian: Plat. Soph. 242. It is implied in the blunt words, ‘ War is the Father of all things:’ and in a saying of more doubtful meaning, Παλίντονος dppovin κόσμου, ὅκωσπερ λύρης καὶ τόξουϊ. Different interpretations of this have been suggested. Per- haps it might be paraphrased, ‘As the arrow leaves the string, the hands are pulling opposite ways to each other, and to the different parts of the bow (cp. Plato, Rep. 4. 439), and the sweet note of the lyre is due to a similar tension and retention; the secret of the Uni- verse is the same*.’ Thus Homer is blamed for praying that strife may be no more, since without strife there can be no harmony. ‘The Deity is Day and Night in one, winter and summer, war and peace, fulness and hunger.’ Each thing is ever producing or pass- ing into its opposite—evil into good, and good into evil: light into darkness and darkness into light. This Eternal process is the world: ‘All coming out of one, and one arising out of all.’ Its nature is to reveal itself in contradictions : Συνάψειας οὖλα καὶ οὐχὶ odda®, κιτιλ, “Ev τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει καὶ ἐθέλει, Ζηνὸς οὔνομα “, But it is more particularly described as the way upwards and downwards, which is the same. In everything there is con- trariety, and the action of the all-embracing, all-dividing fire. But there is a more general contrariety between the fire itself and its grosser forms, i.e. between the absolute process itself and * Fr. 56 (Bywater). " Hor. Epist. 1. 12. 19; ‘Quid velit et possit rerum concordia discors,’ 8 Fy. 59. * Fr. 65. APPENDIX A. 245 the elements which are at once the subjects and the products of its Law. Fire is becoming all things, and all things are becoming fire ;—the things are typified as air and water and earth. Here it is more difficult to separate the symbol from the thought. There is an effort made to give greater outward reality to the process, and the language becomes more sensuous accordingly. The way upwards is the way from earth through water and air to fire, the way downwards is from fire through air and water to earth. Both processes are ever moving on together; and each element has its own harmony or law. There is then not only contrariety and harmony in the world, but also a lower anda higher. This is more simply expressed by the distinction between the moist and dry exhala- tions; e.g. the clouds and the sun: the one dark, the other light; the one tending downwards, the other upwards. These are, as it were, the body and soul of the world. The death of either is the other’s life. The Universal Process is perpetually circling between them. At this point we return to the world of sensible things. They exist only by perpetual strife, life and death work together in them; their birth is a death, their death or absorption into the higher region is the true life ; the only harmony amongst them is due to war. But is there war in heaven? Is there no escape from this region of conflicting elements? Is the fire itself, the origin and goal of the struggle of existence, torn asunder by a similar struggle? We may possibly imagine the primordial activity and its law (πῦρ, μέτρα) as two coexistent and opposite principles, the balance of which is order (κόσμος); but it is probably nearer the truth to say, that the fire is insepar- able from the world, and therefore from the conflict of things: as these in their war are ever coming into existence and absorbed again, so the fire is ever parted asunder so as to become all things, and at the same time united out of them}, quenched into the lower forms and kindled into itself again. But then this process is all-embracing ; not isolated like the war of particular things: and for each thing to rise from earth to fire, that is, from particular existence to the Universal Process, is to attain to peace. This seems to be implied in the notice of Diog. L. (9. 8): Τῶν δὲ ἐναντίων TO μὲν εἰς γένεσιν ἄγον καλεῖσθαι πόλεμον καὶ ἔριν, τὸ δ᾽ ἐπὶ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰρήνην, On the other hand, that which is wearied with the ‘Eternal process moving on,’ is carried downwards by a weak desire of rest and of particular being; and to this is 1 ό Ἰεὶ συμφέ ἐποίησεν ἡδὺ καὶ ἀγαθόν,--- κάματος ἀνά- Διαφερόμενον ἀεὶ συμφέρεται, ἐποίησεν HOU καὶ ἄγαθον,.,---κᾶμα 2 Cp. too the words Νοῦσος ὑγιείην Tava. 246 APPENDIX attributed the origin of the individual soul. (See Lassalle, Her. vol. 1. pp. 123 sqq.) What is the bearing of this theory on the mind, on human knowledge, and on human life 1 1. The universal law or process may be conceived of as a con- tinued act or utterance of mind (γνώμη ἣ κυβερνήσει πάντα, τὸ ἕν σοφόν, θεῖος λόγος). This, though more or less personified (as Ζεύς, Δίκη, Θεός), is nowhere distinctly personal. The act or utterance itself is the soul of the World, not exactly ‘immanent,’ but ever moving throughout all, passing into everything and returning into itself again. Yet while thus pervading all things, it essentially holds the upper ethereal region, and embraces all, being opposed to the things beneath it as universal to particular. 2. Knowledge therefore is the acquaintance and union with this universal and pervading mind or law. That human mind is the best, which most partakes of it ; that which lives in its own world of particular impressions and notions, is ‘nearer earth and less in light.’ This idea finds a symbolical and also an abstract expres- sion. ‘A dry soul is the wisest and best, flashing through the body as lightning through a cloud’ (cp. ξηρὰ ἀναθυμίασις). ‘The soul that is moist (e.g. with wine) “embodies” itself like a gathering cloud’ (cp. ὑγρὰ ἀναθυμίασις). ‘The Law of things is a law of universal Reason, but most men live as if they had a wisdom of their own” ‘To live in the light of the universal Order is to be awake, to turn aside into our own microcosm is to go to sleep.’ ‘Most men even when they hear are as though they heard not, their speech bewrays that though present they are absent mentally.’ It is an obscure question, and one which Heraclitus probably did not distinctly ask himself, by what path, according to this theory, the mind passes from sense to knowledge, from the darkness of the particular into the light of the universal. The answer would probably be little more than that the eye of the soul is opened. As the faculty of sight is quenched in sleep, so the mind is quenched while it is concerned only with the things surrounding it. But if a man is awake, the fire within him finds its kindred fire, and flashes through the clouds of the sensible world. Thus living in the universal order he becomes a partaker of the mind which follows all through all. Sensation igs not annihilated, but is absorbed into the grander movement of the mind, and becomes the transparent medium of true vision. (See the expression κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐειν, where the transition from sensible to mental perception is not marked.) While the mind is thus acquainted with the universal _ meer ENDIX A. 247 law, it must also follow the swiftness of the universal motion (Plat. Cratyl. 412 : Διὰ τοῦ ἰόντος ἰέναι παντός), distinguishing all things into their true elements (διαιρέων ἕκαστον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει Ἶ), perceiving their transformations, comprehending their unseen har- mony (πάντα τὸ πῦρ ἐπελθὸν κρινέει καὶ καταλήψεται). Heraclitus could not be unconscious that this was an ideal state for man, who ‘lights a taper for himself in the night,’ and ‘is but an ape to compare with God. ‘The subtlety of Nature far exceeds the subtlety of man’s intellect, and her energy far exceeds his power to grapple with it. Hence as in the Heaven of Heraclitus there is no rest, so in his philosophy there is occasionally a despairing tone. This, however, never occurs in speaking of the Eternal process, but only of its comprehension by man. 3. For in comparison with the grandeur of the Universal Law, human life becomes a very little thing, if it be not more fitly called a death. Indeed, as in all things else, so in man, life and death are ever working together. His body is ever ab- sorbed into his soul, his soul is ever dying into his body; his birth into the world is the entombment of a higher life, the death of what is earthly in him is the awaking of the God. As the Reason is but a small part in any man, so the good amongst men are few, and misunderstood (for dogs also bark at him they know not). Even the philosopher is like the gold-digger, * who toils much and finds little*, and often his truest wisdom is to know- himself, and to feel the nothingness of his individual Being in the presence of the Universal Order. Yet public law is to be zealously maintained, as more general than the private will, the excesses of which are to be quenched as a dangerous fire ἡ, Such is the bare outline of a thought the grandeur of which was far beyond the comprehension of that time. The Adyos or Law of Heraclitus was not exactly a law of progress, for his elements are ever circling in one round, yet it is as near an approach to that Idea as is to be found in Ancient Philosophy. A still nearer approach is made to the conception of the in- finity and simplicity of Nature. And while we feel that the metaphysical systems of Plato and Aristotle owe much of their strength and reality and perfection to the One Being of Parmenides, and in part also to the Pythagoreans, in whose philosophy finite and infinite were already combined, it is im- > Br, 2; 2:1. 26; 3 Cp. Plat. Rep. 5. 450. *°YBpw χρὴ σβεννύειν μᾶλλον ἢ πυρκαϊήν, Fr. 103. 248 APPENDIX possible not to recognise in Plato a nearer kindred to Hera- clitus than to any other of his predecessors. The union of Imagination and Reason, the plasticity of mind, the tendency at once to soar and to roam, may be mentioned as some of the points of communion between them. Many scattered thoughts, as well as the spirit pervading whole passages, might be quoted in confirmation of this. It is not surprising therefore if Plato grasped the thought of Heraclitus more firmly than the dark philosopher’s own followers had done}, The fate of Heraclitus’ teaching at Ephesus? reminds us of his own picture of the soul that is too weak to follow the Uni- versal motion, and falls away from it to take an individual shape. The very multiplicity of his symbolism seems to have contributed to this result; each disciple interpreting the whole theory by the figure which was most intelligible to himself: one fastening on the Fire, another on the Sun, another on the dry exhalation, another on the more abstract Righteousness, or the ruling Mind, while some appear to have seized upon his habit of teaching by strange outward signs, if there be any truth in what Aristotle gravely asserts, that Cratylus at length * The two passages in which this appreciation appears most distinctly are, Sophist. 242: Διαφερόμενον γὰρ (sc. τὸ ὄν) det ἐυμφέρεται, φασὶν ai συντονώτεραι τῶν Μουσῶν (with which contrast Sympos, 187, where the say- ing is explained away), and Cratyl, 412: Ὅσοι γὰρ ἡγοῦνται τὸ πᾶν εἶναι ἐν πορείᾳ, τὸ μὲν πολὺ αὐτοῦ ὑπολαμ- βάνουσι τοιοῦτόν τι εἶναι, οἷον οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ χωρεῖν, διὰ δὲ τούτου παντὸς εἶναί τι διεξιόν, δι’ οὗ πάντα τὰ γιγνό- μενα γίγνεσθαι. εἶναι δὲ τάχιστον τοῦτο καὶ λεπτότατον οὐ γὰρ ἂν δύνασθαι ἄλλως διὰ τοῦ ἰόντος ἰέναι παντός, εἰ μὴ λεπτότατόν τε ἦν, ὥστε αὐτὸ μηδὲν στέγειν, καὶ τάχιστον, ὥστε χρῆσθαι ὥσπερ ἑστῶσι τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ οὖν ἐπιτροπεύει τὰ ἄλλα πάντα διαϊόν, K.TiX, * This may be illustrated by the continuation of ‘the passage of the Cratylus just quoted, Μέχρι μὲν οὖν ἐνταῦθα, ὃ viv δὴ ἐλέγομεν, παρὰ πολ- λῶν ὁμολογεῖται τοῦτο εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον. ἐγὼ δέ, ὦ Ἑρμόγενες, ἅτε λιπαρὴς ὧν περὶ αὐτοῦ, ταῦτα μὲν πάντα διαπέπυο- μαι ἐν ἀπορρήτοις, ὅτι τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ δί- καιον καὶ τὸ αἴτιον--- δι᾽ ὃ γὰρ γίγνεται, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ altiov—xet ἰδίᾳ καλεῖν ἔφη τις τοῦτο ὀρθῶς ἔχειν διὰ ταῦτα' ἐπειδὰν δ᾽ ἠρέμα αὐτοὺς ἐπανερωτῶ ἀκούσας ταῦτα μηδὲν ἧττον, Τί οὖν ποτ᾽ ἔστιν, ὥγαθε, δίκαιον, εἰ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει ; δοκῶ τε ἤδη μακρότερα τοῦ προσ- ἤκοντος ἐρωτᾶν καὶ ὑπὲρ τὰ ἐσκαμμένα ἅλλεσθαι. ἱκανῶς γάρ μέ φασι πεπύσθαι καὶ ἀκηκοέναι καὶ ἐπιχειροῦσι, βουλό- μενοι ἀποπιμπλάναι με, ἄλλος ἄλλα ἤδη λέγειν, καὶ οὐκέτι συμφωνοῦσιν. ὁ μὲν γάρ τίς φησι τοῦτο εἶναι δίκαιον, τὸν ἥλιον' τοῦτον γὰρ μόνον διαϊόντα καὶ κάοντα ἐπιτροπεύειν τὰ ὄντα. ἐπειδὰν οὖν τῳ λέγω αὐτὸ ἄσμενος ὡς καλόν τι ἀκηκοώς, καταγελᾷ pov οὗτος ἀκούσας καὶ ἐρωτᾷ, εἰ οὐδὲν δίκαιον οἶμαι εἶναι ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἐπειδὰν ὁ ἥλιος δύῃ. λιπαροῦντος οὖν ἐμοῦ ὅ τι αὖ ἐκεῖνος λέγει, αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησί: τοῦτο δὲ οὐ ῥᾷδιόν ἐστιν εἰδέναι" ὁ δὲ οὐκ αὐτὸ τὸ πῦρ φησίν, ἀλλ᾽ αὐτὸ τὸ θερμὸν τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ ἐνόν. 6 δὲ τούτων μὲν πάντων καταγελᾶν φησίν, εἶναι δὲ τὸ δίκαιον ὃ λέγει ᾿Αναξαγόρας, νοῦν εἶναι τοῦτο Ὁ αὐτοκράτορα γὰρ αὐτὸν ὄντα καὶ οὐδενὶ μεμιγμένον πάντα φησὶν αὐτὸν κοσμεῖν τὰ πράγματα διὰ πάντων ἰόντα. ἐνταῦθα Ὁ δὴ ἐγώ, ὦ φίλε, πολὺ ἐν πλείονι ἀπορίᾳ. εἰμὶ i) πρὶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι μανθάνειν we q τοῦ δικαίου, 6 τί ποτ᾽ ἔστιν, APPENDIX A, τ 18 only moved his finger. These divided members of Heraclitus continued after him a partial and spasmodic life, and the Sys- tem ended consistently in a kind of war. Until the end of last century the fragments of the early Greek The frag- philosophers were only accessible to the few scholars whose reading ae extended over a large field. These of Heraclitus were first col- lected by Schleiermacher in 1807. But the discovery of the Philosophumena in 1851 gave materials not previously accessible. For Hippolytus, or whoever wrote that treatise, sought to discredit Noétus by identifying his teaching with that of the old Ephesian, and to this pious wish we are indebted for several fresh quo- tations from the Περὶ Φύσεως. The sentences containing these additional fragments were carefully re-edited in 1854 by Jacob Bernays, by whom the study of Heraclitus has been otherwise greatly advanced (Heraclitea, 1848, etc.) More recently, in 1869, _ there appeared from the same acute and learned pen Die Hera- klitischen Briefe, ein Beitrag zur philosophischen und religions- geschichtlichen Litteratur, a memorable essay towards determining the complex question, ‘What kind of evidence can be obtained from spurious writings?’ In this work, and also in his Heraclitea, Prof. Bernays has pointed out many echoes of Heraclitus in subsequent literature. Mr. Bywater* has conceived the design of presenting in one view the substance and the shadow of Heraclitus, of letting us hear the ‘voice of the Sibyl’ and its reverberations; not by weaving the scattered fragments into a complete whole with the help of unlimited conjecture, as was done by Lassalle (more theologian than scholar) in 1858, and more recently by Schuster in a laborious effort of ‘constructive criticism’ (Teubner, 1873), but by displaying the relevant facts, including the citation of authorities, with as much exactness and with as little admixture of conjecture as possible. The citations throw considerable light both on the interpretation of Heraclitus and on the history of his influence. An obscure phrase often becomes clearer when we see how it was quoted (see esp. Fr. 60); and even the names of the authors are instructive. _ We are reminded by them how a secondary phase of Heraclitus’ doctrine came to be woven into the philosophy of Plato; how * Heracliti Ephesii Reliquiz. Re- which follow here were printed in censuit I. Bywater, Coll. Ex. Soc. an article for the ‘Academy’ of that Oxon. 1877. Some of the remarks year. » ᾿ς tt 4 250 APPENDIX a the dark speaker was compelled by Aristotle to render up his logical account, as Locke and Leibnitz are by our Hegelians at . the present day ; how the Stoics gave him fresh currency, having been attracted to him both by the austerity of his spirit, and by the kindred nature of his symbolism (πῦρ, ἐκπύρωσις) ; lastly, how the Fathers of the Church employed him as they did other ~ heathen writers, now wresting him to their side for the con- _ demnation of Pagan superstition, now seeking to overthrow an adversary by comparing him with the infidel philosopher. The reproach of obscurity was more deserved by Heraclitus than that of melancholy, which became proverbial perhaps in consequence of his association with Stoicism, although it is true that the philosophy of change, which saw ‘man kindled and ex- tinguished like a spark in the night’ (Fr. 77), was in close accord with the sadness which had characterised much of the earlier Tonian reflexion (Mimnermus, Fr. 2; Hdt. 7. 46). But it may be questioned if he were more obscure than other prophets of the — mind, who in the sixth century B.c., perhaps unconsciously moved by some Oriental influence, strove to catch the universe in aphorisms, And if his Περὶ Φύσεως were now extant, abrupt and disjvinted as it would probably still appear (not, as Bacon thought, outweighing Plato), it might be more intelligible to us than it was either to Aristotle or to the Stoics, The ‘transcendent Pantheism,’ whether of Heraclitus or Par- menides, is an open secret to the student of Descartes and Spinoza. The Hegelian, for whom the true individual is the true universal, and all thought proceeds by collision of oppo- sites, can understand his master’s saying that he had taken up the philosophy of Heraclitus into his own. And some of our modern φυσιολόγοι might be surprised to find, in what they supposed to be a fistful of air, the expression of principles which they have verified, such as the permanence of the sum of energy, the interchangeableness of energy and heat, the reciprocal trans- mutation of elementary forces, the transience of phenomena, the permanence of law, the relativity of perception to the organs οὔ sense (Fr. 37), and might acknowledge that ‘Anticipatio Nature’ was less a term of opprobrium than they had imagined. But the wonder would be all on their side, for Heraclitus would have wondered at nothing so much as if these things had turned out otherwise. oil The scholar might find germs of Platonic thought and expression (Frr.115,114; cp.Rep. 2.376, 7.540); the general critic, unconscious APPENDIX A. 251 ~ coincidences. with remote literatures, like that between Fr. 60, ‘Time is a child at chess,’ and the well-known lines of Omar Khayyam. The agnostic and the mystical theologian might both find meaning in the deep saying, ‘God at once reveals and hides himself ;’ while the religious reformer would rejoice to see that Greek no less than Hebrew prophets felt the abomination and absurdity of sacrifice. ‘They think to purge their sins by polluting themselves with blood’ (Fr. 130). So rich in germinal expression was this prophetic soul, who, in clinging to a seeming paradox, was really presaging thoughts of many generations. The character of Heraclitus came nearer than that of Socrates _ to Plato’s description of the great mind born in a little State and despising her birthplace, but soaring aloft to survey things in Heaven and Earth, The pride shown in his contempt for Py- thagoras and Xenophanes, and his grudging praise of Bias, may _help to account for the conceit which Plato noted in his followers : but there is a Socratic loftiness in the tone in which he speaks of death (as an emanation, Fr. 37, a sloughing-off of the body, Fr. 85), and in his outburst on behalf of Hermodorus we see a trace of underlying kindliness and of the passion for justice which is the best note of the philosophic spirit. We gather from Fr. 73 that he was more austere in his habits than Xenophanes. II. The sublime thought of the Eternal movement of an Parmeni- infinite law was not, however, destined to be the final concep- 495: tion of the Greek mind. While life and death and the suc- cession of phenomena were thus idealized on the Eastern shores of the Augean, a different, though parallel impulse was preparing elsewhere, it is said at Elea in Magna Grecia: an impulse equally if not more sublime, yet by itself no less incapable of giving rise to such a philosophy as Plato’s. Xenophanes had already said— ‘There is one God above all in heaven or earth, not like to mortals either in form or mind.’ ‘He is all sight, all thought, all hearing.’ ‘He ever abides immoveable in one stay: nor does it become him to waver to and fro.’ Inspired with this thought Parmenides rose at once into an _ ideal world of mind and being, not seeking there an explana- tion of the sensible universe, nor endeavouring to grasp its _ law, or idealize its continual process, but dwelling solely on the all-sufficient object of Absolute and Perfect Being. From 252 APPENDIX= the world in which his thought reposed, growth and decay were exiled far, into a region which Pure Being did not enter, a world of nothingness, which yet seemed to satisfy the minds of ordinary men, who trusted in the blindness of opinion and sense, and lived amongst contradictions. For in this lower world of opinion, opposite principles ever strove, light and darkness, heat and cold. But Pure Being is one, a rounded whole, perfect and full, identical with the Absolute Mind. The only symbol of Parmenides is the Perfect Sphere. The main effort of Plato’s dialectic, as is well known, is to bring these opposite poles of thought, the Eleatic and Ionian, into organic and well-balanced harmony. In its most abstract conception it is the problem of the one and the many (τῶν λόγων ἀγήρων πάθος παρ᾽ ἡμῖν), or of motion and rest. In this effort he was assisted by the Pythagoreans, who had already found a sort of middle term in Number, The doctrine of Parmenides does not enter directly into the Theeetetus, from which the discussion of it is expressly excluded: — but his influence is notwithstanding present in the Megarian method, which was in part derived from Zeno (see Introduction), — in whose hands the One had acquired a negative power, and was used rather to distinguish than to comprehend, so becoming — rather the form than the sole object of thought. This Eleatic — influence appears chiefly (1) in the relentless way in which sen- sation and motion are reduced to nothingness, and because they 7 have no unity are shown to present no object to the mind: (2) in the crowning point of the dialogue, where it is admitted 7 that there are universal perceptions of pure mind, and that Being is the principal of these: (3) in the paradox about false opinion, which is similar to that of Zeno about motion,—not ‘it is impossible for a thing to be in two places at once,’ but ‘it is impossible to know and not to know at the same time,—and is solved in the same way by reverting to the conception of degrees: (4) in the form of argument with which this paradox Is enforced, ὁ ἕν γέ τι ὁρῶν ὄν τι ὁρᾷ; (5) in the question about the whole and its parts, pp. 203, 204. APPENDIX B. ἼΑνθρωπος μέτρον. PROTAGORAS, who gives to the inquiry in the Theetetus _ its subjective turn, and some part of its dramatic interest, had died at the age of seventy, some ten or twelve years before the trial of Socrates, which is the supposed date of the conversation. The real share borne by him (or by his Shade) in the dialogue is less _ than appears at first sight. It is to his ‘disciples’ that the doctrine of sense based on that of motion is attributed, and though he is made to bear the brunt of the attack, because the guardians whom he has left will not defend his ‘ orphan’ theory, yet when challenged _ to meet him upon his own ground, Socrates falls back upon the saying quoted at first, ‘Man is the measure of all things,’ and the explanation of it, ‘Things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.’ The same words occur also in the Cratylus. This, then, is nearly all that we can with any certainty point to in this dialogue as Protagorean, except the name of his treatise ᾿Αλήθεια, the sceptical frag- ment about the existence of the gods, and perhaps one or two rhetorical words, such as μεγαλειοτέρως, mwodvdparos. For it is evident that the doctrine of motion and becoming, which he is said to have entrusted to his disciples ‘in a mystery’ (cp. Cratyl. 413), cannot have been extant in his writings. It is therefore surprising to find Sextus Empiricus representing the tenets of Protagoras in language closely resembling that used in the Theetetus. The wonder is abated, however, if we reflect that _ there was really a very close affinity between Protagoras and the _ Cyrenaics, and that of this affinity Plato is in this dialogue the interpreter. Aristotle follows Plato in identifying the theories _ of Protagoras and Heraclitus. And there are thus three sources, independent of Protagoras, from which the account of Sextus 4 may have been derived: the Cyrenaics, the Theetetus, and Aris- _ totle. The similarity of the language in which different sensa- _ tionalist theories are described in later times may possibly indicate 254 APPENDEX ΒΒ. the influence of this very dialogue in fixing the terminology of that aspect of thought. It is therefore the more interesting to examine the one say- ing of Protagoras which is here preserved: Πάντων χρημάτων μέτρον ἄνθρωπον εἶναι, τῶν μὲν ὄντων ὡς ἔστι, τῶν δὲ μὴ ὄντων ὡς οὐκ ἔστι. Might not this seem at first sight to imply something less than the absolute relativeness of knowledge? Might it not even be interpreted to mean, ‘quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab om- nibus?’ In answer to this it may be remarked, first, that Pro- tagoras appears so far at least to have interpreted his own Saying, ὡς οἷα μὲν ἐμοὶ φαίνεται, τοιαῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἐμοί, οἷα δὲ σοί, τοιαῦτα δὲ αὖ σοί. But it may be added, secondly, that the dis- tinction between the race and the individual, between the general term ‘man,’ and the singular term ‘this man,’ was probably not distinctly present to his mind. When we reflect on the absence of any abiding consciousness of the universal and of the dis- tinction between abstract and conerete, exhibited, for instance, in the first answer of Theetetus, or in the attempt of Meno to define virtue, it becomes evident that the term man, thus barely used by a popular teacher, would naturally call up the idea, not of human nature or of the human mind, nor of the race col- lectively, but of ‘a man,’ ‘this or that man,’ an individual, ‘you or me,’ not, however, conceived of as an individual, nor consciously distinguished from any abstract or generic notion of man, but simply present to the imagination }, _ Protagoras saw that men were weary of systems which had no reference to human life, and seemed to make knowledge unat- tainable. He saw persons teaching astronomy and the nature of Being to those who wanted to learn how to become able and — successful citizens. Like other popular teachers, he had a keener eye for the immediate wants of those who came to him than for abstract truth. The theory of Parmenides, which had its warm advocates at Athens, was one purely objective ; although beginning — and ending in the mind, it was wholly independent of any human standard: the highest aim for man was to rise by pure thought — into the world of being. | Protagoras felt, like Socrates, that the truth which man requires is relative to man, but, unlike Socrates, he made this the end and not the starting-point of his inquiry, and instead of searching by reflection for that one truth by which man ought to live, he " Cp. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, Thuc. 1. 140, which does not correspond to the modern generic use of the word. arPENDIX GC. 255 _ was contented with inferring that truth was variable, according to the common notion, ‘many men, many minds.’ As embodied in the Thezetetus, the above doctrine receives some _ fresh characteristics, first, as being made the type of a contem- porary theory, and being interwoven with that of Heraclitus; secondly, as holding one side of an antithesis, which gives a sharpness and precision to the term ἄνθρωπος, as equivalent to ἕκαστος ἡμῶν, which it probably had not when first used; and, thirdly, by being pushed to its minutest results, according to the Megarian method,—not only ‘man’ but ‘each man,’ not only so, but ‘every creature,’ and even the same person at different times. APPENDIX , Protagoras and Mr. Grote}, I. KNow1EnczE is relative in two senses, not wholly unconnected with each other, which in ancient philosophy were not yet clearly distinguished. There is the relation of subject to object, and the relation of the universal to the particular. For the sake of clearness, these different aspects of the relativity of knowledge may be treated separately, although the study of either involves the consideration of both. (1) Knowledge is relative to the mind. But here also there is a distinction which must not be overlooked. For there is a general and a particular subjectivity. (a) There can be no knowledge apart from the mind which knows. An object of knowledge _ without a subject is inconceivable. Or rather, knowledge cannot be conceived except as the joint working of the mind and of that which is external to the mind. All knowledge is neces- sarily in this sense subjective. But this condition in no way limits or impairs the certainty or perfection of knowledge. Relativity of this sort is not inconsistent with the existence of ; Absolute Truth. (6) It is otherwise with the peculiar subjective conditions of individual minds. These modify and render de- fective the knowledge of particular men, ‘who see and know but in part, and have different prospects of the same thing according ‘ From an article in the Quarterly Review for January, 1856. 256 APPENDEXS a: to their different positions to it4’ Yet even this partial know- ledge, in so far as it is knowledge, has an objective and universal reality. Now, although it is mere nonsense to talk of eliminating the subjective element, if by object-without-subject is meant know- ledge minus mind, there is no such absurdity in supposing that knowledge, while remaining under the conditions of mind, may become perfect through being purified from the effect of bias. Nor is it chimerical to hope that to this ideal an indefinite approximation may be made in the growth of science, in which every forward step is the relinquishment of that which some have thought, for that which all who understand the proofs must think. This process is, in effect, the enlightenment or enfran- chisement of individual minds. The aim of every scientific inquirer is to come forth from the den and stand under the open heaven; to correct the inequality of the mirror of a particular mind by a method valid for all minds; to shake off the idols of — the tribe and theatre, and become the denizen and pupil of the universe, and no longer of a country or of a sect only. Such— are the images, borrowed from the old philosophy, in which Bacon described the progress of knowledge. Those who believe in the reality of inductive science will hardly maintain that they are illusory. And they point to an idea of knowledge as some- thing wholly different from individual opinion; as containing what, in contradistinction to the particular subjective, may be called the subjective-universal. Closely parallel to this, if account be taken of the intellectual circumstances of the time, was the idea of knowledge which Plato derived from Socrates. He looked for a definition that should hold universally, an irrefragable hypothesis, an opinion — which could not be shaken by examination. In other words, he sought for that which is true, not for the individual thinker only, but for all who think. He everywhere acknowledges, — however, or rather insists, that general truths cannot be attained — or imparted except through the awakening of individual minds. — There is no vision until the eye is turned in the direction of the light. It is only the coarse Thrasymachus who imagines that he can take and thrust his notions bodily down his hearer’s— throat. And Socrates, in attempting to answer him, is unable to say anything but what he individually thinks. The Socratic dialogue represents the meeting-point of a particular conscious- * Locke’s Conduct of the Understanding, § 3. SS ee ee a ee ΨΥ ee ee a a ee i APPENDIX €. 257 ness with universal reason, and the process which results is an approximation on the part of two individuals to a universal truth. In none of the dialogues in which Socrates is the chief speaker is there any element of authority; but they are equally removed from sanctioning an arbitrary or capricious ‘ private judgment.’ No testimony is admitted but that of the respondent’s own mind; no persuasion or enforcement, except that of argu- ment, is applied. The single duty recognised is that of obeying reason. But there is no dispensation from this duty. Except in passages which are clearly playful or ironical, mere verbal juggling and all opinionativeness are earnestly deprecated, and the speakers simply endeavour, by means of dialectic, to obtain and exhibit Truth. ‘We must use our own faculties, such as they are, and say what we really think'’ ‘We must follow, at all risks, whithersoever reason guides*.’ ‘No logical puzzles can frighten us from pursuing the path of knowledge*, ‘We have to consider, not who said this, but whether that which is now said be true‘. ‘It is my way, Crito, to yield to no influence of those surrounding me, but to the reason, which, when I think, seems to me the best®” This is the reply of Socrates, when urged to escape from prison: and go in the same prison he advised his friends. ‘Care not for Socrates, but care much rather for the truth®.’ This position was contrasted by Plato with that of Protagoras, who asserted the subjectivity of all knowledge without distinguishing the universal from the par- ticular subject. His formula was rude, but intelligible: ‘Man is the measure; that is to say, things are to me as they appear to me, and to you as they appear to you.’ This Plato understood as the denial of that’ belief in a common measure or universal truth which was implied in the work of Socrates, and he joined issue with Protagoras accordingly. Mr. Grote has given fresh life and interest to this ancient controversy by taking the part of Protagoras against Plato. Himself holding that while the sub- jective. ‘reling of belief is universal, the object or matter of belief varies in each particular case, ‘and apparently thinking that this radical imperfection is incurable; not distinguishing, as it would seem, between the propositions, ‘My belief is my belief,’ and ‘My belief depends wholly upon my individual peculiari- ties’—or, at least, not recognising the difference between belief 1 Theet. 171 D. * Charm. 160. 2 Rep. 3. 394 D. 5 Crito, 46. 5. Thezt. 197A; Men. 81 E. δ Phed. gt C; cf. Soph. 246 Ὁ. 258 APPEN DIX =e grounded on sufficient and insufficient reasons—he can imagine no alternative between a blind dogmatism and the entire relativity of truth. Either one individual opinion is the infallible standard by which all other opinions are to be judged, or else every opinion is alike valid, not indeed for those who question that opinion, but for the person holding it. But is not a third case possible? That which is different need not be wholly different’; and may there not be in all human experience, however diverse, a common element? If belief is universal, so also is the process of reasoning. May not the exercise of this on the facts of ex- perience bring men gradually to the acknowledgment of universal truths—not such as have been laid down by dogmatists, but such as are found, at least approximately, after long inquiry, when out of many ingenious hypotheses some have been verified beyond the possibility of doubt? It is not necessary that these should be dogmatically taught. Indeed, they cannot be imparted thoroughly unless the learner is led to repeat the process of invention. His curiosity must be aroused and satisfied, his reason must be awakened to perceive and solve the difficulties — surrounding each hypothesis. Otherwise, he may believe, but cannot know. Mr. Grote accuses. Plato of first misrepresenting: Protagoras and afterwards following him, and of misrepresenting him in two ways: in identifying his doctrine with another and a different doctrine, that knowledge is sensible perception, and in having suppressed the characteristic addition ‘to me,’ ‘to you,’ as if Protagoras had said that relative truth was absolutely true. The weight of the former charge depends on the intention of Plato in blending the two theories, and on the exact signification of the term which we translate Sensation or Perception. Now it should be observed that the word sthesis is expressly said to include, according to the theory, the feelings of pleasure, pain, desire, and fear’, and apparently also the distinction between good and evil®. The common characteristic of these impres- sions and of knowledge, according to this theory, is that of constituting the experience of an individual at a particular — moment (τὸ παρὸν ἑκάστῳ πάθος). Such present impressions — are regarded as more certain than the fainter repetition of the — same in memory‘; and the active operation of the mind, in re- viewing and reasoning over her impressions, is supposed to be™ 1 See Theet. 158 E. 3 Thid. 157 BE. Ibid. 152 B. * Theet. 166 A, compare Hume. meee HN Dr xX-- Ὁ 259 left out of view’. Protagoras might possibly have exclaimed at this, and said that the individual was the measure to himself in thought as well as in sensation. But he seems to have drawn his examples from the facts of sense?; and Plato’s object is to show that while the impressions of sense and feeling have in themselves only a momentary value, it is not so with the reasonings of the mind by which these are compared and generalised, and which are often justified not at the moment, but long afterwards in the actual experience of those who did not share them at the time. : This brings us to the other accusation, that Plato has sup- pressed the words (‘to me,’ ‘to you,’) which mark the essential relativity of Protagoras’ ‘Measure.’ He has certainly not for- gotten them, for he has been at some pains to illustrate this very point, where it is shown how the theory justifies the illusions of a sick palate*; and, again, where it is observed that the opinion of the true prophet proves not less true for those who did not believe him. If Plato is unfair to Protagoras, it is in making an addition, which may or may not have been consciously implied in the formula, ‘Each man is the measure of what is true to him.’ To this Plato adds in effect, ‘and there is no. other standard of true being. But this negative aspect of the doctrine neces- sarily becomes explicit, when the statement is viewed as having a controversial import. The assertion ‘Man is the measure’ is unmeaning, unless this measure is brought into competition with some other, such as the Eleatic Being. Now, if the formula is thus interpreted, there are two less exact modes of expressing the same thing. Either ‘nothing is true’ (i.e. absolutely), or 1 The difference between ancient and modern philosophical language is repeatedly exemplified in this discus- sion; what Mr. Grote calls ‘ compared facts of sense,’ e. g. weighing, measur- ing, etc. (ii. 364), Plato would proba- bly have treated as the conclusions of the mind on reviewing her passive impressions. 2 Theet. 152 B: Ἐπακολουθήσωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ, κ.τ.λ. 3 They are true to the sick man during his sickness. Mr. Grote says Gi. 353), ‘Socrates imputes it as a contradiction to Protagoras—‘* Your doctrine is pronounced to be false by many persons; but you admit that the belief of all persons is true; there- fore your doctrine is false.” Here also Plato omits the. qualification an- nexed by Protagoras to his general principle—Every man’s belief is true —that is, true to him. That a belief should be true to one man, and false to another, is not only no contradic- tion to the formula of Protagoras, but is the very state of things which his formula contemplates.’ Plato is more wide awake than Mr. Grote imagines. He points out that Protagoras did not hold the principle of relativity to be only relatively true; otherwise he must have admitted that all the world, who differed from him, were not to themselves measures of truth, and that he himself in their judg- ment, that is in relation to them, was not a measure, so that his principle was not applicable to them. 5 2 260 APPENDIX CG ‘everything is alike true’ (i.e. relatively). Either ‘there is no absolute,’ or ‘the relative is the only absolute. Both forms of expression are found in the Theetetus’. But it is not fair to infer from this that Plato has argued ‘a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter. The same cavil would apply at least with equal force to the language of Protagoras himself, who called his treatise ᾿Αλήθεια, real (not phenomenal) truth. ‘There can be no discussion without reference to a common ideal standard.’ ‘There can be no discussion without reference to individual belief.’ Mr. Grote’s whole argument proceeds on the implied assumption that these two propositions are irrecon- cileable. Hence he charges Plato with inconsistency in at one time appealing to an imaginary expert or wise man (the βασιλεὺς τεχνικός Of the Politicus), the personified ideal of knowledge, and at other times repudiating all authority except that of the consciousness of the -respondent in the dialogue, and thus up- holding what Mr. Grote characteristically styles the ‘autonomy’ of the individual reason. But the whole spirit of Plato’s dia- lectic lies in bringing together the individual and the universal consciousness, and if cross-questioned on the point he would ᾿ probably have said, as he has said of the kindred antithesis of the one and many, that this union is essentially inherent in the nature of thought, τῶν λόγων αὐτῶν ἀθάνατόν τι καὶ ἀγήρων πάθος, Those beliefs, however, which are more particularly the re- spondent’s own, which he derives from natural idiosyncrasy or from previous intercourse, are invariably shaken and removed by Socrates, and much also of what is evoked during the conver- sation by his suggestive art, is in turn criticised and cut away. That which is allowed to remain as the result of the discussion (though still open to further examination) is certainly the present belief of the respondent ; but is different in kind from the belief with which he entered on the argument. He began with loose impressions gathered from hearsay or from his own half-reasoning ; he ends with a conviction which has been evolved by an active exercise of the reason, in which reference has been made at every step to an ideal standard of knowledge. This result is not ade- quately described by saying that the beliefs and convictions of — one person are modified by another. Plato appeals at once to the requirements of the argument, and to the consciousness of d the individual reasoner, and, whether his position is tenable — ' Theet. 152, 166, 167; cp. 170 B. The former expression, ‘ Nothing is true,’ is however more frequently assigned to Gorgias, ὃ: Phil. ple APPENDIX C. 261 or not, he cannot be accused in this of alternating between oppo- site points of view. If the two appeals are mutually destruc- tive, he makes them, not alternately, but together. The horns of Mr. Grote’s dilemma pass harmlessly on either side of Plato. Even one who professed to have found absolute truth, might hold that this could only be communicated by awakening gradu- ally the individual mind. But Plato in most of his dialogues pro- fesses to be still seeking for the truth in whose reality he believes, and invites others to help him in the search. He views universal truth as neither hopelessly lost, nor actually found, but in con- tinual process of discovery. He certainly does hold inquiry to be a real endeavour, and not a mere mental exercise, and believes (in spite of difficulties which he keenly appreciates) that the distinction between truth and error has a value that is inde- pendent of human opinions. And it is here that he parts company with his English critic. Mr. Grote urges, in language nearly similar to that with which Socrates in the Theetetus affects to defend Protagoras*: ‘To say that a man is wise, is to say that he is wise in some one’s estimation, your own, or that of some one else*®.’. This is undeniable: but then every such estimate must be either true or false, nearer to or farther from a perfect estimate. Of this difference, indeed, no man is an infal- lible judge, though one man can judge more correctly than another, as experience proves. God, not man, is the measure, as Plato himself has said*. But it is not less clear on this account that the degree of approximation is something real, and that he who judges more correctly of this is in reality the better judge. Mr. Grote admits that, in his own opinion, in matters involving future contingency most men judge badly*®: only a few persons, possessed of sufficient skill and knowledge, judge well. He believes the distinction to be real and important, and allows that most other persons believe the same. He adds, ‘In acting on this distinction, I follow out my belief, and so do they. This is a general fact, respecting the conditions which determine individual belief. Like all other causes of belief, it 1 Pheed. 75 E: Ὃ καλοῦμεν μανθά- νειν, οἰκείαν ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνειν ἂν εἴη. 2 Theet. 166, 167. Pa Voli, p. 352. * Legg. 4. 716 C. ° This language, like that in the defence of Protagoras (Theet. 167), seems to be adopted (unconsciously) to avoid the words true and false. But it is at least as arbitrary to with- hold the terms true and false from judgments, as to apply them to plea- sures, which Plato has been censured for doing in the Philebus. See also vol. ii. p. 351, where the question of degrees of mental force is substituted for the question of truth or reality. 262 APPENDIX ae operates relatively to the individual mind.’ (Vol. ii. P. 355-) This is indisputable: but those who believe the distinction to be real and important, believe in a measure of truth, which they do not suppose to alter with the variations of belief. They be- lieve the distinction to be important for others as well as for themselves. ‘When a man speaks of truth, he means what he himself (along with others, or singly, as the case may be) believes to be truth:’ he does not mean only what is true to him. Once more, Mr. Grote says, ‘You pronounce an opponent to be in error: but if you cannot support your opinion by evidence on authority which satisfies his senses or his reason, he remains un- convinced. Your individual opinion stands good to you, his opinion stands good to him. You think that he ought to believe as you do, and in certain cases you feel that he will be brought to that result by future experience; which of course must be relative to him and his appreciative powers. He entertains the like conviction in regard to you.’ (Vol. ii. p. 515.) This is freely admitted—and amounts to this, that each (either truly or falsely) believes his own opinion to be true. When Mr. Grote says he © thinks the doctrine of Protagoras respecting pleasure ‘nearer to the truth’ than that of Gorgias, and that of the Republic ‘ utterly at variance with the truth,’ does he mean nearer to and at variance with what is true to him? No man ever held fast an opinion merely as his opinion, but as the truth. And this implies reference to a standard which is Independent of individual judgments. But to confound mere individual belief with belief grounded on evidence, or rather not to admit the difference between them, would take us back to Pyrrho and the ancient sceptics. Nor is there any modern theory of knowledge, whether that of Locke or Kant or any other, on which such a doctrine, : which is really the denial of knowledge, is tenable. The same misunderstanding may be made apparent by analysing a favourite expression of Mr. Grote’s, viz. ‘individual reason. Granted that nothing is true for me but what I in my own person believe—that it is impossible, even were it desirable, to force conviction—that when I yield to an authority, I exercise my private judgment in pronouncing the authority sufficient,—still the question may be asked, wherein differs the assent of the individual reason from — impressions of sense or creations of fancy? And it would’ be difficult to find any distinguishing note, except the conscious- — ness that the object of assent cannot be otherwise, and claims: the belief of all who think, Mr. Grote will say that this con- = = we eae Cyr ὦ wEPENDEX. Ὁ. 263 sciousness often proves delusive, and that the case of sensation is exactly parallel’. Those whose minds are constituted alike have similar thoughts, as those whose organs are alike have similar perceptions”. To this Plato would answer that but for the hope which lay at the root of the endeavour of Socrates, that differing minds may be brought by dialectic nearer to one ano- ther, by being brought nearer to unchanging principles of truth, and that the eye of reason may be thus purged to see the light, philosophy would be an idle pursuit, the turning of an oyster- shell or a scytalé, a cycle without the hope of progress, an endless process never moving on, a ‘purpose’ not ‘increasing through the ages,’ but terminating in failure and despair’. How far Plato ever viewed universals as wholly objective is a question which cannot be determined without taking into account the differences of ancient and modern thought. The distinction between the mind and external objects had not yet been clearly made. Both poles (the objective and subjective) were absorbed in the antithesis of Being and Phenomena, which the Eleatics had placed far asunder, leaving their reconcilement as the great problem of the succeeding age. The tendency of the early speculation had been to give to psychological problems what in modern language must be called an objective treatment, in saying which we ought not to forget that we are applying a distinction which was then unknown‘. Parmenides and Heraclitus were not unconscious of the working of the mind, but their thought did not assume the form of self-reflection. The unity or the energy of scientific intelligence appeared to them as the Permanent Sub- stance or the Law of Change, which constituted the Universe. 1 Vol. ii. p. 361, note. 2 See a curious note in vol. ii. p. 285, where it is said that the contro- versy between Mr. Mill (who holds the common attribute of many objects to be one) and Mr. Speneer (who says that the same abstract word denotes one attribute in subject A, and another exactly similar in subject B) illus- trates forcibly the extreme nicety of the question between the one and the many, under certain supposable cir- cumstances. Also vol. li. p. 329. ‘The Entia Rationis exist relatively to Ratio, as the Entia Perceptionis exist relatively to Sense. You do not, by producing the fact of innate mental intuitions, eliminate the intu- ent mind; which must be done in order to establish a negative to the Protagorean principle.’ 3 Mr. Grote sometimes speaks of reason in language which appears to us happily inconsistent with his argu- ment in the present discussion. See for instance his touching and impres- sive words on the death of Socrates (vol. 1. p. 302, note). ‘He contem- plates death with the eye of calm reason; he has not only silenced “ the child within us who fears death,” ... estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and indepen- dent reason.’ Was his estimate really true? Or was Socrates really pitiable to those who pitied him ! * See for instance the verse of Par- menides, τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἔστιν TE καὶ εἶναι. 264, APPEN DIX *¢ But the theory of Protagoras, and the more potent influence of Socratic inquiry, gave to philosophy what may with equal propriety be called a reflex or subjective turn, and side by side with Existence and Appearance, or Becoming, rose the corres- ponding difference of Knowledge and Opinion, or Sense. Now Knowledge, according to Socrates, is of Universals, and these Universals Plato identified with Being. He often speaks of general ideas, and especially of the Idea of Good, in language which implies that their reality is independent of particular minds, but yet when Socrates suggests, in answer to Par- menides, that they are of the nature of thought’, he gives utterance to a mode of conceiving them which is never entirely absent, but is latent even where not expressed. This frequently appears from phrases dropped by the way, as when the form (εἶδος) is identified with the definition (Adyos*), or when, in the midst of a poetical description of the ideal world, it is said that the human soul must have seen the forms of Truth, because it is necessary that Man should comprehend the meaning of general terms*. And in the well-known passage of the Republic, where the highest truth is set over against the highest knowledge, they are both viewed in relation to the mind, which, through inter- course with the Existent, begets Thought and Truth‘; and the Idea of Good is regarded not only as the transcendent Form of Being (ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας) but as the crowning study or act of intelligence® A transition is thus made from what at first appears a fanciful ontology towards a true psychology, which in the Thestetus, Sophistes, Philebus, and the seventh book of the Republic, is seen to have made considerable progress in the analysis of mind °, (2) The question of Subjectivity has already led us to distin- guish between particular and universal, between the modifica- tions of the individual consciousness and true knowledge, in which these differences are lost, And we have seen that this distinction corresponds nearly to that made by Plato between the transitoriness of Phenomena and the permanence of Being, and, still more closely, to his antithesis of Sensation or Opinion and Science. But the knowledge of universal truths would ὁ Μὴ τῶν εἰδῶν ἕκαστον ἢ τούτων ° Μέγιστον μάθημα, Rep. 6. 505A; νόημα, Parm. 132. ἐν τῷ γνωστῷ reveviaha Rep. 7. ? Theat. 148 Ὁ. 517 A. * Phadrus, 249 B, * See esp. Thewt. 185, 186, 189 KE, ' Tevynoas νοῦν καὶ ἀλήθειαν, Rep, 194; Soph, 261-2; Phileb, 33-433 6. 490 B, Rep. 7. 523-4. APPENDIX Ὁ, 265 be of less value, if these were not applicable to particular facts. And hence the inductive, generalising process, is followed by one deductive and specialising. But this is not merely a return to the subjective particular from which the mind set out. For a phenomenon seen in relation to other phenomena by the light of general laws, is different from the same phenomenon, when at first presented to the inexperienced and unreflecting sense. ° Therefore the particular modification of the individual subject is to be distinguished from the true particular, which has objective as well as subjective reality. Now as Plato, in the infancy of Induc- tion and of Moral Science, had a notion of universal knowledge, which he believed in but could only partially realise, through an imperfect method of hypotheses and exclusions—so in the absence of any adequate means of verification, he saw the necessity of connecting the universal forms of knowledge with particular facts. The powerful impulse which he received from the Eleatic philosophy tended to the sublation of all diversities of existence, as well as thought, into a merely abstract Unity. But on the other hand, the method of Socrates, whose generalisations were sifted through examples, and the genius of Plato him- self with his manifold affinities to the world, required the Muse of Philosophy to descend from these heights, even into the den if necessary’, and to hold intercourse again with the objects of sense and with mankind. Plato sometimes speaks, especially in his more imaginative moods, as if he wished to repeat the Hleatic contrast of Being and Phenomena in a new form: as if the real and apparent, the Ideal and the Actual, were separated by an impassable chasm. This way of speaking has become stereotyped in what is called the Platonic theory of ideas, including the doctrine of reminiscence: a theory which, in seeking to account for the knowledge of phenomena, creates new difficulties, which it fails to solve. But in those which Plato probably regarded as his more exact writings, the half-mythical erudities of this hypothesis have disappeared, the necessity as well as the difficulty of reconciling the abstract with the concrete, the Ideal with the Actual, is clearly recognised, and more than one dialogue is chiefly devoted to this task. An approach is made to a new and larger idea of knowledge, not merely as the Universal in which subjective peculiarities are done away, but as the Union of all permanent relations in the contemplation of * Rep. 7. 519. 266 APPEN Dix the mind. A change of this kind, especially when made gradually by a writer who often ironically half reveals and half conceals his thought, is apt to expose him to the charge of inconsistency. That Plato, in falling into Mr. Grote’s hands, has not escaped this fate, is partly due to those who have hitherto represented the philosopher as a mere transcendentalist.. But Mr. Grote sometimes speaks as if knowledge could not com- prehend the universal with the particular, as if generalisation and specialisation were incompatible. He says (vol. ii. p. 253): ‘It is inconsistent in Plato, after affirming that nothing can deserve the name of art except what is general—capable of being rationally anticipated and prescribed beforehand: then to include in art the special treatment required for the multiplicity of particular cases.’ He finds fault with the examples drawn from facts of sense to illustrate knowledge in the Theetetus ?, and truth and falsehood in the Sophist®, See also a passage in the chapter on the Politicus (vol. ii. pp. 471-3), where the relative or specialising aspect of Plato’s doctrine is very forcibly characterised. We may notice, as affording a point of transition towards the same mode of thought, a passage of the Philebus, where, besides the abstract knowledge of measures, numbers, and forms, the know- ledge also of concrete existence is allowed to be necessary for the perfect life ‘if a man is to know the way to his own door.’ But it is not fair to accuse Plato of returning to the doctrine which he had rejected that ‘sense is knowledge,’ because he admits that knowledge is related to particulars, any more than it is fair to speak of the argument of the Theeetetus as the rejection of indi- vidual reason (vol. i. p. 295). He has not relinquished his belief in the immutable nature of true knowledge. ‘Where there is not absolute permanence there can be no reason’ is an emphatic statement of the very dialogue which asserts the relativity of the ideas*. Here we repeat that if Plato holds contradictory opinions, he holds them not alternately, but together. While expatiating on the ‘plain of truth,’ he speaks of general notions as passing from many sensations to a unity comprehended by reasoning’. And after describing the happiness of the philoso- 1 See esp. Sophist. 259 OC; Polit. knowledge or cognition,’ there is a 72 A, 285 B. qualification suppressed, It should be ? Viz. the facts of a case of assault ὁ knowledge of a concrete fact.’ or robbery. Plato purposely chooses * *Theetetus is sitting—Theatetus the simplest examples. But when is flying.’ Mr. Grote represents him (vol. ii, * Sophist. 249 ©. p. 382) as saying that to be person- ® Phedrus, 249 B, ally present and look on is ‘essential to "ΟΣ. ἃ ὦ χὸ.." APPENDIX D. 267 pher who knows nothing of his neighbour but studies the universal nature of man, he speaks of the mind as abstracting and generalising from her impressions’, The Phedrus, as Mr. Grote has observed, combines the extreme of generality with the extreme of specialty. But the special is supposed to be en- lightened by the general, and this position, whether tenable or not, is in no sense a return to the mere subjective relativity of _Protagoras. The Parmenides, Theeetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, and Philebus, do, however, show a change or growth in Plato’s theory of knowledge, which may be briefly stated thus. The difficulty of finding a way down from the Ideas to sensible things is clearly stated in the Parmenides, and again touched slightly in the Philebus, where, however, the Ideas are conceived some- what differently as unities amidst plurality, and knowledge, as we have already noticed, is made to include particulars. The Theetetus presents a similar class of difficulties from the sub- jective side, arising from the co-existence, not of Being with phenomena, but of Knowledge with sensation and opinion. It is natural to suppose that Plato was led by these difficulties towards the modified view which he has expressed in the Sophistes? and Politicus, where the ideas appear as logical wholes, standing in relation to each other, genera comprising species and species individuals under them; where the dis- tinction of absolute and relative, or, in Greek language, of rest and motion, disappears in the notion of a complexity of fixed relations, and universal and particular meet in an all-embracing harmony or law (μέτρον). APPENDIX D. εἶδος, ἰδέα. δ 1. Tux words εἶδος and ἰδέα are throughout nearly synonymous in Greek, but there is a tendency observable to a difference in their use, perhaps in some way connected with the difference of gender. εἶδος seems earlier to have shaken itself clear of metaphor, and to have settled into an abstract meaning. Thus in Thucyd. 2. 20 1 Theet. 175-186. the Parmenides and Sophistes in 2 The important word μέθεξις, ‘par- Plato, See Ast’s Lexicon, s.v. ticipation in the idea,’ occurs only in 268 APPENDIX” & τὸ εἶδος τῆς νόσου means simply the nature of the disease, but in 2. 21 τοιαύτη ἣν ἐπὶ πᾶν τὴν ἰδέαν, “was such in its general phenomena :’ ἰδέα calls up a picture, while εἶδος simply designates a class or kind of thing. So πᾶσα ἰδέα... θανάτου, Thuc, 3. 81, is not ‘every kind of death,’ but ‘death in every form,’ δ 2. The word εἶδος occurs frequently in Plato in its ordinary sense. Thus in Theeet,. 157 C: "Ανθρωπόν τε τίθενται καὶ λίθον καὶ Kal? ἕκαστον ζῶόν τε καὶ εἶδος, the word is scarcely more abstract than in Herodotus, 1. 94: Τὰ... τῶν παιγνιέων εἴδεα. A more philosophical application of the same use occurs 181 D, where we have the δύο εἴδη κινήσεως. § 3. But it occurs also in a more abstract sense, which we may possibly be right in attributing to Socrates, as a distinctly logical term. εἶδος then means a class, or species, as that to which parti- cular things are referred, which contains them, and marks them off from others, and which itself answers to their definition. See Theztetus, 148 D: Ταύτας πολλὰς οὔσας ἑνὶ εἴδει περιέλαβες. 205 D: Εἰς ταὐτὸν ἐμπέπτωκεν ἡ συλλαβὴ εἶδος ἐκείνῳ. § 4. It may be doubted whether in Plato the word εἶδος ever loses entirely the association of its earliest meaning (in which he fre- quently employs it) of outward appearance, form. (See Ast, Lex. sub voc.) But as it approaches to its technical use in his philo- sophy, it tends to regain metaphorically the association of visible shape, which in a literal sense it has cast off. The metaphor is not perfect, however, until the word has been changed to ἰδέα, Or if we choose to put it so, εἶδος expresses the general shape and contour of a thing; ἰδέα implies also the colour and the whole appearance, εἶδος is a colourless ἰδέα, See Theset. 203 E: Ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον. And there is a real difference underlying the figurative one. For a comparison of passages tends to prove that εἶδος is applied to the universal forms of existence as they are distinct from one another ; idéa rather as each of them has a unity in itself. Thus in Theet. 1, c. we have ἕν τι γεγονὸς εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον, ἕτερον δὲ τῶν στοιχείων |, Again, 204 A: Μία ἰδέα ἐξ ἑκάστων τῶν συναρμοττόντων στοιχείων γιγνομένη. Ib. A: Ἕν τι εἶδος ἕτερον τῶν πάντων μερῶν. 205 C: Μία τις ἰδέα ἀμέριστος συλ- λαβὴ ἂν εἴη, 205 D: Καὶ μία ἐστὶν ἰδέα. Cp. 184 D: Εἰς μίαν τινὰ ἰδέαν. συντείνει, It should be noticed, that in the above passages the use of both words is in a transition state, assuming rather the form of an adapt- 1 Cp. Rep. 544 C: Ἤ τινα ἄλλην ἔχεις ἰδέαν πολιτείας, ἥ τις καὶ ἐν εἴδει διαφανεῖ τινι κεῖται. APPENDIX Κ᾿ 269 ation of the ordinary use, than of technical phraseology. Plato may perhaps be teaching the doctrine of ideas by example ; but he does not avowedly give to the words the ‘second intention’ with which they are used in many passages to express the eternal forms of Being, There is also an intermediate transition noticeable in the use of ἰδέα, from the abstract to the concrete, i.e. it passes, by a kind of synecdoche, from meaning the sum of the attributes to mean that to which they belong. So in Thuc. ]. ὁ. πᾶσα ἰδέα θανάτου:ΞΞ θάνατος ᾿ πάσης ideas. And in Theext. 184, 205, pia ἰδέα is used synony- mously with ἐν εἶδος, ἰδέαν μίαν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ ἔχον. It is more to the purpose, however, to observe generally, that the word εἶδος tends to a use at once more logical (ἕτερον εἶδος, διττὰ εἴδη, κατ᾽ εἴδη διῖστάς, κατ᾽ εἴδη τέμνειν) and more concrete—(the ἰδέα is spoken of as inherent in it): the word ἰδέα to one more metaphysical (εὶς play ἰδέαν συνορῶντα ἄγειν τὰ πολλαχῇ διεσπαρμένα, μίαν ἰδέαν Out πολλῶν πάντῃ διατεταμένην ἱκανῶς διαισθάνεται), more abstract, and at the same time more figurative. The word ἰδέα is a fair symbol of the union of reason and imagi- nation in Plato. APPENDIX KE. The Theetetus and Aristotle. One chief source of difficulty in the Theetetus to the modern reader is the imperfect development which it presents of the con- ception of the Proposition?. In the earlier part, the ever-varying succession of phenomena, bound up with the ever-varying im- pressions of sense, are only dimly felt to belong to any Subject. Indeed as the argument proceeds, the unity of that which is the subject of different impressions or qualities is expressly denied. At a further stage, where the question arises, How is false opinion possible? there appears indeed a sort of consciousness that all predication implies a subject (188: Οὔτε περὶ τῶν ὄντων οὔτε αὐτὸ Kal? αὑτό), and that to think is to say to oneself, ‘ This is that ;;—-which first shows itself in the example, ‘I think Theztetus is Socrates,’ and is afterwards more distinctly expressed where it is said that 1 Συλλογισμός in the Thevet. (186) is nearly equivalent to ‘abstraction and generalization.’ 270 APPENDIX E. thought is the mind’s silent discourse?. But that which remains unnoticed is the relation of subject to predicate in any proposi- tion. Thus it is assumed that when one predicate is substituted for another (as when, in the propositions, ‘Yonder man is Socrates,’ cr ‘Thersites was handsome,’ the terms ‘Socrates’ and ‘handsome’ have been substituted by mistake for ‘Theetetus’ and ‘ugly’), this is the same thing as if the terms so confounded were pre- dicated of each other (thus, ‘Thetetus is Socrates,’ ‘What is ugly is handsome’). The relation between the terms of a proposition where the subject is something immediately perceived by sense, is brought out afterwards by the image of the waxen block; but the same indistinctness still hangs about abstract propositions. The line is not clearly drawn between saying, ‘the sum of 7 and 5 is ey and saying ‘11 is 12,’ Lastly, when it is asserted that the combination of names in speech corresponds to the combination of elements in the object of knowledge, we are still left in the dark as to the exact relation between words or things which is implied in either combination. This confusion between subject and predicate is, in other words, to use Aristotelian language, the confusion of matter with form, and of δύναμις with ἐνέργεια. The subject is all its predicates δυνάμει, and is that which, together with the new attribute, becomes τόδε τι. Thus Καλλίας ἄμουσος becomes μουσικός : hence Callias is in one sense the material part. It may be said, therefore, that in the earlier philosophy, when the matter changes from one form to its opposite, or from a privative to a positive state, it is lost sight of that the form cannot properly be said to change, and that the matter or subject, as such, remains unchanged, while assuming different forms. 1. It is this aspect of the questions raised in the Thestetus which is taken up by Aristotle, who follows Plato in pointing out that the views of Heraclitus and Protagoras meet in one. Their views are thus identified and criticised at length in two. very similar passages of the Metaphysics (3. 1005 b-rorz2 b, 10, 1061 b-1063 b), in both of which Aristotle is engaged in defending the principle of contradiction. The theory of Heraclitus is stated in its most abstract and logical form, ‘Everything at once is and is not. ‘This is at ‘A close study of this passage necessity of getting behind Aristotle (189, 190) will afford convincing proof (if the expression may be permitted) of the indeterminate state of the in order to understand Plato, science of logic at this time, and the SerENDIX Ἢ 271 first put forward with the qualification, ‘Some (i.e. Plato?) think that Heraclitus means this:’ but afterwards it is made to figure as the Heraclitean theory, ‘adopted by many physical philosophers.’ The theory of Protagoras is shown to come to the same thing; for if every man’s impression is true, then contradictories are true (and not true) together. Aristotle does not profess. to use direct proof in defence of what he assumes to be self-evident and the basis of all reasoning, but he brings forward a number of indirect arguments, which throw considerable light upon the nature of the question. These are intended for such persons as really feel the difficulty: there are others for whom a more summary method is required (οἱ μὲν yap πείθους δέονται, oi δὲ Bias*). Amongst these arguments there are two which deserve especial notice here, as being of a different kind from any which are to be met with in the dialogue. (a) ‘We will not say that the act of predication must either be or not be something, lest they should accuse us of begging the question ; but we will say, that every predicate means some- thing, and that its meaning is one, and not indefinitely various ; otherwise language and even thought is destroyed. And to pre- dicate it in this one meaning of a particular subject is either true or false. Hence, “man” and “not man” cannot be truly predicated together of the same subject.’ (Ὁ) ‘The difference between the same man’s impressions at different times regards not the quality, but the subject of it. Sweet and bitter are the same to the sick as to the healthy man: it is the wine that appears to him at one time sweet and at another bitter. The idea of sweet is the same to him in the ‘past, present, and future.’ There are other points in which the discussion is characteristic of Aristotle (as where it is said that the principle of motion rests on a too narrow induction; or that if all creatures having sensation were destroyed, the universe would still exist; or where he points out that the admission of degrees, e.g. ‘nearer and farther from the truth,’ necessitates a standard of truth to which the approach is made); but the influence of this dialogue and of the discussions (Megarian and Platonic) which preceded and followed it is also very apparent. The following points of coincidence are worth mentioning :— * Cp. Hom. 1]. 2. 188-199:"Ov7iva παραστάς]... Ὃν δ᾽ αὖ δήμου τ᾽ ἄνδρα μὲν βασιλῆα καὶ ἔξοχον ἄνδρα κιχείη,,] ἴδοι βοόωντά τ᾽ ἐφεύροι, | τὸν σκήπτρῳ τὸν δ᾽ ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε ἐλάσασκεν, ὁμοκλήσασκέ τε μύθῳ. 272 APPENDIX ἃ (1) It is assumed, as part of the theory, that everything ig thus and not-thus (οὕτως καὶ οὐχ οὕτως). But this is nearly the last point to which the principle of motion is reduced in the Thee- tetus (183 AB). Aristotle proceeds to infer that everything must be infinite ; and this in two ways: first, as ‘not-this’ means ‘ every- thing but this,’ it follows that everything must be everything else?; and, secondly (with Plat. Thezet. loc. cit.), if οὕτως καὶ ody οὕτως is true, then its contradictory (οὔθ' οὕτως οὔτε οὐχ οὕτως) must also be true; and this, he adds, must go on to infinity. The theory gives an indefinite, that is, a purely negative account of Being (τὸ μὴ ὃν λέγει). (2) Further, in reference to Protagoras it is shown that, in making all impressions true, he makes them also false,—his own theory amongst the rest. (3) The Heraclitean or Protagorean philosopher is seen to avoid tumbling into a ditch. It is evident therefore that he acknow- ledges the distinction between good and bad. Everything then is not equally indifferent. And if there are impressions to which the theory does not apply, so much has been conceded. Or, ‘as Plato puts it,’ with regard to the future, the physician is a better judge of what will prove wholesome than a chance person. (4) Aristotle further points out the absolute relativeness. of the doctrine. They cannot say, ‘What appears, is,’ but ‘What appears to me, is to me.’ ; The following scattered touches may be quoted without com- ment :— ‘The theory of Protagoras is called ἡ περὶ τὰ φαινόμενα ἀλήθεια." ‘My eyes may each receive a different impression from the same thing.’ ‘The doubt about the criterion of knowledge is like the question whether the waking or the dreaming life is real.’ ‘Socrates is not a different person for every different attribute.’ ‘When a pleasant thing appears bitter, this is in consequence of a manifest defect, viz. disease. The one state then (i.e. the healthy one), and not the other, is to be held the measure of things.’ ‘Language is made impossible,’ ‘The man thinks thus and not thus: i.e. it is equally true that he is not thinking as that he thinks, He is reduced to the condition of a vegetable.’ (5) Lastly, Aristotle, like Theodorus, remarks upon the difficulty of reasoning with the men, because they will not lay down anything to start with, and allow it to remain firm. Aristotle’s view may be summarily described by saying that he * Καὶ γίγνεται δὴ τὸ ’Avagaydpov, Heraclitus himself, he would have ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα. Aristotle thinks been compelled to acknowledge its that if this argument had been put to force, APPENDIX Ἢ, 273 meets the indefiniteness of the physical and sophistic theories by asserting the distinction between form and matter and the eternity of form. 2. But he does not deny that a continual process takes place between them, or that there is a world in which growth and decay, generation and corruption, are ever going ‘on, viz. the world of sensible things, which in Aristotle reasserts its reality, as being inseparable from the natural forms, and perhaps even from the relations expressed in mathematics. This is not the place for the discussion of Aristotle’s theory of becoming. It is enough to notice (1) that he adopts from the early philosophers, whom he classes together as upholding the material cause, on the one hand the dualism, and on the other the indeterminateness of matter (Phys. Ausc. 1), and points out that therefore it can only be the object of knowledge ‘by analogy,’ with reference to the form. And (2) his conception of sensation as a realization of mental life is very similar to that expressed in the Theetetus and Timeus. The ἐνέργεια αἰσθήσεως, which is inseparable from the ἐνέργεια αἰσθητοῦ, is the meeting point of active and passive elements in motion. (In modern language it is a pro- cess between object and subject.) But the φαντασία or mental image, which accompanies sensation but is separable from it in thought, in the Theztetus is merged in sensation, although the term as here used is simply the noun of φαίνεσθαι (φαντασία ἄρα καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτόν), but is clearly distinguished from it by Aristotle. The distinction is made the ground of an argument for the pos- sibility of error’. 3. The same distinction between matter and form is also applied to the solution of the doubt, whether the complex whole is one or many, e.g. whether the syllable is all the letters combined, or something above and beyond them. Aristotle shows that neither 1 (Met. 1. 1010 Ὁ: Οὐδ᾽ ἡ αἴσθησις where the φαντασία is false the δόξα ψευδὴς τοῦ ἰδίου ἐστὶν ἀλλ᾽ ἡ φαντασία may be true. De Somn. 3. Cp. de ov ταὐτὸν τῇ αἰσθήσει) Again, even An, 3. 3. The difference between Aristotle and Plato (in this dialogue), on this point of psychology, may be illustrated by the following tabular view :— Aristotle thus traces the gradual Plato distinguishes ascent of the human mind from ἐπιστήμη sense to knowledge : from 7. σοφία. μνήμη each of which is 6. ἐπιστήμη. These two are in δόξα accompanied by 5. τέχνη. some cases inseparable. αἴσθησις. | φαντασία, 4. ἐμπειρία. 3: μνήμη. 2. φαντασία. 1, αἴσθησις. » a hohe 274 APPENDIX ΒΕ. the parts nor their arrangement can create the form of the whole: much rather it is this mould which determines the arrangement of the parts. It is prior to them, and is eternal and uncreated. They affect the nature of the compound thing only by being capable of recelving a certain form. At this point Plato (in the Theztetus) and Aristotle seem almost to touch one another, except that in Aristotle the conception of the end (τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα) is bound up with that of the form. As the tendency in the Theztetus is to rise from the ordinary notion of an element to that of elementary Ideas, so Aristotle points out that the universal is in one sense an element: (i. ὁ. logically.) (Met. 4. 1014 b.) 4. Among the germs which the Theetetus (like most of Plato’s Γ»» dialogues) contains of Aristotelian formule, the most remarkable is the distinction between possessing and having Knowledge, which obviously corresponds to Aristotle’s distinction between Knowing and Contemplating (ἐπίστασθαι, Oewpeiv),—his favourite illustration of the difference between possession and use, or between a poten- tial and an actual state. No such general application is made of it by Plato. The notion enters into the Thestetus only as a last ineffectual attempt to reconcile the existence of Knowledge with the possibility of error, and it is expressed through an imaginary sym- bol. But the distinction latent in the image—between the potential and the actual—is the same by which Aristotle afterwards solved this and other difficulties, if not finally, yet with admirable com- pleteness. APPENDIX F, Platonic Idioms in the Theetetus. ᾿Αλλ᾽ ob πρότερόν γε, οἶμαι, Θεαίτητος ἐν ἐμοὶ δοξασθήσεται, πρὶν ἂν ἡ σιμότης αὕτη τῶν ἄλλων σιμοτήτων ὧν ἐγὼ ἑώρακα διάφορόν τι μνημεῖον παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημηναμένη καταθῆται, Thest. 209 Ο. : The words of Socrates, it is said in the Euthyphro (rr B, 15 B), are like the words of Dedalus; they are endued with motion. This image expresses the most characteristic peculiarity of Plato’s style, the source of much both of its beauty and of its difficulty. His thoughts are not fixed and dead, like specimens in a museum APPENDIX ΚΕ 975 or cabinet, but flying as he pursues them, doubling, hiding, re- appearing, soaring aloft, and changing colour with every change of light and aspect. The reader of the Theetetus, for example, is disappointed, if he looks for perfect consistency with the Republic, or if he expects to find the logical statement of a definite theory. The ground is shifted several times. One line of inquiry is abandoned, and yet the argument presently returns from a new starting-point upon the former track. A position is assumed and then relinquished ;—the figures are erased,—and yet the subsequent dis¢ussion is not without reference to the hypothesis which has been demolished. The doc- trine of sense, for instance, is wholly negatived, and yet it cannot be said that we are not intended to gather something from it. Plato's metaphors are ‘living creatures’ rather than figures of speech; he regards them not as airy nothings, but as realities; he recurs to them with fondness, as Lord Bacon does. But no ex- pression is ever merely repeated in Plato. If an image is recalled, it is with some additional or altered feature: if a conception is resumed, it is not merely copied, but a fresh picture is drawn from the life. Even in recapitulating, some modification is often made, or the argument is carried further. Thus the photograph, as it has been called, of the connection is apt to be blurred, from the thought moving as we read, Even in the same passage, where an ordinary writer would be contented with referring to an example or illustra- tion just adduced, Plato surprises the reader with a different one, which perhaps gives a new direction to the current of thought. A fair instance of this occurs in Thesxt. 169 A, where Theodorus says: ‘It was mere nonsense in me to hope that you would excuse me and not compel me to strip for the contest, as the Lacede- momans do. You are rather to be compared to Sciron: for they tell one either to strip or go away; but you are rather like Anteus in your way of doing business, for you will let no man go till you have stripped him (like Sciron) and compelled him to wrestle with you (like Anteeus).’ The argument itself (6 λόγος) is continually personified and is spoken of under a Protean variety of figures. It is at one time our servant, who must wait our leisure, or who runs away from us, or who seems likely to die and vanish away ‘like a tale.’ More frequently it has power over us, like a General commanding us, like a sea in which we must swim for our lives, while it rolls its successive waves over us, like a wind which car- ries us we know not whither. Sometimes ‘its name is legion,’ and T 2 276 APPENDIX ΙΝ it is multiplied into a swarm or an impetuous throng. Or it takes a milder form, as the raft, or dolphin, on which we seek to escape from a sea of doubt, or the wall behind which we screen ourselves from the driving shower. The Argument talks with us, it goes through a subject, takes up a position, hides its face from some threatening objection and passes on. It rebukes us for unfair treatment of itself, it can be insulted, it stands in need of help, it has a father, and guardians of its orphanhood. This movement or plasticity of ideas, which penetrates the whole of Plato’s writings, is closely connected with their conversational form, and manifests itself in what may be called his poetical use of language. The observation of both these elements of Plato’s style is of im- portance to the student, because it saves him from the necessity of resorting to some forced construction, or flying to conjecture, upon each occasion of grammatical perplexity. I. Conversationalisms. In Plato we often meet with irregularities of construction, which in an oration or set treatise would be referred to looseness or inelegance of diction, but which only make the dia- logue more easy and lively and natural. a. Changes of construction, The following are a few out of several instances in the Theetetus :— (1) 144 A: Τὸ γὰρ εὐμαθῆ ὄντα... πρᾷον ad εἶναι. ἐγὼ μὲν οὔτ᾽ ἂν φόμην γενέσθαι οὔτε ὁρῶ γιγνομένου. Theodorus begins by simply expressing his surprise, but proceeds to dwell upon his previous anticipations and experience to account for it. (2) 153 B: Ἡ δ᾽ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἕξις... κτᾶταί τε μαθήματα, K.7A. Cp. 173 1): Σπουδαὶ δ᾽ ἑταιρειῶν em ἀρχάς . . οὐδ᾽ ὄναρ πράττειν προσίσταται αὐτοῖς. The emphasis on the first words causes the sentence to begin vaguely, and the construction is determined as it proceeds. (3) 167 B: Πονηρᾶς ψυχῆς ἕξει δοξάζοντας συγγενῆ ἑαυτῆς. Here, unless something is corrupt, a transition is made to the re- flexive pronoun, as if ψυχή were the subject of δοξάζοντας : a transi- tion from the persons who think to the mind which thinks. (4) 172 B: οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε φῆσαι (ὁ λόγος)... ἐθέλουσιν ἰσχυρίζεσθαι. He passes from what the argument would say, to what certain persons do say. So elsewhere there is often a transition from the indefinite singular to the indefinite plural. To this may be added the occasionally difficult use of the cases of © nouns: e.g. Theet. 147 C: Ἔν τῇ τοῦ πηλοῦ ἐρωτήσει, without περί : aPeHNDIX ν΄" 277 just as we might say in conversation, ‘the mud-question,’ for ‘the question about the mud.’ 8. Resumption. A thought is frequently resumed in the same sentence, for the sake of modifying it, or of particularizing the aspect in which it is considered, or merely for the sake of clearness. The introduction of the pronoun αὐτός, to recall a noun which has been thrown back for the sake of emphasis, is a familiar instance of this. E.g. 155 D: Ἐάν σοι ἀνδρῶν .. τῆς διανοίας τὴν ἀλήθειαν . . συν- εξερευνήσωμαι αὐτῶν ; Perhaps the most marked instance of resumption in the Thex- tetus occurs 171 B: Μᾶλλον δὲ ὑπό ye ἐκείνου ὁμολογήσεται, ὅταν τῷ τἀναντία λέγοντι ξυγχωρῇ ἀληθῆ αὐτὸν δοξάζειν, τότε καὶ ὁ Πρωταγόρας αὐτὸς συγχωρήσεται. y. Redundancy. There are other ways in which regularity of construction is sacrificed to fulness of expression. E.g. 153 C: Ἔτι οὖν σοι λέγω νηνεμίας τε καὶ yadnvas καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ὅτι αἱ μὲν ἡσυχίαι σήπουσι καὶ ἀπολλύασι, τὰ. δ᾽ ἕτερα σώζει. 172 D: Τοὺς λόγους ἐν εἰρήνῃ ἐπὶ σχολῆς ποιοῦνται, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς νυνὶ τρίτον ἤδη λόγον ἐκ λόγου μεταλαμβάνομεν, οὕτω κἀκεῖνοι, ἐὰν αὐτοὺς ὁ ἐπελθὼν τοῦ προκειμένου μᾶλλον, καθάπερ ἡμᾶς, ἀρέσῃ. 109 Β: Μὴ γὰρ ἔχειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην τούτου οἷόν τε, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέραν ἀντ᾽ ἐκείνης, ὅταν .. ἀνθ᾽ ἑτέρας ἑτέραν ἁμαρτὼν λάβῃ, ὅτε ἄρα τὰ ἕν- δεκα δώδεκα ήθη εἶναι, τὴν τῶν ἕνδεκα ἐπιστήμην ἀντὶ τῆς τῶν δώδεκα λαβών, τὴν ἐν ἑαυτῷ οἷον φάτταν ἀντὶ περιστερᾶς. An occasional consequence of this fulness of expression is the deferred apodosis, which sometimes occurs, especially after ὥσπερ: e.g. Rep. 3. 402 B: Ὥσπερ dpa... Ap’ οὖν, ὃ λέγω, πρὸς θεῶν, οὕτως, κιτλ. Theet. 207 A: Ὥσπερ ἂν... οὕτω τοίνυν, κιτ.λ. δ. Also connected with the conversational form οἵ Plato’s writ- ings, and the plastic, growing condition of his thoughts, is the imperfect kind of argument which he sometimes employs. It is a saying of Aristotle’s that Dialectic deals tentatively with those sub- jects on which Philosophy dogmatizes (ἡ διαλεκτικὴ πειραστικὴ περὶ ὧν ἡ φιλοσοφία γνωριστική) ; and Bacon speaks of a Socratic induc- tion. To this, and to a certain economy used towards the re- spondent, is to be attributed the frequency of the argument from example (the example often covering more ground than is quite fair), and of the inference, by means of simple conversion, from particular to universal. 278 APPENDIX F. The immaturity of the science of logic no doubt renders this mode of reasoning more easy and natural than it could be in a later. age, but it is not explained without allowing for the fact that the inquiry is conducted, at least on the part of the respondent, in a tentative and inductive spirit. An instance occurs in the Theeetetus, 159 A, when it is argued that if what is different is dissimilar, then whatever is dissimilar is wholly different, and what is similar is the same. That Plato was fully aware of the inconclusiveness of the form of argument thus ironically adopted, appears from Protag. 350 C, where Socrates is checked for it by Protagoras, who says, "Eywye ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ σοῦ, εἰ οἱ ἀνδρεῖοι θαρραλέοι εἰσίν, ὡμολόγησα" εἰ δὲ καὶ οἱ θαρραλέοι ἀνδρεῖοι, οὐκ ἠρωτήθην᾽ εἰ γάρ με τότε ἤρου, εἶπον ἂν ὅτι οὐ πάντες. And sometimes, even where an instance is really meant to cover a large conclusion, its power is ostensively limited with persuasive modesty: as in Theet. 1 52 C: Φαντασία dpa καὶ αἴσθησις ταὐτὸν ἕν τε θερμοῖς καὶ πᾶσι τοῖς τοιούτοις... Αἴσθησις ἄρα τοῦ ὄντος ἀεί ἐστι. Ib. 204 D: Ταὐτὸν ἄρα ἔν γε τοῖς ὅσα ἐξ ἀριθμοῦ ἐστί, τό τε πᾶν προσαγορεύομεν καὶ τὰ ἅπαντα. ε. It is difficult to separate between the conversational and the poetical element in Plato. Their combination gives him the power of ‘saying anything.’ Just as there is a freedom of expression possible in conversation, which we feel to be impossible in writing, or as the poet can express with grace and dignity what by other lips were better left unsaid. II. This leads us to the Poetical use of language. Plato’s words have frequently a different value from any that could be given them by a mere prose writer. The language as well as the thought is instinct with a creative power, which gives it a dramatic vividness and refinement; at times even a dithyrambic cadence, or a lyrical intensity. The poet whom Plato most resembles in this is So- phocles; but his style may be regarded as the mirror of all Greek literature. a, Poetical use of single words. (1) Choice of a more sensuous expression (mpd ὀμμάτων ποιεῖν). 150 D: ’Evapyés ὅτι for δῆλον ὅτι (‘as clear as day’). 155 A: Ταῦτα τὰ φάσματα. 156 B: Συνεκπίπτουσα καὶ γεννωμένη. 160 D: Μὴ πταίων τῇ διανοίᾳ. 162 A: Διωλύγιος φλυαρία. 165 B: Σφαλεὶς γὰρ ἧττον ἀσχημονήσει. a =o. 2 aeeEN DIX P, 279 169 B: Μαλ᾽ εὖ ξυγκεκόφασιν. 171 D: Ταύτῃ ay. . ἵστασθαι τὸν λόγον. 172 ΕἸ : ᾿Ανάγκην ἔχων ὁ ἀντιδίκος (wielding coercion). 202 A: Taira. . περιτρέχοντα πᾶσι προσφέρεσθαι. To which may be added the ‘ hypocoristic’ use of diminutives. 149 ©: Φαρμάκια. 195 A: ᾿Εάν του σμικρὸν ἦ τὸ ψυχάριον. (2) Use of Epic words, the meaning of which is sometimes spiritualized. 149 A: Matas γενναίας καὶ βλοσυρᾶς. 162 E: λξιος οὐδ᾽ ἑνὸς μόνου. ᾿ 174 D: Πολὺ βδάλλοντα. 180 Εἰ : Τοῦτο γάρ μοι ἰνδάλλεται διανοουμένη. 194 Εἰ : Ὅταν τοίνυν λάσιόν του τὸ κέαρ 7. (3) Playing upon a word. 150 C: Evpynya. (Cp. Soph. Cid. Tyr. 1108.) 152 A: Τὴν ἀλήθειαν. 181 C: Τοὺς ῥέοντας. 194 C: Τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς κέαρ. 208 B: ᾿Αληθέστατον ἐπιστήμης λόγον. Closely related to this is (4) the etymological use of words: i.e. when, by dwelling upon its etymology, a word is made to express something different from, or more than, its ordinary meaning. 149 B: Ὅτι ἄλοχος οὖσα τὴν λοχείαν εἴληχεν. 152 EH: (perhaps) Ξυμφερέσθων (let them march one way). 160 EH: Τὰ ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν κύκλῳ περιθρεκτέον. 193 C: Ὥσπερ οἱ ἔμπαλιν ὑποδούμενοι παραλλάξας. 198 D: Πρόχειρον δ᾽ οὐκ εἶχε τῇ διανοίᾳ. (5) Poetical use of particles: e.g. the frequent use of ἄρα, helping to keep up the idea that Socrates is repeating what he has heard, the occasionally difficult reference with γάρ (152 C: Oia γάρ, and note), the hyperbaton of καί (154 Εἰ : Kat μὴν ἔγωγε), and gene- rally the dramatic liveliness with which successive clauses are con- trasted, as if each were put into the mouth of a different person. Speech thus becomes literally a ‘ self-dialogue.’ See especially 155 Β : °O μὴ πρότερον ἦν, ἀλλὰ ὕστερον τοῦτο εἶναι (1): and 190 B: Ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον .. ὡς παντὸς μᾶλλον... ὡς παντάπασιν ἄρα... ὡς ἀνάγκη .., with which the supposed answers of the mind to itself are in- troduced. Compare Phil. 38 C: Ti more dpa ἔστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν πέτραν τοῦθ' ἑστάναι φανταζόμενον ὑπό τινι δένδρῳ. β. The same poetical energy shows itself in the expansion of 280 APPENDIXy Τὸ some of the ordinary forms of grammar. In this also Plato reflects the general tendency of the Greek language. (1) Apposition. The use of the apposition of clauses (as a form of epexegesis) deserves to be reckoned among the more striking peculiarities of Plato’s style. One example from the Theetetus will suffice to indicate what is meant. 175 D: Πάλιν αὖ τὰ ἀντίστροφα ἀποδίδωσιν"... ἰλιγγιῶν τε ἀφ᾽ ὑψηλοῦ κρεμασθείς . . ἀδημονῶν τε καὶ ἀπορῶν καὶ βαρβαρίζων . . γέλωτα... παρέχει, κιτιλ., where another writer would prob- ably have inserted γάρ. (Cp. Lach. 182 B.) Sometimes a sentence is thus placed in apposition with a pronoun such as τοῦτο (189 E ad fin.) or ὅ (158 B). Compare the use of τὸ δέ, 6. 5. 157 E. A slightly different use is that of the accusative in apposition to the sentence. Instances of this are 153 C: Ἐπὶ τούτοις τὸν κολοφῶνα, κιτιλ. ; 160 E: Ta ἀμφιδρόμια αὐτοῦ, «.T.A. (Many of the examples of resumption and redundancy above referred to would fall grammatically under this head.) (2) Attraction. E.g. where a main verb was to be expected, we find a participle. It can be accounted for; but there is reason to believe that it is partly due to the neighbourhood of another parti- ciple, or of some word that is usually construed with a participle. 173 B: Τοὺς δὲ τοῦ ἡμετέρου χοροῦ πότερον βούλει διελθόντες ἢ ἐάσαντες πάλιν ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον τρεπώμεθα ; where we should have expected διέλθωμεν. 150 D: Τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται . . καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προιού- | σης τῆς συνουσίας... θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες, ὡς αὑτοῖς τε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις δοκοῦσι : where, but for the proximity of és. ., ἐπιδιδόντες would probably have been ἐπιδιδόασιν. See also λαβών, 199 B, which but for ὅταν... λάβῃ would be λαβόντα. γ' To the same self-consciousness of language which betrays itself in the foregoing instances may be attributed the minuteness of anti- thesis, which, though common everywhere in Greek, is strikingly so in Plato. 150 E: “Epos δὲ καταφρονήσαντες, ἢ αὐτοὶ ὑπ᾽ ἄλλων πεισθέντες (2). 197 C: Εἰ δυνατὸν οὕτω κεκτημένον μὴ ἔχειν, ἀλλ᾽ ὥσπερ, κ-τ.λ. 8. This power of refining upon language is turned to account in adapting the mode of expression to the exigencies of the argument. K.g. 152 B, where we are gradually led from the example of the wind, which one man feels cold, and another not, to the position that sensation is the correlative of reality. See also 158 H, 159 B, where, as the argument proceeds, (ἕτερον) ὅλον τοῦτο ὅλῳ ἐκείνῳ is substituted for ὅλως ἕτερον, ae Ἐ Vir «ae πω ἢ mol ae i a ay’, ah eee Ne ee ῃ ᾿ i Ψ Α i Soe eN DIX: Κὶ 281 e. The care which is taken of the rhythm is a further peculiarity of Plato’s style, and may be treated as a poetical element. This is especially noticeable (1) in the manner in which quotations from poetry are shaded off so as to harmonize with the surrounding prose, and (2) in the occasional elaboration of prose writing to something like a metrical cadence. (1) 173 E. In the quotation from Pindar, φέρεται is probably substituted for πέτεται (see note on the passage), the words τὰ ἐπί- πεδα γεωμετροῦσα are inserted, and τῶν ὄντων ἑκάστου ὅλου is added at the close. Thus the poetical language is interwoven with the sen- tence, so as to embellish it without. interrupting its harmony. 194 C. The substitution of the (early) Attic κέαρ for the Homeric κῆρ is probably due to a similar motive. (2) Dithyrambic and lyric cadences are more frequent in some other dialogues than in the Theztetus. See especially Sympos. 196, 197, the close of Agathon’s speech, especially the last few lines, in which the rhetorical antitheses have more the effect of rhythm than of argument: Pheedr. 238, 241, alibi; Rep. 8. 546, 7; 10. 617,18; and several places of the Timeus, e.g. 47 B: Ὧν ὁ μὴ φιλόσοφος τυφλωθεὶς ὀδυρόμενος ἂν θρηνοῖ μάτην. With such passages may be compared Theet. 176 A: Οὐδέ γ᾽ ἁρμονίαν λόγων λαβόντος ὀρθῶς ὑμνῆσαι θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνδρῶν εὐδαιμόνων βίον ἀληθῆ. The same power shows itself more slightly in an occasional inver- sion of the order of words for the sake of emphasis. 158 B: Οἱ μὲν θεοὶ αὐτῶν οἴωνται εἶναι. 160 D: Κατὰ δὲ Πρωταγόραν τὸν σοφώτατον πάντων χρημάτων ἄνθρωπον μέτρον εἶναι. ¢ A few words may be added in conclusion on the artificial structure of Plato’s dialogues, of which the Theeetetus is acknow- ledged to be a prominent example. There is a unity in each of them, approaching to that of a living organism :—the spirit of the whole breathing in every part :—a continuity independent of the links of question and answer, by which it appears to be sustained ; which may be viewed apart from the scenery and the changes of persons, and the passages of humour and pleasantry by which it seems to be interrupted. And while it is comparatively easy to distinguish the principal stages of the argument, yet there is such a dovetailing and inter- penetration of the parts, that it is difficult to adopt an exact division without doing violence to the real harmony, or even to mark the exact point of transition from one hypothesis to another. An instance of this is the way in which the reader is prepared - | |, ἘΞ ῊΝ ge ee ee Se “4 282 APPEN DIX for the argument from the idea of expediency, which may be said to be anticipated as early as 157 D: ᾿Αγαθὸν καὶ καλόν. (Compare the anticipation, at the very beginning of the dialogue, 144 E: ᾿Επεσκεψάμεθ' dy εἰ μουσικὸς dv λέγει, οὗ the conclusion arrived at 179 B: Σοφώτερόν re ἄλλον ἄλλου εἶναι καὶ τὸν μὲν τοιοῦτον μέτρον εἶναι, κτλ) The difficulty of reconciling the ideas of goodness and wis- dom with the doctrine of sense appears more distinctly in the defence of Protagoras, 167 A, and presses for solution ag an ele- ment of the common opinion of men, 170 A: Καὶ ἔν γε τοῖς μεγίστοις κινδύνοις... παρὰ σφίσιν. These two passages have prepared the way for the statement in 171, 2, of the ‘semi-Protagoreanism’ of those who will not venture to say that every creature knows what is for its own health, nor that every individual and every state knows equally what is ex- pedient in legislation. When a breach has thus been made in the enemy’s lines of defence, a rest is afforded to the reader by the vision of the Divine Life which follows, in which, however, the ideas of wisdom and holiness and righteousness have a direct bear- ing upon the conclusion towards which we are being carried step by step, and its effect upon the tone of the discussion is apparent in the words 177 D: πλὴν εἴ τις τὸ ὄνομα λέγοι' τοῦτο δέ που σκῶμμ᾽ ἂν εἴη πρὸς ὃ λέγομεν" οὐχί; kA. At this point the argument from Expediency is fully entered into. But it is difficult to say exactly where it began. A similar gradation may be observed in the development of the difficulty about false opinion. Note also the artfulness of the transition from sensation to thought, 184-187, and from ‘ true opinion’ to ‘true opinion giving an account of itself,’ 207. And while the earlier part is written with a view to what is in reserve, the previous discussion is not forgotten as the inquiry pro- ceeds. See 194 D:‘*a δὴ ὄντα καλεῖται, compared with 152 D: “A δή φαμεν εἶναι, οὐκ ὀρθῶς : and 209 C: Μνημεῖον παρ᾽ ἐμοὶ ἐνσημη- ναμένη καταθῆται,----ν application of the (relinquished) conception of the waxen block. Plato’s philosophy has been compared to a building, of which the Republic is the superstructure, while the other dialogues are the pillars and fretted vaults upon which it rests. The image fails to give an adequate idea of the perfection of Art, —or rather of Nature conscious of itself, —which gives harmony, but not regularity, a growing, not a fixed, consistency, both to the parts and to the whole. APPENDIX ΒΡ. 283 His writings are the creations of a great master, whose sketches are worked up into the larger monuments of his genius, a cycle sur- rounding an eternal Epic poem, bound together by the unity not merely of a particular age and country, but of an individual mind. 3 5 Δ ἀντ, & Ὁ, θαυμάσιε, ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ μέλε. These and the like phrases are apt to be slurred over in trans- lating or interpreting Plato, from the frequency of their recurrence and the difficulty of appreciating their exact force in each connection. They belong to that conversational sprightliness and play of fancy which it is impossible to bind to any rule. ‘Here, as elsewhere, Plato carries further an existing tendency of the Greek language. Such addresses as δαιμόνιε, δαιμονίη, ἠθεῖε, in Homer (Il. 6. 407, 486, 518, 521; ep. Plat. Rep. 344 Ὁ, ὦ δαιμόνιε Θρασύμαχε) vary in signification according to the mood of the speaker. The same may be said of ὦ δαιμόνιε, ὦ μέλε, in Aristophanes. In Plato the variety of such addresses is much greater, and the variety of their meaning greater still. They can often be more perfectly rendered by a changed expression of the voice or counte- nance, than by any words. All that can be said of them generally is, that they give an increased intensity to the tone of the conver- sation at the moment, whether this be grave or humorous, respect- ful, ironical or familiar. ὦ θαυμάσιε in its simplest use conveys a remonstrance, ‘I wonder at you.’ The most decided instance is in the Phedo, 117 D: Οἷον, ἔφη, ποιεῖτε, ὦ θαυμάσιοι. ‘What are you doing! I am amazed at you.’ It may also sometimes convey admiration. But it is frequently used where the subject of wonder or surprise has no- thing to do with the person addressed: e.g. Cratyl. 439 C, where it indicates Socrates’ intense interest in the mystery of the Ideas. Compare the use of the form of congratulation ὦ μακάριε (see Aristoph. Nub. 167) to express Socrates’ own delight at some great discovery: e.g. Rep. 432 D, where Justice is discovered ; Pheed. 69 A, where Socrates congratulates himself as well as Simmias on the superiority of the philosophic life-—In Theet. 151 C, ὦ θαυμάσιε can hardly be rendered except by a note of ad- miration. ‘Do you know that many have been ready to bite me !’ 284 APPENDIX AR Nearly the same is true of ὦ δαιμόνιε, 180 B, though it here retains a slight tone of remonstrance. ‘Disciples, my good sir !’ ‘Disciples, did you say?’ While in 172 C it wears quite a dif- ferent expression, conveying Socrates’ genuine admiration for the philosophic life, and is more difficult to render. ‘Ah! my good friend, this is not the first time I have observed how natural it is that a philosopher should make a poor figure at the bar !’ The affectionate confidence and familiarity expressed in ὦ ἑταῖρε, ὦ φίλε, ὦ φίλε ἑταῖρε, acquires, in ὦ μέλε, a degree of humorous or triumphant gaiety. 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